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abstract 
 
 
In the modern society, communications and digital transactions are becoming 
the norm rather than the exception. As we allow networked computing devices 
into our every-day actions, we build a digital lifestyle where networks and 
devices enrich our interactions. However, as we move our information towards 
a connected digital environment, privacy becomes extremely important as most 
of our personal information can be found in the network. This is especially 
relevant as we design and adopt next generation networks that provide 
ubiquitous access to services and content, increasing the impact and perva-
siveness of existing networks. 
The environments that provide widespread connectivity and services usually 
rely on network protocols that have few privacy considerations, compromising 
user privacy. The presented work focuses on the network aspects of privacy, 
considering how network protocols threaten user privacy, especially on next 
generation networks scenarios. We target the identifiers that are present in 
each network protocol and support its designed function. By studying how the 
network identifiers can compromise user privacy, we explore how these threats 
can stem from the identifier itself and from relationships established between 
several protocol identifiers. 
Following the study focused on identifiers, we show that privacy in the network 
can be explored along two dimensions: a vertical dimension that establishes 
privacy relationships across several layers and protocols, reaching the user, 
and a horizontal dimension that highlights the threats exposed by individual 
protocols, usually confined to a single layer. With these concepts, we outline an 
integrated perspective on privacy in the network, embracing both vertical and 
horizontal interactions of privacy. This approach enables the discussion of se-
veral mechanisms to address privacy threats on individual layers, leading to 
architectural instantiations focused on user privacy. We also show how the 
different dimensions of privacy can provide insight into the relationships that 
exist in a layered network stack, providing a potential path towards designing 
and implementing future privacy-aware network architectures 
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resumo 
 
Na sociedade moderna, as comunicações e transacções digitais estão a 
tornar-se a regra e não a excepção. À medida que permitimos a intromissão de 
dispositivos electrónicos de rede no nosso quotidiano, vamos construíndo um 
estilo de vida digital onde redes e dispositivos enrirquecem as nossas interac-
ções. Contudo, ao caminharmos para um ambiente digital em rede, a nossa 
privacidade vai-se revestindo de maior importãncia, pois a nossa informação 
pessoal passa a encontrar-se cada vez mais na rede. Isto torna-se particu-
larmente relevante ao adoptarmos redes de próxima geração, que permitem 
acesso ubíquo a redes, serviços e conteúdos, aumentando o impacte e 
pervasividade das redes actuais. 
Os ambientes onde a conectividade e os serviços se tornam uma constante, 
assentam em protocolos de rede que normalmente contemplam poucas 
considerações sobre privacidade, comprometendo desta forma o utlizador. O 
presente trabalho centra-se nos aspectos de privacidade que dizem respeito à 
rede devido à forma como os protocolos são utilizados nas diferentes cama-
das, e que resultando em ameaças à privacidade do utilizador. Abordamos es-
pecificamente os identificadores presentes nos protocolos de rede, e que são 
essenciais à sua função. Neste contexto exploramos a possibilidade destes 
identificadores comprometerem a privacidade do utilizador através da 
informação neles contida, bem como das relações que podem ser estabe-
lecidas entre identificadores de diferentes protocolos. 
Após este estudo centrado nos identificadores, mostramos como a privacidade 
em redes pode ser explorada ao longo de duas dimensões: uma dimensão que 
acentua as relações verticais de privacidade, cruzando vários protocolos até 
chegar ao utilizador, e uma dimensão horizontal que destaca as ameaças 
causadas por cada protocolo, de forma individual, normalmente limitadas a 
uma única camada. Através destes conceitos, mostramos uma visão integrada 
de privacidade em redes, abrangendo tanto as interacçoes de privacidade 
verticais como as horizontais. Esta visão permite discutir vários mecanismos 
para mitigar ameaças específicas a cada camada de rede, resultando em 
instânciações arquitecturais orientadas à privacidade do utilizador. Finalmente, 
mostramos como as diferentes dimensões de privacidade podem fornecer uma 
visão diferente sobre as relações estabelecidas na pilha protocolar que 
assenta em camadas, mostrando um caminho possível para o desen-
volvimento de futuras arquitecturas de rede com suporte para privacidade. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The true voyage of discovery lies not in seeking
new landscapes, but in having new eyes.
Marcel Proust
As the first chapter in the Thesis, the introduction sets the background for the topic
of Privacy in Next Generation Networks, along with the motivation for pursuing a PhD
on network privacy. It presents the hypothesis along with the goals that guided the work
evolution, followed by the contributions that resulted from the concepts explored. Finally, it
presents the overall structure of the document.
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1.1 Background
In the past years I have been engaged in privacy related matters, dealing with networking
issues. This is a very hard topic to synthesize. Most people cannot clearly state what privacy
is. That is not uncommon, given that even the well-know scholars in different research fields
cannot agree on what privacy actually is [136]. This confusion spills into areas in which
privacy matters, such as computer networks, where the lack of effective privacy suggests that
a deeper understanding is required. But, the absence of a common agreement on what privacy
is should not halt research efforts in computer networks, given that users still feel threatened
and violated when confronted with privacy compromising situations, regardless of scholarly
definitions. Coming from a network background, it is easy to understand why considering
privacy, as a user or engineer, can be a daunting task. The confusion around privacy concepts,
along with their lack of systemization on the network, make them hard to address.
Privacy has been engraved as a fundamental Human Right into the European Convention
on Human Rights [50], making it part of every country’s law, carved into the foundations of
our society. In this context, it is only natural that we expect privacy to be preserved in most
aspects of our life. But, what if suddenly privacy begins to sink into a quicksand of different
technologies? Over the past years we have witnessed the appearance of pervasive technologies,
from mobile phones to micro-sized digital cameras, creating an ever present Internet. And
so far, we have welcomed such intrusion in our daily life, as part of an enhancement of our
daily activities, allowing us to do more, better and faster. We have been slowly and steadily
becoming more dependent on technologies that we do not fully understand, up to a point that
goes beyond what was originally intended for most of them. Only recently we became aware
that letting digital technologies into our inner circle will come at a cost to our privacy. As
we navigate towards future networks, technology adoption is rapidly increasing. What does
this mean for privacy? Can we counteract the adverse effects of technology on our individual
privacy? These questions have driven the concerns outlined in this Thesis.
The presented work aims at improving user privacy in a network environment. It does
so by trying to identify network specific mechanisms that jeopardize privacy, and by ques-
tioning the assumptions upon which they work. Most protocols on the network resort to
identification mechanisms that are associated with the layer on which they work. This leads
to several identified entities (e.g. users or hosts) within the network space. These identifiers
are fundamental to the network operations, specially in packet-based networks where every
packet or frame must be properly identified. This introduces a set of privacy threats around
the identification of the user, and associated properties (e.g. location), that can stem from
observing ordinary network operations. While there are privacy enhancing features for spe-
cific protocols, there is a lack of a common vision on the privacy problems that can grow from
normal protocol operation, especially as we step into an ever growing and pervasive digital
world. The presented Thesis focuses on the assumption that next generation heterogeneous
networks will amplify the privacy threats already present on the network, by reaching more
users through ubiquitous and mobile technologies. By attempting to define these privacy
threats, we propose several network oriented solutions that try to clarify meaning of privacy
on the network, and how it can be addressed. To achieve this, we look at several privacy mod-
els, and try to propose meaningful concepts that fit the network aspects of privacy. Starting
from these models, we tackle network specific problems that can stem from network protocol
properties.
Beyond the technical aspects, the guiding principle behind the presented contributions is
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to generally improve the privacy conditions for the end user, attempting to isolate and fix
systematic problems. This frames the underlying reasoning that drives our proposals, where
we strive to be as pragmatic as possible, identifying and clarifying privacy threats, showing
their relationships to network mechanisms, and providing adequate solutions where possible.
1.2 Motivation
Privacy has always been a concern in many ways for the modern society. Appearing in Article
8 [143] of the Human Rights Declaration, it has been carried over to the communications and
digital world, through Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Directives [47] and European Union directives [29, 30, 31, 32]. As we border the digital
frontier, we are presented with a new array of interactions that are yet to be fully understood.
This venture into new environments makes the study of privacy a relevant topic in networking.
Society has already demonstrated that it does not possess the tools to understand the impacts
of pervasive technologies [81, 118, 27], and has clearly shown not to grasp the full impact of
privacy. Technology tries to keep up with a growing list of requirements that appear by
adding hot-fixes and extending existing solutions. The common denominator is that most
people do not understand the impacts on privacy, nor to what extent is their privacy already
in jeopardy, given that there is no to clear way of measuring the consequences of adopted
habits and technologies. This lack of means for assessing privacy, coupled with the fact that
privacy requires preemptive measures that are only observed when they are negated, creates
a delayed effect of privacy violations: the user usually discovers that there is a privacy issue
only after his privacy has been breached.
A quick-paced technological evolution is bringing forth the much announced digital rev-
olution that impacts not only networking but life, bringing overwhelming socio-economical
changes. It is undeniable that these phenomena are tightly coupled with the offspring of fu-
ture and next generation networks, accompanied by a changing life style, ever more digital. It
is important to discuss in this context what are the major evolutions that contribute to a new
paradigm in computing and networking, and more importantly how they relate to our pri-
vacy. With micro-electronics generally advancing at Moore’s law, devices have become small,
portable, and at times near invisible. These devices (first laptops, then mobile phones, and
now smart phones, MP3 players, gaming consoles, sensors and all sorts of electronic gadgets)
are small enough to become part of our daily apparel. We carry these devices everywhere,
for a myriad of purposes, that go well beyond what was initially expected [138].
As we discuss these devices, we cannot neglect to mention the accompanying networking
technologies that converted this trend into a connected lifestyle. Mobile telephony has become
essential to our daily functions, powered by technologies like 2G and 3G. Most people have
one or more cell phones, and it possible to observe a widespread dependency on such devices
that have become part of daily routine. Moreover, we are extending this dependency to
several wireless technologies, especially WiFi. We expect to have a WiFi connection (or any
combination of 3G, LTE or WiMax) that brings us on-demand and on-the-go digital content.
Such wireless technologies are becoming omni-present, and we expect nothing less.
However, it seems that we are taking (too) large steps given the fact we do not quite
understand most of the implications of this connected lifestyle. The commonly neglected
counterpart of this growing scenario is that, in order to function, the network uses several
protocols that relate to users and devices. These protocols carry identifiers that can identify
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a user or terminal, as well as information that can compromise the privacy (e.g. location
aware applications are becoming commonplace). These different network protocols and their
layered interactions with the network can provide mechanisms to breach user privacy, allowing
user recognition, tracking or geographical pinpointing, among other threats. And while this
is true for existing network paradigms, the pervasiveness of new electronic devices (all them
with network connectivity) connected to a Next Generation Network (NGN), raises issues
that have no straightforward solution.
By allowing digital technology to permeate our life, we are potentially enabling a Big
Brother society that can reach beyond its intended purpose, violating our fundamental privacy
rights. Privacy concerns in network environments can stem from the widespread incorporation
of computing and mobile devices into the lifestyle of the average person. By linking these
devices into wireless technologies, we enable several privacy threats, which are not being dealt
with properly. The privacy aspects of such pervasive networks were well predicted by an early
paper by David Chaum, where he speculates about a future Big Brother scenario surrounding
digital environments [21]. What is expected over the coming years is that networks and devices
become even more pervasive, and embedded in ordinary things, increasing the privacy threats
as we move to an Internet of Things [106].
The most immediate threats are reinforced by the evolving user requirements of wanting
to be “always best connected”, a paradigm that is gaining traction. To support this paradigm,
we have seen the appearance of Next Generation Networks, which not only define a set of
entities, but also a blueprint for future networks that enable ubiquitous environments. We
must understand what an NGN is, and what aspects need to be retained from this keyword
along the lines of the privacy threats.
1.2.1 Next Generation Networks
There is a strong emphasis on NGN in this work. However, this acronym is becoming a
synonym for several concepts, and not all of them are aligned. It is interesting to explore
both the colloquial and formal notions of the term NGN.
NGN, in its original form, is a standard proposed by th ITU-T, following recommendation
Y.2001 [73]. According to the ITU-T, and paraphrasing the overview document, an NGN is
“a packet-based network able to provide Telecommunication Services to users and able to
make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-
related functions are independent of the underlying transport-related technologies. It enables
unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and services of
their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous
provision of services to users”. This definition provides a reference model, supported by
several recommendations. Of those, the following principles better characterize an NGN:
• A packet-based network, IP in nature;
• A means to access services over multiple technologies, therefore considering a heteroge-
neous environment, as stated by the support for multiple last mile technologies;
• Lastly, a network which supports generalized mobility, and presents ubiquitous avail-
ability,
These three aspects are, in most generalized approaches, the terms that define an NGN,
along with the common ground when discussing NGN concepts. Instead of dwelling on the
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architectural details of the Y.2001 recommendations, in this Thesis we draw upon the larger
definition of NGN, to lay ground to the default application scenario of privacy considerations.
While the two first points, enumerated above, outline a technology scenario or base expecta-
tions, the last point, where we claim ubiquitous network access for mobile devices, can be seen
as the fundamental aspect that turns privacy into a vital network feature. However, there
are key principles in the NGN definition that provide guidance for future solutions and are
worth discussing with greater detail. Of particular importance is the NGN reference model,
outlined in Y.2001, which introduces a clear separation between the management, control
and user plane. From this structure stems the functional split between control and bearer
functions. If properly and consistently applied, this property alone can lead to new paradigms
in networking, drifting away from current pitfalls in existing solutions.
It is also important to single out the features that can provide value for both security
and privacy, from the plethora of functions and requirements imposed by the ITU-T “formal”
NGN architecture. The need for identification and authentication mechanisms are among
the most noteworthy requirements to build networks where access control and authorization
functions are common. It is clear that NGN networks bring forth several new interactions,
specially considering its ubiquitous intent and mobility support.
An important conclusion to extract from NGN recommendations is the scenarios that
are presented in terms of network interactions: they show the pervasive scenarios that can
amplify already existing privacy problems on the network. ITU-T specifications such as
Y.2001 [73], should be considered only as a guiding framework for heterogeneous mobile
networks. Applying the proposals mentioned in this document (or similar) to specific NGN
interfaces and standards should be considered in future work.
We focus on the broader concept of NGN, sometimes referred to as 4G network scenarios,
or even Heterogeneous Networks. These 4G network scenarios [1, 3, 4] typically encompass
several administrative (federated) domains, handled by different providers. They provide a
heterogeneous environment powered by different technologies, such as WiFi, WiMax, UMTS
or DVB, seamlessly integrated on the architecture. These networks, from where we derive
a simplified architecture (represented in Fig. 1.1), normally provide a common controlled
environment regarding resources and authorization. Functional boxes such as Bandwidth
Brokers (in NGN term, the Policy and Charging Rules Function or PCRF) control the net-
work’s resources and distribution, facilitating the optimum distribution of resources among
the registered users. To sustain the controlled environment, Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) servers, or their augmented version also providing AAA plus Auditing
and and Charging (A4C), take care of terminal authentication and authorization, providing
a secure environment for network usage. In the NGN architecture these functions are repre-
sented by the Network Attachment Control Functions (NACF) and Resource and Admission
Control Functions (RACF). Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [125] proxies are in place for sup-
porting multimedia applications (in NGN terms the Call Session Control Function - CSCF),
while mobility anchors enable the support of mobility between the several types of networks
(which can be roughly mapped to the Subscriber Location Function - SLF). A service pool,
which defines the application layer, is composed by a set of application servers that can either
be located locally or remotely (e.g. Internet).
From this model we highlight the support for mobile devices and session continuity using
either Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [77] or SIP [125], which enable the “always best connected”
paradigm over packet-switched networks. It is this ubiquitous support that magnifies the
network based privacy threats towards the user.
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Figure 1.1: Heterogeneous Network Architecture Model.
1.2.2 Privacy in NGN
Due to the foreseen (and to some extent already existing) ubiquitous environments, it is safe
to acknowledge that NGN can increase privacy threats [119], magnifying already existent
security threats. In the proposed environment, we can imagine the user resorting to several
devices and services. More importantly, it is a fact that we now see so many services appearing
with a web-based component (a cloud service), which leads us to believe that the user’s privacy
is more endangered: by storing (even more) personal information on remote services, the user
is opening the door to more privacy threats. When this model is combined with an NGN, it
is possible to harvest levels of information which were not previously plausible. Taking NGN
as a general-purpose mobility aware heterogeneous IP network, we can define the boundaries
within which the user’s privacy needs to be analyzed, understanding the threats that linger
over the user when he interacts with his devices in this type of environment.
Several threats stem from the fact that the network mechanisms must always identify
the user in some way. Either through addresses, a user ID, or any similar identification
mechanisms, the user becomes traceable through his digital fingerprint1. It becomes possible
to know what the user does, and where he does it from. This becomes a major peril when
we tend to do almost everything on-line. Through network traffic analysis it is possible to
determine user actions. It is also possible to determine the user’s location, by converting
his IP addresses to geographical information. Combining these two issues leads to another
threat only possible in NGN environments: the provided mobility support allows tracking the
user as he moves through different networks, converting his present location to an accurate
geographical position. Most of these topics are covered in-depth in the following chapters.
We have already been confronted with several privacy risks in such environments, espe-
cially if we consider the individual threats on the each layer of the network stack. But we
lack a de facto approach to protect the user against the multitude of privacy attackers that
already exist today. To define such an approach, we must carefully understand the existing
1This refers to the identifiers that uniquely reference a particular user in the network or in a service, therefore
serving as a unique proof that a particular user or device was involved in a communication or transaction.
6
privacy threats, in the network as a whole or in each individual layer, and how these can be
mitigated. This must be done considering that NGNs are becoming the heart of the future
communication infrastructure. By serving as the primary realization of the aforementioned
digital lifestyle, it is clear that we must understand how privacy will function in this environ-
ment, and more importantly what can be done to improve it. Furthermore, we must see how
the problems pertaining to identifiers on the different protocol layers, which already affect
existing networks, play a role in NGN privacy thus showing how the privacy threats increase
in ubiquitous networking environments.
1.3 Hypothesis and Objectives
It has become clear that the user faces an array of privacy threats, stemming from different
situations and adversaries. In an NGN environment, the network contains several privacy
jeopardizing mechanisms. Several of these threats are a direct consequence of the original
design requirements of the different protocols: when created, most protocols focused on sim-
plicity and pragmatism to accomplish their task, focusing on connecting hosts on the network
rather than being the foundation of an all-purpose network, ubiquitous to our modern lifestyle.
Therefore, a question we must ask gradually becomes apparent, in the light of the outlined
motivation and network scenario: How do network mechanisms, especially those inherent
to heterogeneous mobile networks, compromise user privacy? This also entails a follow up
question regarding the solution space: is it possible to mitigate the problems caused by
network mechanisms on individual user privacy, while retaining the expected behavior of
heterogeneous mobile networks?
The answer to these questions takes the form of the hypothesis of this thesis: the network
identifiers that are at the core of network protocols, are the cause of several threats on user
privacy. Such identifiers, which are used either for identification, routing or any other purpose,
introduce mechanisms that enable an attacker to identify and track a user, as well as collecting
(personal) information about the user and his activities. We believe this to be especially true
when considering the interactions between different network layers and protocols: when linked
together, and related to the user, identifiers can provide unique ways of undermining privacy,
resulting in systematic privacy breaches.
To complement the hypothesis concerning identifiers as a major threat, we postulate how
this can be mitigated: to handle the identifier related threats it is necessary to break the
relationships between identifiers and the user. In the same context, it is also important to
break the relationships between the different identifiers on the network stack, because their
correlation can lead to privacy threats towards the user.
In summary, the hypothesis defines that identifiers are one of the main causes for pri-
vacy threats in the network, and that these threats can only be thwarted by breaking the
relationships between user and network identifiers.
The formalization of this hypothesis can unveil several problems when subjected to a
deeper analysis. The first question concerns the definition of user privacy on the network,
which is a kernel issue to all network related discussions: it is important to define individual
user privacy on the network, in order to understand the threats and how to mitigate them.
Accordingly, we must realize what are the specific mechanisms that threaten privacy, and
how they operate. This is crucial to understand, given that we must understand how these
threats can be mitigated, specially the context of the postulated hypothesis. Finally, and as
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a guiding principle, all these questions must be evaluated under the light of heterogeneous
mobile networks, considering the expected ubiquitous network and service access.
These initial questions imply that there are many dimensions to privacy in a network en-
vironment, that cannot be properly handled unless considering a holistic approach to network
privacy. We should carefully examine if the network, through its protocols and mechanisms,
can contribute to the overall user privacy, or just simply undermines it. This suggest a du-
ality: using privacy enhancing technologies on the network actually increases user privacy,
but simultaneously, these solutions can be compromised through the layered composition of
the network, especially considering the characteristics of each individual protocol. This flaw,
which could be the result of privacy breach at any layer in the protocol stack, must be handled
with a combined view of the network, encompassing user information and privacy features.
The stated hypothesis can trigger several questions that must be answered, in order to
understand how privacy is upheld or forfeited in the network. If we analyze these different
issues, it is possible to draw a set of objectives that will enable us to prove or disprove the
hypothesis. The starting point should be to determine what models exist that accurately
describe privacy in a network context, and how effective they are in exposing threats on next
generation networks. This will inevitably lead to understanding the relationships between the
network stack and privacy. The idea behind such a course of action is ultimately to determine
how privacy can be assured, or even disrupted. The importance of this step lies in the fact that
it is only possible to propose novel solutions that protect user privacy, in existing or future
scenarios, if the relationships between network and privacy are well understood. This implies
that we must clearly identify the threats against user privacy, originating from the current
network stack or from next generation networks, which should only be possible through an
in-depth study of network mechanisms.
After the privacy risks stemming from the network are clearly identified, we must strive to
propose solutions that handle the privacy threats at different layers. We propose to achieve
this with an integrated vision of the network stack and architecture, while still keeping in
mind that privacy is not the only vector that exists in the network: we must make sure
that proposed solutions do not compromise network flexibility, user flexibility and the overall
pervasive environment of NGN while still retaining a high degree of privacy. Ideally, the
proposed solutions should articulate a user-centric privacy environment that respects the
network’s layered architecture and uses it in favor of privacy. Therefore, it is part of our
hypothesis that the proposed models and solutions can provide a framework where the layered
design of the network is properly explored. In this approach, it is especially important to
consider how identifier relationships can lead to privacy solutions, starting from the idea that
the identifier relationships that threaten privacy must be broken.
However, as we evaluate and propose new models and solutions, we should try to under-
stand what are the guiding principles of such threats and solutions, so that we can propose
concepts that go beyond NGN, and carry us onto future Internet designs, thus improving
privacy in the long run.
1.4 Contributions
At first glance, user privacy on the network appears to be a contained topic. However, this
Thesis shows that, in fact, it involves a multidisciplinary approach, even on the network side,
to provide effective privacy to the end user. Therefore, the scientific advances presented in this
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Thesis are not confined to a single issue or topic, but rather span across different proposals,
layers, and even architectures and paradigms. One of the most important contributions
presented here is an integrated view of privacy on the network, supported by the definition
of vertical and horizontal dimensions of privacy in the network.
Beyond the privacy overview presented in Chap. 2, the contributions begin to take form
in Chap. 3. In this chapter we propose a privacy model, published in the PriMo Privacy
Workshop [104], that draws on existing literature, outlining a new way to address privacy in
the network. The model is built upon network-oriented privacy definitions, also presented in
the chapter, and its key contribution is the articulation of the vertical and horizontal privacy
threats on the network. The network application of the model resulted in a network-based
threat analysis (Sec. 3.4) and the conceptual guidelines towards addressing the identified
threats (Sec. 3.5). The potential mitigation approaches set the pace for the following chapters
which led to two complementary approaches: exploring the vertical relationships of privacy
across layers, and addressing the threats stemming from individual network protocols, shifting
towards a horizontal perspective on privacy, i.e. within the same layer.
The vertical approach to privacy in the network is mostly discussed in Chap. 4 where
we proposed a Virtual Identity (VID) Framework, resulting in a journal contribution enti-
tled “VID Framework for Telecom Operators” [129], published in Springer Wireless Personal
Communications, which presents an Identity based framework modeling user interactions with
the network, perceived as virtual identities, that affect different levels in the network. The
VID solution suggests the use of pseudonymity on the network, to support different personae
towards the network, leading to a network based pseudonym solution, “Preserving privacy
in mobile environments” [97] presented at IEEE Globecom’07. This work further suggested
that we needed greater insight on network pseudonymity, which was later presented in a jour-
nal article entitled “Virtual Network Stacks: From Theory to Practice” [95], accepted in the
Wiley Security and Network Communications Magazine.
The VID approach work also transpired into the EU project IST “Designing Advanced
network Interfaces for the Delivery and Administration of Location independent, Optimized
personal Services (Daidalos) II” [71] and later IST “Secure Widespread Identities for Fed-
erated Telecommunications (SWIFT)” [72]. Also, the tight involvement in the Daidalos II
project demonstrator, which used an instantiation of the Virtual Network Stacks (VNS) con-
cepts, resulted in a contribution regarding testbeds on the Open NGN and IMS Testbeds
Workshop hosted at ISCT Tridentcom’09, entitled “Deploying and testing an NGN testbed:
IST Daidalos testbed”.
To explore the horizontal dynamics of privacy, focusing on each individual layer mostly
relating to the work in Chap. 5, we started by presenting a link layer solution presented at
IEEE Infocom’07, entitled “Who said that? Privacy at link layer” [9]. The results were ap-
plied in a 802.11 environment, and consolidated in a journal publication on the IEEE Wireless
Communications Magazine, as “Towards dependable networking: Secure location and privacy
at link layer” [96]. The work presented in these papers was subjected to intellectual property
evaluation, resulting in two distinct patents: the first, “Method for Protecting Location Infor-
mation in Wireless Communication Networks” [8], and the second “Method for establishing
a secret key between two nodes in a communication network” [7], both under the network
security topic. On the network layer we proposed “Waypoint Routing: Privacy as a Ser-
vice” [105], presented at IEEE Globecom 2011, dealing with location and identification issues
using a Chaum Mix [22] based approach.
From the bi-dimensional approach to privacy, several architectural issues were identified
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and addressed. The relationship between privacy and Identity Management (IdM) led to
several complementary proposals that use identity concepts as a tool towards solving privacy
and network issues, related to the concepts presented in Chap. 6. We proposed integrating a
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) based IdM system with the VNS approach in
“Cross Layer Privacy Support for Identity Management” [93]. The continuous exploration of
the vertical role assumed by identity, led to “Identity Driven Mobility Architecture” [98] that
shows how identity can be used to drive mobility aspects. Contributions developed in the
scope of the IST SWIFT [72] project, led to a joint publication entitled “Security and privacy
enablers for future identity management systems” [15]. These three mentioned publication
efforts, with close relationship to the SWIFT project, were publish in the Future Network
and Mobile Summit in 2010.
Additionally, using a locator/identifier split on the network layer to explore the privacy
approaches outlined before, we proposed a solution using the Host Identity Protocol, published
at the Mobiarch’06 Workshop, held at IEEE Globecom’06, under the title “HIP Location
Privacy Framework” [102]. This work encouraged a standard track submission resulting in
contributions to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), more concretely the Internet
Research Task Force which focuses on research and novel approaches, with two versions of
a IETF draft entitled “HIP Privacy Extensions” [100, 101]. Also, the above efforts were
consolidated in a national journal publication, “Location Privacy Extensions for the Host
Identity Protocol” [99]. Further research into the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) protocol led
to a tight integration with a SAML IdM architecture, resulting in a publication at IEEE
ISCC’09 with the title “Integrating user identity management systems with the host identity
protocol” [14]. Finally, we proposed “Embedding identity in mobile environments” [103],
published in the Mobiarch’07 workshop held at IEEE Sigcomm’07, which promotes tight
network integration of identity and network protocols. Also, based on the exploration of
how local mobility solutions can affect privacy, and in the scope of localized mobility aspects
explored within the Daidalos project, an IETF draft contribution was presented covering a
“Problem Statement on Common Interfaces for Local Mobility Management”[28].
As part of the evolutions originating from the privacy principles applied in the aforemen-
tioned solutions, in Chap. 7 we proposed solutions that use identity concepts and apply them
in future scenarios and architecture. “Mobility aware paths: The identity connection” [94],
published on the International Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia Communications
(WPMC), outlines a novel way of integrating identity into future communication paradigms
such as the concept of a path. We also published a journal article entitled “User Centric Com-
munity Clouds” [16], on the Springer Wireless Personal Communications (WPC) Magazine,
that deals with privacy and identity issues in upcoming cloud computing environments.
For convenience, we summarize the contributions in Table 1.1, organized by type and
date, so that outputs can be better understood.
1.5 Structure
The main body of work presented in this Thesis is structured around the concepts of the
vertical and horizontal dimensions of privacy in the network, followed by the application of
those same concepts on the network. We present a structure consisting of an introduction and
conclusion, a related work chapter, and four central chapters incorporating the most novel
contributions.
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Type Year Title Venue
Workshop 2006 HIP location privacy framework MobiArch @ IEEE Globecom
Workshop 2007 Embedding identity in mobile environments MobiArch @ IEEE Sigcomm
Workshop 2009 Deploying and testing a NGN testbed ONIT @ TRIDENTCOM
Workshop 2011 A Privacy Model for Heterogeneous Mobile Networks PriMo
Conference 2007 Who said that? Privacy at Link Layer IEEE Infocom
Conference 2007 Preserving privacy in mobile environments IEEE Globecom
Conference 2008 Mobility aware paths: The identity connection WPMC
Conference 2009 Integrating User IdM Systems with HIP IEEE ISCC
Conference 2010 Security and Privacy enablers for future IdM systems FN’MS
Conference 2010 Cross layer privacy support for identity management FN’MS
Conference 2010 Identity driven mobility architecture FN’MS
Conference 2011 Waypoint Routing: Privacy as a Service Globecom
Journal 2008 Towards dependable networking: Secure location and
privacy at link layer
IEEE Wireless Communica-
tions Magazine
Journal 2008 Virtual identity framework for telecom infrastructures Wireless Personal Communi-
cations (Springer)
Journal 2007 Location privacy extensions for HIP Revista DETUA
Journal 2011 User Centric Community Clouds Springer Wireless Personal
Communication
Journal 2011 Virtual Network Stacks: From Theory to Practice Wiley Security and Communi-
cation Networks
Draft 2007 P.S. on Common Interfaces for Local Mob. Mgmt. IETF
Draft 2006 Hip privacy extensions - version 01 (revised) IETF
Draft 2005 Hip privacy extensions - version 00 IETF
Patent 2008 Method for establishing a secret key between two
nodes in a communication network
European Patent Office
Patent 2008 Method for protecting Location Information in Wire-
less Communication Networks
European Patent Office
Table 1.1: Publication contributions summary of the work presented in the Thesis.
The two initial chapters, Chap. 1 and Chap. 2 frame the content and topics presented in
the Thesis. The Introduction presents the background and motivation, setting the stage for
the hypothesis and goals of the Thesis. It also highlights the contributions stemming from the
presented proposals. In Chap. 2 we present an overview on privacy, showing the current trends
on privacy topics that relate to the network, and a survey of the most important solutions that
either relate to network privacy, or provided key ideas for the work discussed in the following
chapters. It presents a generic privacy discussion as well as a brief overview of the the legal
boundaries defined within the European Union, establishing what is the current play-field for
any and every privacy considerations. It is followed by the most well-known privacy models
that handle network privacy, or that relate to it. It also shows important trends on user-
centric privacy issues embodied by IdM, comprising projects, initiatives and architectures,
along with the most important privacy solutions on different layers of the network stack,
especially Link and network layer oriented.
Chap. 3 provides an overview of the difficulties that compose privacy on the network
stack, starting with lexicon issues. It proposes clear definitions, building a consistent privacy
terminology. It then goes on to provide a novel model for privacy, focusing on network
issues. Feeding on the problem description, this chapter presents the underlying theoretical
cornerstones that serve as the base attacker model for the privacy concepts on the network.
The chapter closes with the application of such model on the network stack, highlighting both
threats and possible solutions. It focuses on linking and correlation with a strong emphasis on
a pragmatic view of the outlined privacy threats, along with possible solution spaces for them,
mainly scoped around network identifiers. This chapter also provides the first introduction
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to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of privacy in the network.
Closely following defined model, Chap. 4 presents a vertical approach to privacy. It
introduces the concept of Virtual Identity, and promptly inserts it in a usable and tangible
framework. The framework abides by the notion of partial user identities, stressing the notion
of pseudonyms towards the network. With a clear focus on privacy, it attempts to provide
personalization towards services, without compromising the user and pioneering the use of
cross-layer IdM. The chapter finishes by evaluating network pseudonymity, instantiating it
within the Virtual Network Stacks proposal, using the metaphor of user-centric virtual devices.
Exploring the second (horizontal) dimension of privacy, and according to the presented
model, we dive into protocol specific aspects of privacy. Because the vertical integration pro-
vides a starting point for horizontal separation, through identity and pseudonymity, we can
focus on each individual layer in Chap. 5, following a structured approach to privacy: we
first investigate and propose new link layer privacy solutions, followed by the same approach
towards network layer privacy issues, and finally focusing on targeted application layer issues.
The proposed link and network layer solutions focus mostly on identification and location
issues. The link layer section proposes a novel communication model that defines the recip-
ients of messages based on cryptographic properties rather then on source and destination
addresses. On the network layer, we reuse Chaum Mix concepts to provide a light hop-by-hop
routing solution resorting to encrypted addresses. We finish the chapter by evaluating the
feasibility of an application layer solution space that supports the privacy concepts presented
up until this point, focusing on SAML based IdM technologies.
During chapters 4 and 5, several concepts frequently reappeared, particularly identity,
hinting at more generic approaches for privacy-aware solutions. In Chap. 6 we expand iden-
tity concepts to become more than a vertical information layer: we propose identity as an
architectural driver for privacy. We expose the different identity-centric architectural drivers,
and provide instantiation architectures, using identity as the driver in different scopes. We
propose a tight integration with SAML and the vertical concepts of virtual identities, particu-
lar pseudonymity and Virtual Network Stacks. We continue by proposing an architecture that
splits actuation and control, with a heavy focus on mobility in NGN and IdM integration.
This is followed by a privacy proposal using a locator identifier split concept, focusing on
identity-centric protocols and location. Finally, we present an architecture that incorporates
identity into the different layers, using identity references, closing the architectural instan-
tiations, coming full circle to the initial proposals revolving around the vertical aspects of
identity enabled privacy concepts.
As the final chapter, Chap. 7 summarizes the entire findings of the Thesis in the context
of user privacy and presents future impacts of the proposed solutions and concepts through a
discussion on some of the insights gathered throughout the research process detailed in this
document. Beyond the results and achievements, it takes us on a journey: first through the
immediate future work on privacy that can directly complement the Thesis; and second, it
takes us out of the privacy conform zone and into future and evolving paradigms, highlighting
how some of the presented concepts can be generalized towards Future Internet or even Cloud
Computing, thus closing the Thesis.
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Chapter 2
An Overview on Privacy
Privacy is a concept in disarray.
Daniel J. Solove in Understanding Privacy
This chapter presents an overview on privacy concepts, as context to understand privacy
in the network. Starting on privacy definitions presented by several authors, we present a
three-fold overview based on social, legal and technical aspects of privacy. Emphasizing the
last point, to enable a pragmatic approach to privacy solutions on the network, we analyze
several privacy models that are relevant to the work presented in later chapters, as well as
technical solutions that handle several identified network threats.
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2.1 Introduction
As the epigraph suggests, privacy can be a very confusing topic. This is especially true
if we attempt to cover different privacy vectors. To properly study privacy without being
completely overwhelmed, it is important to follow a structured approach; it is even more
important to be prepared to absorb different definitions for seemingly similar concepts. We
choose to first look at privacy as a whole, through its societal definitions, in order to under-
stand what is intended to be. This involves looking momentarily at the most philosophical
and legal aspects, which usually tend to go hand-in-hand, showing what privacy really means
for a common user. However, we deal with digital environments, which have their own set of
rules, expectations and possibilities. We briefly show the legal requirements and framework
for data protection directives, particular in a European context, delimiting the network issues
that must be addressed.
To start dealing with privacy on the network, we provide an overview of privacy models
that deal with network related issues or provide interesting features, foundations or concepts
that we can draw upon. While this allows us to better frame privacy in a network environment,
we must then jump onto specific technologies, starting with Identity Management. IdM
is currently one of the most promising trends in privacy related technology towards user
information and service interaction. This is however, an application layer solution in most
cases, and we must deal with lower network aspects of privacy. To do this, we survey the
most interesting privacy solutions that deal with link layer privacy, network privacy, and later,
mobility related aspects, all of which are relevant in an NGN scenario. These technologies
will provide the starting point upon which to enhance the privacy landscape.
To tackle the above proposed concepts, we look into privacy in a social and legal context
in Sec. 2.2, followed by a review of existing privacy models in Sec. 2.3. Upon dealing with the
most theoretical-related aspects of privacy, we look at IdM concepts in Sec. 2.4, discussing
recent trends and framing user privacy in connected environments. We later provide a struc-
tured overview of network related privacy technologies, focusing on link and network layer
issues, in Sec. 2.5, and even on mobility aspects. We finish in Sec. 2.6 by providing a summary
of what was concluded from the discussed trends and technologies.
2.2 Privacy
Privacy is a confusing concept, with multiple implications, often social and legal. The first
place we look at when we talk about privacy is ourselves and others, which can be considered
the social component of privacy. It is undeniable that privacy is a social phenomenon, only
relevant within, and between, social groups. It also varies from person to person [2], meaning
that there is a personal value of privacy. Right from the start, we become confused with the
different personal aspects of privacy. And this is not uncommon. Quite often, we find privacy
texts starting with a section entitled on “understanding privacy”, or “defining privacy”. It
has been the tittle of books [137], chapters or sections, and has a place in almost every
document on the subject, and this is no different. This is the typical path, followed by most
privacy-centric documents, starting by term clarification, understanding, and later on, an
acknowledgment of multidisciplinary concepts. This shows that we must understand privacy
as a multi-disciplinary concept. In “Privacy and Freedom” [147], one of the first postwar
themed privacy books and a reference document on privacy as a social and constitutional
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right, Alan Westin ignites the discussion on privacy in modern times. He too acknowledges
the privacy confusion by stating that “few values so fundamental to society have been left
so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such vague and confused writing
by social scientists”. This alone shows how privacy is often misunderstood, ill-defined, and
flat out confusing. Lacking clear social definitions of privacy, we cannot presume to provide
a clear definition of what privacy is, especially in applied sciences, like computer science.
However, Westin’s work on privacy is extensive and provides many of the guiding principles
on what privacy is and what implications it has. Westin goes on to provide a very brief
definition of his understanding of privacy: “Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others.”
This shows that by nature, privacy deals with private information, as would be expected,
and tends to be broad scoped, revolving around information disclosure about individuals,
groups, and even institutions to others. Understandably, the definition is generic, given
that indeed privacy is multidisciplinary and has a strong dependency on principles that are
qualitative and relative to society. This leads to the four basic principles presented by Westin,
which will not be discussed in depth, since their scope is sociological in nature: anonymity,
reserve, solitude and intimacy. From such fruitful argumentation, Westin outlined the first
legislative material on constitutional and common law responses to privacy threats and private
surveillance, making remarkable contributions to privacy protection.
The complex nature of privacy is also acknowledged by Daniel J. Solove. His work on “Un-
derstanding Privacy”[137]1 provides several foundational concepts for privacy in this Thesis,
along with some of more sensible approaches towards privacy in general. Solove argues that
privacy is “a plurality of things” and that “questing for an overarching definition is a dead
end”. In his book, he states that privacy is a confusing and muddled concept, with multiple
dimensions. The author presents a detailed overview on privacy definitions, legal, social and
philosophical classified around six topics2: i) Right to be alone; ii) Limited access to self
(shield one self from unwanted access); iii) Secrecy (conceal information); iv) Control over
personal information; v) Personhood (identity, protection of personality, individuality and
dignity) ; and vi) Intimacy - control over one’s intimate relationships or aspect of life. Solove
finally argues that existing definitions are “too narrow, too broad and too vague”, a statement
which perfectly scopes our view on privacy, and specially network privacy.
The most important conclusion, which can be implicitly found in our approach, is that
privacy must be a focused effort contained to specific contexts. Even though a top-down
approach should always be required, starting from the person or user, privacy can only by
properly analyzed when the necessary contextual boundaries are defined. This is particularly
inspiring for our network related work, by catalyzing the idea that we must avoid generic and
metaphysical concepts, and jump into network privacy, clearly defining our context.
Adhering to the ideas stated above, Solove proposed a conceptualization of privacy, rather
than a generic definition. Focusing on four distinct aspects, this conceptualization offers
guidelines instead of definitions, on how to approach privacy problems, which are synthesized
next:
1For both the casual reader or privacy expert, this book provides many vital insights on privacy, and can
guide privacy discussions in different areas of expertise, and therefore is thoroughly recommended by the author
of this Thesis.
2A detailed analysis of such related concepts is out of scope of this work, which must refrain from digressing
into philosophical discussions, and focus on network related issues.
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Method Privacy is pluralistic with no common denominator, and should be treated as such;
Generality Too generic concepts offers no guidance, whereas privacy should be worked out
contextually and with pragmatic approaches, but still using a conceptual model;
Variability Leave room for significant variability in norms, attitudes and conditions about
privacy;
Focus Attitudes about privacy must have a focus, and deal with concrete problems, rather
than abstract scenarios.
This conceptualization indicates that we can benefit from understanding a focused version
of privacy, and should rely on the contextual definitions of the problem at hand. In fact,
this entirely supports our vision of a contextualized top-down approach, as well put in the
“Generality” aspect, which states that privacy must be worked out contextual but still using
a conceptual model. This in turn should yield contextualized and pragmatic solutions, where
our focus, following closely the “Focus” aspect defined above, aspect should be the network
context and scenarios.
To finalize the evaluation of the work proposed by Solove, we must look towards “A
Taxonomy of Privacy” [136], where he outlines several different activities that affect privacy,
and that can frame our work.
Figure 2.1: A taxonomy of different privacy affecting activities in [136].
The key concepts outlined in Fig. 2.1 revolve around collection, process, dissemination
and invasion. Collecting means watching, observing or probing. This is immediately rele-
vant to the network, which is an environment where collecting information can be a simple
and straightforward procedure. Processing deals with aggregation, the combination of infor-
mation, identifying or linking information to individual. It is presented in [136] as directly
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related to unique identifiers (of which the network has no shortage) focusing on operations
and relationships built on top of collected information. Finally it deals with dissemination
and invasion, the direct negative consequences that can stem from privacy attacks or security
violations.
There has been sufficient studies and research to fill several pages worth of social definitions
of privacy. However, the aforementioned ideas already expose the most important concepts,
which in our opinion must be followed to achieve any relevant solution towards the network.
First, we must acknowledge that privacy is an elusive concept. Consequently, the initial
barrier to overcome is to understand and properly define privacy in the network context.
This is also an important step, because this definition can become pivotal towards providing
guidance and perspective over privacy solutions. The different faces of privacy assure that
no single theory or context can grab all the different, legal, social and technical aspects of
privacy. This three-fold approach is promoted within a privacy study by the ITU-T [119].
The study, as frequently occurs, contains an “understanding privacy” section, focusing on the
importance and definitions of privacy, with special attention to term clarification. It presents
privacy in a three domain perspective: technical, regulatory and sociological.
So far, we have focused on the social aspects of privacy, and how it can be understood.
This has led to the reinforced idea that privacy is contextual, where generic and overreaching
definitions are often insufficient. Next, we complement this view with legal and regulatory
aspects of privacy, along with more recent data protection laws, guidelines and directives.
While the previously discussed concepts and definitions frame the ideology on privacy, legal
and regulatory frameworks also play an important role in focused objects of study, such as
privacy in NGN.
2.2.1 Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
When analyzing privacy, it is important to look at the legal and regulatory frameworks
that govern human and civil rights. Only by understanding this component can we develop
solutions that simultaneously meet the privacy requirements mandated by law and respect
the need of revoking privacy when required, e.g. lawful-interception by judicial institutions.
This is a two-edged knife, where on one hand we must protect the user, and on the other,
respect lawful authorities by providing means to access private information when lawfully
required.
Privacy has been an acquired right for many generations, and is consecrated, as mentioned,
in several documents. These documents can summarize the existence of privacy within a legal
and regulatory context, providing boundaries for the above mentioned competing concepts.
We analyze the European Convention on Human Rights to determine how privacy is defined
as an acquired right, and then uncover how it is applied in the data-centric work of telecom-
munications, by analyzing the OECD guidelines, and derived European Union Directives on
data protection and privacy matters.
2.2.1.1 European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights in one of the first documents, within the Euro-
pean space, to engrave privacy as a fundamental right. In this document, privacy appears in
article 8, stating that everyone has the Right to respect for private and family life. This right
is broken up in two aspects: 1) the right to respect for private and family life, at home and
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for one’s correspondence; and 2) any interference with this right must be made in accordance
with the law, and under defined exceptions. While this right was written in the late 1950’s
and did not foresee an information society, the parallels are obvious: the rights to private life
still must be respected, and where previously was stated (mail) correspondence, now sits any
digital communication. This is however better captured in the OECD guidelines on privacy
and data protection.
2.2.1.2 OECD Guidelines
It is important to understand that privacy is an acquired right, consecrated in Human Rights
declarations. But, for the purpose of our work, and for any work on telecommunications and
networking, it is more important still to understand the rights distinguished within the scope
of data protection guidelines.
The foundations of EU law, and individual EU members’ law as well, originate from the
OECD guidelines on data protection [47], dating back to 1980. These documents explicitly
deal with digital environments, and set the pace for almost all privacy related matters, ad-
dressing issues on privacy and personal data protection. The guidelines can be sorted in two
groups, composed of: first, pre and during data collection; and second, after data collection
has occurred. For the first groups, major driving forces are Notice, Purpose and Consent.
Generically, they describe that the user, or data subject, should be notified of what data is
being collected and whom is collecting it, along with the purpose of such data. In certain
conditions, that collection should even require the user’s consent. After the data is collected,
it should be governed by Security, Disclosure, Access and Accountability. This means that
the data collector should ensure the security of the data, do not disclose it under any con-
ditions except for the original purpose of the collection, provide access to the data by the
data subject, be accountable for any violation of the principles. The principles are defined as
follows:
Collection Limitation Principle There should be limits to the collection of personal data
and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate,
with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
Data Quality Principle Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they
are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate,
complete and kept up-to-date.
Purpose Specification Principle The purposes for which personal data are collected should
be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited
to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those
purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.
Use Limitation Principle Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or oth-
erwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with the Purpose
Specification Principle, which are with the consent of the data subject or the authority
of law.
Security Safeguards Principle Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modifica-
tion or disclosure of data.
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Openness Principle There should be a general policy of openness about developments,
practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available
of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their
use, as well as the identification and usual residence of the data controller.
Individual Participation Principle An individual should have the right to obtain from
a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has
information relating to him. By holding information the data controller is mandated to
report to the user, in a reasonable and readily intelligible manner, what information is
being store and why is it occurring. Conversely, the individual has the right to challenge
the data relating to him and to have that data erased, rectified, completed or amended,
if the challenge is justified.
Accountability Principle A data controller should be accountable for complying with mea-
sures which give effect to the principles stated above.
The bottom line on all of the aforementioned principles is that the user should be informed,
aware and protected. The user should know what is being collected, by whom, and certified
that the information remains secure. It is also strongly stressed that the ability to collect
data should be limited, justified, relevant and only carried out by lawful and authorized
authorities. These are the guiding principles that are carried over to European Directives,
regulating privacy within the European Community.
2.2.1.3 European Union Data Protection
As discussed, the OECD guidelines captured several of the regulatory principles that should
govern privacy in environments which require data protection. This entails not only tele-
phony, mobile phones, but also Internet (and networked) communications, and any of the
new communications paradigms. With little surprise, these principles got adopted by the
European Union in several Data protection Directions, which are now the baseline for privacy
within Europe. From this transposition, stemmed several EU directives that are centered
mostly around data protection, defining clearly the subjects and the information that is pro-
tected on telecommunications. We review the most relevant principles, scattered across sev-
eral directives, from which the most important are Directives 95/46/EC [29], 97/66/EC [30],
2002/58/EC [31] and 2006/24/EC [32].
The objective of Directive 95/46/EC [29] is to define and regulate the processing of per-
sonal data. Processing of personal data means any operation, automatic or not, on personal
data. Examples are provided on the directive text which include: collection, recording, or-
ganization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by trans-
mission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction. In line with the OECD principles, this too defines a set of principles
which should drive privacy guidelines for legislation, which are mostly discussed in the arti-
cles between 6 and 24, covering three areas: legitimacy of data collection and its associated
conditions and transparency; confidentiality and security of the processing itself; and liability
deriving from the stored data.
Collecting and processing personal data becomes legitimate if “the data subject has given
his consent unambiguously”. The user’s consent can be obtained in several ways: by means of
a contract, legal obligation, to protect the user’s interest, public interest or official authority.
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But even in the aforementioned cases, apart from positive and negative exceptions, the user
must be generally informed of what data is collected, and the purpose of that collection, to
maintain a transparency approach. The user should also be allowed to consult the collected
data within reasonable time frames and cost, while reserving his right to object in case the
data is collected under exceptional conditions (i.e. crime investigations).
Directive 95/46/EC also discusses the conditions under which collected data should be
stored, such as retaining confidentiality, security and data protection in conformance with the
OEDC guidelines. 95/46/EC also considers the liability, sanctions and remedies that derive
from the collected data, and the enforcement of the previous guidelines.
Directive 97/66/EC [30], known as The Data Protection Telecommunications Directive,
provides a complement to Directive 95/46/EC, with regard to Telecommunications, operators
and users. It describes the guidelines for subscribers, users and their privacy protection in
public telecommunications networks and telecommunications services. It mostly addresses
the mandatory security principles that should be provided, stating that the providers of
telecommunications services must adhere to providing a security infrastructure and technical
measures to safeguard the security of their services with attention to the state-of-the-art in
their domain and the associated implementation costs. The user must be informed of threats
and breaches along with possible solutions and costs for such events.
The directive also defines that communications must be confidential, and that no listening,
tapping or any type of storage can be done, with the exception of authorized legal entities.
It also provisions traffic and billing data3, stating that such information must be confined
to the delegated entity of the telecommunications provider. Also, the data must be deleted
or anonymized after processing or until the legal deadlines expire, which must be defined in
accordance to regulatory law. The user must have the possibility of disabling such features
as calling-line identification and automatic call forwarding.
Directive 2002/58/EC [31], known as Directive on Privacy and electronic communica-
tions, extends Directive 95/46/EC [29] and supersedes Directive 97/66/EC [30], because it
only addresses a specific domain of Telecommunications, while 2002/58/EC is applicable to
Communications in general. The importance of this directive relies on the fact that this
document pertains to communications environments, which also include the internet and
TCP/IP communications, therefore guiding any work to be done in the area of privacy in
next generation networks. It focuses on five key points: Security, Confidentiality, Location
Data, Spam and Consent. Regarding security, it states that the provider of electronic commu-
nication services must take appropriate technical and organizational measures to safeguard
service security, while considering state-of-the-art and cost on their implementation. Also,
the subscribers have the right to be informed of any breaches, along with the measures taken
to remedy the occurrence and the costs involved. As far as confidentiality is concerned, it
should be illegal to listen, tape, store or perform any other means of data or communication
surveillance without the consent of the users, except for legally authorized entities. This
directive also discusses how traffic data must be discarded or made anonymous after it has
served its transmission purposes. Beyond that, traffic may be processed for billing purposes,
and retained until the bill is payed. It first mentions marketing relating to electronic com-
3This data include: number or identification of the subscriber station; address of the subscriber and the
type of station; total number of units to be charged for the accounting period; called subscriber number; type,
starting time and duration of the calls made and/or the data volume transmitted; date of the call/service;
other information concerning payments such as advance payment, payments by installments, disconnection
and reminders.
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munication means, where user information should be processed only with the consent of the
user, which may withdraw at any time.
Directive 2002/58/EC also addresses Location Data issues by defining that, when avail-
able, such information may only be processed after being made anonymous, or with explicit
user consent. The user must also be aware of what type of location information can be pro-
cessed, and whether it will be relayed to a third party or not, prior to consenting to the data
processing. As always, the user must have a simple and free of charge means to cancel such
data processing. An increasingly important issue addressed in this document is the user’s
right to be informed whether his subscriber information, and what is that information, is
stored in any directories, and who may access it under what terms, reserving the user’s right
to verify, correct or withdraw any personal data free of charge when required. Unsolicited
Communications, also known as Spam, is described as only being possible with the direct
and prior consent of the user. The aforementioned condition applies to a range of commu-
nication means such as voice or electronic mail. Beyond the previously mentioned articles,
this directive also contains guidelines about the right to itemized billing, the presentation and
restriction of calling and connected line identification and automatic call forwarding.
Focusing on Data Retention, and amending 2002/58/EC, Directive 2006/24/EC [32] sets
the categories of data to be retained, the obligation to retain that data, and who accesses that
data. It also defines the legal periods for retention, along with data protection, security and
storage requirements. Service Providers are mandated to retain the user’s data for a period
no less than six months and not more than two years, where the access to it is granted based
on lawful grounds, and according to national law. Article 5 determines the categories, or
data types to be retained by the service provider. It makes the distinction between Internet
communications and normal telephony situations. Focusing on Internet aspects, it states that
providers must retain email addresses or user ID of the subscriber, complemented with name
and address of the subscriber, if necessary. Similar information about the destination must
be retained, along with duration, and type. Beyond these mentioned data types, Directive
20006/24/EC identifies the problem relating to location data on mobile communications. It
seems originally intended for normal mobile telephony, but nowadays it will also apply to IP
mobile devices. It states that the location label, or Cell ID, must be recorded at the start
of the communication. Furthermore, data identifying the geographic location of the cells by
reference to their location cells, must be retained for the duration of the communication.
2.3 Privacy Models
One way of contextualizing the privacy problem on network-related aspects is to explore
existing models and technical solutions that deal directly with network related privacy. It
is important to understand what are the existing contributions that relate to or enhance
privacy on the network, before defining any new models or contributions. This analysis will
enable a broader understanding of current privacy trends, threats and model, and contribute
towards the objective of providing an in-depth study of privacy on the network. We focus
especially on the relationship between user privacy and networked environments, departing
from socio-legal aspects towards practical network-related models. We explore a wide array
of privacy oriented models and systems, that can contribute to the understanding of what a
network oriented privacy model must cover. Below, we present an overview of the relevant
models, especially analyzing their main purpose and means towards achieving it.
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As we focus on privacy related models, the first observation is that there is no single
encompassing model that harnesses all different privacy aspects, relating to user or network
privacy. Instead, most proposals focus on a specific subset of information or mechanism.
Therefore, we present below several “pieces” of the privacy model puzzle, that, while lacking
a consistent model that drives model overview, enables an insight on the overall aspects that
govern privacy solutions: threats are discussed as stemming for specific aspects.
In the course of our study we have identified several areas that relate to network privacy,
directly or not. We start with indirect concepts, regarding database privacy models, that have
been extensively debated, and provide a bridge towards atomic user information, as reflected
on the network. We later study anonymity models and their relationship to privacy. Only
afterwards we focus on network specific privacy models, that are directly aligned with the
course of our work. We finalize by studying interesting models that can provide further hints
on how to handle privacy in the network, like Bayesian models, used for Spam classification
or in intrusion detection systems, or orthogonal models, that are not directly related, but
provide some insight on the problem at hand.
2.3.1 Database Privacy Models
The first relevant attempt to model privacy originated in the distributed database world,
where the correlation of several data columns in distributed relational databases would yield
privacy violations and allowed accurate identification of anonymous subjects. The most rele-
vant model in this area is K-anonymity [141]. The model behind this proposal focuses almost
entirely on data as a personal attribute on a table. Data is treated as a tuple of informa-
tion, where an identifier is associated with a particular piece of data, siting in a database
row. The model is built purely around identifier and data, upon which several anonymizing
functions are discussed. The main idea is to ensure that the same information appears at
least K-times, associated with different identifiers. The information is scanned and arranged
to extract (almost) unique identifiers, dubbed Quasi-Identifiers [34]. These identifiers are
used as the main correlation mechanism, establishing relationships between different seem-
ingly anonymous pieces of information. This approach to relational databases has proved
to be effective, and became the basis for a research branch that now sees further devel-
opments with derivative and improved schemes, such as K-unlinkability [92], l-Diversity [91]
and T-Closeness [84]. These solutions all use different models to hide relationships established
through the Quasi-Identifiers. While this does not seem directly connected to the network
environment, it provides a powerful insight to the organization of information as tuples com-
posed of identifier and data, as means to model information, and consequently threat user
privacy. Also, the single fact that information nowadays is almost entirely becoming an entry
in a relational database, as we converge to a computer-centric society, indicates that privacy
on relational databases must be widely considered by any solution that wants to be taken
seriously on any computational field.
2.3.2 Anonymity Models
While anonymity does not equal privacy, in recent years several approaches have tried to
provided privacy through anonymity functions. The common assumption is that, when
anonymity is provided, privacy is assured, even though this neglects several of the differences
between privacy and anonymity. Regardless of the differences between them, it is important
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to analyze the main trends that deal with anonymity, since it can be an important property
towards providing privacy.
Most anonymity-related proposals rely on the concepts of anonymity sets, or anonymity
by numbers. Anonymity usually deals with an omni-present attacker on the network and is
usually discussed in terms of “knowledge” or exchanged messages. In most cases it requires
that both senders and receivers remain anonymous in the communication process. This is
exactly what is proposed by Chaum Mixes [22], which provides several important concepts
for anonymizing messages, concealing the senders and receivers. In this approach, messages
are distributed through a number of nodes, constituting a mix, where once a message crosses
enough participants in the mix, it becomes impossible to determine its true origin, and is then
forwarded to the final recipient. In this scenario, the mix constitutes an anonymity set, where
any participant can be the original sender. The level of anonymity varies with the number
of participants in the mix, where the larger the set, the more anonymous the message given
that there are more possible senders. These concepts have been applied in several solutions.
The most noteworthy solution derived from from Chaum Mixes, is Onion Routing [142], or
TOR [37], which will be discussed in Chap. 5.
The value and success of Chaum Mixes [22] has lead to an attempt of building concrete pri-
vacy and threat models around it, explaining and measuring the amount of privacy provided.
The initial effort of modeling and measuring the privacy associated with such anonymity
ecosystems came from [133]. This paper presents the seminal work on using Shannon’s In-
formation Theory [134] to measure anonymity, instead of relying on the tried-and-tested
technique of anonymity set sizes. It details the construction of an anonymity set where infor-
mation is deposited, and later measuring it with entropy calculation. While such anonymity
proposal seems to model a reality that is somewhat different from normal operations on the
network, focusing on mixes, it provides an important contribution to a more generalized pri-
vacy model: information can be generally treated as a set, from which its anonymity value
is extracted. Therefore, following the Information Theory rationalization, the more concrete
and identifiable the information is, the smaller its anonymity set becomes, and the informa-
tion begins to be clearly identifiable. The evolution of this research trend has lead towards
measuring anonymity, rather than privacy models around anonymity.
A recent contribution [120] that builds on the above cited concepts focuses on hiding rela-
tionships, also resorting to information theory concepts. In the process, it provides definitions
for anonymity, unlinkability and unrelatability. This shows how complex relationships can be
observed for elements within a set, therefore focusing partially on set theory derived rules and
theorems. However, the most interesting conclusion from [120] is that privacy indeed is about
relationships, and these relationships must be properly acknowledged and accounted to truly
understand the complicated privacy inter-connections that occur on the network space. But,
this is not the first effort focusing on hiding relationships. Information hiding was made no-
ticeable by [65]. This work presents a very high level framework for dealing with anonymity
and privacy using an elaborate graph theory model. It is based on the same underlaying
assumptions as Chaum Mixes, where senders and receivers should be indistinguishable (i.e.
equiprobable), but focuses on an interesting concept: partial knowledge. The idea is that
information can be broken up in different views, explored by the attacker to gain information
about different observations. This is supported by graph theory, used to establish relationship
gained by examining the knowledge put forth by different functions. However, while clearly
showing the difference between privacy, anonymity and modeling difficult concepts such as
pseudonymity, its pure mathematical and abstract nature makes the relationship with the
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network, and network events, very elusive.
The above entire body of work focusing on anonymity, information theory and relation-
ship concealment shows that, as recurrently stated, privacy is as complex as it is diverse.
These are the most interesting trends in recent years, partially due to the increasing inter-
est of anonymity and mix networks, that show the appearance of several concepts that we
highlight: i) the appearance of a data or information set, that relates to private information;
ii) the existence of multiple relationships between such sets of information pieces, guiding
attackers (partial) view; and iii) the unification of information through the acknowledgment
of information as data tuples. While these concepts were extracted from models that at times
seem hardly related to network operation, i.e. packets on the network, they provide great
insight into what a network oriented model can look like.
But, before moving on to network specific models, we must acknowledge that one of the
most prevalent findings of the anonymity work is that each model tries to present first and
foremost a definition of privacy, second a definition of anonymity, and thirdly how those
concepts are addressed within the framework. Most solutions on the network, and discussed
in several of the following sections, do not have any clear model, but rather make some
underlying assumptions about the type of attacker and possible privacy attack. Due to the
specificity of most discussed attacks, indeed it is not possible nor desirable to tackle a high
level concept of privacy and privacy protection in each of these proposals. But, without
understanding the model behind them, it is not possible to tie them together in common view
of network privacy.
However, an important conclusion considering anonymity, is how it relates to privacy. As
stated at the beginning of this section, it is important to clarify that privacy is not anonymity.
A definition of privacy, that takes anonymity into account, comes from [65], where the authors
state that privacy is simply relationship anonymity between two users or agents, whereas
anonymity is the concealment of the user or agent identities. Another example comes from
the outlined technical challenges of network anonymity [80]. This shows a clear differentiation
of privacy and anonymity, and argues that anonymity is a property that can be used to achieve
privacy.
2.3.3 Network Oriented Privacy Models
Most privacy models, and technologies, are usually centered on the user. The user is usually
described as relating to information blocks, that can flow on the network or be statically
stored in databases. This very abstract information model could fit anything from network,
to databases, or even sociological models. However, the network is anything but abstract. On
the network level, there are credible and immediate threats, relating to information disclosure,
action disclosure, and correlation. Most threats stem either from particular identifiers (e.g
IP or MAC addresses) and their properties (e.g location) or using specific mechanisms that
jeopardize privacy (e.g, MIPv6). Given the specificity of the threats, and consequent proposals
to address such gaps, the consequence is a very segmented approach to all threat that brings
no real model behind network privacy. Therefore, solutions on different layers can originate
from a diverse range of interactions, which are never captured.
The essence of privacy on the network eludes us. There is however, one model that
focuses on network interactions, and indeed models several key participants in the network
and how their relationships undermine privacy, although not covering the entire spectrum
of privacy threats discussed previously: the Freiburg Privacy Diamond (FPD) [150]. FPD
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uses relationships established between four key network entities and properties - user, device,
location and action - to determine how privacy is breached (and protected). The proposed
entities indeed cover a large spectrum of the network interactions, and can accurately model
most network situations. Also, the establishment of relationships between the entities, as
means of determining or breaching privacy, follows in the steps proposed by the before-
mentioned abstract privacy models. They present a clear way to convey how the associations
between the entities lead to unwilling disclosure of private information, but focusing entirely
on the network level. This makes it interesting to explore this model more closely than others.
While many schemes exist to enhance user privacy in some level or particular aspect (c.f.
Sec. 2.5), a very neglected issue is how to actually measure or compare the privacy level
provided by each solution. FPD is a conceptual model that tries to, according to the authors
words, “classify, analyze, and construct anonymizing mechanisms in respect of the type of
mobility that is required for this anonymity mechanism”. And while it focuses on anonymity,
it can also capture the nature of privacy, which we analyze below.
Figure 2.2: The Freiburg Privacy Diamond in [150].
The FPD attempts to model privacy around a completely connected graph, diamond
shaped with 4 vertexes, as shown in Fig. 2.2: User (U), Location (L), Device (D) and Action
(A). The idea behind the four vertexes shows that an attacker can try to reach to map a user
to an action by observing in which terminal was the action performed and who is the user
associated with the terminal, or on the other hand, observing the location where the action
happened and the matching user. Since the graph is completely connected, any variation
of these steps is allowed, and every path that connects an action to a user has successfully
broken the user’s privacy. It is worth mentioning that FPD does not provide a solution that
preserves privacy, but rather a model to evaluate if the user’s privacy is being breached or
not, which is exactly what we were striving for initially, and should precede any real solution.
Also, the model assumes that time is an implicit dimension, and that no time correlation
events occurs. They are assumed as mostly absolute events, that either yield information or
not. This simplifies the graph in terms of edge weights, since it is assumed that all actions
provide the same amount of information, i.e. once the link is established between a vertex, it
is irrelevant the degree of information that was applied, since the link was established, making
it binary in nature.
Perhaps the single most important contribution proposed by the FPD is the notion of
using relations to connect the different edges. By looking at Fig. 2.2, we see that each edge
has a particular identification, which denotes the relationship established between each of the
vertexes. In total, the diamond is composed of 12 relationships that model the author’s notion
of privacy. As explained in [150], two elements (x, y) are in a relationship Rx,y, if the attacker
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possesses knowledge that ties the elements together. This notion of relationship makes all the
difference, because for the first time, we are able to derive the notion that something in the
network may cause a dependency that ultimately leads to privacy violations.
Using these tools, the author proposes a set of definitions that are worth exploring. First,
the anonymity of an action (A) towards a user (U) exists whenever there are two elements
(U,A), which share no relationships RU,A. In this situation, if there is no information that
ties the user to an action (directly or otherwise), then not only is the anonymity of the action
preserved, but also the privacy of the user concerning that particular action. The following
rule defines transitivity between relationships, so that if Ra,b and Rb,c exist, then Ra,c is also
valid. This denotes the first inference reasoning on network privacy. Applying these rules to
the entire set of relationships yield the attacker’s view of the user, stated as a closure view over
the information. As these views come together, the attacker forms a composed view, through
the “composition of elements”. This composed view is subjected to recognition, linking and
intersection attacks. Recognition attacks means recognition relationships in two different
composed views, and thus combining them into a richer view of the user. The linking attack
means that the elements can be attributed to a specific user through contextual information,
usually using exclusion. Lastly, the intersection attack means looking for similar traces in
different views, also through contextual information.
These rules provide the first insight at a network privacy threat model, which yields
relationships between user and the network, in such a way that it can be systematized. The
diamond can be simplified to have a set of well defined, loop free, paths that lead to the
positive identification of the user. These are summarized by the author as:
1. user to action directly
2. user via location to action
3. user via device to action
4. user via location and then device to action
5. user via device and then location to action
Whenever these observations are possible, the user’s anonymity and privacy are forfeited.
This means that to provide privacy, none of these paths can be detectable, an important
conclusion that is worth extracting such a privacy model. A smaller observation is that the
model defines itself as trying to capture the attacker’s knowledge over the system, which could
be modified with appropriate edge weights to provide a measure of anonymity rather than
providing absolute linkage vectors.
While being the most promising attempt at a network counterpart of a privacy model,
it neglects that privacy is built around identifiers (which are omni-present in the network),
a prevalent discussion in K-Anonymity [141] with Quasi-Identifier [34]. Because identifier
information is not a central element of the model, it is impossible to see how different iden-
tifiers play a role in different locations, since, depending on the location of the attacker, the
information extractable from packets and actions is different. The result is that how and why
relationships are established is not evident in the model, leaving a large gap, as made obvious
by the discussions on databases and anonymity (and further supported by the evidence model
presented in the following section). It also fails to acknowledge that in most scenarios, users
desire privacy and not anonymity (e.g. service customization), making the ideas of minimal
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disclosure or private data sets inescapable, something which is not captured by the model,
which deals only with relationships.
Another discussion concerns edge weight. The model assumes no edge weight as a simplifi-
cation, failing to acknowledge that different information can yield different value, for instance,
different topological information. While at first this may seam a reasonable compromise, the
rules presented for recognition, linking and intersection indicate that they work based on con-
textual information. These are at best, probabilistic inferences from network observations.
And because these are important, they should play a role in the overall privacy model.
Despite these shortcomings, FPD still provides the most interesting overview of what are
the key relationships in the network. It presents one of the most illustrative discussions of
what privacy on the network implies or requires. The described model is a good fit for most
network interactions, based on actions, locations, devices and user are actually suited in most
current environments. This is both a blessing and a curse, because the specificity of the actors
can hinder the abstractions that could be introduced into the model. Lastly, the modeling
of an action, while interesting on a purely network level, forfeits the information plane that
is widely discussed in the previous sections. Actions can pose a threat due to two different
information planes: the action itself and the exchanged information.
2.3.4 Bayesian Models
An interesting field in privacy, which is not commonly considered, relies on Bayesian infer-
ence. Bayesian probability is based on the observation of multiple evidences, and building
a probability according to the observations. In concrete terms, the Bayesian probabilistic
approach assigns a starting (prior) probability, and continuously updates it (posterior) in the
face of new data, thus evaluating the probability of a given hypothesis. As such, Bayesian
probability is considered to treat a probability as measure of knowledge, that evolves over
time (observation). This is the guiding intuition for Bayesian inference, where a collection
of evidences are used to calculate a probability upon which the likelihood of an event or hy-
pothesis is stated. This approach to evidence gathering, with appropriate probabilities, that
increase or decrease based on the gained knowledge, has many applications in fields that do
not directly relate to privacy.
Bayesian inference is the common approach [78] for Intrusion Detection Systems [35],
where the different events or alarms are assigned a probability and related to the remaining
events to determine whether any abnormal behavior is taking place in the network. This
evidence collection mechanism is used because each event (positive or negative) takes part in
a continuous network detection mechanism, gathering evidences until a decision is taken. A
similar approach is taken for email spam filtering [128], with Bayesian Filters [58]. Some of
the most popular filters today are based on Bayesian probabilities, or Bayesian networks. The
normal procedure is to scan emails with multiple iterative rules, and build on the probability
of considering an email as spam. The result of each rule is added to a Bayesian probability,
that is adjusted based on evidences.
This introduction to Bayesian based mechanisms is interesting because it shows how sev-
eral systems work based on evidence gathering. Instead of single and uncorrelated information
evaluation, these systems perform a continuous evaluation, where different events or evidences
contribute to an overall probability. In fact, this represents a new model for privacy that only
recently gathered attention. What we have seen with Intrusion Detection Systems and spam
filtering is that information can be extracted from several events. However, the Bayesian
27
approach can also be used to handle information in data mining architectures [25], allowing
the extraction of large amounts of information from distributed databases, unquestionably
breaching user privacy. Using Bayesian network to mine concealed information has been show
in [23], which shows a new framework based on information-theoretic analysis using Bayesian
networks to learn about private data. The framework proposes several algorithms for knowl-
edge acquisition from data. Even though not directly about privacy, it shows how Bayesian
networks can lead to learning information about users. Using these database techniques to
invade user privacy has been show in the previously discussed l-Diversity [91] model. In l-
diversity, a notion of privacy using Bayesian inference deducts the prior and posterior beliefs
of an attacker in the face of a newly acquired piece of information. They argue that this
information can be aggregated, building sufficient knowledge to defeat K-anonymity.
Dealing directly with the user, it is possible to treat a user privacy as a system subjected
to intrusion. An interesting analogy would be to define user privacy in the same terms as an
IDS, as we can view the user’s privacy domain as an intrusion prone system. In this scenario,
gathering information can lead to a breach, as in IDS systems gathering information can
uncover an attack. This approach is loosely taken in [6], which shows how dynamic Bayesian
networks can be used to collect evidence to assert whether privacy has been violated or not.
An extension to this approach, which could be used to threaten user privacy, would be to use
such an IDS-like approach as a means of evidence gathering and information inference about
identifiers, data and personal identifiable information, classifying information until a user is
positively identified, as opposed to detected privacy breaches.
All of the previous discussed approaches and techniques reinforce the notion that, by
resorting to continuous analysis of private information through Bayesian inference, it is pos-
sible to compromise privacy when enough evidences have been gathered. The commonality
of all these systems is that they all gather evidences, and properly mark them, to extract
patterns and hidden information. However, the relationship to a network privacy model can
seem foggy: there is no clear or consistent privacy model that can help in the definition of
network driven privacy. But, there is a clear conclusion: privacy can be dealt with in terms
of evidence collection, and not just as singular observations. This conclusion opens the door
to a more complex ecosystem in the network, where multiple iterations can be harnessed by
such systems, and turned against the user, similar to data mining mechanisms. And in turn,
this needs to be properly accounted in any network privacy model.
2.4 Identity and Privacy
As we depart from privacy models towards technical solutions that deal with privacy, we
acknowledge that, when discussing privacy in current digital systems, the focus is on the
user. As in real life, the primary object of privacy is the user, a manifestation of a real person
on the system. The metaphor for these user-centric concepts is identity, focusing entirely
on the user. Identity is directly related to privacy because identity fosters notion of self,
which is the subject of privacy. This was made clear by the definitions of privacy, and more
importantly by the presented legal arguments. The relationship between identity and privacy
is obvious and made more relevant in digital systems [54].
Therefore, it is not surprising that on the network, identity, in the form of the user and
user-centric technologies, appears tightly coupled to privacy. Research on identity in the
information society [62] shows that identity, embodied by IdM technologies, is being hailed as
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a beacon for privacy and security in the Information Society. We must study these concepts
in the light of privacy protecting mechanisms, that deal directly with user sensitive data.
To do this, we present the most important aspects of the identity trend, especially on the
application layer plane. We also review how identity is currently being used on the network,
in different application scenarios that resort to user-centric technologies.
2.4.1 Identity Management
The evolution of Internet paradigms has lead to an explosion of services available over the
Internet. This followed closely the trend of recent years, where Web 2.0 opened the door to
the social web, making users signup and register with different services, blogs, forums, and a
wide range of utility applications. As the number of accounts and corresponding passwords
grew, a problem emerged facing the authentication and access control of end-users, which
now faced multiple accounts and login forms, locked in information silos, resulting in a large
amount of replicated information. This ecosystem provided unique conditions for the growth
of IdM concepts as means to relieve the burden of user management, both on the user side
(by handling multiple providers and service through a single account, requiring a single login
action), and on the service side (by reusing authentication and authorization systems, and
enabling federative properties).
It is arguable to actually state when the IdM trend began to gain momentum, but it is
unquestionable that one of the driving forces behind was the work proposed by Kim Cameron,
with Microsoft Research, that came to be known as the “The Laws of Identity” [19]. Rather
then proposing yet another user-centric platform or architecture, this work proposed an iden-
tity meta-system defining the requirements for IdM operation and adoption. Below, we sum-
marize these laws and their meaning:
• User Control and Consent: Only reveal information that identifies the user with
the user’s consent;
• Minimal Disclosure for a constrained use: Release the minimal amount of identi-
fiable information;
• Justifiable Parties: Limit information release to justified parties that express a real
necessity for the information;
• Directed Identity: Limit the identifiable information towards a specific goal, and do
not reuse it, making it unidirectional;
• Pluralism of Operators and Technologies: Promote interworking of multiple iden-
tity technologies and the federation of multiple providers.
• Human Integration: Make the user (human) part of the system design.
• Consistent Experience Across Contexts: Guarantee a simple and tangible user
experience throughout multiple operators, technologies or devices.
These apparently simple and straightforward rules, make up a very solid foundation for
the discussion of user-centric technologies that build on identity concepts. However, this only
defines a meta-system, where several architectures can be used to fulfill several of these laws.
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Below we explore the technologies that can be used to fill in the gaps promoted by the various
laws as means to provide privacy.
One of the primary objectives of many IdM solutions is to solve the multiple account and
authorization issues, by providing a Single Sign-On (SSO) experience. With this goal, towards
enterprise authentication models, the Liberty Alliance proposed an architecture, Identiy Fed-
eration Framework (ID-FF) [5] that enables an SSO platform with federative capabilities,
using SAML [20] assertions. By using an Identity Provider (IdP), which provides a cen-
tral point for authentication, that can be federated with other IdP system, it is possible to
provide an SSO experience across many providers. Therefore, the ID-FF platform provides
authentication and federation capabilities that can be complemented by attribute exchange
procedures and web service interfaces, thus composing the entire Liberty Alliance Frame-
work. Interestingly, the ID-FF defines the usage of pseudomyity towards the providers using
the federation system, creating a unique pseudonym association between user and provider,
that is uncorrelatable across different providers. The entire specifications of ID-FF and fam-
ily protocols were later contributed to the Kantara Initiative [79] that now aims at steering
identity related discussions. It brings together several of the Liberty alliance members, along
with many of the proponents of Internet based solutions, discussed below, providing a new
forum for discussing identity, privacy and the network.
Using similar concepts to ID-FF, applied in the scope of educational environments, Shib-
boleth [70], a unilateral proposal from the Internet2 Initiative [69], focused on a user-centric
approach using identity providers. It further defines the concept of Service Provider (SP),
that is able to discover the user’s IdP, for facilitated federation mechanisms. Both these
initiatives, ID-FF and Shibboleth, led to the creation of the SAML 2.0 [20] standard, which
covers a wide range of scenarios, such as SSO, Federation and attribute exchange, all with
a strong emphasis on end-user privacy. It makes use of options discussed earlier to create
a combined specification that is being widely adopted as the standard for enterprise SSO.
It uses the same basic components, and reflects the same basic operations as its originating
technologies.
The adoption of SAML 2.0 is also reflected on Microsoft Cardspace [109], a Microsoft ef-
fort to create a recognizable paradigm or user identity. Cardspace has its root on an Internet
oriented scheme known as Microsoft Passport. Passport aimed at providing an SSO envi-
ronment for internet based applications. It later evolved into Windows Live ID [110], which
provided a consistent user account across different services along with a single authentica-
tion mechanism used across multiple services, whoever limited within the Microsoft portfolio.
This has become somewhat stagnant due to the shift towards Cardspace, which is foremost a
metaphor that provides information cards as a tangible identity management concept to the
user. Cardspace builds on web service technology, but aims at being a meta-system for iden-
tity concepts, and can be integrated with other IdM solutions, complementing them. Using
Internet-based services, it already reflects some of the concepts present in IdM systems, such
as an IdP and a service provider entity, named Relying Party, but empowers them with a
much needed user relationship through the cards - something the user can understand - that
can be presented at different websites.
With the emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomena, OpenID [122] has gained momentum
as widespread user adoption grows. It is also an Internet based IdM system, where users
are identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). Using the concept of Users, Relying
parties and Identity providers, it enables SSO, secure authentication and attribute exchange.
It provides the expected and necessary features for the basis of an identity system, but only
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tackles application (web) based concepts, extremely biased towards Internet-based services.
OpenID has seen adoption by providers like Google, converting all their user accounts into
OpenID identities, usable at any enabled website. Another open protocol that enables SSO
in a web environment is OAuth [116]. Major social websites like Twitter and Facebook
provide OAuth support, enabling their users to login on other services using their Facebook
or Twitter credentials, through the website’s API, without compromising privacy. The login
credentials provide a limited access to the user’s profile, thus enabling SSO, and even some user
attributes, without providing full access to the user’s profile at the corresponding provider.
OAuth has been standardized within the IETF [40], and is picking up momentum in the cloud
environment.
On a completely different front, european projects have been experimenting with identity
as a privacy enabling technology, of which the most relevant are Privacy and Identity Manage-
ment for Europe (PRIME) [63] and Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) [46].
PRIME is a European research project that aims to develop and promote Privacy Enhanc-
ing Technologies, based on Identity Management Systems. Its primary goal is to enhance user
control over the overwhelming amount of data scattered through different networks. The ap-
proach relies on the concept of “partial identities”, supported by an IdM framework that takes
into account legal, technical, social and economical requirements. Using several technologies
and concepts, the PRIME project defines an IdM ontology to serve as the interoperability
foundations. Also, a key concept is using Identity Mixes for privacy support. It is primar-
ily a web oriented project, taking advantage of several HTTP based technologies and web
services. The PRIME architecture is based around generic concepts, such as Entities, Data
and data exchanged between entities, in the form of Claims. The entities are differentiated
as Users, which refers to natural persons as defined in the European Union directives and
Organizations, representing generic legal persons. Data exchange between entities is a very
important part of the PRIME definitions, which is accomplished by claims. There is a key
exchange protocol executed beforehand to establish trust between entities, in such a way that
the subsequent claim exchange is trusted. All of the aforementioned components define a
PRIME system, which can be summarized as a a framework for secure data exchange, with a
very strong regard for privacy. However, it uses only application level protocols to exchange
application level information, showing little or no regard for network aspects and concepts.
The other interesting initiative is FIDIS, which is a Network of Excellence centered on
privacy and identity management sponsored by the European Community. It aims at sup-
porting interoperability of identity with prevailing security. Much like PRIME, FIDIS focuses
on IdM solutions for the European Union. The general approach is somewhat common for
both projects, focusing first on a set of socio-economic and legal requirements for identity
management systems, which include privacy constraints. This project’s primary goal is to
push forward on identity solutions, with a high interoperability capability therefore unify-
ing scattered existing systems. Also, it focuses on security and privacy along with profiling
and forensic implications, which are mandatory topics when discussing IdM systems. FIDIS
aims at becoming a driving force for future IdM solutions, establishing a widespread base of
documentation that describes the implication of several socio-economic factors and identity
management systems. FIDIS devotes particular attention to the high level integration of iden-
tity management systems, rather than to protocol specific or too detailed information bits.
It considers an important topic of Identity and Mobility, but only scratches the surface by
laying the groundwork of requirements along with a few interesting directions. The practical
results of this approach can be seen more as models, as opposed to deployable architectures,
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and it is not restricted to computer networks and digital identity, as it grasps real identity
and computer aided systems like Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) enabled passports.
Most of the situations where (user) identity has been considered are at the application
layer, which deals more directly with user and user related information. As an application
level feature, focusing mainly on Internet-based scenarios, identity has played a part in several
services and architectures, especially in the new web 2.0 landscape. Several architectures and
protocols follow this approach to user identity, using concepts such as Identity providers and
service providers, relying on HTTP/XML based protocols and web services.
Regardless of the previous trend, the paradigm shift towards IdM is not happening solely
on the Internet. The user is becoming increasingly defined as an identity, and identity driven
architectures and services are becoming a reality. As part of the research expressed in this
Thesis, as mentioned before, the IST Daidalos [33] and IST SWIFT [72] projects, have pro-
moted the use of identity in the network, bringing it to all levels of the network stack and not
only the service layer. This led to a user centric network where identity is the driving force
behind network provided services, preserving privacy while providing an unprecedented level
of pervasiveness and personalization. However, in different places, the network has shown
traces of using user-centric information and identity related paradigms. Below we try to
uncover such traces, even if implicit in certain efforts.
2.4.2 Identity in the Network
The network has long resorted to the use of identification of the user or user related resources.
This has been done implicitly in most cases, and results in a disguised use of identity related
technology that must be understood. Several technologies have always needed to either iden-
tify the user, or the device under the control of the user, creating a unique coupling between
user and device. Therefore, it is interesting to observe that identity has already made brief
appearances in different network contexts.
All of the technologies mentioned in the previous section are agnostic to lower layers and
fail to address the “network side of things”. At the same time, there is already a large amount
of identity information that resides scattered across the network stack. But, on the lower
layers, such identities are usually tied to devices and protocols rather than to the user and his
digital identity, as observed in GSM and UMTS. The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and
the Universal SIM (USIM) are in fact cards that store the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), which is a unique number that identifies the user and acts as a key for
network access. The SIM (or the USIM) can be perceived as the “user”, or a representation
of the user. Similarly, a growing trend is, for example, mobile payments supported by Near
Field Communications (NFC), where the division between user and device is further diluted,
and yet another real-life aspect is moved towards digital interactions, with all the privacy
associations it implies. There is a tightly coupled view of the device and the user in this
model. If we consider the TCP/IP network stack, we also find identity information. Unique
protocol and network identifiers provide simple handles to recognize or identify a specific user
or device, a phenomena that is not limited to a single layer. At the link layer, the terminal is
identified by its unique MAC addresses. At the network layer, this is achieved by a public and
usually dynamic IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. Mobility bound identifiers, such as the MIPv6 [77]
Home Address (HoA), are also unique. These addresses identify both the user and terminal,
since they are tightly coupled. Furthermore, some addresses are tied to public keys, such
as the proposals for Cryptographically Generated Addresses [10]. The key can be bound to
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the user identity or to the terminal, leading to more information based on identity acting as
singleton information pieces, with no real link to the upper layer identity concept.
An interesting case of identity (or identification) in the network stack is Host Identity
Protocol [113]. HIP is, in its essence, a key exchange protocol based on a new cryptographic
namespace. It accomplishes a clean separation of locator and identifier, between network and
transport layers, by introducing a new namespace through the Host Identity (HI). A HI is
a statistically global unique name for hosts with an IP stack; it represents the identity of a
host on the network, which can assume multiple identities, some “well known” and others
unpublished or “anonymous”. The HI is the public part of a cryptographic key, where the
private part is stored in the host, or kept by the user. In order to represent the Host Identity
in other protocols, either a Host Identity Tag (HIT), a hash of the HI or a Local Scope
Identifier, a legacy identifier that fits in IPv4 fields, are used. HIP introduces the concept
of an identity namespace, where the identity object is the host. As with the other discussed
identifiers, this can be easily mistaken by the user, given the close relationship that can exist
between user/device (host).
On other layers, dealing with the use of identity in the network usually involves the
representation of the user through handles (e.g. usernames) or application identifiers. At
application layer protocols and services, this usually takes the form of usernames or even
URIs. This brings us once again to the IdM systems, discussed before, and how identity is
represented in such systems, given that application layer protocols and services already fall
under the category covered by IdM systems.
Every piece of information mentioned in the preceding paragraphs identifies the user, or
at least some part of the user identity, regardless of its intent to disclose this information.
Each of these protocol or network identifiers either uniquely map to the user or to the device
being used by the user. The lower layers are thus a gray zone, where the user “is” the
device, and the device is the user. And no concerns on user privacy, or identity protection,
exist. The network stack currently does not support the semantics of several digital identities
representing the same user, which may be used for different purposes or actions, or for different
roles. While this is simple to address at the application level, the task becomes complex at
the network level, where we can have two “personae” representing the same or different users
simultaneously in the same device.
2.5 Network Aware Privacy
Apart from the previous section, which covered identity paradigms in the network stack,
most of the discussed work discussed so far has no particular network oriented focus. In fact,
most approaches are conceptual in nature. However, as previously discussed, to understand
privacy on the network, we must reduce the applicability scope. Accordingly, we try to
further narrow the studied solutions towards network related approaches. This focus results
in a review of privacy enabled solutions that aim at protecting different aspects of network
operation. Usually, these solutions are only applicable in the layer on which they operate.
The first part of the discussed work focuses on link layer threats and solutions. We mainly
intend to explore solutions focusing on the network access. In the scope of link layer solutions,
we are faced with individual protocol threats, identification and tracking through unique link
layer identifiers. We then focus on solutions that target the network layer, where the most
important issues are the location and identification of end points, due to network properties.
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In this scope we also explore some mobility related solutions that focus on privacy. Finally,
we explore a trend that primarily resorts to using different pseudonym identifiers i.e. alias
identifier on different network levels, for privacy protection. This comes at the end because
solutions using pseudonymity tend to have relationships between several layers or concepts.
2.5.1 Protecting Network Access
The network access corresponds to the link layer domain, to which users connect their devices.
These technologies are usually broadcast mediums, such as WiFi or Ethernet. Most link layer
security solutions aim at reducing the security impact of a shared broadcast medium, where
users can observe all the traffic flowing in the network.
Beyond this shared-medium security problem, there are other security and privacy threats
stemming from the link layer, which are discussed in depth in Sec. 3.4. To evaluate the security
protocols for the link layer it is worth mentioning that the most pressing threats stem from the
usage of a unique identifier, the MAC Address, leading to identification and tracking of the
user. Through a MAC address, it is possible to uniquely identify users through their devices,
especially as they roam through different networks. These threats are particularly observable
in environments that enable roaming and ubiquitous access, such as wireless technologies,
where an attacker does not even have to participate in the communication to monitor all the
data. These properties require a deeper discussion of such technologies.
Wireless technologies usually resort to broadcast transmission, translating into inherently
insecure communication: all nodes located in the broadcast cloud can effectively monitor every
packet traveling through the air. This is the default behavior of IEEE 802.11 [66] technologies,
offering no guaranties on either privacy or confidentiality. The initial proposal to protect
WiFi environments, conveyed by the 802.11 standard [66] aims at providing Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP). WEP is based on shared key between station and Access Point (AP), relying
on the fact that an unassociated station cannot listen to the ongoing communications, without
access to the shared secret. Besides being a weak mechanism [140], WEP does not provide any
protection from the already associated nodes, forfeiting node privacy and confidentiality. It is
easy for an attacker to deploy illegitimate probes to monitor traffic and location of a roaming
STA. A later specification amendment, IEEE 802.11i (which is now a part of the base 802.11
standard [66]), commonly known as WPA2, was designed to replace WEP, providing a more
adequate security solution. It defines different ways of generating a Session Key from a Master
Key, which can be based on a pre-shared secret (shared key mode), or server authentication
(enterprise mode). The session key mechanism does not suffer from WEP’s insecurities, and
provides better confidentiality, since the secret is only shared between one STA and the AP.
Neither legitimate nor illegitimate stations can listen to each other’s traffic. But 802.11i
only protects the payload of the 802.11 messages, leaving the protocol headers susceptible
to information collection from any eavesdropper. Under such traffic inspection, stations can
be easily tracked, forfeiting their location privacy, along with link layer data, which can be
used to derive privacy breaching information. Also, none of the previous solutions conceal
the STA global identifiers, namely their MAC address, which uniquely identifies them in any
situation, further simplifying tracking by an attacker.
The link layer is also afected by location privacy issues, given that each AP has a fixed
geographical position, and the nodes can be placed inside its antenna range, leading to geo-
graphical tracking.
It is worth mentioning that several network layer architectures provide location and
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identification privacy features [53, 24, 130, 139, 114], as discussed in the following section
(Sec. 2.5.2). But despite their effectiveness on the network layer, they are still vulnerable to
link layer attacks. Therefore these proposals will needs to be complemented with adequate
link layer privacy protection, tackling both location and identifiers.
2.5.2 Protecting Location and Identification
The threats identified on the network layer, considered by most of the presented related work,
relate to tracking a user’s location by uniquely identifying the user through unique addresses.
While these threats are discussed extensively in Sec. 3.4 in the network layer, we can advance
that they are associated with the fact that a user is uniquely identified through the IP address
on the network. Nevertheless, the address also yields topological location: the hierarchical
assignment of IP addresses can be surveyed and mapped, tracing addresses to specific cells
with a fixed geographical position. The increase of private and commercial services surveying
network locations has led to surprising accuracy for such IP to location services [148].
Location privacy has been mostly addressed in absolute geographic location environments,
particularly with GPS technologies [59, 17, 39]. These solutions show that introducing con-
fusion [17] or imprecise location [59] benefits location privacy. While not directly applicable,
such solutions provide a better understanding of location privacy issues, especially considering
that IP addresses can yield surprisingly accurate geographical position, available from public
services [148] (and even more accurate with private services). Considering absolute location
issues, an approach to attain privacy introduces imprecise measures (less accurate or relative)
in the location metrics, omitting any accurate positioning. Gruetser and Grundwald [59]
attempt to reduce the accurateness of location queries both in time and space, to provide
location privacy. They show, by measuring location accuracy deviation, that confusion can
increase location privacy, thus enhancing the overall user’s privacy. After showing how anony-
mous traces can lead to identification through information correlation (i.e an office location
trace can be matched to desk sitting and worker identification), Beresford and Stajano [17]
propose an entropy quantifier to show how correlation probability can decrease by performing
unexpected actions. The disruption of movement and location patterns shows that entropy
increases user privacy. In a similar approach, Duckham and Kulik [39] propose an obfuscation
mechanism that introduces inaccurate and imprecise locations in the coordinates sent by a
user responding to a location query. They then use “levels of privacy” to measure privacy. Lo-
cation privacy is achieved by creating an anonymity set that yields multiple locations. Such
an approach shows that location privacy does not depend only on the amount of samples
available but also on their precision.
Another approach is to conceal the node’s IP address altogether, removing location infor-
mation, thus protecting user privacy, as proposed by Chaum Mixes [22]. In this approach,
the message receiver is not able to determine the message sender because the message is
anonymized by the mix, through store-and-forward cryptographic mechanisms. This con-
cept has been applied in Onion Routing [142] and TOR [37] using the notion of encrypted
virtual circuits. The circuit progressively decrypts the routed packets, according to a lay-
ered construct: the packet is encrypted many times over by the sender, and is successively
decrypted towards the destination, providing anonymity, privacy and resistance to traffic anal-
ysis. However, the TOR architecture favors user enrollment as TOR routers, making traffic
reach the network edges, which results in reduced privacy and suboptimal routing. It also
redefines several transport mechanisms which were solved in other places of the network stack
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(e.g. segmentation). In all, TOR mechanisms are very secure and flexible - route telescop-
ing allows reusable circuit building - but the required full packet encryption along with the
drawback of the users becoming the routers, leads to severe performance issues. But despite
the performance drawbacks, TOR provides location protection because it conceals any user
information concerning addresses.
Blind [149] introduces a security framework that allows endpoints to identify themselves
without revealing their identity to eavesdroppers. This is accomplished by an initial crypto-
graphic handshake, and through the usage of forwarding agents to provide location privacy.
It is worth mentioning that Blind does not propose any elaborate threat analysis, and focus
directly on providing anonymity. However, it requires an entire new mechanism, similar to
HIP, that intrudes in the current layered configuration.
It is worth noticing that the negative impacts of location privacy and user identification
on the network are expanded when coupled with mobility aspects. Mobility protocols, such
as MIPv6 [77] and HIP [112], need to resort to global identifiers for user identification. These
identifiers can be used to track the user and his current location. By tracking the mobility
updates performed by the user, either a Correspondent Node (CN) or an illegitimate eaves-
dropper can learn the user’s current location. In MIPv6 this is achievable by tracking the
Binding Update (BU) messages [44, 60]. Also, given that it is a global identifier that does
not change regardless of point of attachment, it suffers from the same threats as the link
layer address, which were discussed in the previous section. Therefore, we can only conclude
that mobility further endangers the user. These mobility related aspects were addressed by
Escudero-Pascual in the scope of a PhD thesis, entitled “Privacy in the next generation Inter-
net: Data Protection in the context of the European Union Policy” [45], baring a title similar
to the current document, but with a different focus and format. The focus is on Mobility
aspects, first with a solution [42] adapted to the Freedom Network (a pseudonymity oriented
network), where the user resorts to pseudonym based tunnels for mobility construction. Sec-
ond, it proposes a solution that conceals the users location through the usage of proxies [43].
This means that the user is protected from remote peers, as well as from location services in
the network, by interposing a location proxy that shields the mobile node.
Paradoxically, several location privacy solutions stem from mobility solutions. Hierarchical
mobility solutions, such as Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [135], or localized schemes
like Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [41], reduce the topological information carried by the IP
address while increasing location privacy. But, as privacy requirements grow, there is a need
to incorporate it in different architectures, and more importantly, future network designs
can be built from the ground up having such requirements. Disruptive solutions that break
today’s network assumptions can provide location privacy, or even identification masking.
New architectures or mechanisms are able to cope with location privacy as a side effect of
privacy or architectural requirements. IP2 [117], Turfnet [130], I3 [139] and Blind [149], while
not focusing on location privacy, address some of the issues.
IP2 [117] is able to hide the user location through the use of anchor points in the net-
work which also deal with mobility. This resembles what happens in HMIPv6 [135] and in
an architectural instantiation proposed in Sec. 6.5.2), but faces a large deployment overhead
mostly caused by features not related to privacy, making location privacy a small-side effect
of a complex architecture not properly adaptable to existing network technologies. Overlay
networks provide also good approaches to hide location information. In Turfnet [130], location
privacy is achieved implicitly mainly due to an innovative method of routing and the use of
Turfnet Gateways connecting each Turf. However, it is difficult to achieve optimal routing. In
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I3 [139], a new realm for routing is defined based on names. Using a rendezvous point between
communicating peers, it is possible to achieve some degree of location privacy, but it is still an
overlay network and we argue that location privacy should be achieved through architectural
support. Blind [149] describes a complete identity protection framework for endpoints. It
proposes a Diffie-Hellman authenticated agreement for identity exchange. Regarding location
privacy, a solution based on identity aware Network Address Translation (NAT) is proposed:
when an endpoint tries to initiate communication with a node in the network, it uses a For-
warding Agent that selects a virtual IP address for it. The peers are able to see only the
virtual address, not the real address of the endpoint. However, it does not contemplate se-
curity between endpoint and Forwarding Agent, or has support for mobility. The Layered
Naming Architecture [11] aggregates several existing solutions, providing a unified and inte-
grated system. The LNA introduces two layers of names: for service identifiers (SIDs) and
for unique endpoint identifiers (EIDs). Both of them are independent of IP addresses. Since
LNA is partially based on HIP, it also incorporates the notion of identity, although diluted.
The two introduced layers have the objective of providing a decoupled view of different layers,
and do not aim at providing a tight integration with identity, even though LNA presents a
first step in abstracting sets of identifiers that are not affected by mobility.
2.5.3 Pseudonymity based solutions
Several proposals exist in the literature on the usage of pseudonymity across different layers
to ensure privacy. In all of these proposals it is important to consider: i) how pseudonymity
systems are controlled; ii) to what granularity they are applied; and iii) if any sort of evaluation
or justification is presented on such approaches. It is also important to understand if they
are used in conjunction with any other technique, given that privacy is a cross-layer issue.
“True Anonymity without Mixes” [111] is one the first proposals of using pseudonymity
in the network. It argues against using mixes, since most mix based approaches do not pro-
tect from the mix itself, when nodes are colluding. It argues towards using a non-personal,
temporary, random identifier IP address. It also tackles the identifier problem of link layer
protocols that rely on 48 bit MAC addresses, and finally resorting to random MAC addresses
with vertical integration for service consumption. Without going into lengthy architectural
analysis, the authors propose a few pragmatic solutions to handle network related privacy.
There is an implicit notion of a vertical threat to privacy expressed in the proposal of si-
multaneous link, network and service solutions. However, such vertical awareness is neither
acknowledged nor systematized.
In the context of network layer pseudonyms, i.e. using multiple concurrent IP addresses on
the same host for different purposes, Flasche [151] stands out by using the already discussed
Freiburg Privacy Diamond. It puts forth a complete system based on location dependent
addresses, associated with a control layer that manages addressing. Flasche is rather flexible,
enabling the creation of virtual interfaces when the need for anonymity appears, along with
location based addresses tied with an application model. However, it does not focus on how
to control the management of such devices, and hence, on controlling the multiple privacy
dimensions that the users require. Although FPD [150] presents a potential implementation
roadmap, it does not detail actual behavior or performance. Addressing impacts are discussed,
based on collision probability of adding more addresses to the network, which is a first step
in the direction proposed in Sec. 4.4.
On a different track, virtualization software is accidentally providing network pseudo-
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nymity. Software such as VMWare [146], VirtualBox [145] or Xen [12], provide network
configurations that enable a virtual machine to appear decoupled from the host. This could
possibly allow running one virtual machine per identity or application, but it is hardly scal-
able, especially considering mobile devices such as smartphones. A recent addition to the
Linux Kernel (Network Namespaces [86]), part of virtualization enhancements, could be used
for pseudonymity purposes. However, it has a strict application of namespaces, and is not
connected to the concept of identity in upper layers.
Until now, there was no complete study that demonstrates the impact, feasibility or per-
formance of pseudonymity based systems. Without a well-defined analysis process, including
practical and theoretical aspects and a clear set of requirements, it is hard to assess the ad-
vantages or drawbacks of such (or any) solution. This leaves a wide theoretical and practical
gap that is explored in Chap. 4.
2.6 Summary
As we start lifting the veil on privacy, we come to the conclusion that we must define it to
provide much needed boundaries for our work. But, the most important lesson to retain from
the different views on privacy is that providing overreaching concepts can lead to failure. We
must understand that privacy is a multidisciplinary subject, and often, it involves a plethora
of considerations, stemming from different environments. From this, we need to scope and
contextualize our privacy landscape, in order to achieve any meaningful definitions, something
that will be carried out in the next chapter.
The followed approach, as discussed, was to study the social, legal and technical aspects
of privacy, so that they can serve as boundaries for the topics on network privacy. And while
these studied concepts may not provide the indented focused definitions towards the network,
they can definitely provide guidelines that enable us to reach those definitions. And while we
saw that, from the social aspects, privacy is a concept in disarray, we can study the legal and
technical aspects without prejudice from this confusion.
The legal guidelines, or directives, studied in the scope of network privacy focused more on
data protection and privacy as a fundamental right. After analyzing all of these directives, it
is important to retain that they deal in abstract terms, establishing regulatory requirements
for communications, as well as privacy. It becomes clear that objective of such directives
and regulations is to define how data should be handled by the different parties involved in
communications. Nevertheless, the focus seems to be on what is lawful and how it should be
carried out, especially dealing with user related information. It does not set many require-
ments for network mechanisms. But, it does present a corollary requirement: if only legal,
authorized or mandated entities should be able to inspect, collect or analyze user (private)
information, every other entity that does not fit this mold should be promptly denied access
to such information. This means that the current mechanisms yielding information fitting the
aforementioned description, to either eavesdroppers or legitimate network peers, are violating
user privacy and should be treated as a flaw that must be fixed. Beyond this corollary, the
provided information also provides a wealth of definitions, conditions, and limitations around
privacy, data protection, and how to deal with it in the modern world. The focus now is put
on privacy in the technical aspects, that must comply with all the discussed guidelines, and
more importantly, to frame them in models that abide by these limitations.
In our privacy analysis we reviewed several models, such as database, anonymity, Bayesian
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and even network models, coming from different privacy fields. There are common aspects
to them, where the first is that the definitions they offer are usually vague, and not fitting
a pragmatic network privacy model. Most of them deal with larger contexts for privacy,
focusing on the entire user dimensions, and not just on the network. So, at a first glance,
we do not find the network focus we required. The database models provide an interesting
view of information correlation than can be helpful when looking at the network, given that
relationships can be established similarly and provided we consider the network as a dynamic
and evolving database, thus contributing in several ways towards a solution space. The
presented anonymity models do not try to model the same thing. They aim at providing
anonymity towards the end user, allowing us to understand clearly that anonymity is not
privacy. As for the network oriented privacy models, while very interesting, we come to the
conclusion that we still do not have the required tools to reach the goals of this Thesis.
The presented models have a consistent problem of providing a level of detachment from
the network, and can become abstract and hard to transpose to practical mechanisms. Specif-
ically focusing on the most notorious solution, FPD, it seems that while it captures generically
the essence of the relationship between user and network, it does not provide any insight to-
wards the actual means of providing those relationships. This is the missing step, that makes
a large difference, and can become the most important part, because it leads to the materi-
alization of the models. Also, what seems to be a common approach is that the presented
models tend to alleviate the process of information capturing by determining that only abso-
lute deductions from information can be processed. By neglecting complex or event probable
relationships, most models can be simplified. This view is incoherent with todays advanced
data mining infrastructures and processes, which tend to go beyond simple information in-
spection. This is a lesson extracted from the database models, that expose liabilities present
in other models.
As a general remark regarding the privacy models, we can only conclude that none of the
presented models provide a perfect environment to tackle network privacy aspects. While
they can serve as guidelines on how to build a new model, they need adjustments, such as a
more focused or pragmatic approach.
Another place that we can look at for privacy guidelines are the existing technical solutions
for privacy. In the search for technical solutions for privacy, we started by exploring the
relationship between privacy and user, in the form of identity. The conclusion is that, by
centering on the user, IdM is acquiring the necessary tools to provide a consistent approach to
user privacy. While the solutions discussed are all similar in nature, they all advocate the same
principals, guided in part by the conceptual notions presented. The conclusion we gather is
that the user, and its identity, are becoming an omnipresent part of communications. Despite
the solutions presented are limited to the application layer, i.e. interacting with services,
it seems that the mantra they advocate of protecting user privacy and information can be
applied generically to all vectors of user interactions. Because of this, we tried to understand
to what degree identity information is already present in the network. Our conclusion was
that, while only implicitly, the user identity is becoming reflected in the different protocols
through unique identifiers that lead to a user. This seems both a hazard and a benefit, because
while improper use can breach privacy, proper use, as proposed by IdM technologies, can lead
to privacy protection.
There is no consistent threat model behind these solutions, rather than protecting user
privacy. In many cases it does not directly match the network aspects or the privacy models
discussed before, which only touch when discussing database privacy models, given that user
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information can be stored in databases. An interesting view that stems from these observa-
tions is that a model that captures the network essential threats in a user-centric view, as
is the case with IdM, would be a very beneficial tool. This would enable the identification
of network processes and their relationships towards the user, filling in the gap of existing
models, and providing the tools for understanding network privacy.
The definite step towards understanding network privacy is to study privacy solutions. For
this, we studied three different solution spaces that aim at providing privacy in the network.
First, we focused on link layer privacy, where we observed that current technologies are more
suited towards providing security in link layer interactions, than actually providing privacy
towards the end-user. When studying technologies which protect the network access, we
saw that they protect the network aspects, but ignore the privacy issues that make users
trackable and identifiable. Similarly, they leave these efforts to network solutions, that can be
compromised by link layer mechanisms. We realized that there is a lack of tools to determine
the threats, and also to understand them on a very pragmatic level. It seems that identifiers
on lower layers do indeed compromise upper layers, such as link layer addresses compromising
the network layer, something which is frequently ignored.
On the network layer, we observed that most solutions aim at protecting location and
identification, without much consideration for lower layers. The solutions regarding location
tend to use confusion as their main tool, and those regarding identification privacy tend to
use encryption as the preferred mechanism. While these are the two primary threats, they
are often not consistent from solution to solution, considering different aspects of multiple
protocols. There seems to be, however, the notion that privacy affects all layers, and that
while they solve part of the issue, there is a bigger issue regarding the entire concept of user
privacy, spawning across all layers. It was also interesting to see that some of these threats
stem from the close relationship between layers, e.g. network and transport, and solutions
that decoupled them are providing solutions that can improve user privacy as a byproduct of
futuristic architecture design without a clear focus on privacy. We also observed that mobility
aspects, common in NGN, generate more privacy threats that enable simpler tracking and
identification, thus accentuating the network layer threats. While solutions exist, they do not
follow any particular model, and have almost no consideration on how they affect either the
network, or the remaining threats.
One trend that can handle several different layers in the network, discussed in Sec. 2.5.3,
is pseudonymity. The ideas coming from the notion that we can generate multiple identifiers
for the same user showed that it can be applied to more than one layer. We saw it emerging
on IdM solutions, as well as in some models that try to propose joint link and network layer
solutions. This seems to be a very reasonable approach, but most solutions analyzed do not
have any guiding concepts in terms of privacy, rather than generating multiple identifiers,
which makes the feel incomplete. While we acknowledge that this may be part of a solution,
it is not determined how it can work or how it integrates into a larger view of user privacy.
The conclusion is that, while privacy definitions exist, there is no concrete model for
network privacy. This becomes evident as we explore, first, the models that govern privacy,
and second, the solutions that currently exist. Most of them address different threats, with
different solutions, but without overall commanding principles, making them niche solutions.
There is a consistent pattern that shows that different threats require different solutions, but
all deal with the user. This suggests that there is a two-vector characteristic to privacy that
deals with the overall privacy of the user, and with the particular aspects of each network
mechanism. This is discussed in-depth throughout the following chapter, exploring what is
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referred as the vertical and horizontal approaches to privacy. However, we first need a model
that guides our privacy approach.
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Chapter 3
Modeling Privacy in Network
Environments
Great things are done by a series of small things
brought together.
Vicent Van Gogh
It is important to have clear definitions, as to avoid confusion when dealing with the
different privacy solutions discussed throughout this document. For this purpose we present
our own definition of privacy and associated concepts. Using these definitions, we propose a
privacy model that tackles the conceptual nature of privacy in the network, and how it can be
synthesized into a clear and consistent framework. Using this model, we evaluate the privacy
threats that exist in current network protocols and operations, structured around network
threats and information relevance of the highlighted mechanisms.
The presented definitions, model, and pragmatic network analysis, result in a high level
systematization of privacy protection concepts. We distinguish between protecting privacy
and protecting identifiers, and the role they play in extracting generalized approaches towards
privacy, which will be followed in subsequent chapters.
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3.1 Introduction
As highlighted in the previous sections, privacy is a complex and multi-disciplinary concept
that causes technological, legal, social and philosophical debates. It becomes clear that, to
properly handle network-related privacy, we must divide and conquer, a strategy that leads to
the partitioning of the problem to cover the interactions of users and communication networks.
When considering individual user privacy in modern networks, we must split the concept
into different views, each with its own set of both threats and sensitive information, turning
privacy at different layers into a tractable problem. To address the subset of issues that relate
to network privacy, a logical solution can be to conceive a privacy threat model that covers
the necessary assets on the network. There is a need to identify what is the information (and
information flows) that jeopardizes privacy, and how it can be properly modeled, specially
concerning threats, so that we can later propose a clear set of measures that mitigate such
threats.
After analyzing different models that can contribute to user privacy (Chap. 2), it is possible
to understand the basic needs of a network privacy model. Some models provide an inter-
esting framework to address privacy in networking environments. Models like the Freiburg
Privacy Diamond [150] (FPD) already provide abstractions for evaluating privacy threats,
and potentially can cover network based attacks. The 4-way model proposed by the FPD
system covers several network interactions: by individualizing the user, the device used for
network and service access, the location of both user and device, and the actions performed by
the user at the device. This provides a generic model for network interactions and identifies
key objects of a privacy model.
But, a recurring problem of the discussed models is the exceedingly generic approach to
privacy. This can undermine the applicability of the different models, as they are instantiated
into network scenarios, given that we deal with concrete privacy breaches, that translate into
bits and bytes on the wire. It can be very hard to go from generic relationships to tangible
concepts in the network. To accurately address privacy concerns, we must understand the
nature of data flowing in the network and provide a model that correctly describes and isolates
the network threats, guiding the potential threat mitigation approaches. Consequently, we
need a model that, in practice, addresses the gaps of privacy models, mapping directly into
network concepts.
To tackle some of the shortcomings of the discussed models, we propose an approach that
covers the diverse interactions on the network, and provide a theoretical and practical set
of rules and assumptions that lead to a correct privacy evaluation. In particular, we need a
model that focus on users, handling both data and identification, which can grow to identify
how their user is compromised. To achieve these goals we must understand how we can relate
high level concepts to the specificity of different network protocols. We propose resorting
to the notion of events as a bridge between conceptual approaches and practical network
applications. This demands that we recognize that privacy (or the loss of it) is subjected
to the observation of network related events, which will exist in the form of data packets
exchanged between different entities.
Not only can these events yield information on their own, but they can also be correlated
to harvest more information about the participants in the communication. The corollary
of the aforementioned concepts is a twofold analysis that must be accounted for in privacy
oriented models: 1) the immediate information an eavesdropper or peer can extract from the
information flowing on the network, and 2) the derivation of knowledge from a continued
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analysis of network events. Basing the model on such apparently simple concepts allows a
straightforward comprehension of the core principles that can compose a broader model, which
can be applied to different levels of the network. The presented definitions allow establishing
a clear relationship between the way we perceive privacy (as it relates to information) and
how protocols operate.
Supported by the previous concepts, in this chapter we propose a network privacy model
that has its foundations on clear definitions, and especially, on a simple information model
that adheres to the principles of the above analysis: event information extraction and event
correlation. This provides a mechanism for threat assessment that is flexible, yet simple, and
permits the re-usage of existing literature and proposals towards creating a network oriented
attacker model that shows how privacy can be protected in the network. This broader model
is a framework that should be instantiated into a more detailed attacker model, thus capturing
the essence of different attack zones along with the varying importance of attacks confined to
specific topological areas.
In the process of solving existing privacy model constraints there are several requirements
that must be met by a new approach to a privacy model. First, the model must handle
identifier based privacy threats. This means that it should be possible to determine if privacy
is threatened by an identifier or event observed on the network, since they are the primary
starting point for recognizing Personal Identifiable Information. Because each identifier has
variable purpose and relevance, the identifier scope must be properly defined and formalized,
within the model or the instantiation of that said model, to access their threat potential. This
implies that we define that threat space, which can be achieved by defining an attacker model.
In this attacker model1 we delimit the network conditions that are relevant towards applying
the privacy model. It is in this space that we must formalize Linkage and Correlation, coupled
with the proper definitions providing a clear understanding of what each concept means and
how it translates into network observations. Lastly, it is important to consider the practical
aspects of the model, such as the network applicability and protection. We should understand
how to apply the formalized models onto the network stack, identifying how the stack can be
improved, ultimately leading to the protection measures that deal with privacy and identifiers.
We thus divide the modeling of network privacy threats into three separate steps. We
provide clear definitions to delimit the scope and comprehension of the defined concepts,
within Sec. 3.2. Afterwards, in Sec. 3.3, we propose a definition of the network privacy model
that is mostly built around the presented information model, which contains Events and
Information Sets, showing the purpose behind these mechanisms and how they can operate.
The final step of the model is to extend the conceptual definitions onto concrete network
applications, done in Sec. 3.4. Applying the model in the network requires that we first
determine the threat space, through an attacker model, but more importantly, we define the
threats along with the relevance of the information present on the network. This enables
scoping the problem in a well defined context, but more importantly, allows defining privacy
protection solutions. This is outlined in Sec. 3.5, where we show how to protect privacy,
identifiers and the relationship between them. We then summarize the results of the chapter
in Sec. 3.6.
1An attacker or attack model determines the amount and scope of information that is available for an
attacker to carry out an attack. In our scope, this directly concerns privacy related information available to
an attacker.
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3.2 Privacy Definitions
The first thing we must do to enhance privacy on the network is to define it. The definition
must be as clear as possible, with the goal of dissipating possible doubts with respect to what
is privacy in the scope of this Thesis and of the proposed solutions in the following chapters.
To support the proposed privacy definition, we also define concepts and terms that con-
tribute to privacy discussions, both as arguments and contextual boundaries that frame the
different proposed approaches. These terms can sometimes be the source of doubt, and expe-
rience shows that the presence of ambiguities can undermine privacy discussions. Therefore,
when discussing privacy, at any layer or context, it is always necessary to agree on a common
lexicon, since several terms in the privacy terminology can have different meanings, specially
when traversing contexts. Acknowledging these limitations justifies our effort to provide clear
and simple definitions that fit our privacy model and assist in its comprehension.
To understand our approach, we must first explain that we propose identifier based def-
initions for privacy (and associated concepts), contextualized in network operations, which
we think is the most adequate strategy towards addressing the problem. For us, an identifier
is any single piece of information that can uniquely map towards a subject (e.g. a person
or device) within a specific scope, thus containing or indexing identifiable information. This
will be better understood as we present the model, but for now, it will serve as the base
for our privacy definition. We present two different sections, one dealing directly with pri-
vacy, and another dealing with two privacy related terms, which are often overused in privacy
discussions with different meanings: linkage and correlation.
3.2.1 A Privacy Definition
We propose a definition based on two different aspects: first, the disclosure of information,
and second, the content of the disclosed information, as relating to a subject (user). In the
scope of our work, our privacy definition is the following:
Privacy is the property of retaining control over the disclosure of identifiable information
on the network.
The most important part of the definition relates to the disclosure of information, focusing
on privacy loss or unwilling disclosure of private information. K-anonymity [141] states that
“a disclosure means that explicit or inferable information about a person was released that
was not intended.” We agree with this definition, which is a ground assumption for privacy,
and add that the information release is done through the network (thus voiding any other
contextual scopes). Therefore, whenever an unwilling disclosure occurs, i.e. that cannot be
controlled by the user, there is a privacy loss to some extent. It is also important to consider
that our definition is almost a reverse definition, since privacy is highlighted as the property
of preventing or concealing disclosures (either involuntary or forced by the network). The
underlying assumption is that we can only lose privacy, as privacy should be considered the
initial state (which will be implicit in most of the proposed solutions), if we are to protect or
even trade it.
The second part of the proposed privacy definition, highlighted above, deals directly with
identifiable information. Here, we turn to identifiers as the main driver of privacy definitions
as highlighted before, and that will be handled in detail within the privacy model (Sec. 3.3).
However, it is important to notice that we do not include “personal” on purpose, as in Personal
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Identifiable Information, because a large portion of the targeted information might not even
relate to the user, but rather to network properties and assets that are indirectly related
to the user, thus better matching the concepts in the network, and following the disclosure
definition on explicit or inferable information.
A corollary of the proposed definition is that privacy must hold in face of network prop-
erties, implying both immediate or continuous observations. The objective is to include
information that might be observed atomically on the network or inferred over several obser-
vations, leading to private information that can either be atomic or extracted (mined). The
user consequences of this is that information can directly link or implicate the user, or alter-
natively be correlated with other information to establish the link to the user. Such distinct
actions bring us to the definition of the terms linkage and correlation.
3.2.2 Linkage and Correlation
Establishing relationships between observed information, what it means and to whom it
pertains, can lead the unwilling disclosure of private information. In this context, linkage
and correlation become important concepts as they define the means by which relationships
can be determined, a key aspect of the privacy model presented in the following section
(3.3). These concepts have been used before in privacy related models [88, 150], either using
aggregation [88] or inference [150] as means of establishing relationships, but with no clear
definition.
Given their central role in the privacy model that follows next, it is important to provide
clear definitions of linkage and correlation. Stemming from their use in different contexts,
these concepts often have competing definitions, colloquial and mathematical. We must
analyze both types in order to define these concepts in the scope of (network) privacy.
Colloquially, linkage is often defined as the act of linking (Mirriam-Webster [108]), or
as the relationship that connects (or ties) one thing to another. The link itself is presented
as the connecting element association, correlation, or even a causal, parallel or reciprocal
relationship. Also in a colloquial sense, correlation is defined as the mutual relation of two or
more things, as well as the act of correlating or state of being correlated. From a mathematical
point of view [82], only correlation seems relevant, in the field of statistical analysis and
probability theory, as it is a measure between two random variables, denoting the strength
and direction of their (linear) relationship.
These definitions enable us to assess that the usage of linkage and correlation in privacy
mostly relates to their colloquial meanings. Linkage relates to establishing a link between ob-
served information, which can be a relationship or shared property, creating potential privacy
threats. Similarly, correlation most often relates to its colloquial definition of establishing a
relationship, but its mathematical bias often points at a complex nature, as opposed to the
simple and direct nature of linking.
In a privacy context, linkage is often perceived as the observation of links, whereas corre-
lation is presented as the act of establishing a (non-obvious) link as an inference2 of observed
information, as shown by Lunt [89]. This is supported by the K-anonymity [141] work on
relational databases, stating that “to draw an inference is to come to believe a new fact on
the basis of another information.”
2Inference is assumed as the process of deriving strict logical consequences of assumed premise [108]. Math-
ematically it is very similar, and stated as the act or process of deriving a conclusion from premises [82],
resorting to either deductive or inductive logic.
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These definitions view on linkage and correlation, stemming from different sources, all
contribute to the definitions used in the scope of our work:
Linkage is the process of extracting relationships from information directly observed on the
network. Linking can be achieved in several ways, but always built upon single and
obvious observations.
Correlation is the process of extracting new relationships based upon preexisting relation-
ships. While correlation can be carried out in different ways, it always defines creating
non-obvious links based on information that was previously observed on the network.
The key difference between linkage and correlation is that, while linkage refers to deriving
links from simply observing network information, correlation deals with creating new links
by analyzing preexisting ones. This is further highlighted by the different natures of linkage
and correlation, reactive and proactive relationship establishment, respectively. In the case
of linkage, the relationships are established by reacting to network observations i.e. factual
observations on the network. Conversely, correlation means a proactive search for relation-
ships based on already observed link, where we are not simply reacting to new information
observations, but actively searching for relationships based on the facts we have already col-
lected. In this light, a non-obvious link can be defined as a link based on preexisting links
rather than network observations.
These definitions outline two major approaches that can threaten user privacy. One is
simply observing network information, and extracting the observed relationships e.g. trans-
ported identifiers, using simple yet effective means to void user privacy. The second approach,
stemming from correlation, creates a more complex privacy threat and involves relating ex-
isting information to threaten user privacy e.g. building dependency graphs to establish a
probability relationship between different pieces of information, where linkage and correlation
are tied to inference3.
As we establish relationships, obvious or otherwise, between different pieces of information,
we are drawing new conclusions based on the observed information. These links are privacy
threats that originate from network observation, and it is in this scenario that we highlight
the definition of linkage and correlation. These key definitions help to scope the privacy
problem, and bring the attention to the network stack, where privacy can be compromised
just by careful observation and through simple (linkage and correlation) techniques, which
are modeled in Sec. 3.3.
3.3 Modeling Privacy
Digital environments are mostly characterized by information blocks, exchanged and stored
across the network. As the basic information units that can take any shape or form, they
depend on context and purpose. This is particularly true in packet based networks, where
information flows in well defined finite sized datagrams. Whenever information can be ex-
tracted from those blocks, or even from the relationship between different blocks, privacy is
threatened. In this scenario, private information stems from attributing generic data onto
particular and identifiable subjects, which are the users or references to the users. When this
3For more information on mathematical induction, and other abstract mathematics topics, the interested
reader should refer to“Foundations of Abstract Mathematics” [82]
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connection is possible, we are in the presence of potentially private information that must be
protected. There are different models for privacy, as noted in Sec. 2.3 where we discussed
databases, anonymity, network and bayesian models. Most of these do not deal with the
network, and even those that do, only focus on high level interactions. This exposes a large
gap when it comes to direct applicability on the network, both for protocol understanding
and vertical network interactions, which must be bridged to take full advantage of the pro-
posed approaches. The requirement for network privacy mandates a network oriented model,
that enables easy identification of privacy threats on the network level. This implies that
the network semantics must be understood, along with potential implications of the network
operation models on user privacy.
To provide an effective model for privacy, concerning network aspects, we must look at
packet based exchanges and realize that they are event driven (a packet occurrence on the
network can be thought of as an event), and assume that all the observed information is, in
different ways, indexed. This is achieved by associating a data block with an identifier, either
by explicit relationship or by context4. This approach generically covers data oriented systems
that deal with blocks of data. In network protocols this paradigm occurs on several levels:
we match the information that flows across the network to different identifiers conveying
origin, destination, data type, and the data itself. But a common shortcoming is that these
information systems (and networks) have no concrete representation of a user. Instead, most
just rely on references to the user (e.g. a handle, an email), usually pointing to a user profile
that might have or not a legal entity behind it. From this observation we can infer that, in
digital systems, a user can be represented as a set of references aggregated at some point in
the system, usually referring to a person, group or entity.
Combining the two aforementioned complementary views can the basic tools from which
we can outline an information model: a contained view of information (data objects) and an
identifier-based view of users in the network (references to information). This approach can
provide the tools to understand the nature of information relationships on the network, in a
concise and reproducible model. It handles information as indexed and related objects, with
relationships between them, independently of how they were created, i.e. the means used to
establish links between observed information.
Based on the idea that it is possible to aggregate information into particular sets, through
relationships between them, we propose the Privacy Event Driven Model (PRIVED), that
uses the concepts of events, information sets and the relationships between them as the three-
fold drivers for privacy breaches on the network. However, we must further understand how
the proposed representations (events, sets and relationships) can actually be used to model
user privacy.
3.3.1 Information Model
The privacy related models explored in the previous chapter cover many privacy dimensions,
either considering threats or preservation relating the end user, in different context and sce-
narios. However, in the light of the privacy, linkage and correlation definitions presented
before, we conclude that most of them do not deal with the potential network instantiations
that we expect in our approach. While they present a rather amorphous view of user and
information, useful for defining theories and conceptual work on privacy, the direct network
4Implicit or contextual relationships are defined by the data itself conveying unique and identifiable infor-
mation, such as references to unique data blocks.
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applicability of these models can still elude us, given that they do not focus on the practical
events that occur on the network.
We need a model that focuses on privacy in the network, relying on the presented def-
initions. We propose a data model and concepts that enable an instantiated network view
of privacy, in order to specify both attacks and protection mechanisms around network in-
formation. In the effort to define the model, it is important to understand how to actually
represent information blocks within it. We split the representation of information into data
and identifiers for that data, as described below:
Data: The data, or data block, is a generic piece of information that by itself has no partic-
ular meaning towards specific subjects. This piece of information, when coupled with a
subject (directly or through a reference), can constitute private information, and there-
fore can threaten the privacy of the subject, but without a subject it can be considered
innocuous in terms of privacy.
Identifiers: The identifiers are references that represent a subject5. These references can be
perceived as properties unique to the subject, allowing their identification, and when
associated to a data block, provide information that relates to the subject consequently
threatening their privacy.
We come to the conclusion that information on the network is usually a two part observa-
tion, consisting of data and identifier. This tuple, composed by related identifiers and data,
defines an important support concept for the model: the information block.
These data and identifier constructions, combined into information blocks, allow the defi-
nition of an information model specifically geared toward capturing the essence of this bilateral
existence. While the contents conveyed by the data block might be relevant for privacy, we
argue that, privacy-wise, the important part of the information directly relates with its identi-
fication. In computer networks and most information systems, information must be indexed.
This alone usually conveys a uniqueness to the handled information, which can be tracked
back to the owner, threatening his privacy. To be relevant, private information must always
be associated with a particular subject or user. This view of identifiers is further supported
by the proven use of Quasi-Identifiers [34], which shows that identifiers can be extracted from
information in database tables that can later be used to establish (and destroy) relationships
between different tables as used for K-anonymity [141]. K-anonymity further supports this
view over information, given it is entirely based on information tuples that can be approxi-
mated to Id, Data. In our work, we propose to leak these definitions to the network view of
privacy, properly harnessed in the information model.
This leads to a clear separation of the privacy problem into identifier based threats, and
data mining privacy threats. Such partitioning enables us to focus on the identifiers based
issues, reducing the complexity associated with information analysis. Nevertheless, when
such analysis is performed, through pattern recognition, advanced syntactic analysis or any
other data mining strategy, we assume that the outcome is a properly tagged information
block, with an identifier for the collected information that can later be used for retrieval or
identification purposes. The result is a recursive approach that again lead to an identifier and
5The subject, either a user, a group or a (legal) entity on the network can be abstracted as an identifier
or a set of identifiers. At this point in the model, we make no effort to differentiate between subjects and
identifiers that reference subjects, given that in the network we mostly observe identifiers and not complete
subject information.
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Figure 3.1: Abstract information model
a data block, restating the privacy threat as an identifier based issue. This allows focusing
on identifier based threats, without disregarding more complex techniques for privacy threat.
Such an approach to information is the cornerstone of the privacy model, which can now
focus on describing the relationships between identifiers and subjects (end users), and even
between different information blocks.
While there is usually no concrete representation of a user in digital systems, for privacy
this should exist to allow modeling the information around the user, given that the user is
the primary stakeholder in the privacy discussion. We propose that, digitally, the user can
be regarded as a set of identifiers (along with their respective data), i.e. a set of related
information, either expressed by the user itself or by the communication systems with refer-
ences towards identifiable information. In this scenario, the user becomes a set of references,
composed by identifiers (and corresponding data) that relate to the same subject, building
the representation of a user in the information system. Such an approach is shown in Fig. 3.1,
where we present the most basic building blocks: the information block organized as the tu-
ple identifier and data. This tuple can then be aggregated into a set, which represents the
knowledge gained about a particular user, outlining potential privacy threats.
Each individual information block can be related to others by establishing a relationship
between the identifiers. Once this relationship is established - which is where the privacy
threat resides - a larger set is built, resulting in aggregated information. This aggregate view
provides information on a user, and more importantly, represents the knowledge gained by
an attacker around a certain subject, undermining his privacy.
Therefore, we must understand how those relationships are established, from which infor-
mation they stem from and how they can be maintained over time, resulting in the concept
of information sets. To answer these questions we propose a three-fold approach that at-
tempts to mimic the natural behavior of the network. We resort to finite and discrete Events
that allow creating Relationships thus building the Information Set (IS). Below we present a
succinct description of each building block:
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Events: An event is a finite and discrete occurrence (e.g. on the network) that conveys
an information block, i.e. identifiers and data, containing potential information for
relationship establishment.
Information Sets: The aggregate set of information that is composed of different informa-
tion blocks, observed from the aforementioned discrete events.
Relationships: Relationships are the links established between events or information sets,
through their common information blocks and properties (e.g. identifiers). Observing
the relationships between information blocks defines the threats that undermine privacy
lays as well as the assumptions for building the information set.
While these concepts are explored in the following sections, it is important to notice that
they are based on the operations observed in packet based networks. Events matter because
they can model the occurrence of information in the network. As finite discrete events,
packets convey observable information for attackers, associating private information back to
the user, and thus defining the baseline for any attack. Through the information conveyed in
a single packet (each can carry multiple basic information blocks), it is possible to establish
relationships that breach user privacy. By concatenating several packets (or events) through
the relationships between them, it is possible to build a larger information set that will surely
include private information about the user, that was not intended for public release. And
yet, through simple assumptions and concepts, user privacy is voided in many dimensions,
especially on the network.
To better understand the model, we must discuss the events, information sets and rela-
tionships between them in greater detail, allowing us to bridge these concepts to the network.
3.3.2 Events
Packet-based networks are defined by the exchanged of small, finite, data packets, the most
atomic unit in such technologies. In the proposed privacy model, we adopt a similar strategy
by introducing an atomic unit: the event. The most simple definitions is to classify an
event as the occurrence or observation of an information block. This information usually
appears fragmented, and when properly identified, can be used to build a steady stream
of information about users, devices or even networks, closely coupled with packet network
concepts. The identifiable information blocks allow modeling events as providing the most
basis for establishing relationships between different pieces of information. As a result, an
event can be described as a tuple of an identifier, an optional subject that can be omitted
when unknown or when similar to the identifier, and the associated information.
The potential threats stem from observing the information block, which can convey all
sorts of personal identifiable, and even private information. The identifier acts as an index
of such information, serving as a straightforward correlation mechanism, regardless even of
whether the subject is explicit or not. In most cases, the type of identifier used as index
conveys the subject itself. The defined tuple is presented in Eq. 3.1, which shows the formal
definition of events in a privacy scope.
ex = (identifier, [subject, ]information) (3.1)
Because events can by typified, the model is not restricted to any particular instantiation.
Therefore, it can be applied to different contexts, entities or scopes, enabling an extensible
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environment. Other models only consider a well defined set of subjects, thus suffering from
limited applicability. In fact, events can relate to any identifiable entity in the network, such
as devices, addresses, protocols or any other type of network information. In other words, an
event is a privacy threat because it conveys sensitive and potentially able to be cross-related,
information on the network. This is a key step that allows applying the PRIVED model not
only to network events, but also to more complex information correlation scenarios, about
user behavior.
We defined two possible scenarios for event observation, based on the nature and content
of the event. Either it yields privacy threatening information when observed individually, or
it can be correlated with other events, maximizing the amount of available information. As a
corollary of our event definition, we can determine that information which is not identifiable or
recognizable has no meaning and therefore cannot yield private information about a subject.
3.3.2.1 Correlating Events
As mentioned before, events alone can contain interesting information, from a privacy per-
spective. But, for an attacker, more information is collected when different events are linked
together. This can be achieved by establishing relationships between events that can be re-
lated to the same subject or user. In many cases, the described event driven mechanism can
be compared to stream communication employed by many protocols, such as TCP, where
the stream is rebuilt based on the address, protocol and port, and every piece of atomic
information is correlated using the protocol identifiers. Consequently, some events appear
unavoidably linked, due to the nature of the system where they appear e.g. capturing a net-
work packet at the link layer can yield identifiers for all layers. However, in some scenarios
that link is not obvious, acting as probabilistic evidences that can be collected to prove a
relationship. These two complementary cases define the basis of event correlation. Depend-
ing on how the events are linked, the connection between them might be inferred, rather
than explicitly deduced, leading to a probability of correlation rather than a certainty. Even
in the most seemingly obvious cases, as in networks, there are factors that erode the event
relationship. The analysis of the network factors is deferred to Sec. 3.4.3, where the different
network protocols, topologies and namespaces are equated into privacy observations.
In theory, we can determine the existence of a relationship between two events, e1 and e2,
when the relationship probability, Pr between them is higher than the a predefined relationship
factor rf .
Pr ≥ rf ⇒ ϕ(ex, ey) (3.2)
We define a relationship between two events x and y as ϕ(ex, ey). The relationship fac-
tor can be tuned according to the model applicability expectations, as outlined by Eq. 3.2,
with values in the interval of ]0..1]. Conceptually, we can define that when a relationship
exists, i.e. Pr is equal or larger than rf , then we can assert a relationship between the two
events. Accordingly, when Pr < rf , there is no relationship between two events. However,
the definition of rf has some impact on the perception of the model. When rf = 1, then
we only accept “certain” events, leading to a simpler instantiation of the model, where con-
dition matching and correlation requires less effort. All other cases require a probabilistic
analysis and evidence collection, typically depending on several observations and factors to
build a decimal value for Pr, as discussed below. The advantage of such definition is that the
model fits generic requirements and several types of analysis, whether working in absolute
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terms (unitary relationships) or with probabilistic relationships (require complex correlation
models). It is worth noting that we assume the condition rf > 0 is always true, meaning
that we not do consider any unrelated events, which would otherwise pollute the existing
relationships.
(IDx = IDy)⇒ Pxy = 1⇒ ϕ(ex, ey), IDx ∈ ex, IDy ∈ ey (3.3)
In the scope of this network based approach, it is important to define a corollary to
the definition presented in Eq. 3.2, for certain events (with Pr = 1) with the relationship
determined through identifiers. When matching identifiers that relate to the same subject
(e.g. observing the same network addresses on two different events), it is possible to use a
simplified event composition. Eq. 3.3 demonstrates that regardless of the value of rf , which
is omitted, whenever there a relationship is defined by two matching identifiers (assumed
to carry meaningful information), we can deduct a relationship probability of 1, leading
to a relationship between the two events. This will prove particularly useful for network
observations, based on identifiers that presumably belong to the user. Interestingly enough,
the simplicity of the proposed model enables the definition of correlation as an event itself.
This is a recursive definition that state that the correlation of two events yield a third event
that can be handled similarly, as presented in Eq. 3.4.
ϕ(e1,e2) ≥ rf ⇒ e3(e1, e2, ϕe1,e2) (3.4)
The missing link in event correlation is the definition of both Pr and rf . The relationship
factor, representing the probability value upon which a relationship to be true, is left inten-
tionally open6. As for Pr, we have already discussed the situation where Pr = 1 (“certain”
events), as a true condition regardless of the value of rf . But, not all relationships will have
an obvious nature, especially when stepping out of the realm of deterministic information
(e.g going from network identifiers to user preferences). Whenever Pr 6= 1, the relationship
between two events should be considered a weighted evidence. In these cases the model must
foresee that non-trivial relationships can be established. For that, we propose a weighted
variation of individual events, treated like evidences7. Each individual event will possess a
certain contribution wi to the overall correlation, weighted in a defined probability of pi for
a number n of correlatable events. Whenever n is sufficiently large for the deduced model’s
purpose, it is possible to check whether the summation in Eq. 3.5 is equal or larger than pr,
leading to a relationship. This approach, using composed or weighted events is highlighted
by Eq. 3.5.
ϕ(ex,ey) =

1 ∃Pi = 1, i = 1..k
n∑
i=1
wi
n
∗ pi
n∑
i=1
wi ≤ n (3.5)
The most important conclusion from Eq. 3.5 is that evidences can contribute with a weight
factor, bounded by the observation probability, leading to a probability, that can be matched
against rf . For each of the n evidences, it is possible to determine different wi and pi values.
6It should be the focus of future work, to determine what values of rf should be used, in light of the theories
discussed in Sec. 3.3.3.
7The usage of the term “evidence” immediately suggests the consideration of the Bayesian model, which is
used in many circumstances such as Spam detection and on Intrusion Detection Systems.
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For an collected evidence i, wi represents the weight of the evidence type. This is important
in different instantiations e.g. on the network, observing a link layer identifier has different
semantic value of observing an IP address. The second variable pi, determines the trusted
conveyed by the observation, which can also vary which the model instantiation, where on
the network, observing a link layer identifier on a core network might not yield a trustable
relationship. The same applies in scenarios where the user could be employing some sort of
privacy countermeasures.
In this scenario, if a relationship is not immediately established, it is possible to collect
more evidences i, with a corresponding weight factor of wi, and a trust factor of pi, resulting
in either discarding the collect information, or to establishing a relationship between ex and
ey. This is shown by the second branch in Eq. 3.5, which states that for n collected evidences,
each evidence i, contributes with weight wi and probability pi to find the relationship between
ex and ey. How to actually obtain the wi evidences should be a result from the discussion
presented in Sec. 3.3.3, because it refers to using contextual event information, such as be-
longing to a set of captured user information, to actually establish the link between events.
Nevertheless, the most relevant definitions are in Sec. 3.4.2 were we show how to actually take
the network related events and use them to build the information set of them, considering
mostly network information. It should be noted that the presented model allows a variable
number of event correlation, at any particular weight or correlation factor. For the purpose
of this Thesis, these concrete values can be omitted, given that most of the work will revolve
around certain relationships, established with network identifiers (as discussed in Sec. 3.4).
But, the model must accommodate a more generic approach that depends on several types
of information correlation. It is up to specific applications of the model to determine the
concrete values of n, pr or even wi, depending on the type of information, observations and
individual event contents.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the presented definition of events is that such an
atomic component provides simple mechanisms for relationship establishment regardless of
the level at which the model is being applied. Establishing relationships between events is
the focal point of the proposed rules concerning events. In fact, the nature of events allows
the definition of several correlation properties used to establish relationships. Events can be
correlated by matching the identifier, or subject, or by linking the contained information (or
even pieces of it). This indicates a two-fold system, designed to tackle the establishment of
relationships through either identifiers or subjects, as is covered from the network point of
view in Sec. 3.4. Alternatively, we have a semantic or contextual evaluation that depends
on several factors (this is outside of the scope of this work). But, when we focus on specific
domains, with well defined roles, these correlation can be greatly simplified. Nevertheless,
once a relationship is created, we can apply several mathematical properties to extend it to
other events, as is described in the following section.
3.3.2.2 Formal Rules and Relationships
The concreteness of the event-based approach provides straightforward means of establishing
relationships between distinct events. Once the relationship is defined, it is possible to apply
rules that determine how events relate to the user and to other events. This provide a formal
set of rules that can be applied to relate events to each other, based on a previous relationship.
Such an approach has been followed before in a privacy context by the Freiburg Privacy
Diamond, which defines a set of rules for relationships and relationship extension. In our case,
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the defined set of rules is fairly similar but scoped around events, providing a more focused
application on the network. Nevertheless, by drawing upon the rules defined by FPD, we can
define a model that takes into account events and relationships, establishing a bridge between
PRIVED and FPD. This is possible because events, or sets of events, can be used to describe
the tools that provide the relationships between User, Device, Location and Action in FPD.
To reuse FPD relationships, it is necessary to describe them in terms of events. Given that
the notion of event is not present in FPD, we can use it to bridge the gap of how relationships
exist within FPD. Taking FPD nomenclature, a relationship Rx,y can be expressed in terms
of events, providing a clear understanding of how the relationship is built (through events),
and how events can be represented in FPD, thus bridging the two models. First, we can
describe the relationship actors in FPD as events which convey the appropriate information.
We can represent the User with an event that conveys an identifier that identifies the user
eu. Similarly, an action is an event that denotes a particular action (or a set of events that
illustrates a high level action), ea. The same is true for an event that carries a location, el,
which can be a packet with an IP address or a GPS coordinate, and an event that identifies a
device (e.g. a MAC address), ed. Now, representing FPD relationships becomes straightfor-
ward. As discussed in Sec. 2.3.3, FPD defines a set of relationships that undermine privacy,
such as relationship between action and location. The example presented in Eq. 3.6 shows
how the relationship between action and location (Ral) can be represented by using events, in
this case linking an action event (ea), with a location event (El) thus reusing the important
relationship privacy work presented by FPD, but eliminating the gaps that do not show how
relationships appear.
Ral = ϕ(ea,el) (3.6)
With the above example, it becomes clear that it is possible to use events to represent all
of the FPD relationships. This leads to the conclusion that relationships, including those of
the FPD mode, can have a pragmatic network application. It is also important to establish
that a relationship in FPD terms is a relationship between well-defined event types, that
carry either, location, device, cation or user information. Accordingly, we can generalize FPD
relationships and formal rules to use generic events. From the set of FPD rules, we conclude
that the most important one towards events is transitivity, which we elaborate in Eq. 3.7,
stating that if a relationship exists between ex and ey, and another between ey and ez, then
a relationship exists between Ex and Ez, thus showing a linkage between events.
R{ex,ey} ∧R{ey ,ez} ⇒ R{ex,ez} (3.7)
This rule provides the basis for establishing multiple relationships across different sets of
information, based only on events. This indicates that the information conveyed by those
events can be assimilated into a larger set, discussed in detail in the next section, as a means
of exposing user information.
3.3.3 Information Set
We have defined the information flowing through the network as a tuple, composed by identi-
fier and data, where the identifier refers to a subject or user, allowing the construction of an
Information Set (IS) around it. From a privacy perspective, the IS provides a representation
of the information that can be gathered by an attacker. It is this feature that, privacy-wise,
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makes the IS concept very relevant, since by building it, we can define what is the potential
view of an attacker on the network, drawing attention to the private information that is being
exchanged.
Once the information collection process is underway, if two identifier relate to the same
subject, we expand the information set. This is the basic correlation process, where identifiers
become the common ground to threaten the user’s privacy. In these circumstances, identifiers
become a concern, closely related to the uniqueness of the identifier’s scope. Each identifier
is associated with a particular information set relating to a user.
The entire set of associated information is defined as the IS. It relates to the user, or
any relevant subject (depending on the attacker’s intent, this can be a host, a service or any
other entity), and compounds the whole range of information that an observer, eavesdropper
or attacker can obtain. The combined information is anything that can be observed about
the subject: it can be anything from network specific items, such as addresses, location,
consumed bandwidth, services, to anything that is user specific, such as eye color or height.
Nevertheless, we impose the requirement of an associated identifier, because every piece of
data must be properly indexed or labeled as in database systems.
The IS description opens the door at an informal definition, which is that of a user.
Given that, as argued, computational systems usually have no perception of the user, we can
treat the information set as the representation of the user on the system. We can assume
this representation as a global identifier, a common handle for the user, with associated
information, ranging from usernames to network addresses. One of the advantages of this
generic representation is that it leaves space for a user which can be the manifestation of a
legal entity, an not just a real person.
But, there is also space for a formal description stemming from events and the relationship
between them, leading to a mathematical concept of IS. Formally, we can see the information
set as a bundle of related events: whenever the subject of the information observed in different
events is (considered) the same, we are building an information set associated to that subject.
This relates to the rules defined in the previous section, which establish links or relationships
between events. A good representation can come from Set Theory [61], where we can state
that an Information Set is the set formed by all the events which share a relationship, as
shown in Eq. 3.8, where S is the set of all n events which share a relationship between them.
S = {e1, e2, e3, . . . , en}, ϕ(ex, ey) ≥ t (3.8)
Therefore, we can model the information relating to the user as the information set built
around a particular set of identifiers, which represent the user. The sensitive and private
information is the data that can be accumulated into the information set built around recog-
nizable identifiers. This is the information that must be modeled around identifiers and that
any privacy oriented solution must acknowledge and protect. With this definition, we can
define the threats on information gathering through Set Theory, where the attacks on privacy
are built on expanding a knowledge set, using correlation of events.
3.3.3.1 Building the Information Set
To prevent linking and correlation, we have to understand how it can occur within the pro-
posed model. From this, we are in a position to evaluate the best means to prevent or even
conceal the relationship that may threaten privacy on the network.
57
As mentioned above, a good approach towards building the IS is through Set Theory [61].
According to Eq. 3.8, every information set is built upon events that can share relationships
with events external to the set. Assuming that Sk represents an IS built of k identifiers, we
can outline the rules necessary to expand the IS. Assuming an event ex that belongs to Sk,
and a new event ey, which does not belong to any set, if there is a relationship between ex
and ey, then ey also belongs to Sk, as demonstrated by Eq. 3.9.
ex ∈ Sk, ey, ϕ(ex, ey)⇒ ey ∈ Sk (3.9)
Assuming that multiple sets exist, such as Si and Sj , we can state that, if they do not
share any events, they are unrelated (Eq. 3.10). But, if an event ei from Si exists and relates
to an event ej in Sj , then the expanded information set Sk is the union of both sets, as
denoted in Eq. 3.11, representing the expanded knowledge. This is not only present in [97],
but it is also expressed as a recognition attack in FPD [150].
Si ∩ Sj = ∅ (3.10)
ei ∈ Si, ej ∈ Sj , ϕ(ei, ej)⇒ Sk = Si ∪ Sj (3.11)
These expansion rules, based on Set Theory, define the basic operations to build an in-
formation set. They assume that the relationship between events is binary, leading to one of
two outcomes: an event either belongs to a set, or it does not. However, one of the outlined
values of the model is the possibility of probabilistic relationships. In these scenarios, where
relationships are not necessarily binary, the value of Set Theory becomes less apparent, as it
does not take into account weighted relationships.
Depending on how relationships are defined, the ϕ factor can be less than 1, forcing us to
assume a non deterministic relationship. A more adequate model to represent such weighted
relationships is Graph Theory. With Graph Theory each event can be represented as a vertex,
and each relationship is an edge between two events. As events occur they are mapped onto
a graph, with an associated edge and a respective weight. Then, the IS that represents the
information collected about a user, corresponds to the vertexes that are connected through
edges which have a value greater than a predefined threshold. This graph representation of
the IS can be simplified, as it is possible to traverse the graph and coalesce the vertexes which
share an assumed relationship, depending on the defined values for ϕ.
In practice we can assume that the representation is a mix of both graph and set theory,
because the coalesced vertexes form a set of their own: when a coalescence occurs, several
vertexes are combined into an information set, subjected to the same rules defined for set
theory. This occurs with minimal information loss, as the assumption for coalescing implies
that the relationships between information blocks in the same vertex are certain (or at least
above the coalescence threshold).
While both approaches, Set and Graph Theory, are possible and complementary, our
focus on certain relationships, observed through network events, places more importance on
set theory. Therefore, it is in this context that we observe how privacy in the network can
be defined, along with what relationships can be uncovered on the network, that lead to a
certain link.
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3.4 Privacy in the Network
One of the key aspects of the proposed model is that it shares a close relationship with the
network. Transforming privacy into events, information sets and relationships, mappable
to network concepts, provides the basic tools to provide privacy in the network. Whoever,
the three-fold approach is not yet completely palpable in network terms. The still existing
abstraction gap must be bridged by converting the model concepts into occurrences in the
network. The remaining challenge for the model is to complement the abstract definitions
with network terms, something that can be done through a practical analysis of the network,
given that the presented definitions already have their roots in network behavior.
In network terms, packets can be seen as events: each one has unique identifiers or cir-
cumstances, containing data (or payload) which can be linked or mined for more information.
However, given that each packet can contain several information blocks, which define the con-
tents of an event, we define on the network a “Packet Event”, as the occurrence of a network
packet that can contain one or several Events as defined by the information model. It then
quickly follows that Relationships are established between packet identifiers, leading to link-
age between independent (discrete) packet observations in the network. Basic relationships
can be extracted through observation, by looking at the plethora of identifiers carried in one
single packet.
From these packet events, more information can be inferred, either from the mentioned
data mining on the payload, or by establishing complex relationships between the pattern
of events, inferring more information about the user. Finally, the collected information is
aggregated into the Information Set, built around the observed identifiers, and forming the
notion of a user behind the gathered information. One important parallel that can be drawn
is that the identifiers present on data packets can mostly be considered Quasi-identifiers [34],
as done for the K-anonymity [141] and derivative solutions [84, 91, 92].
By approximating the model to the network, it is possible to understand the nature of
network interactions. This includes understanding the fullness of what relationships can
be established, and how, by understanding the composition of the model in a networking
environment. Therefore, it becomes possible to witness the consequences of introducing an
identifier into the Information set, and its impact on network related privacy, considering that
different identifiers have different meanings and bear different weights on end user privacy.
We highlight the most meaningful relationships and analyze existing network identifiers, along
with the information they carry. Understanding the nature of network based threats will be
increasingly important as we study and propose solutions that aim to increase user privacy on
different levels. Only in the light of a well structured model can we make such assertions and
proposals. But this knowledge must first start on the assumptions provided by an attacker
model, which defines the amount of information available to an attacker, threatening user
privacy.
3.4.1 Attacker Model
Before diving into the application of the model and potential threats on the network, it is
important to establish the attacker model behind the proposed discussions. As we instantiate
the model onto the network, part of the realization assumes that an attacker is obtaining
information on some point of the network, which will either soften or strengthen the conse-
quences of the attacks depending on where and how they occur. The attacker model assumes
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any type of passive listeners: this means any eavesdroppers on the network, at any point, as
well as legitimate correspondents, such as services, that can have access to user and network
information. This means that the location from where the attack is carried out is not limited,
nor is the eavesdropper: it can be either on the access network, either by legitimate peers
or eavesdroppers, or it can be accomplished throughout the network, either by the network
operator, wire-tapping (illegal or not), and by remote peers, typically services, both malicious
or normal.
This defines an attack scenario where the user can be taped on different levels in the
network, requiring the evaluation of several network assumptions, identifiers, and consequently
multiple threats. However, we can summarize the attacks along the following main lines:
• Passive local eavesdropping, typically on the wireless or even wired first hop.
• Remote colluding peers that can establish information relationships.
• Aggregated local and remote eavesdroppers or legitimate providers, such as the network
operator, resulting in an omnipresent-attacker8 threat scenario.
In fact, the network operator is the entity that harnesses the most means to void user
privacy. It has cross-layer information access, ranging from low level network information
to location, and even to high level privacy on the services it provides and associated legal
contracts. The remaining attackers can be a derivation of the omni-present attacker embodied
by the network operator. However, for the proposed work we do not aim to distinguish
between malicious or non-malicious providers or passive listeners. In the privacy spotlight,
every listener, legitimate or not, can assert or gather information about the user, and by
defining privacy as unwilling disclosure of information, all listeners are potential threats.
As we focus on possible threats and solutions, this attacker model frames the potential
information threats, as well as the type of attacker that can access and benefit from the
collected (private) information.
3.4.2 Applied Network Threats
The primary focus of any applied threat in the proposed model, must now turn to network
packets. Special attention should be applied to the identifiers they convey, how they are used,
and what information they carry. The underlying assumption is that observing a packet on
the network is observing at least one event that conveys meaningful information. This is how
data flows across the network, with purpose and intent. The information conveyed by packets
is not devoid of meaning, and can relate to the user, either directly or indirectly, contributing
to the construction of the IS. This further supports the notion that the information set can be
perceived as a set of references to the user, especially concerning the network, where several
seemingly dispersed identifier actually create a detail snapshot of the user.
Establishing these relationships between events, based on the conveyed identifiers, provides
the missing link on the conceptual model, leading to the notion of packets as events in the
model. The transmission of a packet will lead to a piece of information flowing on the
network. As network protocols demand, these events are properly tagged with identifiers and
types that define specific network interactions. It is this uniqueness that is also observed
8The omnipresent attacker is assumed to be the most harmful for privacy, because it can listen and gather
information on all points of the network.
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in databases [141], that enables the Quasi-Identifier [34] properties of identifiers conveyed in
network packets.
Based on these properties, we can assert several conditions that lead to relationships
between apparently unrelated identifiers. Being state driven, the network provides intrinsic
mechanisms for correlating identifiers and events. Many protocols hold internal state machines
based on identifiers. This alone enables relating multiple events. Furthermore, the layered
structure of the network creates a co-dependency of identifiers that can be explored for privacy
threatening purposes. Because protocols must be transported over other layers, identifiers get
reused and relationships are purposely created. We can safely state that everything in the
network is designed to be identifiable, given the discrete nature of protocols and (frequent
and finite) packets. For that reason, we have unveiled only the tip of the iceberg for network
correlation, as we will see throughout this Thesis. But, this clearly shows that there are
straightforward mechanisms that provide linking between events, assuming that there are
Quasi-Identifiers present in them.
In the network, we can highlight several means of identifier driven correlation, such as
time-based, contextual or layered. While these different types of correlation will be explored
in greater detail on the following sections, they already allows us to establish guidelines for
privacy threats: the relationships between events are based almost entirely on identifiers con-
tained inside the network packets, such as link, network layer or transport layer identifiers,
causing several threats. Such relationships can be classified according to two distinct ap-
proaches, that result from the nature of observations: relationships can be established based
on a single event that conveys distinct information (identifiers), or multiple events related
together through network techniques or inference. Further examining this conclusion shows
that in the former case there is a vertical relationship between identifiers, while the latter
exhibits an horizontal predisposition, when discussed in terms of network layers. This leads
to the following categorization of network based linkage:
Vertical Linkage: Correlation of identifiers present in a single packet event, typically by
observing multiple layer identifiers, corresponding to several information blocks, in a
single packet.
Horizontal Linkage: Establishing relationships between identifiers of the same nature (be-
longing to the same layer, horizontally on the network), leading to relationships between
multiple (packet) events.
These definitions make a concrete difference in the network, due to the nature of protocols
and the internal structure of network packets. Therefore, both are described in greater detail
below, properly explained and discussed.
3.4.2.1 Vertical Linkage
The proposed definition for vertical linkage indicates that it relies mostly on single packet
event observations that contain multiple information blocks. In practice, a vertical linkage
or relationship is established by deriving a correlation between a lower layer identifier and a
higher layer one. The simplest way to achieve this is through packet inspection, discovering
which (inner) identifier is being transported by the outer identifiers. This is shown clearly
in Fig. 3.2, where a link layer packet transports a network layer packet. If captured in the
access network, this relationship is unique to a user, associating all identifiers (and contextual
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information) to that user. Depending on the location of the observation, because different
identifiers have different relevance, we can harness information that uniquely binds together
several identifiers. This sort of relationship does not require further information to enable its
aggregation under a common information set pertaining to a user.
Mac Header IP Header Payload
IPv6 Address
MAC Address
Linkage
Linking by Packet Inspection
Network
Layer
Link
Layer
Figure 3.2: Linking between L2 and L3 Identifiers by packet inspection.
In the explained example, two identifiers appear together, creating a lasting relationship
between them. In this case, resorting to the proposed model, we can observe that each packet
event carries multiple information blocks, or payloads, which sustain the relationship. It is
also possible to conclude that it is a recursive property, innate to packet structure, that allows
us to establish the line to the conceptual model: because packet events can contain several
information blocks, corresponding to a simple event in the model, they can convey multiple
correlated events, establishing certain links between them. An example of this property is
linking between link layer identifiers and IP addresses shown in Fig. 3.2 where, by packet
inspection, a link between the L2 and the L3 identifiers could be established. This can be
expressed by Eq. 3.12, which defines a practical aggregation through identifiers, one of the
most fundamental linkage rules observed throughout the proposed work.
Ex(EL2, EL3) (3.12)
Once the relationship is established, it is straightforward to aggregate it to the information
set, a process which simply requires finding a set with matching identifiers. In this case,
using set theory is sufficient, given that the relationship is considered certain. While yielding
powerful and simple results, it is still worth mentioning that vertical correlation is highly
dependent on where it is performed. Identifiers have different semantic values depending on
their location in the network, and their direct relationship towards the end user is not always
relevant. As packets flow through the network, several identifiers can change, specially on
lower layers, confusing the relationship between user and identifier. This is where identifier
properties become important to consider: the scope of the identifier (i.e. the grasp of its
namespace) leads to different privacy-related conclusions depending on the network path it
is observed. As an example, consider a Link Layer identifier captured on the core network.
The relationship highlighted in Fig. 3.2 would mix a user IP address with an ISP-related
MAC address (probably belonging to a core router), yielding no positive relationship between
identifiers and with no consequence towards privacy. These properties are further discussed
in Sec. 3.4.3, where each individual layer is properly analyzed.
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3.4.2.2 Horizontal Linkage
Establishing horizontal relationships means that identifiers in the same layer or protocol are
related together, building on the previously collected knowledge. Because they operate on
the same layer, identifiers do not appear on the same packet events, thus avoiding the threats
discussed as vertical linkage. To establish such horizontal relationships, several collected
events must share a property, e.g. a common identifier, thus creating a link between them.
The relationship is not as obvious as those which appear in the same packet event, but can
still be performed.
It should be possible to establish a link between seemingly unrelated events, by either
deducing a relationship resorting to other identifiers (that appear on other layers), or by
inferring it due to the context of the layer they operate on (e.g. time based). The most typical
case is using a simple deduction through lower layer identifiers: whenever two identifiers on
the same layer appear in packet events (that yield through vertical linkage) along with a
common lower layer identifier, we can deduce the horizontal relationship. This fits the exact
definition of correlation, presented earlier, since it uses already collected knowledge (observed
events) as the basis for inferring new relationships. This is useful to correlate higher layer
identifiers such as usernames (through IP addresses) or even IP addresses (through common
MAC addresses), as presented in Fig. 3.3, which shows an example of linking two network
identifiers, B and C, by inference. This eventually leads to a link between the other previously
linked identifiers (achieved by packet inspection), A and D. From this process we can extract
a single set of identifiers that belong to the same user, or a fully connected graph, as explained
before. This is what usually happens with MAC address the network interface card usually
utilizes the “original” address, inserted into the firmware of the card by the manufacturer,
resulting in the fact that any communication using that device will use the same MAC address.
As a consequence, every IP address used on that device can be tracked back to the device,
whenever a link can be made between IP and MAC. More elaborate methods for performing
inference can of course be applied.
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Figure 3.3: Linking the same layer identifiers by horizontal inference.
This is expressed in the model through the functions that enable building the informa-
tion set: two different events yield a link between them (vertical, through identifiers) when
observed in the same packet event; later, if a relationship is built between two similar layer
identifiers present in different packet events, the previous relationships can be extended,
forming the information set. The importance of these horizontal relationships forces us to
understand how such a correlation can occur on the network.
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As discrete events, packets appear on the network at different times. This suggests a
temporal quality to events and identifiers. The interesting case for horizontal correlation, in
the terms discussed above, is that identifiers have different life-spans, which will lead to a
time based correlation.
Short lived identifiers (e.g. dynamic IP addresses) only correlate upper layer identifiers
during a defined time frame (e.g. the DHCP lease time). Therefore, inferring a correlation
between those identifiers is only valid within a well defined period. Beyond that, there is no
conclusion that can be made by using the vertical relationship between a lower layer identifier
and many upper layer ones. Once the period expires, the assumption is no longer valid, and
the relationship is dropped, most likely not to repeated itself in a near future. In the DHCP
example, it is only possible to establish such relationships while the acquired dynamic address
is in use, because once the lease expires, that address may be reassigned to another user.
However, depending on the identifier type, the lifespan may vary. Some long-lived iden-
tifiers can persist throughout longer periods. By lasting for a considerable amount of time
(e.g. lifetime of a device), some identifiers are used in an larger amount of communications.
The privacy threats that stem from the constant reutilization of the same identifier tied to
the same user or device, can facilitate the occurrence of horizontal correlations, followed by
larger information sets. Therefore, we can conclude that Long lived identifiers are prone to
more correlation threats of (transported) upper layer identifiers. This behavior is exemplified
in Fig. 3.4 using network and application identifiers, where the link between A and B occurs
in t(0,x), and link between A and C only occurs during t(x+y,t). Through these observations,
it is possible to conclude that a link between B and C exists. A practical use case for this is
contacting a service, using the same username, through different IP addresses, which can be
obtained dynamically through DHCP leases.
Coupling the identifier life-span property with the fact that the network is naturally
structured around layers and protocols, we have provided simple means for correlation across
several identifiers and layers. This conclusion is further supported by the analysis done later in
Sec. 3.4.3, highlighting the individual properties of several relevant identifiers, where lifespan
is just one of many interesting properties privacy-wise.
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Figure 3.4: Temporal linkage of identifiers.
The so far discussed means for attacking privacy are only valid in the scope of a long lived
analysis. If the mechanisms employed by an attacker are not adequate for evidence collection,
possibly complemented by off-band tools, the effectiveness of the discussed threats can be al-
most non-existent. Because these threats rely on temporal properties, they also depend on the
type of attack executed, either short lived attacks or longer periods of information collection,
used to build the IS. We make an effort not to distinguish between them due to the frequency
and simplicity involving the storage and exchange of user information in the network. When
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coupled with the fact that there is a long-term “memory” in the network, due to book-keeping,
logs or even legal mechanisms, this over-time correlation is not only possible, but probable.
In which case, either by direct live analysis, or post-mortem database information mining,
such attacks will be easy to carry out. This is how the discussed database attacks are per-
formed, but now scoped to network based Quasi-Identifiers, rather than Personal Identifiable
Information.
Horizontal correlation introduces the concept of probable events, since the observed events
and identifiers can be unrelated, leading to potential false positive relationships. This is part
of the theory described in Sec. 3.3.3, which includes the possibility of erroneous relationships,
depending on the strength of the collected evidences. This is possible in any evidence based
model, where weaker evidences may lead to wrong conclusions, and stronger evidences better
support a correct decision. In our approach, we consider that most results stemming from
horizontal correlation are so likely that usually leave almost no margin for error. As an
example, the probability of a device using random identifiers and generating a similar identifier
as another user (e.g. MAC addresses) is almost zero. These are identifiers that can cause great
losses in terms of privacy, where they are applicable. This type of probabilistic correlation
is classified as very likely and treated with P = 1, in our scenarios, simplifying any analysis
based on the PRIVED model.
The temporal correlation process establishes relationships between identifiers by resorting
to property that remains static over a determined time-frame (e.g. identifiers). But, it is
possible to establish additional relationships by chaining of vertical and horizontal correlation
mechanisms on the network, contributing to the information set. Relying on protocol and
identifier context, obtained from events and surrounding conditions, it is possible to infer
relationships between identifiers (and events). The key issue here is data mining on network
information, or on the event payload, to extract relevant private information. In this scenario,
the probability of the relationship depends on the mined information and the means to extract
it, leading to probabilities than will most likely not be certain. In this case, it is possible to
benefit from the PRIVED approach, as it can use conditional and probably relationships,
resulting from the evidence based system. And while we focus on deterministic relationships,
using probable relationships could prove to be an interesting privacy research path. Network
relationships are deemed probable, handled as evidences, and correlated against each other to
determined information leaks, and potential threats, as discussed in Sec. 2.3.4. Furthermore,
in one way or another, this type of approach is already surfacing on complex policy based
privacy negotiation schemes [87], performing privacy inspection on changed information.
3.4.3 Network Information Relevance
With the network correlation mechanisms described before, and the theory behind them in
place, we now turn our attention towards the identifiers seen on the network. As stated,
we treat network identifiers as Quasi-Identifiers centering much of the privacy discussion on
identifier observation and their relevant properties. However, we are yet to determine the
individual nature of identifiers that make up for different threats. Unless we isolate what
information can be gathered from each identifier, and how that information is relevant in
an overall privacy landscape, we cannot fully understand the consequences of capturing or
observing a particular identifier on the network.
To provide a privacy overview of identifiers, we look at each individual layer, analyzing
the unique privacy and network contributions asserted by each identifier exchanged on the
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network. So far, we have looked at network identifiers simply as unique numbers or strings
that have associated information. But network identifiers have more dimensions that need to
be explored. In fact, the different properties, specific to different identifier types, influence
the scope and relevance of identifiers.
In a nutshell, the relevance of the identifiers varies accordingly to the network segment
they appear on, leading to the idea that not all identifiers are interesting everywhere. As
discussed in Sec. 3.4.2.2, depending on where horizontal correlation is performed, observing
an identifier might yield private information or relationships: a cited example is binding a
core router link layer (L2) address with an end-user IP address (L3). Based on the previously
postulated ideas, we arrive at the definition of a Locality property of identifiers, detailed in
Sec. 3.4.3.1, which does not exist in the discussed literature. It can be defined as the scope of
the identifier, in privacy terms, that is connected to the purpose and namespace of identifiers.
Also related to the namespace is the uniqueness of identifiers, a direct consequence of the
namespace definition, that together with the locality, defines the important privacy analysis
vectors for different identifiers.
An indirect consequence of a namespace is the fact that identifiers themselves have mean-
ing, depending on their network functions. As an example, an IP address not only provides a
unique identifier for a host, but can also convey its topological position in the network. The
implicit meaning of identifiers must not go unchallenged, at a cost to user privacy, and must
be subjected to careful analysis, as carried out in the following sections.
The discussed properties indicate that, for the practical application of the privacy model,
the location of the events is indeed important. The places where events are observed can define
the scope of a relationship, making it important to define the purpose of identifiers, because
they can convey other meanings that influence privacy (e.g. IP can yield geo-location). In
practice, we must consider a combination of both locality and uniqueness to define the threats
posed by identifiers, specially considering packet observation, without neglecting their intrinsic
meaning. That is why some relationships can only be set within a defined spatial bound, as
discussed below. As an example, in a core router it is possible to link L2 and L3 identifiers.
The result is that every single IP served by that router will be linked to its L2 address,
forming a set of all IP addresses that cross that particular router. It is obvious that this does
not yield any knowledge gain on an attacker’s part, since it bares no meaningful information
concerning the users.
3.4.3.1 Spatial Relevance
We have been discussing that identifiers are usually confined to a particular space of action
where they are relevant. This spatial relevance, denoted as Locality, defines the network
scope in which an identifier has privacy meaning. This means that, when observed in an
event, identifiers are only relevant in a certain network context, or location, beyond which
they can become devoid of meaning, concerning the user that originated the message.
The locality of an identifier is a direct consequence of namespace and purpose. The
namespace defines the properties of the identifier, especially considering its uniqueness. Re-
gardless of how identifiers are used, whenever we observe them, depending on the reach of
the namespace, there are direct privacy consequences. Therefore, we can classify namespaces
according to their reachability: local or global. Identifiers are required to be either globally
unique, yielding a one-to-one relationship with a user, or local, where the uniqueness of the
relationship is only assured in a confined scope. Despite the namespace characteristics, we
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must also consider what is the actual purpose of the identifier in terms of its properties: if it
is required to uniquely identify an object within a global namespace, or within a restricted
location. While these two properties may seem similar, they are actually very different, and
this can be made very clear with an example: typically a link layer identifier is global in
nature, due to its namespace, but the purpose of the identifier is just to single out a device
on the access link, and is not used beyond that.
According to identifier purpose, it is important to understand how unique an identifier
must be, in what scope it operates, and what are the associated privacy consequences. De-
pending on the locality of an identifier class, it can yield more or less information regarding
a possible correlation, especially concerning the location where the identifier was observed.
This shows that the occurrence of specific identifiers cannot be decoupled from the location of
the event that yielded the identifier. Consequently, to understand locality and its usefulness
for linkage and correlation, we must define several network areas where different identifiers
bare different significance.
We tackle this issue by resorting to the earlier presented view of Next Generation Networks.
The typical NGN approach shows that the network is composed of i) the access, where an
access technology is used, e.g. 802.11 or UMTS, ii) the provider domain or local domain, and
lastly iii) the global domain, or in a more mundane view, the Internet. These three areas are
presented in Fig. 3.5, clearly showing a separation that is not only physical, but logical with
consequences on the identifiers. We must analyze each of these network sections separately
to understand what information they convey.
Access
Network
Link
Transport
Application
Local
Domain
Network
Link
Transport
Application
Global
Domain
Network
Link
Transport
Application
Critical
Optional
Safe
Figure 3.5: Spatial Relevance of identifiers.
We review each layer (link, network, transport and application) on the access, local do-
main, and global domain. For each of these combinations, we analyze the subject identified,
the observability of the identifier, and (as a result of the two previous) the relevance of such
an identification. In this analysis, the subject represents the network entity to which the
identifier relates; the observability classifies the identifier according to the need to be seen i.e.
if is it used by the network entities on that layer observe the identifier, and if not, if it can be
concealable (e.g. through encryption); lastly, the relevance, a qualitative classification based
on our understanding of the subject and observability, matched against the function of the
layer.
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3.4.3.2 Access Network
When referring to the access network, we are really considering the network’s last hop, some-
times referred to as the last mile. This is where an attacker can obtain the most information,
since packet inspection reveals the largest set of linked identifiers. The L2 Identifier is crucial
since it is represents the peer (and the user’s device) that is using the upper layer communica-
tion, i.e. the communicating peer. This means that the packet recipient and transmitter is in
fact the real owner of any identifiers contained inside packets, like the IP addresses, endpoint
identifiers, URI’s or usernames. Also, this is where it is usually easier for an attacker to obtain
packets for inspection, since these are usually broadcast mediums, e.g WiFi or Ethernet.
The most important identifier at the access network is the link layer identifier, which in
most technologies must be visible. It must uniquely identify a node in the access network,
making it very important for both network operation and user privacy. Beyond that, every
other identifier can be concealed (e.g. using 802.11i [67]) between the node and the first IP
router. But, their importance stems from the fact that they identify the end user, thus gaining
an important dimension when not hidden. This is summarized int Table 3.1, and represented
in the leftmost part of Fig. 3.5, showing the access part of the network and the important
identifiers. This figure indicates that the link layer privacy is critical, while the others are of
optional importance, as they can be concealed.
Layer Subject Observability Relevance
Link Endpoints Observable Crucial
Network Endpoints Concealable Important
Transport Endpoints Concealable Important
Application Applications Concealable Important
Table 3.1: Access Network
3.4.3.3 Local Domain
The local domain corresponds to the local part of the network where the topological infor-
mation on IP addresses is most relevant. This can also be seen as the Network Operator or
ISP domain. Here, the L2 identifiers bare almost no relevance since they pertain to network
routers and switches, given that this predominantly an L3 network segment where most pack-
ets are routed or switched. Therefore, the addresses present on packets have no particular
privacy importance to the end-user. Regardless, the addresses used at L3 have a significant
topological mapping and cannot be encrypted since routers need to properly process them.
In this case, an attacker is also able to inspect them and link the contained information.
The IP address is the most relevant identifier within the local domain. Even when using
different IP transport solutions, such as localized mobility, the IP is relevant and pinpoints
the node on the network. The remaining addresses are either not relevant or can be protected,
as summarized by Table 3.2. This is also reflected in Fig. 3.5, where the user is “safe” from
any link layer privacy threat, but the network layer is critical for privacy.
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Layer Subject Observability Relevance
Link Routers and Switches Irrelevant Irrelevant
Network Endpoints Observable Crucial
Transport Endpoints Concealable Important
Application Applications Concealable Important
Table 3.2: Local Domain
3.4.3.4 Global Domain
The third part of the proposed division consists on the global domain, which is usually
perceived as the network backbone (e.g. the Internet backbone). While for the most part,
it can be considered an L3 domain, it does not necessarily imply the same characteristics as
the Local Domain. These are usually high speed (optical) links that resort to label switching
for fast packet forwarding. Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) tunnels are usually in
place (or other protocols for that matter), operating between link and network layers. But
privacy wise, it is not assured that the upper layer identifiers are concealed within these
tunnels, and could be observed. That means that the identifiers, or addresses, flowing inside
the communication channels can contain meaningful information. The L3 addresses seen on
packets should be the ones used in the local domain, threatening user privacy, as well as all the
upper layer addresses, which could be concealed, as synthesized by Table 3.3. Remarkably,
on Fig. 3.5 we can see that the global domain is aligned with the local domain properties,
given that the identifiers used are the same, and refer to the same subjects.
Layer Subject Observability Relevance
Link Routers Irrelevant Irrelevant
Network Endpoints Observable Crucial
Transport Endpoints Concealable Important
Application Applications Concealable Important
Table 3.3: Global Domain
This similarity between local and global domain only dissipates in special conditions. On
of such exceptions is the when a locator-identifier split architecture is used. In this case,
there is the possibility that the conveyed (network) addresses only have a generic topological
significance, and might not even always map to the same upper layer identifiers, similar to
the L2 identifiers in the local domain. The direct translation of this into privacy terms is
that an attacker might not always gather correct information using the L3 identifiers, and
needs to dig deeper (end-point identifier, username, etc) in order to obtain relevant linkable
information.
3.4.4 Identifiers and Privacy
Exploring the relevant network spaces where identifiers exist showed that there is a discrep-
ancy between the identifier namespace and the areas relevant for privacy information, and
most importantly, between the scope of identifier and its purpose: identifiers (or addresses)
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which are only used locally, are unique, and therefore establish a one-to-one relationship with
the user, revealing a stronger than required relationship.
Therefore, we must analyze what each identifier carries as its meaning, especially consid-
ering the properties of the associated namespace, and the contextual information provided by
the identifier. This is because, the identifier is usually not used simply as subject identifica-
tion, but also conveys information about the associated subject (e.g location).
We take a layered approach, and evaluate the most important identifiers on each layer
in the network, to better pinpoint the primary threats stemming for network identifiers,
and to better understand how these threats can be solved, presenting the user with a privacy
preserving environment. By following the TCP/IP model, we focus on four different layers, the
ones most used at that convey more information: Link, Network, Transport and Application.
We also introduce layers that attempt to offer separation or decoupling between different
layers, such as layers often referred as 2.5 or 3.5.
3.4.4.1 Link Layer
The most common identifier used at link layer is the MAC address, which uniquely identifies
a network interface, and is usually 48 bits long. Even thought it provides two bits expressing
scope and administrative control, these are easily ignored at no cost to the purpose of the
identifier. In different technologies, e.g. UMTS, it can be a 64 bit identifier but the meaning
is similar. The MAC address could be generated as a random number given that it has no
imposed structure beyond its size (apart from the bits mentioned above). But for commodity
and uniqueness, a per-manufacturer prefix is usually imprinted in the device, making it easier
to track cards by manufacturer and model.
A MAC address has a global scope, but has only a narrow usage. It only has meaning in
the link reachable through the network device. In both wired and wireless technologies, the
scope of the identifier is limited to the broadcast domain, in which the device must respond
to direct queries. Beyond that, even though it is a globally scoped identifier - it should be
unique for each device, and consequently user - the identifier gets replaced by the target
device, which will route packets based on upper layer information. The conclusion is that the
identifier corresponds to a user, which is coupled to a unique device identifier, threatening
privacy when captured within the link scope, i.e. before getting replaced at the router.
Related to the link layer, there is an identifier class that is used only for transporting
benefits of upper layer packets. These identifiers are used between the link and network
layers, forming a wedge layer for special operating purposes. For simplicity, we assume that
they belong to the Link Layer because they share the same fundamental properties. These
identifiers do not define links with a real connection between them (e.g. an Ethernet cable),
but rather a login link layer connection run atop the link layer. Examples of these scenarios are
Virtual LAN (802.1Q) identifiers, which are used to emulate different physical networks over
the same switching devices. Another example is MPLS, which is used to create switching
environments through the backbone networks, serving as a fast switching technology that
simplifies the routing mechanisms by using label matching rather than complex longest-match
algorithms used on the network layer. These identifiers do not actually identify a device, but
rather a network (VLAN) or a logical tunnel (MPLS), and therefore do not constitute a direct
user privacy threat.
Considering link layer technologies, we conclude that in the access network, the link
layer identifier uniquely references an interface belonging to a terminal, along with the user
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associated with that device, binding also all the upper layer identifiers. This association
disappears when packets are routed at the IP layer and bridge different link layer domains,
where the MAC addresses are replaced, since they are only meaningful within a local scope.
But when a relationship with the L2 identifier is made, it will probably remain valid, since the
device identifier usually defaults to the card’s original MAC address (present in the firmware).
This is true until the card is replaced, or the MAC address is voluntarily modified by user or
operating system.
3.4.4.2 Network Layer
The primary identifier at the network layer is the IP Address. Either in version 4 or 6 format,
its purpose is to identify and locate a host on the network. It is a hierarchical addressing
structure divided into two different parts: the network prefix and the node identifier. The
network prefix is used to topologically locate the network to which the node belongs. Addi-
tionally, the node identifier uniquely identifies a particular node within its subnet. Together,
both parts point to a unique peer in the network at a specific topological location. The IP
address was originally designed to be a global identifier, and that is the case of both IPv6
address and public IPv4 addresses. But there are exceptions, both due to nature and ap-
plicability of addresses. By using NAT mechanisms in IPv4, private addresses can be used
to extend the size of the identifier base: one public address can have multiple users behind
it. This technique also conceals the topological network information behind the public ad-
dress, rendering private addresses meaningless outside of their applicable domain. There are
also some specific reserved ranges that do not carry any associated meaning, (e.g Multicast
addresses), which we do not consider for the purpose of this discussion.
On IPv6 there are special purpose addresses that also have singular properties. The IPv6
Link Local address is used for messages that should not be routed, i.e. only relevant within the
link layer domain, used mostly in the scope of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol [144]. These
addresses are built using the MAC address (EUI 64 bit expansion), establishing a one-to-one
relationship with the device, reusing identifiers.
The conclusion of the previous analysis is that, at any point in the network, an IP address
(v4 or v6) yields the topological position of the node, along with the identifier that distin-
guishes the node from another in the same network. This holds true unless special purpose
mechanisms are used (like NAT). This conveys the identification and location of host and
user, resulting in both tracing and tracking threats.
3.4.4.3 Network Layer Mobility and Separation
The wedge layer created between network and transport is important enough to deserve a
separate discussion. As means of providing mobility, along with other properties that depend
on the applied scenario, there are special purpose identifiers that create an indirection over
the network layer, enabling IP based mobility, retaining on-going connections as the user
roams through different networks.
While this is discussed in detail on Chap. 5, it is worth mentioning that to enable mobility,
solutions like MIPv6 [77] and HIP [112] have been proposed. MIPv6 [77] creates a separation
layer based on the same namespace with overlapping functionality to the network layer. While
the identifiers have a similar structure, they are trackable regardless of location, since multiple
locations of the same device (and user) can be aggregated through a common IP address. This
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is also true for IPv4. HIP [112] proposes a different approach by creating a completely new
namespace. It decouples the node identity from location, but with similar results as MIPv6
regarding mobility. Due to continuously updating location to peers, i.e. IP address, it is
possible to easily track the location of associated devices and users.
The two presented use cases show that, even though this wedge layer may seem beneficial
at first, privacy-wise it amplifies the network layer problems. Identifiers still suffer from the
same privacy concerns that affect IP addresses, but with simplified means to track the location
of endpoints (for mobility support). Since MIPv6 relies also special IP addresses, not only
can we identify the current location of a node, but also its primary origin, which is given by
the Home Address. HIP’s Host Identity (Tag) is a globally unique identifier that singles out
a node, and is mappable to the appropriate location. Even though HIP acts mostly on the
control plane, it unequivocally binds to the location of network addresses, so that it functions
in today’s networks.
However, this separation can allow the creation of solutions that tackle the privacy prob-
lems at those layers, because they enable underlying identifier replacement without breaking
connections, like we currently have on most L2 technologies.
3.4.4.4 Transport Layer
As complex as transport protocols may be, this is actually one of the most straightforward
layers to analyze. In existing IP architectures, the transport layer identifiers are usually the
network layer identifiers. This means that the transport layer suffers from the exact same
problems mentioned in the network layer, either when binding to the normal mechanisms or
to a wedge layer. Even in the face of these wedge layers, where the transport identifiers used
become the wedge identifiers, along with the port information, there is no actual semantic
change from one layer to another. In short, it suffers from the exact same issues as the network
layer, but with the added nuance of port numbers: port numbers allow inferring exactly what
application is being used, since there are well defined ports for well-known applications. This
along with topology and user pinpointing, can not only tell who is the user, but what is
the nature of its interaction in the network, resulting in an extraction of action through the
collection of observed events.
3.4.4.5 Application Layer
The main problem of addressing the application layer has to due primarily with the plethora
of available protocols, all of which deal with identifiers and identification in some shape or
form. Still, it is possible to single out trends and directives that deal with identification on the
application layer. Most Internet related protocols usually deal with HTTP based interactions,
resorting to Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), supported by DNS, for most (if not all)
types of interactions. Therefore, on the Internet, which has a strong HTTP component, it
is common to use Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) [18] and Uniform Resource Locators
(URL). These identifiers imply using an FQDN that requires conversion to a Transport Layer
identifier (e.g. IP addresses resolved through DNS) and a service related component. Also,
in some cases it is possible to include a user reference in the URI, resulting in the explicit
identification of the user.
In order to deal with growing requirements on the naming layer, a new class of identifiers
was introduced, the eXtensible Resource Identifiers (XRI), that are an enhanced and flexible
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extension of the URI/URL standards. With the added flexibility comes the potential for
stating more information about user and action on the identifier, raising privacy concerns.
As mentioned, the application layer is too large to come up with one approach or solution
that handles user privacy. As it stands, providing privacy on the application layer is out of
the scope of this Thesis, unless it concerns a conceptual privacy approach. Beyond that, it is
only treated as a generic identifier threat mechanism on a URI based scheme that must be
properly assimilated. Application layer identifiers are usually either application or domain
bound, making them uniquely identifiable within a domain or an application namespace.
This means that an email address identifies a user within the mail related protocols such as
SMTP, POP and IMAP among others or a username at a particular site. The degree of privacy
information that is leaked through these types of identifiers relates to the size of the domain
to which they apply. However, they tend to be global, since the unique user identification part
is usually coupled with its domain counterpart to properly scope the conveyed information,
such as an email address like user-id@domain-name.com.
3.4.4.6 Identifier Summary
The main conclusion of the analysis on the most significant identifiers in the network stack
shows that they are as diverse as their meanings. Table 3.4 provides a necessary summary
about the scope and meaning of identifiers.
By inspecting the MAC address we can see that, regardless of having only local meaning,
it is globally scoped identifier, as it uniquely addresses a device in the world. Its flat structure
shows that there is no particular need for extra meaning beyond an identifier, also falling short
on the justification of using a global scope. Similarly, IPv4 is global both in scope and in
meaning, as it uniquely identifies a host in the a globally connected network. Moreover, there
are variations to this approach based on specific deployment scenarios and protocols, which
reduce the scope to local. Nevertheless, the main usage scenario is global. For IPv6, these
scenarios are still uncertain, and the current application is global, not considering exceptions
or link local addresses. These consideration on IP addresses take care of both network and
transport, because ports only add local multiplexing, and do not impact addressing structures.
Finally, if we consider the application layer as merely URI/XRI based identifiers, we can
see that their size is variable, as well as its applicability. However, the nature of the identifiers,
built using a global FQDN and an identifier unique within that FQDN, leads to the notion
of a globally scoped identifier.
Generally, what we observe is that each identifier or namespace possesses different prop-
erties that adequate its use to their specified layer. These properties, suited to particular
application of network protocols, lead to different privacy related information conveyed by
identifiers, as already discussed. But, the most interesting conclusion is that there is a clear
Identifier Size Scope Meaning
MAC Address 48 Global Link Domain
IPv4 Address 32 bits Global Global
IPv6 Address 128 bits Global Global
URI/XRI variable Global variable
Table 3.4: Summary of most relevant identifiers and their scope.
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overreach in scope. From the discussed identifier, all have a global scope, even if some can be
applied in limited domains. The most critical example concerns link layer addresses, which
are only used in the local physical network, but uniquely identify a device in the entire world.
In fact, many identifiers have a global meaning and only a scoped meaning, out serving their
purpose. This shows that there is much that can be done for network privacy, considering
identifier structure and the applicability domains of identifiers.
3.5 Network Privacy Protection
The previous sections addressed the process of how to undermine user privacy using a system-
atic model. In most cases, this is only interesting when used as means to defining countermea-
sures against the identified threats. In our case, we showed that knowledge can be constructed
by observing events and establishing relationships between them, to form information sets.
This points at two different steps that undermine privacy: first, the establishment of rela-
tionships between events and, second, the aggregation of those events into an information
set.
This leads to the conclusion that, in order to protect privacy, we should either conceal
the relationships between events or prevent them from being aggregated into an information
set (or even combine both approaches for greater privacy). In practice, we can hide the re-
lationships between identifiers by protecting them, and thus avoiding any privacy leakage.
Alternatively, we can try to protect the user’s privacy as a whole, by protecting information
from being aggregated towards the information set. This translates into roughly two seg-
mented approaches with distinct characteristics. On one hand, to protect user privacy we
must look at the network as a whole, guided with a consistent vertical view over all protocols.
On the other hand, we must focus on a designated layer with specific properties, in order to
conceal eventual relationship between identifiers, either through their interactions with above,
below between layers.
The only way to achieve this is by understanding what protecting privacy means, what
protecting identifiers means and how both can be achieved.
3.5.1 Protecting Privacy
Protecting privacy directly relates to the user, and not to identifiers and protocols, which
are merely tools employed by user and network to carry out information exchange. In our
approach, we imply that protecting privacy means the protection of the information set
associated with the user, preventing it from increasing due to network observed relationships.
While using identifier protection mechanisms necessarily improves privacy on the basis
that the identifiers based relationship are protected, the reverse is not necessarily true due to
several conditions: i) the correlation can be desired, under certain conditions (e.g. personal-
ization); ii) when communicating with peers or services, some identifiers must be released to
identify the user; iii) correlation free environments cannot be guaranteed, in most cases. In
an optimal privacy environment, establishing relationships would be impossible, eliminating
the need to to define and build an information set based on the proposed model. But, the
enumerated conditions lead to the conclusion that first, its is necessary to provide an approach
that guides privacy solutions, and only then concern ourselves with identifier protection. As
such, identifier protection solutions can be important, as they provide mechanisms that can
aid in reducing the information set, but are only one approach. The privacy goal should focus
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on reducing the information set, which could be achieved by using the transient identifiers
that loose relative importance, instead of focusing on protecting identifiers. The concept of
reduced information sets is presented next.
3.5.1.1 Reduced Information Sets
Preserving user privacy must rely on reducing the information set associated with a particular
identifier (or user). Given that the user information is aggregated into the information set, a
larger set directly results in less privacy enjoyed by the user. Therefore, the first step towards
increasing user privacy is to reduce the information set associated with the user. This can
resort to any number of strategies, such as identifier protection, discussed below. But, concep-
tually it is necessary to establish barriers between events. The basic idea is to create vertical
shields between information, and instead of one large information set, produce several smaller
unrelated sets where the user privacy is maximized. The result is that information previously
associated with the user is now broken across different aggregated identifiers, scattering the
information. To create these shield, more importantly than concealing relationships, is con-
trolling how they are aggregated. An approach to solve this would be to generate random
identifiers that are only related to the intended IS.
Using any of the introduced techniques contributes to fewer relationships and smaller
information sets, which can boost user privacy. The optimal situation in information re-
duction is to randomize identifiers per atomic operation, associating one operation with one
untraceable identifier. Nevertheless, to control these relationships, it is necessary to protect
identifiers, in most cases. There should be a balance between techniques that provide inner
and inter layer privacy, but all under the scope of mechanisms to provide reduced information
sets, that are the true threat to user privacy.
To assist the idea of creating vertical shields, that define several reduced information sets,
we also use techniques that aim to protect identifiers (and conceal relationships), through
vertical and horizontal separation, as discussed next.
3.5.2 Protecting Identifiers
Most threats on network identifiers stem from the vertical or horizontal threats discussed in
Sec. 3.4.2. Such links can be avoided by protecting identifiers, thus breaking the relationships
between them. But, no matter how commonly the expression is used, there is usually no
clear understanding of what protecting identifiers means or what it entails. Protecting iden-
tifiers means resorting to special procedures or mechanisms to conceal a particular identifier,
therefore protecting its existence. If an entity (e.g an attacker or eavesdropper) is unaware
of a particular identifier, that identifier is protected in the sense that it does not yield any
information about any user, be it real persons or protocols to which the identifier belongs.
To safeguard identifiers, we can provide specific layers of protection. By applying layer
specific solutions that protect identifiers, used or conveyed on a given level of the network
stack, we can segment privacy solutions according to what they provide. This can be converted
to the approach that we undertook for threats, which is to create vertical and horizontal
separation layers between identifiers:
Vertical Separation This describes a horizontal barrier that separates the identifiers on
each layer. Any identifier conveyed by the layer in question is hidden, and unavailable
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to any attacker on the network or to lower layers. This thwarts vertical correlation
threats, by concealing its existence.
Horizontal Separation Horizontal separation means to create a shield between identifiers
on the same layer, thus avoiding their correlation through observation on the same
network layer. Identifiers should be shielded in such a way that it is impossible to draw
a conclusion based on straightforward horizontal threats.
Both of these concepts, can be combined to reduce the amount of relationships observed on
the network. When coupled with the reduced IS approach, also associated with randomized
identifiers, can provide a strong set of tools to provide privacy. But first, it is necessary to
understand how vertical and horizontal separation can be achieved.
3.5.2.1 Vertical Separation
To achieve vertical separation, it is important to create a barrier between identifiers. One
example is to use encryption mechanisms on network packets. In fact, encryption at any
layer hides any upper layer identifiers, that are conveyed inside the encrypted payload. With
encryption techniques, like IPSec, it is possible to create an opaque tunnel that no entity is
able to inspect, besides the endpoints. Opaque tunnels define secure communication channels
that conceal any information flowing inside. Such an approach provides a few advantages
such as tunnels are reusable for several communication sessions, and in some cases, can be
fairly simple to deploy and establish. However, they fail to protect the endpoints, since they
only provide a horizontal separation layer and do not conceal the currently used (endpoint)
identifiers. Another drawback of using tunnels results from the increased communication
overhead, reducing packet efficiency as control data, and processing, is required for the same
amount of exchanged data. Also, a negative aspect often overlooked concerns the use of
multiple encryption tunnels at different layers. It is not uncommon to use Transport Layer
Security (TLS) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connections that overlap in functionality with
mechanisms such as IPSec. When used together, we face a two-tunnel penalty that can
negatively impact performance. Each of these tunnels is protecting the conveyed data payload,
but the application data is protected by the TLS tunnel and by the IPSec tunnel, which can
be waste of resources and a security redundancy.
Source 
Endpoint
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Endpoint
Opaque Tunnel
Unobservable Encrypted Data
Figure 3.6: Identifier protection through encrypted tunnel, unobservable by eavesdroppers.
These drawbacks do not necessarily mean that opaque tunnels are a flawed solution.
In fact, such technologies provide a quite effective privacy protection mechanism, for the
sole purpose they were designed to achieve. Therefore, they should be extended towards a
consistent use, taking advantage of other means to protect the transport identifiers, without
having rely on lower layer tunnels. However, this type of solution only covers identifier-based
threats on the network where there is identifier matching or aggregation. Even so, opaque
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tunnels are just an example of how the vertical separation can be achieved. The underlying
principle is to create a barrier between two adjacent layers in the layered model, which could
be achieved through other means e.g. creating a shim layer with interchangeable identifiers.
3.5.2.2 Horizontal Separation
While vertical separation is discussed between layers, horizontal separation focuses on identi-
fiers in the same layer. Breaking horizontal relationships must unequivocally resort to using
different identifiers that no not provide obvious relationships within the same event space.
This implies the use of solutions like pseudonymity, where multiple identifiers are used on the
same layer to hide user interactions.
Using different identifiers on the same layer is only vulnerable to the use of band or con-
textual information to link two events together, forcing the attacker to resort to the discussed
probabilistic scenarios that become harder to deploy. When necessary, these example hori-
zontal shielding techniques should be complemented with vertical separation techniques for a
more complete ecosystem in privacy protection. However, as discussed in Sec. 3.4.2.2, hori-
zontal correlation threats that resort to side channels or contextual information requires more
than changing identifiers or concealing them in opaque tunnels. They demand more evolved
privacy considerations as will be discussed in the next chapters. Nevertheless, the concept is
simple enough to expand to both situations and is summarized as a need to establish a barrier
between identifiers or events in the same layer in such a way that they are not relatable. This
can be done by different identifier mechanisms along with a privacy protecting mechanism.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we started by proposing a privacy definition, supported by previous definitions
that rely on information disclosure and identifiers [141]. This paved the way for the proposed
privacy model, established upon simple definitions that try to describe privacy interactions
using concepts that can directly relate to the network: identifiers.
The PRIVED model, presented in Sec. 3.3 and subsequent sections, uses the proposed
privacy, linkage and correlation definitions and introduces the concepts of Information Set,
Event and Relationship. The IS creates the necessary comprehension on user information
directed towards the network, while the events translate the repercussions of network inter-
actions on the user. This is achieved through the notion of relationship, a key component
of the PRIVED model as well as of other discussed proposals [150, 65].This can provide the
right balance between abstract and pragmatic concepts for building the PRIVED model.
One important advantage of our approach is the effort to keep the model as close to the
network as possible, allowing a clear integration path between model and network. By dis-
cussing how linking and correlation occurs on the network, we were able to show the usefulness
of the model, and how it can describe network privacy. By extending the PRIVED definitions
with identifier-based threats, established through horizontal and vertical relationships on the
network, it is possible to show the resulting privacy loss.
Focusing on identifier-based threats, we discussed the relevance of each major identifier
on the lower network substrate, which includes link, network, transport and even application.
Here, the network privacy review (presented in Sec. 3.4) becomes important: it provides a
basic understanding of the network, which is now subjected to our proposed model, thus
resulting in a synergy between the theory and realization of the problems we face on the
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network. By combining these two approaches, we were able to outline a clear vision of the
identifier issues we face on the network, which are the core of privacy threats, along with the
potential hazards of each individual protocol identifier.
One of the most important conclusions regarding the analysis of identifiers and the network
as a whole is that protocols can single-handedly compromise above layers, thus jeopardizing
privacy throughout the network stack. Not only can they compromise above layers, but also
other identifiers on the same layer, further undermining user privacy. This conclusion em-
phasizes the need for a vision of vertical and horizontal privacy threats. Using a systematized
view, the vertical and horizontal conceptualizations, we were able to explain the difference
between protecting privacy, which is a vertical coordinated effort, as shown in Sec. 3.5, and
protecting identifiers, relating to a horizontal view of privacy. These, in our opinion, are
fundamental principles that show a solution path towards privacy preservation in the net-
work: the vertical aspects are directly related to the user, and must be handled vertically,
whereas the horizontal aspects deal with each individual protocol or layer, and can be han-
dled orthogonally (as long as the vertical issues are addressed). These conclusions shape the
contributions in the following chapters, which further explore this duality: in Chap. 4 we
tackle the vertical problem, as opposed to Chap. 5 where we deal with the horizontal threats
that appear in different layers. There is always a connection between vertical and horizontal,
given that horizontal threats can undermine vertical approaches, requiring a balance which
is also explored in the face of different solutions, and even architectural paradigms, in the
following chapters.
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Chapter 4
A Vertical Approach to Privacy
The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
Aristotle in Metaphysica
After modeling privacy, in the previous chapter, we dive into the different possibilities and
approaches that increase user privacy in the network. In this chapter we aim for a vertical
solution for privacy that encompasses the different dimensions of the user’s interaction with
the network, focusing on his information. We do this by proposing the concept of a Virtual
Identity (VID), a generic approach that models users in NGN systems, describing an identity
centric approach to network paradigms. On top of this concept, we present a framework
composed by the necessary entities, a data model, an overall architecture and the necessary
support components. Together they form the VID Framework.
The structure of these partial identities is oriented at limiting the information seen
on the network. Therefore, the proposed solution segments user information, resorting to
pseudonyms used towards network and services, and simultaneously, provides the means for
concealing private information whenever possible, supported by the application layer. More-
over, because the proposed approach must reach the different layers of the network, we must
handle how pseudonyms are translated into network mechanisms, leading to a network pseu-
donymity concept. By understanding what moves and differentiates different pseudonym
solutions, as shown later in the chapter, we introduce a cross-layer pseudonymity approach
to support virtual identities in the network.
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4.1 Introduction
It has become apparent that privacy is not limited to a single layer or protocol. The threats
on each layer along with the dependency between layers, define a clear landscape: individual
layers have their own privacy issues, due to specific protocols, mechanisms, identifiers and
conveyed information; but, different layers, especially those adjacent in the network stack, can
compromise each other through linkage and correlation techniques. The resulting inter-layer
dependency, in privacy terms, requires a consistent approach, where we must consider the
network as a whole, before considering solving individual threats. To achieve this, we propose
a vertical approach that translates into privacy considerations that spawn to every layer in
the network, providing the basic instruments for preserving user privacy. In practice, this can
be described as a vertical view over the network privacy issues, that relates to user privacy.
In this context, the most pressing issues concern the presented identification problem, and
every associated mechanism which builds on the user information set.
There must be a common framework to aggregate user related information, and therefore
preserving user privacy by controlling how information gets associated to an information set.
In this chapter we present a framework that handles user related information, tackling how the
user is perceived in a cross-layer (network) view. This enables control over what information
blocks are actually disclosed, which can be either user or network related. The vertical nature
of the framework requires an aggregation point for all the user and network information. We
propose using identity as the vertical driver that handles user information, through IdM
concepts and technologies. We extend this feature to become the network privacy glue that
holds the different layers together in the light of a VID concept, defining a new paradigm to
approach network privacy problems.
Using the VID as a fundamental concept, alongside all the necessary support concepts, we
present the VID framework in Sec. 4.3, which proposes a vertical identity-based aggregation
layer, consolidating privacy in the network stack. An important part of the framework is the
VID IDentifier (VIDID), which provides the basic building block for the vertical view over the
network. We also cover the high-level mechanisms required by such a layer, that also serve as
the privacy tools for different elements in the network stack. Given that the VID framework
heavily relies on the concept of pseudonyms, we explore how network pseudonyms can be
used for privacy, in Sec. 4.4. The results in the introduction of a cross-layer pseudonymity
solution, Virtual Network Stacks, detailed in Sec. 4.5. The proposed solution is evaluated in
Sec. 4.5.4 through a theoretical and practical analysis that provides conceptual boundaries,
by highlighting design barriers and benefits, as well as performance expectations based on an
experimental prototype. We close the chapter by discussing the benefits of the pseudonymity-
based vertical identity solution in Sec. 4.6.
4.2 Virtual Identities
The privacy analysis done so far (including network models) has led to the conclusion that
neither the user nor providers (service or network) know how to express privacy in a clear
and tangible way. This stems in part from the fact that there is still no accurate or consistent
representation of the user, making it hard to design or provide any privacy solution. But this
problem goes beyond privacy: there is a generalized lack of understanding on how to represent
the user in the communications ecosystem, undermining several network and service efforts.
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In most cases, the user is a number or an identifier, whereas in other cases it is represented
by personal information. However, this information can vary from interaction to interaction,
leading to the complex problem of how we can represent the user in a digital system.
Apart from user representation and identification issues, there other aspects that reflect
on the way users currently interact with communication systems. As users resort to different
applications, seeking comfortable access conditions and services, they establish different trust
relationships exchanging privacy-sensitive information. This user information, the digital
representation of user identity as data, can end up distributed (and even duplicated) among
different platforms, introducing several obstacles that both user and system need to overcome.
The first and foremost problem is that user information can become inconsistent. As data
modifies and “evolves”, the user alone is incapable of maintaining his information properly
updated, simply because it’s an overwhelming task. Moreover, the user has multiple services
with different sign-on procedures and credentials, which are hard enough to manage even
without requiring the coordination of the information associated to those accounts. This
shows that there is a crippling inability to make use of data across different platforms, even
if that is in the best interest of the user. Consequently, it becomes difficult for the user
to manage and control privacy information across several platforms, resulting in the loss of
control over all his digital information.
As users move towards an connected lifestyle, the concept of Digital Identities can pro-
vide a meaningful representation of user data in digital formats, showing potential to be a
breakthrough and convergence technology that addresses these concerns. The Virtual Identity
concept, explored in the topic of this Thesis and also within the IST Daidalos II [71] Euro-
pean Project, adds another dimension of flexibility to digital identities, making privacy and
the multiplicity of roles part and parcel of the solution. The VID approach not only tries to
provide a framework that defines how the user is presented in networked systems, but also
seems adequate to be deployed by telecommunication operators, exploring already existent
trust relationships.
The main goals behind virtual identities are to overcome the current privacy shortcomings,
targeting a unified approach to privacy, along with new communications paradigms. First
and foremost, the objective is to link identification to the user, rather than to the device, re-
converting the network and privacy discussion. This shift allows us to rethink many network
processes, especially access across several devices and while on the move (user mobility rather
than terminal mobility). In fact, this removes the limitation of owning a device that travels
with the user, leading to a concept of seamless and ubiquitous network access. This simplifi-
cation and transparency is extended to different aspects, such as billing, enabling the user to
limit customer relationships to fewer trusted providers, and also simplified management and
control of private information across platforms.
While these objectives may seem daunting, they can be feasible with a vertical approach
that ties user identities to a cross-layer network concept. We focus on the privacy implications
and proposals of putting the user, and not the terminal, at the center of the communications,
preserving privacy control even towards the network provider.
Fig. 4.1 illustrates a user-centric view of the world that frames the VID concept. The user,
in one of several roles (worker, boss, father), uses one of many access possibilities (e.g. DSL,
car-to-car) to access the digital world, such as at home, in the office or while shopping. Each
such use could correspond to a specific “Virtual Identity” of the user, and different providers
will only perceive the information which the users so desire - regardless of the communication
layer where they operate. The overall concept, aligned with the framework presented below,
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   Figure 4.1: The virtual digital world for a user
links the real and the digital worlds, thereby considering various contractual and contract-like
relationships that a user has. These relationships serve to vouch for some aspects of the user’s
attributes, such as nationality, driving capability or financial credibility. Nonetheless, the user
should remain in control of personal sensitive data. In addition, various contractual partners
should be able to exchange user data in a controlled way (federation), while respecting both
the users’ and the contractual partners’ needs.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates the basic approach. To begin with, we note that the VID reflects a
collection of data constructed by the user for a particular purpose. It contains an identifier,
called VID IDentifier, but the VID itself is far more than an identifier. Though the VID
concept is not restricted to persons, we use persons for explanation purposes as the starting
point - the extension of this to other entities is afterwards immediate. The physical person
is the real identity (or uniqueness over time) of the person with all its associated attributes,
as shown in Fig. 4.2. Some of these attributes may change without affecting the identity.
Such uniqueness over time may also be held by legal persons, such as companies or societies,
though their uniqueness over time is more easily challenged. Often, in common language and
in public debates, “identity” is also used to denote belonging to a specific group, reflected in
terms such as “national identity” or “religious identity”. This latter usage is not more than
a user attribute or group membership. These “common language identities” are dealt in our
model as attributes or properties of a real identity.
Many attributes or properties of a physical person are stored by contractual partners and
governmental organizations. A birth certificate, a driver’s license or a passport are examples
that reflect data stored at an office, and may contain user data, such as date of birth, ability
to drive, names of parents or address. These credentials - or issued identities - are then
directly used for purposes such as travel to some other countries. A very different type of
issued identity is the SIM card, which stores data related to mobile network access rights and
a link to the person using it. These issued identities are not only inflexible, because they
cannot easily federate across organizations, but they also do not allow the user to control
what information is revealed. At the other end, for the web and for applications, we often
have names and passwords as the issued identity. This incorporates what we note as the
contractual or acquired attributes (Fig. 4.2) extending issued identities. However, it is worth
taking a broader view of what this means in a more grasping communications scenario.
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Figure 4.2: The construction of an encompassing Virtual Identity.
The VID concept builds on such real world schemes, adding a new dimension of flexibility
by enabling the choice of revealing, or not, user information. Credentials that allow the user
to make well-defined assertions, which are nothing more than user-related information blocks
certified by a trusted party, can be used by the user to construct virtual identities, each of
which reflects a specific scope of use, which may be linked to role assumed by the user (e.g.
boss, teacher, client), or persona (the contextualized view of the user highlighted in Fig. 4.1).
In this scope, the VID is equivalent to the persona embodied by the user on the network, and
the terms become synonyms.
The overall data contained in a virtual identity should be under the user’s control, and
brings together an intended scope of use, such as reflecting a private person who does not
want to reveal any personal information for use in a low cost sector only. It should be noted
that the user does not even need to reveal all the data of the VID when accessing a service:
the revealed VID data can be filtered to whatever is needed or whatever the user wants to
reveal.
This presents a new approach in communication systems. When access to the Internet
and other communication infrastructures and services is not a privilege of the few but a right
of many, the VID opens the door to on-line digital identity. In this new scenario we must
respect the use privacy, and the VID shields user information, protecting his personal life, e.g.
relieving the user from the worry that the bank has access to information about services he
paid for. The VID takes into account the different identities and roles we incarnate each time
we turn on our computer, mobile phone or PDA. Only the a subset of the identity information,
required for a given role and acceptable to the user, should be disclosed. Depending on the
situation, anonymity and even concealment of attributes such as name, profession, or age,
should be possible. The information needed to provide a service varies greatly and seldom
requires detailed personal information. In some cases, only the ability to pay is required, in
other cases proof is needed about being above some age limit or about being citizen of some
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country. Nevertheless, legal tracking capabilities will need to be supported.
All of these attributes are part of the user’s digital identity, therefore the user should have
control over what is disclosed when accessing a service, as well as the choice on whether this
information is kept private or shared with others. If the information required by a service is
more than what the user is willing to provide, service access may fail. Furthermore, users are
not the only ones with several (virtual or digital) identities. Any entity capable of establishing
legal relations with other entities can benefit from this framework. We propose that users,
groups, service providers, network operators and even banks all share this identity framework
and utilize it to communicate with each other and establish their relations, not based solely
on their “real” identity but also on their “virtual” one.
Given the ambitious reach of defining virtual identities, it must be contextualized in a
support framework (Sec. 4.3), which, bound to the law, presents its users with a range of new
and interesting possibilities in the fields of privacy, identity and federation. However, this
can only be done in light of the privacy model, and with clear design guidelines (as discussed
below).
4.2.1 VID in a Privacy Model
The virtual identity can be seen as a privacy aware information aggregator, leading to the
assumption that all the information present within a VID relates to each other in some way.
This view is aligned with the Information Set (IS) from the PRIVED model, where the VID
is a set of user related information blocks. The parallel drawn between the VID and the IS,
constructions that share a natural relationship, only differs from the observer’s perspective,
presenting a small difference concerning the purpose of the set. The IS is a privacy construct
used within the model to detail the aggregated information through relationships extracted
from events. With the VID, the paradigm is slightly different, because it is a user oriented
construct where information is controlled and disclosed willfully by the user, according to
privacy aware operations. But, regardless of who builds the set, the contents are similar.
From the attempt to model the IS under the specific conditions mentioned in Sec. 3.5.1.1,
where we highlight that privacy comes from reducing the information contained in each set,
comes the privacy focus of the VID. The aim of the VID is to provide this reduced set, a
part of the user information set that is not related to any other IS. In this set we place
the information required for a VID to access a service without any issues (e.g. information
shortage). Obviously, it can contain more information, but that urge should be feigned off,
to retain a better chance of privacy. Nevertheless, in some situations, as we will see below,
the information set can be quite large, providing a highly customizable environment for the
user. The nature of the partial identities, presented as a Virtual Identity, presents the initial
building block of a more generic abstraction, which is to reduced the information associated
with a Virtual Identity as much as possible.
We use the VID to tackle the vertical aspects presented in the model, splitting informa-
tion across several sets through the partitioning principle. This makes it less vulnerable to
privacy threats, minimizes the consequence of a privacy breach, and puts the disclosure of
information (conceptually) in the hands of the user. And, while the IS is the result of privacy
mining technologies, as outlined before, the VID provides strategies and structure to control
information vertically. It must be noted that, to provide the vertical component based on
partial identities that limit the information set size, the VID must respect the IS principles
to avoid into linkage and correlation in the network. This is where the IS and VID walk
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hand-in-hand.
While the PRIVED model and the mapping between VID and IS exist only to deal with
privacy related concepts, the VID defines a paradigm that goes beyond privacy. This requires
that we explore other dimensions in the light of the overall framework, as highlighted next.
4.2.2 Dimensions of a Virtual Identity
When undertaking the task of defining how users are perceived from the network point of
view, and aggregating that with an information model that suits both user and network needs,
it is important to define a clear set of guidelines that enable building a complex architecture.
Specially considering that the Virtual Identity aims at providing a new paradigm for user
representation and consideration in the networking systems, it requires considering several
dimensions that affect the network ecosystem, with special emphasis on the privacy aspects.
The VID concept can provide significant advantages in several network vectors. We define
several dimensions that are part of the guiding principles present in the VID framework, that
stem from the VID concept: privacy, Unification and Uniformity, Contractual Information,
Context Data and Access Control.
Privacy, as discussed before and embodied by the PRIVED model, is one of the core fea-
tures that a VID approach can provide, especially in an NGN environment. Users travel from
and in networks with no concern for their privacy or even awareness of privacy threats. Wher-
ever they go and connect their devices, they inform the world of their presence and movement.
One of the main objectives of this model is that the user not only regains control of his data,
but also that he can access the network via distinct untraceable “avatars”. The network and
service layers, including the operators owning them, cannot link two different avatars to the
same user unless he allows it. In addition, the user will control which information is linked to
which avatar and can create distinct virtual identities to access the network and services. We
thus propose a mapping of the users’ multiple identities into multiple network counterparts.
This allows us to devise a mechanism that enhances user privacy by maintaining attributes
for each of these network counterparts separately, which also separates individual service and
network perspectives.
The VID, by not being limited to a single layer or protocol, provides unique means for Uni-
fication and Uniformity throughout the network, focusing on user-centric paradigms. Since
the VID concept cuts across layers, it can be used to unify the handles by which users or ser-
vices are represented by the VID, including access data across different layers. This imposes
uniformity in protocol design, thus simplifying the process by which data is stored, archived,
transported and used. The objective is that the VID maintains consistent semantics through-
out all affected layers of next generation network, and can be accessed by different network
components such as services, billing, accounting, authentication or authorization.
The relationship between the above mentioned components and the VID can often be
based on Contractual Information, something that is handled within the concept. Although
network access, as well as service access, is restricted to the information contained in the
VID, most of the user’s contractual data still relates to the real identity. Either directly or
indirectly, by cross-certification, the entity that issues the contract must be assured that a
valid person exists. In most cases, this means assuring that the user can pay for the contracted
services. All contractual information should then be translated into a language that the
network can understand, verify and account for. This information is linked to the VID,
and can include Quality of Service (QoS), authentication or authorization credentials, among
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the several sources that can relate to network information, as well as any other contractual
binding data.
The contractual data is usually partnered with Context Data as it translates into the net-
work. Context data or context information characterizes the current situation of an entity.
This information can either be relevant for the entity itself or of broader interest. In conse-
quence, two different kinds of context data have to be distinguished: Context data bound to
a VID and context data independent of a VID. In the first case, context data is associated
to the VID and represented only in relation to that same VID. The architecture itself has no
notion of user. The mechanism by which entities access and provide context has to consider
the VID concept. In the second case, context data is considered a commodity that can be
traded and should be decoupled from the acquiring context source. Furthermore, this context
data must not be linked to a VID of the providing entity. Context is also one of the most
critical parameters, which can be used to link two ore more different VIDs of one entity.
Therefore, an entity has to pay special attention to ensure that context data cannot be used
to link two or more VIDs. One measure to achieve this is context obfuscation. Nevertheless,
this is a gray area in which no solution covers all angles since the concepts of context and
privacy are somewhat contradictory.
Finally, we present a traversal aspect to the VID and its possibilities that is Access Control.
The user sets rules on VID attributes filter the information a service or operator can see. By
controlling the access to such information, the user can present to a service only a small
part of the information contained in a VID. Access control provides the notion of a “filtered”
VID that limits the view on that identity to the amount needed by the service and desired
by the user. This provides another partitioning layer upon the Information Set, something
that will be detailed in the VID model (Sec. 4.3.1). However, this also triggers the concept
of ownership around a VID and its related components, because a user may own the VID,
but that does not mean that he has full control over its parts. Having attributes, such as
age, does not imply that the user can change them, nor does it mean that he owns all the
information contained in it. A VID is composed by information linked to the avatar of the
user, which may come from many different places. The nature of the information in the VID
also determines who owns it. Information resulting from a contractual right of the user is
under the control of the user, to be used as deemed fit. On the other hand, information about
contractual obligations of the user will need to be enforced by contracted business entity and
thus cannot therefore be under full control of the user. For example, the maximum QoS level
the user has a right to use is under his control while related metering information is not, since
it represents a contractual obligation.
By understanding the different dimensions of the VID, we can take the proposed paradigm,
along with the model in which it is inserted, and carve the basilar stones upon which to erect
he VID framework.
4.3 Virtual Identity Framework
The previous section tried to clarify the concept Virtual Identities, where a user has different
personae, each showing a different side of the user, associated with different information.
When aligned with the PRIVED model, this approach fosters the notion of information sets,
along with providing a way to properly partition them. However, there is a gap between
the conceptual approach of partitioning the information set based on virtual identities, and
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achieving that partitioning in the network. We turn to IdM to bridge that gap, which already
deals with the notion of user identities or digital identities. This provides the mindset of the
VID framework, which can be summarized as a vertical model to tackle privacy, using IdM
as the corner stone of the infrastructure to support the cross-layer approach.
It is in this vertical approach that we can consider the complete array of objectives and
guidelines that were considered earlier. But, as we consider the different layers, we are no
longer restricting IdM to service providers. In fact, by using a cross-layer approach to satisfy
such requirements, we are bringing the NGN requirements onto the drawing board, and
considering both user and network operator interests in the process.
By building on all this entire vector of concurrent motivations, and taking into account
the previously highlighted guidelines, we can move onto a model that portraits the user and
operator reality, using a cross-layer VID approach.
4.3.1 VID Model
The VID model can be described as the integration of virtual (partial) identities with the
PRIVED model, by resorting to identity management semantics. While succinct, this defi-
nition highlights the key values of the VID model: by being based on tangible concepts of
how privacy works, heavily influenced by PRIVED, and on how we can shape information,
according to the VID, we can define a model that brings us one step closer to an architecture
(based on IdM). The identity semantics bring several definitions that compose the core of
the logical model, which is later instantiated into proper network components. We provide
a definition of a user, that is properly generalized to fit the virtual aspects of the user, de-
scribed as generic “entities”. By using logical “entities” it is possible not only to define a
privacy preserving architecture, using virtual concepts, but also to define handy tools that
enable architectural support, working on multiple levels. This means that services must be
properly considered, along with different user-related aspects such as personalization, access
control and other features that are convoluted into the presented model.
Therefore, we provide a privacy-aware communication model for NGN, and possibly Fu-
ture Internet approaches. The VID Model, which is a fundamental component of this frame-
work, is described below, along with an architecture to support the model (Sec. 4.3.2). One
of its core properties is a cross-layer approach that supports aggregated visions over several
network aspects. First, it supports uniform namespaces, relying on identity (one ID for all
purposes). It is this bound to identity that makes it suitable for network identification, and
promotes controlled exchange of user/service/group information. Still based on identity as-
pects, it enables the maintenance of pseudonymity at a higher level, without depending on
a single protocol instance or application. This results in a top-down approach, that can be
independent of application, service, interface and even terminal.
4.3.1.1 Model Overview
The VID model is a data model that aggregates user information into a comprehensible set of
structures that allow the interaction between users, services, focusing on privacy-aware VID
constructions. Fig. 4.3 shows an overview of the VID model. The model is best described as
the relationships that can be established between an Entity, its profile, the parts that compose
that profile, and the views of that profile. An “entity” can either be a user (person) or a group
of users, generalizing its applicability. On the left hand side of Fig. 4.3 there are several parts
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Figure 4.3: VID Data Model
of the profile about this entity. The Entity Profile Part (EPP) represent the fragmented pieces
of information that stem from different contracts at different networks and/or services. In the
middle, there is the aggregated logical profile about the entity consisting of all profile parts,
called Entity Profile (EP). It is important to note that the EP is an abstract notion that is
not stored anywhere as data, but represents an aggregation of all the user related information
that can come from user, network, contracts or any other source. On the right hand side,
several views on this overall profile are shown. They represent the Entity Profile View (EPV),
which holds a subset of the information aggregated under the EP. The EPV represents a VID
of the user, an contains all the relevant data for the user, that can be provided for service
consumption or interaction. In any case, there is a single logical profile, the EP. The views
are only pointers to the real entity profile parts and implicitly to entity attributes stored in
a database (e.g. operated by a network provider).
An entity profile should be considered as a pool of entity profile parts and consequently
as a set of attributes about the respective entity. From this profile, different pieces can be
chosen, and together form a view on entity. However, each of these individual components
will be further clarified, given that their functionality and definition can exceed this brief
summary.
4.3.1.2 Entity, Profile and Parts
An entity is any actor or “real identity” that is able to establish legal, contractual bindings
with other actors. The most common entities are users, service providers, network operators,
banks or groups of any of the former. Although network or software components that act on
behalf of an entity do not have a VID themselves, they can be associated to the identity that
owns them. When discussing entities, we highlight two particular realizations: user and group.
The user in the VID framework, is an abstract entity, which is not represented directly in
the framework, but rather impacts the architecture through his VIDs that do have a network
representation. A user is able to create legal bindings with other entities, which allow the
user to create VIDs and to utilize the services underlying the architecture. Additionally, a
group is a set of entities which also can be represented by a VID. A group can also be seen
as an entity with a set of common attributes, and may be treated by the architecture as one.
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Such a group, in contrast to a legal entity, does not necessarily exhibit the identity properties
of being identifiable as the same group over time.
Each entity has its own profile, the Entity Profile. The EP is an abstract concept repre-
senting a group of EPPs that relate or belong to an entity, as described below, including the
knowledge possessed only by the entity itself. By holding the information related to the entity,
the EP becomes a controlled realization of the Information Set concept, stemming from the
PRIVED model. There is only a slight difference between since the IS models the knowledge
of the attacker, from a privacy point of view, whereas the EP models the knowledge of the
entity over its data.
The compartmentalized view of the EP, which builds on several EPP, allows the user to
define how to best build the VID, choosing what information is contained in a single identity.
By using different blocks to build VIDs, we are in fact defining different (and hopefully
unrelated) information sets that relate to a single entity.
It is important to understand that the EP cannot be stored in a single well-defined location
because it represented the collective set of user related information dispersed through multiple
databases. The EPP is a system representation of partial information on the entity profile.
This means that the entity will have a set of attributes, which can be joined together to
form an EPP. The rule for creating an EPP is that it should be the minimum consistent
and coherent set of data, which can be extracted from the EP. The EPP attributes should
be atomic (cannot be broken into smaller parts), holding the information that belongs to the
EPP. We can also look at an EPP as a block of data, which exists in a database in the system.
This block of data can be read, written into, copied and acted upon.
When establish an analogy between VID and PRIVED, we can map the EPP to an Event,
provided that we make a few assumptions: if the EPP is transferable and observed on the
network, it is an event from the PRIVED point of view. While this is valid for several
observations, we draw this parallel due to the nature of the information: both the EPP and
PRIVED events should be as atomic as possible, allowing in one case to build the VID by
stacking information, and in the other case allowing evidence stacking that breaches privacy.
4.3.1.3 Entity Profile View - The Virtual Identity
The VID represents an avatar, or persona, of the user in the network. It is a subset of EPPs,
which belong to a single EP. Because the VID is simply a scoped view of the EP, it can
be formally described as an Entity Profile View (EPV). The EPV is an alias for the VID
because it defines a partial view of the user’s identity, forming a virtual persona. From a
different perspective, the EPV is comparable to the Information Set, when properly reduced.
The only true difference between the EPV and the IS occurs when there is a privacy leak,
and the information traveling on the network is larger than that intended by the EPV owner.
This happens because the VID model tries to build on the information known by the user,
and the IS models the information actually seen on the network from a privacy perspective,
known by an attacker, which should be different. The VID is used to reflect different personal
information, as well as different network circumstances, and is purposely intended to difficult
the task of an attacker linking several identities. It is expected for a user to have, in average,
5-7 different VIDs, depending on the roles he assumes. Managing more than this may prove
difficult from both a user and network perspective. To add more flexibility to the EPV, or
VID, we accompany it, first with an identifier, the Entity Profile View Handler (EPVH), and
second with a filtering mechanism, to enable granular use of the information contained in the
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VID, outlined as a Filtered Entity Profile View (FEPV).
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Figure 4.4: VIDID - The Virtual Identity Identifier
The EPVH provides a unique mechanism to identify and reference an EPV. Because it
identifies the VID, we also term it VIDID. The VIDID, shown in Fig. 4.4, is the identifier
that acts as the initial reference towards the VID, allowing a holder to reach the appropriate
information of a “realm” identifier, which maps to the server or domain responsible for the
VID, and a flat identifier, which uniquely identifies the VID within a certain realm (while not
revealing any information about the owner). The length of the VIDID is in direct relation to
the diameter of the Internet and the number of expected identities which use it. In fact, a
VIDID should uniquely identify a VID in a certain realm (this format allows 248 such users
per realm, and 216 realms).
The VIDID can be a useful tool for integrating identity references into the network stack,
as we will discuss later in the Thesis. Its identification purposes can be combined with the
network identifiers of existing protocols, creating an environment where common protocols
carry identity references that lead back to the user identity and to the IdM plane. Because
the identifier can be represented in different ways (e.g. hexadecimal, string), or can be derived
from specific information pieces, i.e. it can be a hash of a well knwon value (e.g. a public
key), it is suited for integration with different protocols, ranging from low level network to
application layer identifiers, such as an IP address or a Uniform Resource Locator (URL).
The unique relationship that can be established between the VIDID and user identify can
be explored in an entire new architectural dimension, building a playground where identity is
integrated into “legacy” protocols, as explored in Sec. 6.6. Because the VIDID can serve as a
unique cross-layer identity reference, it can also be used as the identifier by which an attacker
tries to build an IS, providing a common denominator for user information, identifiers or
references that relate to the same user identity. This property leads to the idea that the
VIDID must be handled with care, to build privacy aware solutions, as discussed in Sec. 4.4.
The second structure that aids the VID is the Filtered Entity Profile View, which repre-
sents a second level of access control on the EPV, thus holding a subset of data of an EPV.
This enables a better control over the information revealed to the outside world. While the
use of distinct FEPVs as a subset of the same EPV may be identified as belonging to that
particular EPV, two FEPVs representing different VIDs should be completely distinct in all
revealed data to make it impossible to link different VIDs. Of course, the owner of the VID
has the power to allow this cross-linkage.
4.3.2 Architecture
To support the conceptual aspects of the VID model, we define the core components that
support the identity oriented operations and functionality. Unified and uniform namespaces
enable the user to be reached despite a very heterogeneous environment and must rely on a
common entry point for identity information, providing consistent access to privileged infor-
mation based on VIDID resolution and credentials. Therefore, access control, which allows
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the user and the provider to limit access by others to the user or to user data based on
well-defined criteria or rules, must use architectural components. These components need to
be tightly coupled with the billing and charging infrastructure, the AAA backend, enabling
charged services to be offered in a flexible way, allowing the user to aggregate billing to one
or a few billing entities. Finally, the base components must provide strong privacy policies,
enabling the user to protect her data as desired, i.e. to prevent disclosing its own attributes
and to limit reachability.
The common components of the aforementioned operations are two specific functional
elements: The Identity Manager (IDManager) and the Identity Broker (IDBroker). With
them, we can define the basic identity framework components and how they facilitate identity
oriented operations.
Identity Manager The responsibility of the IDManager is to handle VID creation and main-
tenance. While providing the interface for creating, managing and destroying VIDs, it
becomes the repository for context and personalization information, which is not stored
on distributed EPPs. It is one of the trusted components on the architecture, since it
handles on one side the VID information that the user chooses to store on the network
and to the other, it may retain information that is considered sensitive, acting as an
EPP repository for specific data, and applying several control policies on the data it
stores. The IDManager has a strong relationship with the IDBroker.
Identity Broker The IDBroker component provides the location of the EPP or proxy to
the requester, and forwards the request to the holder of the EPP (the place where it is
stored). The IDBroker thus becomes the main contact point for identity information and
the preferred location to set the initial privacy and content access policies. Depending
on the operation mode, different amounts of trust are placed at the IDBroker. If the
IDBroker only redirects requests, the burden of policy control is redirected to the EPP
holders and possibly the IDManager. Moreover, when applying access control rules
directly on the mapping and content access, pointing to different locations depending on
the requesting entity, it becomes a more crucial architecture component. The IDBroker
must therefore be fluent in handling VIDIDs, since this is the preferred notation to
handle the unified namespaces. The process of resolving and accessing information
through the identity broker are described below.
4.3.2.1 Identity Brokerage
The IDBroker is the component that is responsible for mapping the revealed FEPV to the
EPPs, and possibly also applying some access control rules and actions. It is called a broker
because it correctly redirects requests for EPPs belonging a certain VID. It is most likely the
component identified by the realm part of the VIDID. The IDBroker is the first contact point
in a realm, although it may be possible that the requests are forwarded to a different machine.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 4.5, where Bob accesses the IDBroker with a specific handle
for Alice (a VIDID), which should be subjected to access control, and lead to a filtered access
onto specific network components (e.g. A4C, PKI).
With only the VIDID to resolve information on a certain VID, the requester uses the
realm part to contact the right IDBroker, and the ID part of the VIDID to identify the VID
within the realm. Additionally, the resolver has to identify to which EPP it requires access,
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Figure 4.5: Using the Identity Broker.
possibly with accompanying credentials for access control. The IDBroker will keep a table of
the VIDID, the associated EPPs and their types, as well as the place where they are stored.
One of the most important functions provided by the the IDBroker is access control on
whom accesses information and what information is accessed. This results in several tiers of
access control applied on user information, which enable a consistent and privacy preserving
approach to Identity information.
EPP Access Control This is the simplest form of access control: directly on the data
storage place. The broker will always direct the requesting entity to the right storage
place (the storage place can already reveal information for linking VIDs, e.g. referring
to the same attribute.). Access control is then performed directly as the requesting
entity attempts to access the information. The drawback is that the requesting entity
knows that this information exists for that VID. Also, on the storage place, the identity
of the requester is revealed (at least partially) for matching access control rules.
Broker Access Control Before redirecting the request, the broker applies access control
rules to tell, or not, the requester that the information exists and where. Optionally,
the broker can “hide” the storage place by presenting credentials from the requester and
obtaining the information encrypted for the requester in such a way that the requester
does not know where the information is stored, and the broker does not know the
information itself, only the type and the requester. Also, at the same time, the storage
entity does not know who requested the information. This depends on the credentials
system and whether this is also brokered by the identity broker. Furthermore, the
storage place for certain attributes can also facilitate VID-linkage.
Terminal Access Control As a last resort, access control can be applied by the rules in
the terminal itself. The owner of the VID requests the information and filters it before
directly giving it to the entity that requested it. This actually means the IDBroker can
redirect all requests to a terminal where the entity can then decide what information to
give out and how to access it. Although this approach can impact performance, from a
security perspective it is the one which offers most user control.
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4.3.2.2 Resolving Information
To obtain information on a VID, an entity must first obtain a VIDID. With the proper VIDID,
it should contact the IDBroker (defined by the realm) to either directly obtain the information
or be redirected to the place of storage of this data. This defines a resolution process required
to go from VIDID to actual information.
We outline this process with an example where the entity trying to reach a particular
user starts with a FQDN. The first step is to resolve the other entity’s FQDN, through DNS,
obtaining the corresponding VIDID. It will then use the realm part of this value to contact the
correct IDBroker. This connection may depend solely on the protocol being used, for example
Diameter for AAA information. In some cases, the IDBroker is simply a box that uses the
same protocol as the information requester, resorting to its private tables to determine how
the requested information can be obtained.
To reach the information itself, it is possible to use two strategies that can be applied
in different situations to enable a requester to resolved the require information. We define
push and pull models for VID information access. In Fig. 4.6, we illustrate both push and
pull mechanisms, involving two entities, A and B, which already have the necessary EPV (or
VID) and request handler (VIDID). In Fig. 4.6, entity B uses a VIDID to access information
about A, that want to access a service provided by B.
!
1: EPV handler req. 
2: EPV handler rep. 
3: Service req. 
4: Service param. req. 
5: User disclosure req. 
6: User disclosure rep. 
7: EPV configuration 
8: Service param. rep. 
9: Service rep. 
Figure 4.6: Identity Brokerage Push and Pull process
Phases 1 and 2 represent the initial establishment of the EPV (or VID) and the initial part
of the push mechanism, where VIDID information on handling a VIDID is initially pushed
to the IDBroker. Steps 5 and 6 represent the pull mechanism, where in order to respond to
an information request from B, the IDBroker pulls information from the user. Following the
initial setup at the IDBroker, the user, entity A, requests a service to B, step 3, triggering
an information request (a service parameter) to the IDBroker in step 4. At this stage if its
a pull situation, the appropriate steps is to consult the user (steps 5 and 6), or alternatively
(push model), the IDBroker retrieves the information from a database (step 7), providing it
to the service (step 8). This concludes the information resolution, and the service is provided
to entity A in step 9.
Both these mechanisms refer to the way in which the VID information is populated and
accessed, along with the applied access control rules.
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4.3.3 VID in the Network
The vertical model focuses on the control part of the privacy solution, that resides atop the
network stack, closely coupled to application level technologies (especially IdM). The vertical
issues addressed are tightly coupled to information exchange and identifier resolution. But,
the model needs to have network repercussions to fit the envisioned cross-layer architecture,
which is a requirement for the privacy features. We must go from vertical virtual identities to
tangible cross-layer instantiations, properly aligning the different communication layers with
the proposed a model.
This integration can be done with a virtual terminal approach to support the virtual
identities present within the VID framework. The concept relies on the fact the network
should perceive each user identity as belonging to a different (virtual) terminal. The virtual
terminal should then be instantiated on top of its physical counterpart, the real end-user
device, following the same reasoning used for the real versus virtual user duality, stemming
from the VID concept. For each information set associated with a VID, we must create an
accompanying virtual terminal that handles communication for that specific identity. As we
expand this notion to different layers, we see that there must be a support for pseudonymity
(or anonymity) on lower network layers, which represents a challenge in itself.
While the VID defines mechanisms for vertical information containment, supported by
the PRIVED approach and the IS, it is the IdM system that provides containment across
different virtual identities. This is represented by a requirement extracted from PRIVED: if
each VID is characterized by an an information set, there can be no shared identifiers between
identities, regardless of layer.In order to preserve privacy, the defined containment requires
that each Identity uses its own pseudonym at each layer. Using the identity model as a cross-
layer solution, it can provide the architectural requirements to fulfill the multi-pseudonym
approach: it enables a vertical control plane that interacts with applications, yielding the
input for network stack management, while still providing control over different network
stacks through their identity relationships. This defines a control mechanism for multiple
pseudonyms where each VID can leverage its own contained network stack, with multiple
uncorrelated pseudonyms. To support this, it is possible to create different identifiers at
each layer. In this scenario, each VID would receive different link, network and transport
pseudonyms, making it impossible to use these identifiers for correlation purposes. This
mitigates such correlation across different identities, where identifiers are generated or used
at the pace they are required to connect to the network at different layers. In this context, it
is important to understand the use of pseudonymity as a solution for privacy in NGN, along
with its impact on existing technologies.
4.4 Network Pseudonymity
Using multiple identifiers, or pseudonyms, for the same user as means for preserving privacy,
is becoming an important approach that has not seen sufficient discussion. Before it can
be considered a reliable privacy tool, pseudonymity requires a formalization that takes into
account network stack impacts. Therefore, we attempt to demonstrate how pseudonyms can
be used to preserve privacy, resulting in the key issues and requirements presented in this
section, which enable the use, control and evaluation of pseudonym based solutions at the
network level. The conclusions serve as the starting point for our pseudonym privacy proposal
defines as Virtual Network Stacks (VNS) [97].
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Identifier correlation (including network layers) can render useless several privacy-oriented
solutions, regardless of how and where that correlation occurs. As network heterogeneity in-
creases, the privacy defined by application-centric systems (from simple username and pass-
word approaches to complex Identity Management solutions) is further questionable. Upper
layer information can be linked or aggregated through lower layer identifiers, hindering most
application-level privacy efforts. In most of these scenarios, attackers reside in the access net-
work (either the network operator itself or a malicious node) and is capable of scanning most
(even all) network traffic. Service providers or endpoints can also be untrusted entities: in
some scenarios they can even collude to increase the knowledge of private information about
the user, and have access to the network traffic (at least the data intended for each peer). In
these scenarios many conditions emerge that can lead to privacy loss, as discussed in Chap. 3.
Different approaches have been employed to mitigate such fundamental privacy threats,
discussed exhaustively in Sec. 2.5. Anonymity based solutions [149, 55, 38] try to conceal the
user involved in the communication or interaction. Albeit an improvement, this is insufficient:
for an efficient privacy solution, the intent is not to completely prevent the disclosure of
information, but rather to control the disclosure process that enforces privacy concerns at
each moment. Pseudonymity solutions take a different approach: they use different identifiers,
i.e. addresses across the network stack, to effectively hide selected interactions between users
(or devices) and services, thus providing privacy. Whenever these identifiers are used for
misdirection (of eavesdroppers or peers) we call them pseudonyms, given that they now serve
a privacy protection purpose: introducing confusion.
Comparing different pseudonymity based solutions can be hard due to the lack of sys-
tematized concepts that can guide a fair comparison. This gap also results in the absence of
concrete studies on the impact of such solutions, either conceptual or experimental. In fact,
the privacy requirements for such solutions have not even been formally expressed, which are
hard to accept or adopt without understanding their consequences. Therefore, a systematized
solution that enables an evaluation and comparison of different solutions is needed. Conse-
quently, there is a need for practical results that explore cross layer pseudonymity solutions.
We propose to fill this gap with a set of formal and applied requirements that can provide
clear guidelines for the solution presented in Sec. 4.5, which enables consistent cross-layer
pseudonym usage. With theoretical and practical evaluation, we can determine the feasibil-
ity of pseudonymity approaches, and simultaneously extract the perceived “cost of privacy”.
Based on the PRIVED model, we are able to provide a framework for pseudonymity that en-
ables the means for understanding how pseudonymity impacts the network. Key points reside
in the theoretical and practical insight gained on pseudonyms, covered by the requirements
and evaluation mechanisms presented. Moreover, the requirements and evaluation harness the
knowledge of an experimental deployment of network pseudonyms, enabling the evaluation of
potential impacts on the network layer. The main objective is to establish a knowledge base
to understand and analyze the VNS solution (Sec. 4.5), both in theory and practice.
4.4.1 Privacy with Pseudonyms
In network and computing contexts, a pseudonym is a fictitious name or identifier used to hide
the real information of a user, device or network entity. It is achieved by using several identi-
fiers of the same type, at each layer, that differ from the default identifiers (such as the MAC
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address). The alias identifiers, created for privacy purposes, are named pseudonyms1. Pseu-
donymity is a concept that has already permeated the computing disciplines. IdM concepts
are in essence pseudonymity approaches, at the application layer.
Today, when accessing services, we choose a username and release a certain amount of
information to that service. This builds our IS towards that service. Given that we do
this for every service, we in fact have multiple identities towards different services, which
build different information sets. The goal of pseudonymity solutions is to break the links
between the different identifiers, to appear in the network as if different terminals or users
are consuming the services, instead of a single, linkable entity.
An example of how a user can inadvertently create links between identifiers over time is
illustrated in Fig. 4.7. It shows how identifiers relate to each other, to devices, and to the end
user. A common use of pseudonyms is when the user chooses different usernames for different
services. Typically, a pseudonym strategy would resort to multiple network IP addresses for
a single interface, separating each username even at the network level.
Pseudonyms can be a fundamental tool to protect user information, and as such, must be
characterized from an operational point of view. For that, we must rely on IS concepts first
presented in Sec. 3.3.1, where user information is described as belonging to a set built around
identifiers, such as an email (or a username) or network identifiers, from link to application
layer, that share a common thread of knowledge.
4.4.1.1 Protecting Users with Pseudonyms
As already extensively discussed, in networking environments, information can be tracked
back to the owner, effectively threatening his privacy. This happens on several levels and can
be associated with a particular user, building an IS. As the information around the identifier
increases, the privacy hazards also increase. It is important to remember that the simplest
way to build an IS is precisely by collecting all possible information around a particular
identifier. However, it is worth mentioning that, to build the set, it is irrelevant whether the
correlated identifiers are pseudonyms or not.
Further examining the definition of IS allows us to understand how pseudonymity protects
the user. Concealing identifiers from passive eavesdroppers, e.g through encryption tech-
niques, hides certain interactions but is ineffective against endpoints and services. Therefore,
protecting the identifiers cannot be the only privacy means applied in a network, because the
IS can still be built associated with the endpoints. To preserve user privacy, the pseudonym
strategy works by reducing the information set associated with an identifier, by generating
alternative identifier, pseudonyms, that have little or no associated information. This is one
of the major protection techniques, discussed in Sec. 3.5.1.1.
Information reduction also safeguards the top level user identity, which in our model is
simply represented by its identifiers, by reducing the information associated with specific
identifiers: instead of one revealing set, several smaller and unrelated sets ((different VIDs)
are built for different purposes . The optimal situation in terms of information protection
would be to randomize identifiers per atomic operation, associating each operation with one
untraceable identifier. This is an extreme case that presents serious performance drawbacks
as will be discussed in the following sections.
1Pseudonym and identifier are used interchangeably to denote an identifier, or set of identifiers, created to
reduced the information associated to a particular user, and can belong to any layer in the network stack.
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Figure 4.7: Identifier associations created, over time, by a user using several devices, resulting
in a broad information set.
4.4.1.2 Threats
The analyzed threats in the PRIVED model allow concluding that application layer mecha-
nisms are not sufficient to provide a safe privacy environment for the end-user. Even if a user
presents different identities to different services, the network stack can disclose the linkage
between identities, breaking the application layer privacy model. This is the essence of hori-
zontal correlation mechanisms, discussed in Sec. 3.4.2. By establishing relationships between
identifiers on the same layer, the privacy of upper layer identities is jeopardized. Lower net-
work stack layers use identifiers that are common to the different virtual personae, rendering
them useless in terms of privacy. At the transport layer, the used endpoint identifier, usually
the IP address, allows linking different virtual personae because every application uses the
same identifier. At the network layer, the same IP address is used for every transport and ap-
plication connection, providing the cross-linkage of the virtual personae through the common
identifier. In the same line, link layer addresses can bind higher layer addressing structures,
whether they are IP addresses, transport identifiers or virtual personae.
Our objective is to leverage the concept of cross-layering virtual personae, embodied by
the VID concept, as the starting point for pseudonymity, using different and non-linkable
identifiers for different virtual users. From the entire formal threats presented in Chap. 3, we
focus on a privacy-enabled network where an attacker cannot be able to:
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• Correlate two identities by mapping them to the same endpoint identifier;
• Correlate two identities by mapping them to the same locator, or different endpoint
identifiers to the same locator;
• Correlate two identities by mapping them to the same link layer identifiers, or mapping
endpoint identifiers (or locators) to the same link layer identifiers.
These are the basic threats that the VNS approach attempts to address, relying on the
VID concept to provide the guiding mechanisms for vertical containment layers, disallowing
any shared information between them, and blocking horizontal correlation mechanisms, that
work either by Set or Graph theory. We do not limit the attacker to a simple eavesdropper.
This model, coupled with the VID, is targeted at protecting from any single network entity,
like the network operator or the service provider, even in the face of collusion.
4.4.2 Controlling Pseudonyms
Each IS contains sensitive information that is complex to handle. As we attempt to partition
information, we maintain pseudonyms associated with each set. Therefore, the control strat-
egy becomes an important part of any pseudonym based solution, because it has to fulfill two
major roles: control information linkability and scale the system usage.
Controlling information linkability includes the management of pseudonyms generation,
and more importantly, the definition of an IS. Given all the exchanged information, man-
aging these sets is crucial to any solution that seriously considers pseudonym usage. The
IS, along with the associated identifier(s), must be properly managed, especially consider-
ing that information reaches all network layers; failing to do so may result in unforeseen
information leakage. The control process depends on the applied paradigm: user-centric so-
lutions try to provide identity pseudonyms [20, 122], whereas application and device centric
solutions [56, 151] try to provide per application pseudonyms.
Most user centric solutions rely on IdM standards [20, 122], providing pseudonymity fo-
cused on the user, at the application level. In fact, these approaches can be described as
striving to maintain an IS for each identity. Consequently, one of the major benefits of IdM
is that it provides not only the means to control identifier exposure, but also the mechanisms
to operate on the attributes that must be shared with services. The fact that IdM limits the
required identifiers on a per-identity basis can guarantee that pseudonyms scale with iden-
tities: because the IdM layer throttles identity usage (limits the amount of identities used
for service consumption), it can provide a set of tools (and boundaries) to tackle scalability
issues caused by the increased number of identifiers.
The alternatives [56, 151] focus on using per-interaction pseudonyms, meaning that each
network connection will use a pseudonym. This will require a strong effort from the control
layer, to maintain the sets consistent across applications, and from the network layer to
maintain a (prohibitive) large amount of pseudonyms on each layer. It also delegates the
pseudonym control to mechanized solutions that focus on system interactions rather than
on the user. Regardless of the control issues, the total number of pseudonyms must be
limited, and it will be necessary to determine which application require pseudonymity and
which applications can share information without compromising privacy, as means to limit the
potentially large pseudonym number. The two aforementioned paradigms will share the same
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requirements that will be common to all control solutions: scaling the system to reasonable
performance boundaries and maintaining consistent information sets.
4.4.2.1 Controlling pseudonyms on the network
For effective privacy preservation, pseudonymity must be supported at the network level. This
requires extending the information set semantics onto the network stack through a segmented
view that enables the dynamic creation of pseudonyms for different sets. We must understand
the impact of such segmentation mechanisms in current addressing models, particularly on
pseudonym collisions (detection or avoidance), which determines not only the viability of any
pseudonymity solution, but defines the scalability boundaries to which the control layer must
abide.
The first stage for handling pseudonyms is the definition of a clear strategy regarding how
pseudonyms are created and managed. Because an Information Set can be built based on any
user identifier, the network stack must be treated as a whole. We need to avoid the estab-
lishment of unwanted correlations at any layer, so pseudonyms must be created and managed
as sets of identifiers for the network stack. For each Information Set, a corresponding set
of network identifiers, that act as pseudonyms, must exist to allow communication without
compromising privacy. This creates a direct relationship between pseudonym set and infor-
mation set, defining the usage boundaries, where two requirements appear: 1) always use the
identifiers consistently as a whole set; 2) do not share identifiers across sets i.e. different user
(pseudo) identities.
Beyond the two above mentioned requirements, an important network application crite-
ria is pseudonym management, where clear policies shall determine the granularity of how
pseudonym sets are applied. However, this responsibility rests on an IS management entity
or function (eventually an extended IdM function), preserving an aligned view over the user
information spectrum as discussed before.
4.4.2.2 Dynamic Pseudonyms and Collisions
The second stage for handling pseudonyms is to provide generation functions that ensure
unlinkability between the generated identifiers. This is typically solved by a proper random
number generator aligned with the identifier structure, which will depend on the target layer
and obey the namespace ruleset (e.g. network addresses must have a prefix matching the
target network to be properly routed).
However, dynamic pseudonyms imply that there will be an increased number of addresses
and identifiers on the network, straining the addressing assumptions. The strain degree will
depend on the required granularity at which sets are generated and consumed, and raises
one important issue behind pseudonyms usage: the overload of the addressing space for each
identifier type. Namespaces usually have a well defined addressing space, limited by the
size, in bits, of the identifiers. With pseudonyms, the original design preconditions for each
namespace are extended, and must be handled accordingly. The impacts on the address space
must be predicted and measured, along with proper solutions for handling collisions. Usually,
it is sufficient to determine the collision probability of a namespace, and from there, determine
whether the identifier size and properties adequately fit the namespace requirements. The
address collision probability can be modeled as a birthday paradigm [107] where the collision
probability is that of any two addresses within the same space colliding. This proposition
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results in Eq. 4.1, which determines the collision probability depending on identifier size (in
bits), where n is the number of random bits in the identifier and k is the total number of
addresses in the collision domain.
Pa = 1− (2
n)!
(2n − k)!× 2nk (4.1)
Solving the presented equation for a given size is computationally heavy. A common
solution is to deduce an approximation based on the expansion of the exponential function
using the Taylor series. Solving the approximation to n leads to Eq. 4.2, as commonly used for
hash collision probabilities, where n estimates the maximum allowed addresses that match a
specific collision probability p, within an address space of 2k. These mathematical principles
lay the base to understand the impact of pseudonym usage.
n(p, 2k) =
√
2× 2k × ln( 11− p) (4.2)
4.4.2.3 Performance and Limitations
To consider the support of multiple pseudonyms in network stacks, one must also consider the
implications for the stack itself. The stack is responsible for specific tasks, and how the ability
to perform those tasks is affected should be determined. In Sec. 4.5.4.1, the details of enabling
the use of pseudonyms in the network stack are considered; however, before tackling the low
level details we need to understand the nature of pseudonyms and the operations involved in
their use, so that we can approach the experimental results obtained later in Sec. 4.5.4.
Some of the addresses employed are subject to registration with the network - like IP
addresses. Using pseudonymity means that multiple registrations will be required in situations
where previously one was sufficient, increasing the amount of internal state necessary to
accommodate these registrations. It can be considered that the resources necessary for the
stack to register new addresses grow linearly with the number of generated pseudonyms, in
terms of required time, computational effort and stored state. While the effort requirements
cannot be easily overcome, the registration of new pseudonyms with the network should be
able to take advantage of parallel operations.
Addressing the above mentioned concerns will introduce additional logic in the network
stack, and consequently overhead. It is also necessary to understand what are the con-
sequences for Key Performance Indicators (KPI). The impact that these changes have for
metrics such as traffic delay and overall throughput must be taken into consideration. Such
values offer a measure of the limitations at the network stack, and are a requirement to un-
derstand how far we can push the pseudonymity approach before incurring in unsustainable
performance penalties.
4.4.3 Addressing Space
While address or identifier collision must be considered at all times, there is a broader impact
on the addressing space itself that is not considered in such calculations or concepts. There-
fore, while useful, having the collision probability as a function of only the number of devices
and bit size falls short when designing pseudonymity solutions, because it is independent of
user or IS. Therefore, we expand on a notion of a bit size calculation that relies only on
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device consideration, introducing the concept of a metric that depends also on the number of
sets expected per user/device. Only this paradigm shift will allow a proper evaluation of the
true consequences to the address space, and consequently, to the network.
We model the existence of i pseudonyms (one per IS on each layer) per user, and from
this, we get a maximum of s pseudonym sets per network, represented by Eq. 4.3, where n
is the number of addresses per addressing domain. However, the collision probability is still
dependent on the number of available addresses.
s = n
i
(4.3)
On the other side, reusing the notions of pseudonyms per network (Eq. 4.3 and of collision
probabilities (Eq. 4.1)), we can update the estimation of the collision probabilities in terms
of how many sets can be supported per network.
For this, we introduce the Virtual Address Space (VAS)2, which represents the available
addressing space based on the expected number of pseudonyms introduced per user/identifier.
The virtual address space varies with the amount of pseudonyms per user, yielding a different
perspective from the traditional collision probability, which depends solely on the bit size of
the identifier. To create this metric, we replace s in Eq. 4.3 by 2k, representing the pseudonyms
per network as if it was a bit sized identifier, leading to Eq. 4.4.
2k = 2
a
n
(4.4)
We then rewrite the number of bits k in terms of the n identifier per set, leading up to
Eq. 4.5, thus creating a user dependent view on the identifier size. This presents a virtual
metric, where the size of the identifier will depend on the number of pseudonyms per user.
k = log2 (
2a
n
) = log2 (2a)− log2 (n)
= a− log2 n (4.5)
With this new formulation, we gain a better understanding of the address space in the
presence of pseudonymity. By applying Eq. 4.2 on the virtual address space we obtain the
different curves shown in Eq. 4.8. We observe here the maximum number of addresses for 64
bit identifiers and a variable number of pseudonym set size at an admitted collision probability
of 0.1%. Note that the original address space is still represented when the addresses per set
is 1. The goal is to estimate the loss of effectiveness of the address space through the usage of
pseudonyms. This loss is represented by the curves of 2,4,8 and 16 addresses per pseudonymity
set.
By taking the results of Fig. 4.8, we can establish a comparison between the original
space and the reduced VAS. We can determine the proportion of space that is consumed by
pseudonyms as the difference of addresses from the curves in Fig. 4.8. If T1 is the total number
of addresses given by the collision probability approximation for 1 address per user (the real
address space), and Tn is the number of addresses as calculated for Fig. 4.8 (the virtual
2The definition presented is virtual since the network addressing space will always ultimately depend on
the size in bits of the addressing structure and its eventual hierarchy, regardless of how many identifiers are
used per user or device.
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Figure 4.8: Available addresses for different pseudonym set sizes (1,2,4,8 and 16) and increas-
ing identifier sizes (at 0.1% collision probability).
address space), it is possible to determine the wasted space (Fig. 4.6), shown in Fig. 4.9, for
64 bit addresses.
Wspace =
T1 − Tn
T1
(4.6)
The results clearly show the addressing space loss introduced by pseudonymity, that in-
creases by each pseudonym introduced into the user portfolio. The important conclusion
from these results is that any pseudonym solution must constrain the usage of pseudonyms
to an acceptable level. Given current link layer and network technologies, this introduces a
practical requirement of no more than 5 to 10 sets per user, at the cost of more than 70% of
the address space, a price only affordable when the identifiers are long enough to sustain a
vast address space even at 30% of their capacity.
This analysis provides us with the tools to understand whether a particular pseudonym
solution is able to be effectively deployed at the network level. Such findings ultimately
impose two overall requirements: any solution must provide a control plane that determines
policies to guide and manage the IS and its associated network pseudonyms reinforcing the
previous control requirements; and also, measures must be taken to determine and minimize
the burden on the respective namespaces, ultimately pointing at design constraints.
4.4.4 Requirements
Throughout the previous sections we have highlighted major requirements that any pseudony-
mity solution must address. Here, we formalize such requirements to enable proper evaluation
and discussion of any pseudonymity solution. We focus on privacy (R1 ), information control
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Figure 4.9: Space consumed by using pseudonymity sets.
(R2 ) and network (R3 ) requirements, along with corollary requirements (e.g R1.1-R1.2), as
cornerstones of any pseudonymity solution for privacy. Failing to acknowledge any of these
requirements may render any solution ineffective or unusable.
R1. Reduced Information Set The information contained in each set must be reduced,
to minimize information leaks under a minimal disclosure approach.
R1.1. Identifiers cannot be shared between sets Sharing identifiers between sets is
the fundamental principle for linkage and should be made impossible.
R1.2. Information Set scalability The sets must be made as large or as small as needed,
with granular control. Large sets increase linkability, but also personalization, while smaller
sets provide greater privacy.
R2 Control Information Linkability Each IS must be adequately managed, controlling
how and what it links, because uncontrolled information can lead to linkage.
R2.1 Handle all network layers Identifiers must be handled on every network layer.
Failing to handle one layer can lead to linking on other layers, forfeiting privacy.
R2.2 Manage network identifiers collectively: All generated pseudonyms must be han-
dled jointly on all network layers, conforming to R1 and R2.
R2.3 Dynamic Identifier Generation Functions Functions that dynamically generate
identifiers, to act as pseudonyms, should exist and avoid easy correlation of the generated
identifiers.
R3. Preserve Networking Functions Protocol function must be retained even in light of
several pseudonym identifiers on the same communication layer.
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R3.1 Preserve Address space Retain address space properties and assumptions, evalu-
ating any impacts resulting from using several identifiers per user (pseudonyms).
R3.2 Handle identifier collision Dynamic identifiers, acting as pseudonyms on the net-
work, can lead to collisions, which must be resolved at the cost of failed communication.
R3.3 Minimize Performance Impact Introducing multiple identifiers on different net-
work layers must have a low overhead, preventing excess communication delay or inflict hefty
bandwidth restrictions.
These requirements provide the foundations upon which we can build a scalable and en-
compassing solution towards network based privacy. By relying on cross-layer pseudonymity,
we are in a position to instantiate the multiple requirements and limitations into a realization
of the Virtual Identity approach onto the network. In this context, Virtual Network Stacks
appears the natural realization of VIDs on the network.
4.5 Virtual Network Stacks
Instantiating the Virtual Identity model implies creating several layers of pseudonyms, wrap-
ping the user in pseudonym identifiers, defining a virtual entity. To accommodate this as-
sumption, we must follow a similar approach with the user’s device, thus providing a virtual
terminal that adapts to the new network reality. However, our notion of a virtual device
pertains only to the network interfaces, where the most relevant metaphor for our solution
becomes that of virtual network stacks, instantiated as required by each identity, towards
the network. In summary, Virtual Network Stacks [97] (VNS) provide a privacy enhancing
solution by applying a multiple pseudonym approach, where each pseudonym set constitutes
defines a virtual network stack, bound to a single Information Set. These stacks are instan-
tiated per user identity, avoiding any possible correlation between identities, partitioning the
network information into a contained IS.
Sec. 4.4 outlined the methods required to apply pseudonyms on any network layer. It
defined key principles and requirements that should appear in privacy-oriented pseudonym
solutions. Those requirements are taken into account in our proposal, which aims at providing
a full network pseudonymity solution, tightly coupled with Identity as a control layer, stem-
ming from the VID layer and relying on IdM technologies. It provides a cross-layer approach,
scaled through identity properties and tied with virtual identities.
The support and management of a virtual stack requires terminal architecture modifica-
tions, both in terms of control and data. The current legacy model is connection oriented:
identifiers are used or generated at the pace they are required to connect to the network at
different layers (e.g., an IP address is generated or assigned at the time the terminal connects
to an access router, and is normally used by all upper layer protocols). The proposed ap-
proach turns the focus to identity, generating different identifiers when an identity wishes to
connect to the point of service.
In practice, relying on virtual stacks to convey pseudonymity consists on assigning differ-
ent Link, Network and Transport layer pseudonyms for each identity, making it impossible
to correlate different identities. Thus, one device is transformed into several virtual termi-
nals, And, as mentioned, to seamlessly support a virtualized network stack, we must provide
modifications to the terminal network support, which we achieve trough the metaphor of
virtual devices, used jointly with the virtual identities. always hand in hand with the identity
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management system. This coupling allows retaining pervasiveness and personalization by
linking the pseudonyms to the identity model, creating different identifier sets per VID. This
is only possible with a clear separation between control and date plane: managing informa-
tion sets, assigning connections and distributing actions across each set, are handled on the
identity control plane; translating information concerning each virtual stack into packets in
the network is handled on the data path.
However, to properly address the network environment, we must start off with a proper
network model, where the (NGN) network architecture is properly outlined, so that pseudonyms
are applied consistently throughout all the network required mechanisms. We present such an
NGN model to clearly define the boundaries of how and where we should apply the control,
through identity, and network mechanisms, through virtual devices, that enable the support
for multiple identities.
4.5.1 Network Model
When discussing network pseudonyms, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion that generating
pseudonyms for all network interactions will greatly depend on the employed network pro-
tocols and mechanisms. Therefore, a practical functional solution must be framed within a
particular network model, which in our target cases revolves around a NGN network, focusing
on all-IP (4G) scenarios. This is important, because ignoring more complex network inter-
actions, such as mobility support in current and future network, may yield a too simplistic
network instantiation, rather than a framework that enables future network evolutions in the
light of a broad array of services, which are appearing in every dimension of the network.
Furthermore, the type of privacy issues that we try to tackle are not only present in today’s
networks, but are amplified by NGN, or 4G, network models, by all the reasons mentioned in
Chap. 1.
Therefore, the network model that serves as reference for our approach, shown in Fig. 4.10,
is based on 4G scenarios. These environments contain heterogeneous access technologies, such
as WiFi, Wimax or DVB, seamlessly integrated into the global architecture. Similarly, user
terminals are evolving into multi-technology devices, capable of sustaining several connections
across different interfaces. This multi-technology availability enables a better user experience,
serving the 4G paradigm of “always on, always best connected”3 and creates a real possibil-
ity for multi-homing and development of multi-homed based solutions. In heterogeneous
multi-homed capable networks, mobility is no longer governed by signal availability, but by
user preferences, possibly identity based - each persona governs its mobility patterns and
selections. In this context, flow based mobility is a well suited candidate for the minimum
granularity available to mobility mechanisms. The way flows are distributed through the
available interfaces should depend on network availability, provider information, cost and
more importantly, on preferences set by the user or, in our privacy model, by the virtual
persona. This allows the user to take full advantage of the concepts of identity management,
personae and multi-homing.
While the proposed solution to tackle privacy can be applied to any mobility scenario, it
becomes particularly interesting in such volatile environments, where a user can distribute
flows belonging to different identities across the same interfaces. It would lead, in the current
3This is also commonly referred to the “always best connected” paradigm, verbalizing the ever more pressing
expectations of users to enjoy faster and more reliable connection even when on mobile platforms and nomadic
scenarios.
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models, to the sharing of similar network addresses, and consequently, to the linkage of iden-
tity personae, which would increase the threats previously presented. However, multi-homing
capabilities can be used to diminish the effects caused by mobility on identity correlation.
Considering an example of a terminal with only one interface, when a new network with bet-
ter signal is sensed, the terminal performs handover and all flows, even belonging to different
virtual personae, need to handover simultaneously as well, which gives information on the
correlation of the different flows and different personae.
It is worth mentioning that this is the reference network used within the Daidalos II
project platform [71], which aimed at providing a 4G all-IP network with multiple service
support and heterogenous technologies. The proposed approach was included and explored
within the scope the highlighted network model, and also within the Daidalos II architecture.
4.5.2 Control Through Identity
The first step towards supporting the VNS paradigm is to introduce a control layer, that
directly instantiates identity layer functionality, pulling the VID concept further down the OSI
stack. This control plane interacts with applications, which are used as input for network stack
management. As can be seen in Fig. 4.11, in the terminal control plane, applications might be
identity aware and provide specific inputs to the management plane, deciding independently
on the usage of identity personae; or applications might be legacy, where the management
decisions will be extrapolated by a legacy interface component, that analyses the application
requirements and selects an appropriate persona.
The control plane dynamically handles the creation and removal of the pseudonym sets
that become available to different identities. It also enables the selection of identities, i.e.
enabling an application to set an identity, implicitly selecting all the associated pseudonyms.
In VNS this is achieved by closely coupling the network events and identifiers to an IdM
system. By introducing an IdM layer that interacts with applications (which are the real
information producers and consumers), it is possible to decide when and how new information
sets need to be introduced.
Binding applications to identities implies that applications are identity aware, and have
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an algorithm for selecting an identity from the Identity Control Layer (Fig. 4.11). Otherwise,
it is necessary to develop an abstraction layer that preserves the current operating system
semantics, resulting results in the shown legacy interface. This legacy interface is required for
identity-aware protocols and applications. As such, mechanisms in the terminal must enable
the instantiation of multiple protocols, by means of a control application that adequately
connects the correct input and output flows, tying them to identity information.
Addressing scalability issues identified in Sec. 4.4 are tackled by a tight integration with
the identity plane. Scaling is provided through IdM properties, which inherently provide a way
of throttling network usage versus provided privacy. Given the limited identities or personae
assumed by the users when interacting with the digital world, it automatically restricts the
total number of Information Sets, and thus the number of required network addresses. Given
the highly customizable privacy framework provided by the IdM system, through policies, it
is possible to support a fine-grain control to suit the requirements of the user, and still keep
the creation of pseudonyms under control.
4.5.3 Cross Layer Pseudonyms
For a terminal to disguise itself under several layers of pseudonyms, it is necessary to support
the concept of multi-layer pseudonyms on an Identity basis, leading to the concept of a
VNS per identity (or VID). The VNS approach provides the instantiation that enables the
required network support for the VID framework. As such, each VNS represented in Fig. 4.11
is associated with a VID. As such, the identifiers present in each VNS belong to a distinct
IS, as defined in the VID framework. Each identity is assigned different L2, L3 and L4
pseudonyms, making it impossible to use these identifiers for VID correlation. We assume
that, at the application layer, the identity scheme in use provides different pseudonyms for
the user, presented at different services.
While the control has been discussed, several aspects of how to support network pseudonyms
in the network have not yet been discussed. We must provide a mechanism by which
pseudonyms are made persistent on each layer, obeying the network model. To gain control
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of the network stack, identity needs to have direct influence on the control plane. However,
the data plane is entirely sustained by a VNS, given the fact that identity operations are not
required on data packets. The objective is to provide control over the network stack without
linking identifiers that can be correlated. While the VNS concept is fairly simple, it needs to
be extended to all mentioned layers, providing the means to instantiate pseudonyms at every
layer, taking privacy into account. The next sub-sections address this instantiation over the
network stack.
An additional layer, the Virtual Device Control Layer, is introduced in Fig. 4.11 to en-
able virtual identities towards the network and supporting the virtual device metaphor, as
discussed in the following sections. With the proper abstractions and control path, the mod-
ifications to the data path in the terminal are minimal. The data path must be capable of
handling packets directed at different identifiers, which are not directly related to the exis-
tent physical devices, but rather to the identifiers or pseudonyms associated with the different
identities.
4.5.3.1 Virtual Devices
Integrating the VID concepts in the network, and especially into the terminal, requires more
than just support mechanisms on the device. It requires a metaphor that adapts and adjusts
to the requirements imposed by virtual identities, and especially virtual network stacks.
We turn to the concept of a Virtual Interface (VIF), or a virtual network device, to support
the idea of multiple concurrent users attached to the same physical device. Emulating physical
devices presents the desired metaphor for enabling different pseudonym sets, or VID, since
at the operating system level the network addresses are associated with a device. A VIF is
a normal device from the operating system perspective, but which does not represent a real
device towards the network. Instead, it must be associated with a real network device, thus
virtualizing a network device over its real network counterpart. This facilitates the existence
of several virtual devices, over a single network interface card, where each VIF is associated
with a new link layer address, a pseudonym, with different upper layer addresses for that
particular device. This enables the support of disjoint identifier sets across different virtual
devices, while preserving operating system semantics.
From a terminal architecture perspective, the virtual device abstraction presents the nec-
essary bindings to cope with virtual network stacks and cross-layer pseudonymity. By instan-
tiating multiple devices that are bound to a user identity, we are able to support different
pseudonyms on different layers, aligned by the layer shown in Fig. 4.11 where the Virtual
Device Control Layer interacts with the identity layer to provide several virtual interfaces
that are associated with their own VNS. Once these concepts are in place, we can start
instantiating virtual devices to provide pseudonyms, as shown next.
However, from the network perspective, every VIF should be independent of of its real as-
sociated device, and all other virtual devices. This creates the illusion that multiple terminals
exist in the network, one for each VID.
4.5.3.2 Link Layer Pseudonyms
On the Link layer, independent addresses need to be generated for each VNS. These addresses
do not correspond to the physical address present in every network interface card. This is
in fact a virtual address that is created for every persona. While it is straightforward to
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generate addresses, the real interfaces need to be abstracted on the user’s terminal, so that
each virtual stack is supplied with the necessary device information, such as signal strength
or provider availability. This can be accomplished in software by using a Virtual Device
Manager (VDM) that controls the real interfaces, and supplies the necessary primitives and
information to the VIF, which contains a virtual MAC address. It is important to notice that
a VNS might be extended to more than one physical device, therefore, creating several VIFs
under the control of a particular identity, as show in the instantiation examples present in
Sec. 4.5.3.7. From the network point of view, each VIF (with its associated virtual MAC)
represents a different device, competing among each other for network access (otherwise, it
would be easy to see at the link layer, especially with IEEE 802.11 protocols, that at each
DIFS interval assigned to a particular device, spoofed frames were being received). While the
aforementioned abstraction bloats the network stack, it is necessary to cope with the privacy
issues, namely to have uncorrelated physical devices and addresses. Moreover, it provides the
added benefit of enabling terminals to deal with future access technologies, such as multi-head
radios and heterogeneous technologies, coping with the previously mentioned 4G scenarios.
4.5.3.3 Network Layer Pseudonyms
Using pseudonyms at the network layer is simpler than at the link layer. Network identi-
fiers are used as locators to determine the routing path. If we consider IPv6 as our target
protocol, the address is usually auto-configured. The support of a Virtual IP address can
be achieved by running independent instances of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP)
performing Stateless Address Auto-Configuration (SLAAC) for each virtual interface. This
leads to independent addressing for each identity. The support of stateful address acquisition
methods is also straightforward and requires several instances of a DHCPv6 daemon. While
running several protocol instances poses a strain on the device and network, its impact is
much lower than in [56], due to the fact that the instances run per persona, instead of on a
per application basis.
4.5.3.4 Mobility Pseudonyms
Mobility solutions at the network layer tend to create an indirection between the locator, the
IP address, and the identifier used by the transport layer, which is the actual endpoint of the
transport connections. We discuss two mobility protocols that are easily extended to support
the VNS concepts, MIPv6 [77] and HIP [112].
MIPv6 The Layer 3 pseudonyms mentioned in the previous section provide pseudonymity for
the Care-of Address (CoA), which is in fact the aforementioned locator. For each VNS,
a different HoA should be used. This means that each VNS has a different HoA and a
different set of CoAs. Each HoA needs to be generated and independently registered at
the Home Agent (HA). Again, added signaling is required to support privacy.
HIP To use HIP each VNS should generate its own HI, and corresponding HITs for each
identity, that are passed onto the transport layer. HIP has the same problems as MIPv6,
in the sense that more signaling is required to support the VNS concept.
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4.5.3.5 Transport Layer Pseudonyms
When mobility is in place, using pseudonyms for mobility already makes the transport layer
VNS ready, since transport protocols, such as TCP and UDP, establish their bindings with the
mobility identifiers, i.e. HoA or HIT. If no mobility solution is used, one can argue that the
L3 pseudonyms already provide the necessary VNS support for the transport layer, because
the bindings are to the L3 identifiers, and the IP address (IPv6 in our case) is used both as
locator and identifier.
4.5.3.6 Application Layer Modifications and Pseudonyms
As already discussed in the previous chapters, most Identity Management solutions work at
the application level, like OpenID [122], Cardspace [109] or [20]. Nonetheless, some modi-
fications are required to keep user privacy intact. The common use case for identity is the
connection to a service presenting the necessary credentials, or identity claims, to that service
(this acts as the identity selection period). The operation mechanism of these identity models
considers that, upon initial connection to a service, the user is presented with a graphical
user interface, known as an identity selector, from which the user selects the desired persona.
While this applies to application layer privacy, it breaks lower layer privacy because the user
will have a set of identifiers already in use when connecting to the desired service. In fact,
the user would be bound to the present VNS, since it would be hard to change the underlying
identifiers without having to start a new connection to that service. Furthermore, the change
would provide an attacker with the means to link past and present identifier sets.
The user should be presented with the identity selector as part of the application startup.
An example of this model is the case of a user browsing a web site and being prompted with
the selection of an identity for that website. This model should be replaced by the identity
selector being shown when the browser starts, leading to the paradigm that the identity is
already selected upon connection to the website. The problem of identity selection has been
addressed as a spin-off of the work presented in this Thesis, as shown in [126, 127], which
shows pragmatic strategies to address the problem. It has also been addressed in the identity
based architectures presented here, in Sec. 6.3, by linking the network identity selection to the
identity selection in a SAML [20] based architecture, in the scope of the SWIFT [72] project.
The proposed IdM solutions also take care of the required pseudonyms towards different
applications, includes different services, web applications, and different application layer pro-
tocols, such as SIP. The latter case is important since it can also provide mobility support on
the application layer, for VoIP solutions. Using the IdM possibilities, it is possible to register
different SIP identities (and identifier,s based on URIs) that use IdM based pseudonyms (e.g.
SAML).
4.5.3.7 Instantiation Example
The best way to understand the VNS approach is to observe a working example of the
proposed abstractions. We show a detailed example on an instantiation of a VNS across
multiple layers and interfaces. Our example scenario, illustrated in Fig. 4.12, consists of two
personae that run independent applications spanning over two real interfaces. In this case,
two virtual stacks are instantiated to cope with the desired privacy levels.
Each network stack can use one or more application identifiers bound to the specific
identity. Going through the layers, for transport, each VNS is bound to one MIPv6 HoA,
110
	  
Virtual Interface 
P1'
Home Address
P1
Home Address
P2
Application
Identifier P1
Care-of Address
P1'
Application
Identifier P2
Virtual Persona
(P1)
Virtual Persona
(P2)
Care-of Address
P1'’
Care-of Address
P2'’
Care-of Address
P2'
MAC Address
P1'
MAC Address
P1''
MAC Address
P2''
MAC Address
P2'
Aplication 
Layer
Transport 
Layer
Network 
Layer
Identity 
Layer
MAC Layer
Virtual Interface 
P1'’
Virtual Interface 
P2'
Virtual Interface 
P2'’
Real Interface 1 Real Interface 2
VIF Layer
Interface 
Layer
Figure 4.12: Virtual Network Stack instantiation for two personae.
providing the appropriate mobility bindings. The network and link layers depend on the
number of active interfaces, that are actually connected to virtual interfaces. From this
example, we observe that two real interfaces spawn into four virtual interfaces (two per
identity), leading to the requirement of one MAC address and CoA for each virtual interface.
We then have two MAC and IP addresses per identity: there will be no linkage between
identifiers across virtual stacks, and consequently, across identities.
4.5.4 Prototype Implementation
The first step towards validating the proposed requirements demands a prototype implemen-
tation of the architecture discussed in the previous sections. To achieved this, we implemented
the discussed VDM as part of the VNS proposal. This prototype [57] was initially developed
as part of the IST-Daidalos project architecture [3] demonstrator, which deployed a next gen-
eration network prototype with multiple access technologies, such as WiFi, WiMax, UMTS,
DVB and Ethernet, providing a playground for testing a pseudonymity approach. The pro-
totype, along with the solution, evolved with greater IdM focus on the identity framework
of project IST-Swift [90], closely coupling the solution to IdM frameworks, as shown by [93],
which is one of the solutions developed in the scope of this Thesis, highlighted in Sec. 6.3.
The VDM, presented in Sec. 4.5.4.1, was implemented on a GNU/Linux operating system
(Ubuntu Linux), along with solutions for the control path, and multiple access technologies.
The software module follows the architecture described in Fig. 4.13 that contains the three
main modules coordinated by the VDM control layer. The Device Management provides
the creation and deletion of the virtual devices, which is in fact an abstraction that controls
the TunTap Linux Kernel module, along with a special purpose WiFi monitor device, to
listen to incoming packets not directed at the real device. The Socket Management module
provides socket management tools to receive and transmit packets, between network, virtual
device, and interprocess communication inside the system. Finally, the Packet Forwarding
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Figure 4.13: Virtual Device Manager architecture.
module provides the packet switching capabilities and primitives, along with the encapsulation
functionalities, for both WiFi and Ethernet technologies. Most state is kept in the control
layer that provides the “intelligence” layer to inter-relate the different modules.
The physical support of the prototype relies on generic Ethernet cards for the wired
component, and IEEE 802.11b Atheros chipset cards for the WiFi component. The Atheros
chipset allows packet injection through the Madwifi drivers for Linux, enabling the emulation
of several wireless cards. Since the support for WiFi relied on packet injection, and not real
driver support, the performance over the wireless interfaces is not discussed here given that
it is not possible to establish relevant comparison with normal WiFi traffic. Therefore, we
focus on the performance of the Ethernet card. For the computing platform, we used an
AMD Athlon 64 3000+ processor to run the VDM, and a Core 2 Duo terminal to generate
traffic flows - both machines pose no computational barrier. Below we present the major
findings stemming from the experimental prototype, along with evaluation of pseudonym
requirements, stemming from the previous pseudonym analysis (Sec. 4.4).
4.5.4.1 Implementation: Virtual Device Manager
Emulating physical devices presents a proper metaphor for enabling different pseudonym
sets, because at the operating system level the network addresses are bound to a device. A
virtual device is associated with a new link layer address, a pseudonym, and with different
upper layer addresses for that particular device. This support separates identifier sets across
different virtual devices, thus supporting multiple VIDs, while preserving operating system
semantics.
From a terminal architecture perspective, the virtual device abstraction presents the nec-
essary bindings to cope with VNS and cross-layer pseudonymity. The VDM is the core
software component that enables the VNS system. Its primary function is to manage the vir-
tual devices, present them to the applications and preserve the semantics that are available
on real devices. Multiple pseudonyms are assured, as mentioned above, by maintaining the
virtual devices and allowing them to interact with the system and network as real devices.
Maintaining the virtual devices implies that the VDM creates and destroys network devices
per identity, as required by the supervising IdM System.
Beyond these functions, the VDM provides support for identity aware applications, de-
livering the control packets when necessary (with identity information), and instantiating
multiple protocols per virtual device. Protocols such as MIPv6 bind to virtual devices and
use them as the basis for mobility. Assuming that the MAC layer technology is capable of
handling such requirements, supporting this operation is straightforward. On the data path,
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Virtual Network Stacks VNS 1 VNS 2
IPv6 Global Address 3ffe::2ff:abff:fe8e:cfee/64 3ffe::2ff:3cff:fedb:78cb/64
IPv6 LL Address fe80::2ff:abff:fe8e:cfee/64 fe80::2ff:3cff:fedb:78cb/64
MAC Address 00:FF:AB:8E:CF:EE 00:FF:3C:D8:78:CB
Virtual Interface vif0 vif1
Real Interface Wireless Interface / ath0
Table 4.1: Virtual Device Manager instantiation example.
the VDM must direct packets to and from the appropriate real devices, while preserving the
associated technology mechanisms, abstracted from the system. In fact, once the virtual in-
terfaces are available, they allow multiple addresses to rely upon operating system semantics
(such as routes at the network layer) - virtual devices emulate real ones. The real devices
are only used as the physical access mechanism to allow actual packet transport over the link
technology. For a VNS instantiation example, refer to Table 4.1 below.
4.5.4.2 Evaluation
The developed implementation enables two types of analysis: a qualitative analysis on the
effective separation between different virtual identities, mostly in terms of signaling and data
packets; and a quantitative analysis that sets an upper bound for performance. In Table 4.1
we can see a sample instance of the prototype including device names, link layer addresses,
Link Local and Global IPv6 addresses. The VDM creates two different virtual devices on
top of their physical counterpart, and consequently it creates different identifiers. The virtual
devices contain the upper layer addresses, which are in fact pseudonyms for the different
identities.
To analyze the performance we have chosen to consider three metrics: delay, bandwidth
and interface bootstrap times. All tests were subject to at least 15 runs, of which we present
the average values, later compared to the reference values for each type of test. For more
volatile values we include a 99% confidence interval.
Delay is one of the most relevant metric when analyzing this type of prototype. The VDM
has to process and distribute incoming packets to the correct virtual interfaces. When multiple
real interfaces exist, it is also necessary to select the correct output interface: this is a one-
to-one mapping, kept at each virtual interface. The process requires copying packets between
different buffers 4, introducing delay beyond the processing itself that must be accounted for.
The delay presented inFig. 4.14 shows an average penalty of 36ms. These results were
obtained by directing multiple UDP traffic flows at several virtual interfaces, where each
virtual interface carried one flow. The additional delay spans from 20% to 50% of the total
delay, and the variation of the delay as the number of flows increases does not stray far
from the reference measurements. This result presents an upper bound performance impact,
resulting mostly from the implementation (using buffer copies in user space, due to Tun/Tap
operation), which could be mitigated in kernel only implementation.
4In a production-grade implementation all copy operations would be avoided through zero-copy implemen-
tations, which is the standard for most operating systems. In this operation mode only buffer references are
passed, instead of copying packets.
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Figure 4.14: Communication delay for UDP.
The bandwidth impact analysis consists on creating multiple TCP flows and compare the
average bandwidth allocation for all flows against reference measures. Each traffic flow is
also assigned to an interface. Fig. 4.15 presents the measured values. We can observe that
our implementation does cause a reduction in average bandwidth, as expected. The average
bandwidth decreases as the number of interfaces increases, since the flow contention becomes
more critical than the actual processing delay. For clarity, we also present the bandwidth
difference within the graphic.
Finally, we recorded bootstrap times of the virtual interfaces to determine if the number
of existing virtual interfaces affects the bootstrap of the newly created ones. These were
obtained from the instant the virtual interface was created, until the instant the interface
established connectivity, by acquiring addresses and routes. Fig. 4.16 presents the average
bootstrap times: we clearly observe that the bootstrap time is not affected by the number
of previously instantiated interfaces. This was the expected behavior for the relatively small
amount of virtual interfaces created (as required by the identity model).
4.5.4.3 Technology Limitations
While we have implemented WiFi devices using a modified driver, packet injection poses
drawbacks. Multiple 802.11 associations must be supported in the actual device driver or
in the card firmware. Failing to do so places unnecessary strain on the system, and allows
an attacker to link different pseudonyms by identifying the expected station in a Network
Allocation Vector (NAV) slot. Also, with current technology all associations must connect to
the same channel. An interesting alternative would be to allow the connection to different
access points on different channels. However, this would require specific equipment, either
with time consuming frequency hopping, or multi-radio devices that would provide added
value for both privacy and mobility aspects.
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Figure 4.15: Average TCP bandwidth per flow/interface.
4.5.5 Requirement Support and Impacts
The generic analysis of network pseudonyms (Sec. 4.4) yielded a set of requirements that must
be addressed when discussing pseudonym solutions.In this section we discuss the presented
VNS solution and accompanying realization (through the VDM) in light of those requirements,
establishing performance and deployment bounds that shed a different light on the presented
requirements.
The first and foremost observation of the prototype wehn compared to the conceptual
model, is that this approach avoids unwanted network identifier linkage, between different
user identities. This provides an experimental validation to the proposed approach, that
goes beyond mathematical proof. The link to IdM technologies satisfies both R1 and R1.2
simultaneously, where information is confined to each identity, and limiting the required
identifiers on one per identity, rather than one per network interaction. Whenever new sets
are required, the user can simply create a new view over his user identity, providing a new
set of identifier towards service and network, accommodating the scalability requirement put
for by R1.2. In fact, when properly configured, each stack runs independent instances of each
protocol, using different and unlinkable identifiers, acknowledging the validity of a cross-layer
pseudonymity approach. This clearly satisfies R1.1, given that no identifier is shared across
sets. This defines the information set approach on the network layer, as a realization of the
proposed concepts.
Similarly, it is in the virtual interface and identity concepts that we handle the R2 family
of requirements. The cross-layer virtual interface approach coupled with high level identi-
fiers provides the foundation to address R2.1 (handle all identifier layers), enabling vertical
identifier sets. Since identifiers are bound to the virtual interface, we must manage them
aggregately, addressing R2.2. The virtual interface approach also addresses R2.3 (dynamic
identifier generation functions) by reusing available operating system mechanics that gener-
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Figure 4.16: Bootstrap delay of several virtual interfaces.
ate network identifiers (MAC addresses on the TunTap kernel module, and consequently IP
addresses). Also, it is worth noting that the implemented solution resorts to virtual inter-
faces that emulate real interfaces, retaining compatibility with current network and operating
system semantics, adhering to R3.
However, as mentioned, there are impacts on different levels. The drawbacks must be
considered, in order to prove that, beyond a privacy protecting solution, we have a feasible
model fitting the requirements of privacy-preservation.
Discussing the theoretical values only makes sense in light of the identity oriented approach
proposed by VNS, especially considering that it limits the amount of identities the user will
have to an average of 5 [129]. This is an important aspect since it guides the expected
degree of impact on the network stack and operational mechanisms, in order to conform to
requirements R1.2 (scalability) and R3 (network semantics) and its corollary requirements.
4.5.5.1 Addressing Impacts
We have identified that one of the most critical impairments for pseudonymity systems lies
in the addressing impacts, embodied by R3.1 and R3.2. We must consider first and foremost
that VNS provides a cross-layer approach, forcing us to consider the addressing impacts
independently on each layer due to different identifier sizes. We focus on the two that cover
most interactions: link layer (MAC Addresses) and network layer (IP Address). For the
MAC layer address, where identifiers have 48 bits, we have a maximum of 248 addresses. For
IPv6 the addressing space is larger, having the dynamic part set at 264 (the remaining bits
represent the network).
The evaluation of the impact can be calculated as according to Eq. 4.6, using the Virtual
Address Space for k sets on 48 and 64 bits, which is reflected in Fig. 4.17. This result is
very similar to Fig. 4.9, but presents a nuance, since we introduce the area where the VNS
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Figure 4.17: Evolution of the wasted addresses, using the Virtual Address Space, for 48 and
64 bit identifiers.
will operate, limiting the space waste to 5 addresses per set, which corresponds to wasting
4.1452× 1005 48 bit addresses and 1.0612× 1008 64 bit addresses; this is an acceptable value
in a universe of respectively 2.8147 × 1014 and 1.8447 × 1019 addresses, addressing R3.1. It
should be noted that, while both curves depicted in Fig. 4.17 follow the behavior presented in
Fig. 4.9, the vertical axis represents the absolute number of addresses; as such, both curves
differ by several orders of magnitude. These numbers are still within the acceptable range,
especially considering that the solution is controlled by identity and this will throttle identifier
consumption. Assuming IPv6 addresses are generated from MAC addresses through EUI-64
expansion, then whenever we detect a collision at the IPv6 layer, we force a complete address
regeneration, thus solving R3.2, avoiding collision on both MAC and IPv6 layers. However,
such findings lead us to conclude that a major requirement is to produce, in the future, a
mechanism that considers collision detection for link layer addresses, much like Duplicate
Address Detection (DAD) in IPv6, because addresses are now dynamic, with non-negligible
collision probability.
4.5.5.2 Bootstrapping Impacts
An important part of R3 relates to performance (R3.3 ). We established earlier that bootstrap
times might vary depending on the number of interfaces. Ideally, the optimal setting would
be one where bootstrap times are fixed and independent of the number of virtual interfaces,
and do not grow with the addition of more interfaces, as opposed to growing whenever a new
interface is added (e.g. linearly or exponentially). The results presented in Fig. 4.16 seem to
lean towards the former case where multiple pseudonym instantiations occur in parallel, with
a bootstrap time of approximately 3 seconds. This setup overhead is acceptable, even for a
considerable number of stacks, given that session establishment occurs in a period where the
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user is less susceptible to delay - in fact he will not be aware of it, thus partially solving R3.3,
missing only performance impacts discussed in Sec. 4.5.5.3.
It is however necessary to point out that the bootstrap process in the prototype tests is a
fairly simple one, mainly acquiring the minimal necessary network addresses. For advanced
bootstrap sequences, that go beyond basic IPv6 connectivity and that might require key
agreements or cryptographic negotiations, contention associated with those specific processes
might significantly degrade these results. In registration or authentication processes that
require cryptographic key generation from hardware devices, the key generation will most
likely impose contention for a large number of pseudonyms. This has been already the focus
of related work, based on VID evaluation in AAA scenarios that require proper user authen-
tication and authorization, as shown in [13]. The main concern here is to realize which of
these bootstrap steps are critical and, if possible, apply measures that circumvent its impact.
4.5.5.3 Performance Impacts
The presented implementation should be regarded as a prototype, and therefore, given its
nature, it can only provide us with indicative values for performance. This allows us to frame
the performance of a deployed pseudonym solution between the existing performance and
the presented results. As far as prototype performance is concerned, we determined that,
as expected, there is a negative impact in the communication system. However, this impact
is extremely small when compared with the contention of several flows across the virtual
interfaces. Delay also seems to hold up within reasonable levels. We can conclude that the
pseudonymity approach has minimal network impact, properly addressing the missing gaps in
R3.3 and consequently R3. Given the previous findings, a commercial solution should perform
very closely to the current single stack, suggesting that virtual stack implementations are
feasible from an implementation perspective, as current virtualization efforts on commercial
platforms begin to show.
4.5.5.4 Technology and Deployment Impact
Wireless networks are the best candidates for pseudonymity solutions, since it is difficult
to determine the frame origin, i.e. physical device, (unlike wired technologies). However,
wireless technologies are usually connection oriented and require explicit associations. The
implementation of the WiFi interface made clear that connection oriented access technologies
pose a problem when implementing a pseudonym stack approach. Packets from unassociated
addresses are dropped, meaning that each virtual device enabled over such technologies needs
to be registered and participate in the wireless medium contention mechanisms. Such is the
case of IEEE 802.11b/g [66], requiring modified drivers to support its connection oriented
nature. Association and dissociation procedures must be done for each address, therefore
participating in the network allocation vector mechanisms. A solution to this issue would
be a modified firmware that allows multiple associations. This would also require that the
hardware is able to support a software MAC implementation, in order to control the device as
a plain radio, and implement more complex features in the device protocol implementation.
Generalizing the solution to all wireless technologies that will serve as the base for next
generation heterogeneous networks, we reach the conclusion that the virtual device approach
requires multiple association support in the device driver for connection oriented technologies.
This is a crucial step toward a pseudonymity solution deployment, and should be treated as
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a requirement for operating system design. The virtual devices and pseudonyms introduce a
new layer of complexity and concurrency, which must be handled directly in the operating
system. Concurrent access to real devices must be assured, along with new paradigms for
both OS implementation and low level network access.
Application design should take into account the reality of multiple network stacks, and
more importantly, of multiple user identities. Upper layer application support for identity
and multiple pseudonyms is a definite requirement for evolved pseudonymity approaches,
that is already being pulled by IdM, and goes beyond username and password schemes.
This support translates into new paradigms in socket programming, since the current model
of network sockets must be extended to enable the existence of multiple pseudonyms with
different network realizations. Packets should be contained within their specific identity scope,
and never cross identity boundaries, so that involuntary identifier linkage does not occur in
the network, e.g. sending a packet to a virtual interface belonging to another identity. This
should be guaranteed by the operating system.
A side effect that needs to be addressed in real deployment of both network drivers and
operating systems is the distribution of traffic sent to the real device. Different virtual devices
can have different QoS priorities introducing a new layer of traffic priority. Queuing must
be applied to enable different priorities across different virtual identities, along with the
appropriate management.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we started dealing with the vertical aspects of privacy, because they can
bring the alignment and coordination to the privacy dimensions. Based on the vertical and
horizontal privacy requirements, from the PRIVED model, we attempted to build a vertical
solution that aggregates user information into a coherent and manageable construction. The
result was the notion of Virtual Identity, as a partial view of a digital entity. This allowed to
size down the Information Set, a concept stemming from the PRIVED model, by providing
the means to perceive the user in an NGN environment. This allowed not only to tackle the
different dimensions of the user, but also its interactions with the network. We believe that
the result is more than a model. It is a paradigm for regarding user in digital environments,
opening the door to a new vision of user-centric mechanisms towards the network and services.
However, the effort cannot be simply conceptual, and must be related to the network and
to the privacy model. To bridge this gap, we proposed a data model and an architecture, that
effectively lay the ground work of the VID in the network. We proposed a data model closely
related to the PRIVED model, building on the IS related concept, and centered around three
generic constructions to model user related information: the Entity Profile, the Entity Profile
Part and Entity Profile View. The EPV is the materialization of the VID, composed by a
set of information blocks that are put together to form the user identity and the view that
services can have over the user. The EPV has a main handle that is used as the main identity
reference, the VIDID, and has filterable content, leading to the creation of different FEVP
sets. The EPV, or VID, is composed of several information blocks, the EPPs, that can exist on
the user local device, on the network, or in different providers (even in non-digital form). The
EPV models not only the vision of a partial user identity for privacy reasons, directed identity
towards services, but also an appropriate model to tackle information distribution over the
different players involved in NGN. These are the tools needed to build the architecture, which
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we define through a lightweight IdM-like approach. It provides the minimal components that
enable the VID environments: the IDManager and the IDBroker. We showed how these
functional boxes can work together to provide most of the identity and information related
operations, supporting the concepts of EPP, EPV and corresponding structures and filters
(through AAA).
An important step in the work evolution was the translation of these concepts into the
network. The VID must have repercussions into the network. Focusing on the pseudonymity
features promoted by the VID on the data layer and supported by IdM, we instantiated these
proposals as network concepts. However, to establish whether pseudonyms were a feasible
approach, we had to first determine the requirements and impacts using pseudonyms on every
layer, along with the necessary adaptations. This led to a study on network pseudonymity,
focusing on privacy, control and addressing, which are among the most pressing requirements
for identifiers on the network. This study yielded several requirements that we believe capture
the nature of pseudonyms on the network, and are accordingly channeled into our proposal.
To accompany the VID solution we proposed Virtual Network Stacks, a mechanism to enable
network based cross-layer pseudonyms, resorting to the metaphor of virtual devices. We pro-
posed this solution aligned within an NGN network model, where control is exerted by identity
(through IdM) and pseudonyms are generated per-identity (VID), according to the virtual
interface approach. This allowed scaling the solution on the network side, while simultane-
ously respecting the vertical privacy boundaries defined by the VID. Finally, this solution
was properly implemented and tested, so that it could be matched against the conceptual
background outlined earlier.
The work presented throughout this chapter showed that the vertical approach is a re-
quirement to maintain privacy, due to the need of aligning the information containers, as
highlighted by the PRIVED model. In this scope, we acknowledge that the VID provides the
necessary mechanics, paradigms and tools to instantiate vertical containers, and when aligned
with the PRIVED model, they can be used to control and maintain user privacy. It is also
important to conclude that there are means to translate the entire approach to the network
by further promoting the pseudonymity solutions.
While the vertical approach is the best candidate to maintain overall privacy, it does
not moot the horizontal threats to individual VID privacy. While it greatly reduces the
risks, horizontal protocol threats can still be used to threaten, correlate and link identities,
information, and consequently forfeiting user privacy. Therefore, we accept that there is
room for improvement on each individual layer, starting right at the link layer. Taking the
conceptual vertical model, implemented and tested, we move on to each individual layer,
and try to complement the vertical privacy protection mechanisms with privacy enhancing
technologies at all the relevant network layers. This is the focus of the following chapter.
120
Chapter 5
A Layered Approach to Privacy
A small leak can sink a great ship
Benjamin Franklin
A structured approach to privacy promotes evaluating privacy concepts on different layers.
Reaching the limitations of vertical solutions, which cannot entrench into the unique features
of individual protocols, we turn to each layer individually to guarantee privacy aware features.
Individually, lower layers must not compromise the vertical privacy schemes that were outlined
in previous chapters. This chapter presents a layered approach comprising link, network and
application layers. To achieve this, we introduce new privacy proposals that protect the
end-user and thwart the threats discussed in Chap. 3, tackling the major threats for each
protocol, but always establishing the conceptual parallels to vertical relationships and the
PRIVED model.
We first propose an entirely new link layer communication protocol that features a privacy-
aware transport mechanism, enabling the user to communicate securely and privately. On the
network layer, we promote a privacy aware routing solution. It builds on anonymity schemes
to provide privacy-protecting routing that can involve service providers for widespread de-
ployment. Finally, we provide a look into application layer protocols, and how they can
leverage identity and user-centric approaches to provide privacy towards service providers,
thus concluding a privacy review on each major layer.
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5.1 Introduction
So far, privacy has been explored as a vertical problem, reaching across the entire network
stack. However, as shown by the PRIVED model, and associated threats, it has deep hori-
zontal ramifications. Individual layers of the OSI stack model pose different threats: some of
them are serious because they provide means to track the user, learn his location and obtain
personal data, which should be further explored.
The horizontal exploration of privacy enhancing solutions and improvements is justified
on different dimensions. We must look at individual layer procedures, that are known to cause
privacy risks, such as the ones outlined in Sec. 3.4. Given that there are serious privacy threats
on individual layers, the conclusion that a flaw in one of them can lead to the corruption of
the entire system is perfectly valid. This is especially true when considering the PRIVED
approach (Sec. 3.3), where a single event observation, through a privacy leak, can lead to
a cascade of conclusions. Also, in the VID ecosystem, having a single correlation between
two separate identities can have dire consequences to the user, and at the same time, void
a considerable amount of privacy support technologies (such as VNS). This shows that the
vertical approach can only go so far. It is pointless to provide a complete vertical solution for
privacy, if then the applied protocols can undermine the proposed solution by not respecting
the PRIVED conditions.
Due to the dependency between layers, we must improve the privacy conditions to as-
sure that there are no easy mechanisms to jeopardize the vertical information containment
layers (using VIDs). By improving privacy conditions on each layer, we are contributing to
an overall more robust privacy solution, where the vertical approach becomes stronger and
more resilient to threats on each layer. Such privacy endangering mechanisms exist on dif-
ferent protocols and procedures, often in multiple places in the same layer. To overcome
these threats on the different layers we must focus on specific aspects. Link layer identifiers,
regardless of access technology, can be used to track and identify the user, compromising the
IS. Alternatively, the network layer address not only identifies the user, but also conveys his
position. Mobility mechanisms further accentuate these threats. Therefore, as discussed in
Chap. 3, the mentioned layers and identifiers can be used to track, identify and locate the
user, jeopardizing privacy.
In this chapter we propose solutions that tackle privacy threats on different layers of the
network stack. Specifically, we propose to address tracking and location issues on the link
and network layers, along with upper layer privacy integration, that do not compromise each
IS as proposed in Chap. 4. For the link layer we propose a novel communication model that
defines the message recipients based on cryptographic properties rather then on source and
destination addresses. It focuses on addressing the communication channel instead of the
involved stations, and is especially focused on wireless broadcast environments. The proposal
discussed in Sec. 5.2 consists of a transport solution followed by performance simulations. It
provides both end-point privacy protection, as well as location privacy protections, i.e. it is
impossible to track a station by its addresses.
Similarly, for the network layer we propose a solution that relates to Onion Routing [142]
focusing on hiding the real addresses of the communicating peers, and consequently their
locations. By relying only on standard IPv6 mechanisms to define waypoints in the routing
path, similar to hop-by-hop routing, the packets go through several privacy-enabled routers,
defining special waypoint routes, with a significantly reduced costs when compared with
existing solutions. Sec. 5.3.1 presents the architecture that enables the overlay solution along
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with the location analysis. The solution conceals the real addresses of the users, making it
harder to compromise not only the privacy threatened by IP addresses, but also breaking any
possible IS correlations based on addresses.
Finally, we investigate transport and application layer privacy concepts. On the trans-
port layer, we identify the particular privacy conditions that are caused by the very close
relationship with the network layer. On the application layer, we focus on IdM solutions
which provide pseudonymity. We evaluate the requirements that stem from other layers, and
from the vertical space represented by the VID/VNS solution, to conclude about the best
IdM protocols that fit our needs. We show how in the IdM space, SAML provides the best
approach towards our goals, and is the primary candidate for vertical layer integration. This
ends our chapter, showing that there are different aspects that require integration from an
architectural view point, bridging the work towards the vertical aspects and architectural
approaches.
5.2 Link Layer Privacy
One of the most interesting conclusions concerning link layer identifiers, highlighted in Sec. 3.4.3,
is that they bear a scope greater then their design purpose: these identifiers are globally
unique, yet are only employed in the logical access link. The result is a loss of privacy that
stems from the fact that we are always connected, and as we change locations we can be
tracked by the unique identifier used at the link layer (Sec. 3.4.4). While this is true for wired
links, it becomes more relevant in wireless environments because of the encouraged nomadic
behavior that the technology induces. The technology has reached such an adoption level that
it is virtually present everywhere we go, but carries a hidden cost: the “always connected” en-
vironment takes a toll on privacy, which stems from the link between our physical movement
and the network attachment of the devices we carry. Due to the recurring privacy arguments,
users require secure and private network operation in order to trust the ubiquitous wireless
access. Accordingly, to keep up with user privacy requirements, link layer technologies must
evolve, and as discussed, wireless technologies require particular attention.
We focus on location privacy and identification issues at the link layer, considering 802.11
protocols as the primary use-case for the proposed solutions, in light of current technology and
standards. We present an approach that sits between the physical and link layers, showing
what can and cannot be protected above the standard specifications and which conveyed
information constitutes a privacy threat.
5.2.1 Network and Privacy Threats
In the scope of a link layer solution, it is interesting to understand the network model, because
it is important to determine how the local operations are carried out. This helps understand-
ing the major threats, in a delimited scenario, thus reducing the complexity grasping the
threats on user privacy. We start with a generic link scenario, and then instantiate into a
well known technology. In our model we consider the last hop of an access network composed
by one Access Point, AP and n terminals (or stations), Ni, with i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n. We further
extrapolate the individual links between each of the terminals Ni with the AP and term them
as channels, where Ci refers to the channel between node Ni and the AP . Each channel has
only two endpoints, which are the addresses of Ni, MACi, and of the AP , MACAP . Our
assumption is that, even though communication occurs only between the individual Ni and
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the AP , the medium is still broadcast and all the nodes in the group can listen to all of the
messages being sent over any Ci.
Focusing on this network scenario, we can highlight the major threats to link layer proto-
cols, first shown in Sec. 3.4.4. The first threat to privacy at the link layer is that of the attacker
having access to all the packets exchanged in all channels Ci. An attacker may track a device
from one network to the other by moving inside the same link layer cloud and mapping the
unchanging MAC address, which often leads to correlating Virtual Identities, and extending
Information Sets. By applying PRIVED, we can see that these threats can extend to the
network layer, by mapping different IP addresses to the same link layer identifiers. Another
issue is the tracking of origin and destination of link layer messages. Currently it is easy for
an outsider to determine traffic patterns and traffic direction. This information can be used
to pinpoint a user, or when correlated with more information, it can provide means towards
discovering the user’s identity (e.g. periodically checking an IMAP server, an often repeated
pattern in current software). Although the problem of anonymously linking identity to a form
of certification is outside of the scope of this Thesis, we provide the mechanisms which allow
the linkage of, for example, participation certificates which can be checked against a Public
Key Infrastructure and AAA servers for validity and uniqueness. Such a combination would
thwart attempts of multiple registrations on the behalf of the same user. In the scope of the
outlined network models, and intrinsic threats, we can summarize the security objectives that
a successful location and identification privacy approach for the link layer should achieve:
• Avoid using a unique link layer identifier: using the same identifier allows an attacker
to track the user’s location by testing the user’s presence in different link layer clouds
(correlating VIDs/ISs).
• Prevent linking network layer location with link layer identifiers.
• Protect communication peer identities and pseudonyms from traffic and header analysis.
• Protect users’ traffic from direction inference: distinguishing traffic direction (from the
AP to the terminal or vice-versa) allows an attacker to infer which service is being used
and possibly the user’s identity.
• Support link layer protocol operations to minimize changes to standards and implemen-
tation costs: the feasibility of our approach depends on the intrusiveness into the link
layer protocol.
• Ideally, when presented with several packets in the network, the attacker should not be
able to link them or even distinguish anything other than the fact that they are disjoint
packets.
In fact, the last item highlighted above presents the guiding principle for the entire solu-
tion, as it provides the best protection mechanism to support the PRIVED approach. When
provided with several packets in the network, an attacker should not be able to link them
or even distinguish any particular information, thus protecting the user’s virtual identity by
keeping the information within different sets separate. This should be achieved in such a
way that supports regular link layer protocol operation, minimizing changes to standards and
implementation costs: Some of the benefits of our approach are its lack of intrusiveness into
the link layer protocol.
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5.2.1.1 Targeting 802.11 Privacy Leaks
One of the advantages of performing a layered approach, is that we can navigate from generic
to concrete approaches and privacy evaluations. We have already outlined major link layer
threats, that converge on identification and location. We can now analyze very detailed
protocol mechanics that can yield privacy leaks, which can be divided into two categories:
direct, when the data is revealed in a packet, or correlated, when the attacker needs more
than one source to obtain the information. To perform an analysis on a protocol, we must
take both types into consideration. In most widely used protocols, link layer addresses used
to identify nodes are sent in every packet. Furthermore, a channel identifier is sometimes
used and, although it cannot be used to identify the node, it aids in tracking connections.
Other potentially leaked information includes sequence numbers, acknowledgment frames and
round-trip times, all of which can be correlated, hence tracking the connection and the user.
This leaked information is present due to protocol requirements and can not be eliminated.
Some cases require that part of this information is received by all the stations. Therefore,
each protocol will need careful analysis in order to determine if we can hide or otherwise
obfuscate the offending fields. Since this is a generic problem, and in order to exemplify
this procedure, we would like to demonstrate how information leakage can be detected in a
common link layer protocol: 802.11.
As mentioned in the overall privacy threats, location privacy is threatened by an attacker
having access to all packets exchanged in the channel Ci. Standard 802.11 operations require
that a station (STA) listens to all on-going traffic on the wireless link. While this leaks
privacy information, nevertheless some fields must be readable by everyone to ensure adequate
protocol operation, such as the NAV. All 802.11 frames share a generic format, which discloses
sensitive data, structured along the MAC Header or Frame Fig. 5.1, Frame Body and Frame
Check Sequence. The MAC Header contains sensitive user and network data. The Frame
control contains management information that carries private information, which we analyze
in relation of particular threats.
Figure 5.1: 802.11 MAC Frame and MAC Frame Control Field
Also stemming from the generic threats, comes the possibility of an attacker tracking a
device from one network to the other by moving inside the same wireless link as the subject,
mapping the unchanging MAC address. Hence, we must avoid using a unique link layer
identifier. In 802.11, the addresses are conveyed in two or more Address Fields, which are
one of the easiest ways to track stations in a wireless environment. Besides the addresses, an
attacker can resort to the Sequence Control field, which is divided into a Fragment Number
and a Sequence number. The sequence number is incremental and STA dependent, which
allows a station to be tracked even if all other information is hidden.
Another potential threat is tracking origin and destination of link layer messages. This
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information can be used to pinpoint a user. Inspecting any of the following fields, shown in
Fig. 5.1, it is easy to distinguish between AP and STA: To DS, From DS (where DS represents
the Distribution System, i.e. the AP), Power Management and More Data. In any of them
we conclude who is sending and receiving the message. The periodically broadcasted beacons
identify the presence of an AP and network parameters, but also notify sleeping STAs that
they have messages queued in the AP’s buffer, by using the Traffic Indication Map (TIM),
a vector of Association Identifier (AID), revealing information about the present stations.
Furthermore, the Duration/Id field has a dual purpose: it serves as the duration for the
NAV, which does not reveal sensitive information, and as the AID, disclosing information
about ongoing associations. Also, the attacker should not be able to tell how many active
nodes exist in a network. Such information might help the attacker in performing statistic and
probabilistic attacks on discovering the user’s identity. He can obtain this data by observing
Association and Authentication requests or by traffic analysis and data/event correlation.
Analyzing the fields Type and Subtype, it is fairly easy to determine which stations are
associating, re-associating or authenticating.
The discussed 802.11 fields can reveal sensitive information, unwillingly providing mech-
anisms to compromise the vertical identity approach. However, some fields must be read by
all stations, particularly regarding the NAV mechanism. All stations must read the duration
field in the frames, even if they are not the destination to perform NAV calculation, i.e. when
they can send packets. This field must be sent unmodified over the air, rendering useless any
solution that aims at encrypting the entire 802.11 frame.
5.2.2 Secure Transport
Our privacy proposal defines a novel transport mechanism. When active this transport pro-
tects the data and management frames against the described attacker model, assuming that
keys have previously been agreed between Ni and AP . When used in parallel with classical
networks, the node might obtain this key by, for example contacting his home network. As
this might not always be the case, we assume the involved parties actively partake in a Diffie-
Hellman authenticated key agreement1, satisfying the objectives given in Sec. 5.2.1. The key
agreement phase should only be necessary if the terminal, Ni, does not have another secure
way of agreeing on a key with the AP .
5.2.2.1 Protecting the Communication Channel
In our approach, a channel Ci is identified by key Ki shared between terminal Ni and AP , as
shown in Fig. 5.2. Logical channels are encrypted and only the key holders can inspect the
traffic inside the logical tunnel. Thus, both MAC addresses and unique identifiers are always
encrypted. But simple encryption is not sufficient: if it does not provide randomization, the
same plaintext results in the same ciphered text. For this reason, we add an initialization
vector iv, in order that the same plaintext results in different cipher text depending on iv.
If the value of iv is synchronized on both end-points, it allows fast determination algorithms
of the origin and/or destination of the packets. The most costly operation is synchronization
of both end-points: a packet is lost and the sequence number si is no longer synchronized
on both end points. When not synchronized, the nodes need to decrypt the packet with all
1An alternative, more privacy aware mechanism has been proposed in the form of a patent document [7],
still awaiting scientific publication.
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known keys and match the result against a known value. If the decryption is correct, i.e.
known values match, then the connection is successfully reseeded, and iv matched to the
ongoing sequence number.
Figure 5.2: Using keys as channel identifiers in a broadcast medium.
5.2.2.2 Transport Header
When encryption occurs, it might be necessary to include padding in the packet. Since the
length transported must reflect the number of bytes sent on the channel, we must include the
real length of the packet, encrypted, at the end of the packet. This will allow the receiver of
the packet to insert the correct length before delivering the packet to the MAC layer. This
requires a transport header, shown in Fig. 5.3, which must be appended to all packets before
encryption. This header contains the original length of the packet, terminates with the value
of si and optionally contains the AID field. In packets where the AID should be sent, the
AID is added to the transport header and encrypted. Before the packet is passed on to the
higher layers, and after decryption, the AID will be copied on top of the duration field.
Figure 5.3: Link Layer Privacy Transport Header
Since both encryption and decryption are performed from end to beginning, we ensure that
the variability in the ciphering caused by the changing si affects the whole packet encryption.
Looking at the header we can see that all fields, with the exception of the duration field, are
encrypted. Also, we observe that one of the address fields is encrypted independently. In the
case of a Ni sending a packet, this field will correspond to the source address. When it is
the AP that sends a packet the destination field is used in this way. The reason is that each
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STA Ni must verify whether the packet is intended for it, while the AP must verify who the
sender of the packet was.
5.2.2.3 Encryption and Decryption
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Figure 5.4: Encryption and decryption processes.
The current value of si is appended at the end of every sent message. Encryption is
then performed from the end to the beginning using the key Ki to the corresponding channel
Ci, with the exception of the fields for fast determination. These fields contain the known
plaintext values of the source or destination addresses. The address (or source) field must be
encrypted and decrypted independently of the rest of the packet by pre-pending the value si
padded to the size of the block of the cipher, such that the first encrypted blocks correspond
solely to si and can be removed before the address is re-inserted in the packet.
As depicted in Fig. 5.4, when station Ni needs to send a packet, it appends the transport
header, updates the length of the packet and applies the pre-selected cipher using Ki on
the identified non-plaintext fields from end to beginning. In parallel, the address of node
Ni, MACi, must be encrypted independently because it must be pre-computed at the other
side. The node encrypts MACi by applying EKi(si||padding||MACi), where padding refers
to the fact that si should be expanded to the block size of the cipher. After encryption, the
encrypted section of si is truncated and only the encrypted MACi is added to the packet.
The same encryption process can also be applied on the receiving side since si is synchronized.
Similarly, when the AP needs to send a packet to a node Ni, it will perform the same
operations using a key table to determine which key to cipher the packet with, and pre-
computes the destination address, in the same way the node pre-computed its own address
to insert in the outgoing packet. When receiving a packet, we split the situation in two,
depending on the receiving node type. In the case of a node Ni, “receiving a packet” means
it will always try to decrypt the message and compare the address after decryption. More
specifically, it will decrypt the packet, from end to beginning, and thus obtain si. It will then
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use si to decrypt MACm by first concatenating the encrypted si with the padding and then
performing the decryption: DKi(EKi(si||padding)||EKi(si||MACi)). This step is necessary
since the MACm is encrypted independently using si as a vector for the cipher. In the end,
the node can compare MACm with its own address, MACi, and check whether the packet
is intended for it. Once the original values for mandatory plaintext fields and length are
replaced by the ones in the transport header, the packet can be delivered to the upper layers.
Finally, this will use the value si to update its own internal sequence number.
In the case of the AP, the initial reception sequence is similar to the case of Ni. When the
AP receives a packet, it will find the right key. The optimized process is to look at the table
of pre-computed encrypted MAC addresses and try to find the encrypted MACm present in
the packet. The address which corresponds to the key Ki, will serve as the check value to
determine if the decryption was successful. As this process might fail due to synchronization
loss, the AP might need to test all the keys in its table. If the key is found, the AP will
proceed to the decryption of the packet as described above for Ni. It will also use sm from
the packet to update its table to map next packet (sm + 1) and Eki(sm||padding||MACi).
An exception to the standard encryption process has to be introduced to properly handle
802.11 Beacon frames. As previously mentioned, beacons must be handled differently to
prevent attacks on the TIM, which contains information that must be observed by all the
stations in the wireless link.
To handle these particular features, we encrypt each position of the bitmap individually
to every station, so that each station receives only the information required to operate, and
nothing more.
Conceptually, the TIM, {AID1||AID2|| · · · ||AIDn}, should be replaced by an encrypted
version, {EK1(s1||AID1)||EK2(s2||AID2)|| · · · ||EKn(sn||AIDn)}, where the original bit value,
AIDn, should be encrypted using Sn. But, each EKi(si||b, Pad) block, , where b represents the
original bit value (AIDn), has the size of an si, and not a single bit as required by the TIM.
To convey a single bit, we simply calculate EK(sn||0) and EK(sn||1), compare them bitwise,
and insert the bit value of the most significant bit, j, that differs between them. When Ni
receives a beacon, it simply extracts its bit value b, from the expected position, calculate the
EK(sn|b), for both 0 and 1, and performs the same bitwise comparison to obtain the first
different bit between them (most significant). The result indicates whether the bit belongs to
the 0 value or to the 1 value, thus determining if there is any packets for that station queued
at the AP.
The end result of the transport functions is that all unicast packets in the network are
indistinguishable from each other. An attacker will be unable to link two different packets by
using link layer information. In practice this means that packet events, from the PRIVED
network instantiation, never bear correlatable information, as all information differs between
them. This allows not only clearly separating the events and the link layer, but results in the
desired outcome that makes it impossible to correlate any IS through link layer information,
as there is no possibly shared information.
5.2.3 Performance and Scalability
There are several aspects that determine the performance issues of the proposed protocol. The
transport presents a twofold problem: i) it depends on the cipher being used and ii) must
obey the 802.11 timing restrictions. When choosing a cipher we must ensure that it allows
the described operations and that it is also efficient, because it will be used in every packet
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i.e. all nodes must decrypt at least the destination MAC address, and during time-critical
events such as 802.11 Acknowledgment frames (which are in the microsecond range). The
small block size and high efficient duty-cycle of RC5 makes it a perfect candidate. The block
size fits the minimum encryption unit required in our scheme, which is 32 bits, which reduces
the need for padding, since packets are usually 32-bit aligned. According to the NESSIE [49],
RC5 encryption and decryption both take 19 clock cycles (cc) per byte in a Pentium III,
which we believe is an acceptable platform for the AP. For further considerations we assume
this RC5 implementation, on a Pentium III 600 MHz.
For real world deployment we consider that cryptographic primitives should be imple-
mented in hardware, which considerably speeds up encryption and decryption times. Also,
multi-core processors are becoming the common computing platform, rather than the ex-
ception, allowing us to consider a more elaborate approach, where the proposed scheme is
implemented with a two-queue solution for packet processing. The first queue handles syn-
chronized packet streams, while the second queue is used when re-synchronization is necessary,
which takes longer to process. This enables us to minimize the delay imposed by out-of-sync
packets in the cryptographic scheme. Another problem we consider is the placement of the
transport header, at the end of the packet, enabling faster processing. When packets are
received, there is no need to iterate over the mandatory 802.11 MAC header. Including a
fixed size header at the end of the packet enables the packet receiver to quickly locate the
necessary bits relative to the end of the packet, which is clearly marked with a Frame Check
Sequence, boosting the speed at which nodes can discard or accept packets, without any
further processing of 802.11 fields.
The overall system scalability also depends on how many nodes can coexist in the same
AP, since it must go through N/2 keys on average to decrypt an unsynchronized packet. This
effect can be mitigated through using first, a hash table based on the expected cryptogram
that is separately encrypted, so that the proper key can be quickly retrieved base on a O(logn)
operation. The second factor to consider is to order the keys smartly to process out-of-sync
packets coupled with a proper caching policy. The most recently used keys will have a much
higher probability of being reused in the near future, since a station has a particular time
window to transmit and given that the traffic usually follows burst patterns, it will require
more than one time slot to transmit all the data. Meanwhile, nodes which tend to enter sleep
mode, and therefore not transmit, will drop further down in the key cache. The Most Recently
Used policy will also enable the keys belonging to users who transmit the most packets, to
be closer to the top of the key table, enabling a quicker lookup.
Performing cryptographic operations on (parts of) every packet bears a hidden power cost.
The power consumption of the 802.11 cards will increase even though this can be mitigated
with optimized low-power hardware.
5.2.3.1 Traffic Impact Analysis
For our test scenario we consider one AP , one Correspondent Node, which is the destination
for all communications in the wireless channel, and an increasing number of nodes (Ni). CN
is attached to the AP via a cable as not to interfere with the radio part of our simulations.
Each added node Ni also increases the load on the network and reduces the opportunities of
a node to find the medium free (which will induce collisions and, due to the nature of our
protocol, cause loss of synchronization between the nodes).
We have performed all our simulations in NS-2 [115] 2.29, using the following parameters:
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The nodes (NN) vary from 1 to 20; the UDP data rate is 67.8 Kb/s, using 178 byte packets;
the TCP packet size is of 512bytes; the simulation lasts 60 seconds (after warmup), over 10
runs.
To perform our simulations we inserted a computation delay at the AP which depends
on whether or not the AP is synchronized with this node. The mechanism used to check
whether the node is not synchronized with the AP is based on whether the MAC layer has
re-transmitted a packet due to collision. In cases where a re-transmission has occurred, the
AP will take the average time of finding an entry in a table which is of size NN/2 (where
NN corresponds to the number of simulated nodes)2. Once the key is found, we assume the
node to be synchronized once again with the AP .
5.2.3.2 Impact on Real-Time Traffic
In this scenario, we are interested in the behavior of real-time applications, such as audio
and video, and make use of UDP with constant bit-rate traffic. We are interested in how our
scheme affects both end-to-end delay and jitter. Source traffic at each node transmits at 67.8
Kb/s, with 178 byte packets. This simulates a 64Kb/s voice call and the RTP overhead.
The performed simulations cover three different cases. The first, for comparison purposes,
is a plain 802.11b simulation. The two other scenarios implement higher processing delays at
the nodes, with one and two queue variants. a ref to where the queues are discussed.
Figure 5.5: End-to-end delay, constant bitrate 67.8 Kb/s per node from 1 to 15 nodes, zoomed
is the saturation point
Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 show the end-to-end delay and jitter for the real-time traffic. We
can observe that the saturation point of the 802.11b network is located at 7 nodes per base
station. With 7 nodes and more, both the delay and jitter escalate rapidly. Fig. 5.5 further
illustrates the jump point for the delay, in the transition from 6 to 7 nodes. This observation
2Please note that we do not assume any optimization or ordering of this table.
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is valid for all the scenarios, leading to the conclusion that the processing times do not impact
the saturation point of the network, even though a slightly higher delay is noticeable. The
observed delay behavior is consistent with the introduced encryption and decryption times,
since the double queue performs slightly better than the single queue, even though both are
higher than the plain scenario delay. Under the saturation point, the double queue delay is
very similar to the plain scenario, due to the fact that the network is not performing a large
amount of retransmissions. The small amount of retransmitted packets, that have a higher
processing time, do not affect the synchronized packets, which have a small processing time.
Above the saturation point the second queue shows even greater value by providing a sig-
nificantly smaller delay than the single queue, because the collision/retransmission frequency
increases due to network congestion. However, above the saturation point, the bottleneck is
the access to the network medium and therefore the delay can present oscillations regardless
of the simulated scenario.
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Figure 5.6: End-to-end jitter, constant bitrate 67.8 Kb/s per node from 1 to 15 nodes
Fig. 5.6 presents the jitter values for all the tested scenarios. We can again clearly notice
that the most influential parameter for the jitter increase is the node number, and conse-
quently the saturation point. As seen in the figure, for up to 6 nodes, the jitter increases
slowly and steadily, whereas after the 6th node threshold we notice a rapid increase, due to
network congestion. The jitter values conform with the delay, showing a smaller jitter for the
double queue when compared to the single queue scenario, but both are still higher than the
delay for a plain 802.11b network. Above the saturation point, the jitter variation is more
erratic, for the same reasons that the delay behavior above the saturation point: network
congestion.
5.2.3.3 Impact on TCP Throughput
In this scenario, we are interested in the degradation of the TCP connection and how it
affects the throughput. For this effect we consider a TCP connection which will try to
make maximum use of the available bandwidth and introduce background noise in the form
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of stations transmitting constant bitrate traffic. Figure 5.7 shows the different available
bandwidth for the three proposed scenarios. We can see that increasing the number of nodes
producing background noise degrades the TCP throughput, as would be expected. The double
queue simulation shows the worst performance due to the fact that it introduces unordered
packets into the network, causing the TCP congestion control mechanisms to reduce the TCP
window and consequently the throughput. For the single queue scenario, the introduced delay
actually helps the TCP congestion control, smoothing the TCP window increase and therefore
introducing less back-off operations, which has a positive effect on the bandwidth that on
average is higher than in the plain 802.11b simulations. As a conclusion, TCP bandwidth is
not greatly affected by the introduced processing delay, and the discrepancies between the
plain and one queue scenarios could be solved by using a more adequate Congestion Control
Algorithm, giving a fairly similar overall performance.
Figure 5.7: TCP throughput, constant bitrate 67.8 Kb/s per node from 1 to 14 nodes of
background noise
5.2.4 Link Layer Vertical Interactions
We provided a mechanism that enables different features at the link layer. We highlight
anonymity from passive eavesdroppers, hiding any ongoing communication towards the access
point. In fact, the ability of hiding every identifier that might yield tracking information is
a powerful feature that does not compromise the vertical approach, nor the privacy of upper
layers. By focusing on wireless technologies, we showed the proposal’s feasibility by using
a well known protocol (IEEE 802.11) as an instantiation. The 802.11 stations have assured
location privacy, along with data integrity protection. The proposed scheme can still be
used with other 802.11 security mechanisms, such as 802.11 [67], but can obsolete them.
Furthermore, given that WiFi cards can have embedded hardware cyphering components,
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the highlighted advantages can probably offset the costs of replacing the existing commercial
infrastructures. Our approach should be used in conjunction with a pseudonym mechanism
to prevent tracking by active communicating peers.
Through the outlined conclusions we proved that the link layer does not need to be a
correlation mechanism for upper layers. This effectively defers potential correlation problems
entirely to upper layers, given that it becomes impossible to use upper layer identifier to
correlate lower layer identifier (e.g reusing an IP address over multiple link layer identifiers),
as no identifier is actually reused. Going back to the PRIVED model, we can say that
this solution provides the most protection, given that no link layer addresses are seen by
eavesdroppers, and hence no relationship can be made to other information in the IS.
Note that, although our proposal addresses link layer threats, there are highly specialized
physical attacks which are not covered by our approach. In radio based technologies attacks
may rely on the physical characteristics of the radio channel. Such attacks include finding the
nearest station and triangulation or trilateration, by analyzing the signal strength, signal-to-
noise ratio and radio-frequency fingerprinting. Some vendors even support certain protocols
for location services which can be used against the users. Corbett et al [26] recently proposed
a passive method to determine the vendor of a certain card by analyzing the way in which the
station adapts its rate (in this case for WLAN). These attacks may erode the protection offered
by the proposed solution leading to the idea that this proposal should be taken in conjunction
with techniques which also protect the physical layer when necessary (considering that these
attacks usually require expensive equipment and are hard to perform).
Beyond the lower level interaction, there are important interactions which require upper
layer attention. One example that needs to take into account the vertical approach is when
the access point is able to identify the link layer address of the user. It is interesting to see
that we cannot use this mechanism to protect the user from the access point, because it needs
to identify the STA at link layer, leading to the idea that the network should cooperate in
the privacy protection mechanisms, rather than the opposite.
Regardless of the network’s role, the vertical pseudonymity approach, represented by the
combined VNS and VID concepts, can complement our link solution to the respect that for
different operations, new link layer identifiers can be used, following the reasoning presented
in Chap. 4. Therefore, when protecting from the network and other services, it is possible
to use different pseudonyms at link layer, following the VNS approach, coordinated by VIDs.
This guarantees that the vertical solution not only ensures privacy protection, but is properly
complemented and reinforced by the link layer approach.
But this vertical relationship leads to the idea that, even with powerful layered privacy
measures, the vertical solution still needs to be properly accounted for on above layers. Con-
sequently, the network layer still presents threats concerning user identification and location,
forcing further consideration on the network layer despite the threats already tackled at link
layer.
5.3 Network Layer Privacy
On the network layer it is important to protect the communication contents from a vertical
perspective, since it transports all upper layer information. It is also important to protect the
endpoint and its location, because the IP address uniquely identifies both the peer behind the
communication and its topological location (Sec. 3.4.4). Location privacy becomes important
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because the topological position expressed in addresses can be converted into geographical
location. But more importantly, the unique addresses, through correlation properties can
become a major tool to link different VIDs on the network. As discussed in Chap. 3, network
addresses can be a simple, yet effective tool for correlation and IS construction.
Most solutions that address network privacy threats usually rely on the concepts of Chaum
Mixes [22] to provide anonymity, mitigating the side effects of using IP addresses: if packets
are anonymous, the observed address cannot be traced back to the original sender, voiding
location information an correlation techniques, since it does not concern the message sender.
However, such protocols usually require trade offs between privacy and performance, or sac-
rifice compliance with standard routing protocols. The most prominent example of such
solutions is TOR [37], which delivers privacy at a cost. TOR employs multiple encryption
layers on every packets to conceal the packet origins and routing hops, incurring in a hefty
performance penalty. It is also used on top of IP, due to its non-standard requirements, such
as circuit establishment and fixed data cell size. The performance overhead and the lack of
integration with routing schemes (IPv4 and IPv6) undermine the adoption of such privacy so-
lutions on the network. Therefore, privacy has a price that only some end-users pay, becoming
a cooperative peer-to-peer effort. This is what we call pushing privacy support into the edges
of the network, resulting not only in crippling performance, but also on compromised privacy:
packets travel to the network edges where forwarding is performed by untrusted endpoints in
a peer-to-peer system, that can inspect the ongoing traffic [131]. Distributed environments
also pose severe difficulties concerning lawful interception, which is a requirement for any
commercial network.
To create a truly adoptable solution, we must reduce performance costs, allowing a solution
that can be easily deployed inside the network, compatible with current routing schemes. In
this scope, we propose Waypoint (WP) Routing, a lightweight framework that through a
novel cryptographic routing scheme, enables treating privacy as a value added service (VAS)
that can be provided by the network. We provide end-user privacy by hiding the original
sender, through several encryption points, mandatory waypoints inside the network, making
it impossible to identify the end user or his location. This directly results in voiding any
correlation means, based on network addresses, as already provided for the link layer. Since
each address can be hidden, as well as its relationship to the user, it does not compromise
the user’s VID, nor extends existing information sets.
This is achieved by using encrypted IPv6 Routing and Extension headers, based on the
concepts of Onion Routing [142] and TOR [37] mechanisms. The encrypted extension headers
define lightweight overlay privacy routes, where each router is aware only of the next hop
in the route, at a reduced cost, thus minimizing performance impact because it requires
less encryption (only extension headers are encrypted). Also, by keeping the packets inside
the network, and routed through trusted entities, we avoid traffic inspection by untrusted
peers [131], along with smaller delay.
Introducing entities along the communication path that anonymize the source of the traffic
is a proven privacy approach. In Waypoint Routing3 we introduce mandatory waypoints in
the communication path, that are only aware of the next hop in a route and replace source
and destination addresses, diluting any information beyond next and previous hop.
As each router only knows the next hop of the defined path, privacy is assured by dis-
3The waypoint naming stems from the use of waypoints as geographical references for navigation purposes,
much like we use in our cars everyday with GPS systems.
135
Figure 5.8: Example Routes with defined Waypoints
tributing routing information. In this case, no entity has knowledge about anything beyond
the next hop. The only entity that might have a broader picture of the privacy associated
with the routes is the network provider, by controlling multiple network hops. But it this case,
we use this knowledge to our advantage, making the network a part of the privacy enhancing
process, transforming privacy into a network provided service.
The waypoint mechanism effectively conceal the packet origin and consequently the sender’s
identification and location, which is tied to the original address. In most cases, no assump-
tions can be made about the observed addresses regarding the original source and destination,
in line with the Chaum Mix [22] approach, and complying with the presented PRIVED re-
quirements. Replacing addresses is only possible through the use of encrypted routing hints
included in IPv6 extension header options, as shown in Fig. 5.9, and can play a major role in
preserving the vertical boundaries defined by information sets.
5.3.1 Waypoint Routing Overview
As seen in Fig. 5.8, an overlay route is defined by several Waypoint Routers (WPR) that
anonymize the traffic flowing between the end-user, the Waypoint Client (WPC), and a se-
lected destination. To establish the route, the WPC contacts each selected WPR, previously
retrieved from a directory or discovery service as proposed in Sec. 5.3.2.1, establishing authen-
tication and shared cryptographic material. The selected WPRs compose a virtual circuit
defining how packets flow (i.e. which waypoints are visited).
To use the circuit, a client encrypts the next hop as well as the destination address, placing
them in an IPv6 extension header and forwarding the packet to the first WPR in a route.
Upon receiving a packet, each WPR decrypts the addresses conveyed in the extension header,
the Routing Hint, thus determining the next hop which becomes the new destination. To
finish the forwarding process, the WPR replaces the routing hint (in the extension header)
with the one corresponding to the next hop, as well as the packet’s source and destination.
The WPR also decrypts the Circuit Identifier, as discussed in Sec. 5.3.1.1, to ensure that
the packet reaches the proper destination. Both these fields have the same size of an IPv6
address, fitting in the IPv6 extension header, shown in Fig. 5.9, which is transparent to
standard routers.
The WP Routing process can be summarized as a cryptographic source-based routing
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Figure 5.9: IPv6 Packet header with cryptographic extension header.
mechanism for IPv6, where the packet’s source and destination change at each WPR. The
routes, defined in Sec. 5.3.1.2, can be established during the authentication process using the
shared keys between WPC and WPR (obtained through a Diffie-Hellman exchange) and are
composed by the encrypted hints and reusable IP-level circuits, as shown next.
5.3.1.1 Hints and Circuits
The two main Waypoint Routing concepts are hints and circuits, which must be integrated
into the routing infrastructure. These mechanisms, compatible with standard IPv6 routing
rules, are necessary to properly route packets, as presented below.
H = Ek(IPT ). (5.1)
The Routing Hint, defined in Eq. 5.1 and present in each packet, encrypts the address of
the next hop in the route (T ). According to IPv6 destination option rules, it is processed by
the packet’s destination, which decrypts the hint to obtain the next WPR in route. Therefore,
in general terms, a node WPRn will receive a hint Hn, corresponding to the encrypted
address of the following WPR, IPWPRn+1 , with key kn. The hint Hn will be stored at the
previous router, WPRn−1, and sent to WPRn, yielding the address of WPRn+1. This process
transforms WPRn into a shield that anonymizes communication between adjacent routers.
The routing process is further clarified in the next section.
If only the next hop was included in the packet, a different circuit would be necessary for
each target, as the only available mechanisms to differentiate targets would be the associated
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keys (which define a circuit). To reuse circuits along the path, we introduce the Circuit
Identifier (CID), inspired by Onion Routing [142]: the CID encrypts the final destination,
eliminating the need to keep state on every WPR for a specific target and allowing the reuse
of circuits between routes (which only requiring hop-by-hop hints). It uses several layers of
encryption, as described by Eq. 5.2, one for each WPR, ensuring that packets traverse the
defined route, and that the CID changes (through different encryption keys) between hops
(preventing tracking based on the CID), similar to TOR. The example CIDn, in Eq. 5.2, with
n layers of encryption, generically represents a three waypoint route, used in the example
presented in the next section, where the IP address of the target is encrypted with keys kn,
kn−1 and kn−2, to form the CID.
CIDn = Ekn−2(Ekn−1(Ekn(IPTarget))) (5.2)
The CID is progressively decrypted, as it passes through each WPR, creating a hint
index 4, used where circuit multiplexing is required. Wherever multiplexing is not required,
the WPR decrypts the CID and forwards the messaged to the hint stored for the (idxn, kn),
as described before, resulting in a default hint behavior (each required multiplexing operation
should be explicitly registered at each WPR). In fact, with the introduced CID, extending or
splitting a route (similar to route “telescoping” [37]) only implies registering a new hint and a
corresponding CID in the required WPR, eliminating the need of an entirely new route. This
process also guarantees that the global target is only obtainable trough the collaboration of
every selected WPR. This raises the number of encrypted addresses in the packet to 2, where
one is a hop-by-hop encrypted address, the routing hint, and the other is the encrypted final
destination, the CID.
5.3.1.2 Routes
In order to understand how routes are formed, and the exchanged information (Hints and
CIDs), we present an example of a three waypoint route setup and the associated forwarding
process. The example is shown in Fig. 5.10, representing the information present at each
involved element. Reaching this state is an iterative process: first, it is necessary to establish
a WPR route including WPR1, to reach T1, then it is necessary to include WPR2, forming
a two WPR route, and later WPR3, forming the final route, with three elements.
To start the first phase, WPC contacts WPR1, establishing a symmetric key (k1) for hint
encryption, through an authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange. This process is repeated for
every WPR. To facilitate the key retrieval mechanisms at the WPR, a key index, idx1 for
WPR1, is also agreed upon for future inclusion in the messages.
To reach T1 via WPR1, the WPC encrypts the address of T1 with key k1, forming the
routing according to Eq. 5.1, where routing hint H1 is the result of encrypting the IP address
of T1 with key k1. The hint is then inserted into an IPv6 extension header, included in the
packet. At this point, since the Hint is similar to the CID, the CID can be omitted, indicating
that WPR1 is in fact the exit router. The packets are sent to WPR1, with the required index,
idx1, consistent with Fig. 5.9.
4Using an identifier for each encryption circuit can lead to label switching mechanisms. This would allow a
more adequate switching mechanism, requiring hop-by-hop or onion-encrypted labels. However, we defer this
option for future work, in order to simplify the current proposal.
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Figure 5.10: Instantiation of a 3-hop route with associated information.
To increase privacy, the client should include more WPR elements in the route. Therefore,
the route can be extended to WPR2, where the client registers, establishing (idx2, k2). Con-
sequently, a new hint must be added at WPR1, in the form of Ek2(IPT1), to be included in the
extension header when WPR1 forwards packets to WPR2. Also, the new CID is the target
address, encrypted by k2 and k1, respectively. When WPR1 receives a packet, it decrypts
the hint present in the extension header, Ek1(IPT1), with the corresponding key, indexed by
idx1, thus determining the next hop. Before forwarding the packet, WPR1 decrypts the CID,
concluding that it is not the last WPR in the route. As a result, before forwarding the packet,
the decrypted CID, Ek2(IPT1), is copied into the hint field.
To introduce WPR3 in the route, the process is similar: the client registers at WPR3,
obtaining (idx3, k3) and updates the hint present at WPR1, which becomes Ek2(IPWPR3).
Also, the initial CID becomes subjected to three layers of encryption, shown in Fig. 5.10 as
Ek1(Ek2(Ek3(T1))). At this point, when WPR2 receives a packet, it decrypts the contained hint,
Ek2(IPWPR3), determining WPR3 as the next hop. As it has no further hints for this CID, it
decrypts the CID and inserts it into the Hint field, corresponding to Ek3(IPT1). The behavior
at WPR3 requires decrypting the received hint, resulting in T1. At this point, since no CID
was provided, WPR3 becomes the exit node, performing Network Address Translation (NAT)
for the WPC, the last shield in the process.
The final state of this process is represented by Fig. 5.10, which details the defined route
using three waypoints. It shows the shared keys, the information present at each point, and
the content of the headers on each hop of the route.
5.3.2 Privacy as a Service
The WP Routing mechanism enables a lightweight approach to privacy at the network level.
By requiring less encryption and being seamlessly integrated into IPv6, it becomes simpler to
deploy. The reduced performance cost, analyzed in Sec. 5.3.3, allows privacy to be deployed
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inside the network, on core routers, as opposed to the edges, by end-users. This can contribute
overall adoption and also enables a new paradigm of perceiving privacy as a Value Added
Service (VAS). Because it can be delivered by existing network providers, WP Routing permits
the creation of a Privacy Service (PS). The PS requires the introduction of a logical entity,
the Privacy Controller, that together with a set of WPR, forms the PS architecture illustrated
in Fig. 5.11, thus completing the framework.
WPR
WPR
WPR
WPR
WPR
WPR
Privacy
Controller
WPC
WPR
WPC
Registration/Route
Register
Register Register
Figure 5.11: Sample architecture operation coordinated by the Privacy Controller.
5.3.2.1 Privacy Controller
As part of the PS, the Privacy Controller (PC) is the entity responsible for managing the
privacy infrastructure composed of WPRs, and for providing end-user authentication and
access control. As the primary privacy control entity, the PC handles WPR discovery, allowing
route establishment. Moreover, it can contribute to hint and address management in different
scenarios. In fact, the usage of a trusted entity for privacy control functions has been presented
before in Chap. 4. In the VID model, the IdP, Identity Provider, assumes these functions for
user related information. Therefore, it is only natural, that in a real deployment, the alignment
between Waypoint Routing and the VID framework should rely on the IdP assuming the
functions of PC. This close coupling of the IdP to the network is also proposed in Sec. 6.5.4,
where the IdP manages HIP identities towards the network.
As a service, the PS holds a tight relationship with its users, enabling authentication and
access control to the waypoint routing service. The trust association created between the
provider and user leads to several outcomes: as a service, the PS must meet often ignored
legal requirements, such as lawful interception and data records preservation; also, the user
enjoys a new privacy environment, where the PS’s design goal is to provide privacy, where in
other scenarios this is a user provided best-effort feature. The second core PC competency
is to enable route setup by providing the user with WPR information. By managing a set of
WPRs, the PC can easily interact with the user to provide an adequate set of WPRs for the
desired destination. This takes a centralized view of WPR discovery, putting PS in the driver
seat of route establishment. It is important to note that, when requesting routes, the WPC
can insert vectors (IP addresses in the vicinity of the target) to allow a customer answer from
the PC, better suited for the target address. The PS, through the PC, can also assume the
support role of resolution or rendezvous service, providing hints to entities seeking to contact
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a WPC. The PC can store public (or global) hints that enable a resolving peer to reach the
required WPC.
To complement privacy, multiple privacy services can be used, even belonging to different
(privacy) operators. This helps increasing privacy by distributing user information, but also
prevents the PS from becomings a single point of failure. If a PS fails, established routes
are maintained, only failing for new resolution requests. Nevertheless, when a PS fails, the
WPC can simply establish a new binding for the particular route, or simply divert the route
through the path mechanisms described in the following section.
5.3.2.2 Route Selection
Route (and WPR) selection can be one of the biggest contributions made by the PS, through
the PC. We separate routes into explicit, User Generated Routes, and implicit, Service Gen-
erated Routes. In User Generate Routes, the endpoint undertakes the bulk of the effort for
WPR selection and route setup, using as many PS as desired. Here, the PC functions as a
WPR discovery service. In Service Generated Routes, the PS can take advantage of the Hint
routing mechanism to provide on-demand and implicit user-independent routes.
Using explicit routes, the WPC has the responsibility of establishing the route. This im-
plies authenticating at the PC and obtaining a list of WPR, highlighted in Fig. 5.11. The
node can include an IP address in the Route Request as an indication of destination, obtaining
routers closer to the optimal solution provided by IP mechanisms (see Sec. 5.3.3.2). After-
wards, the WPC contacts each selected WPR, authenticating and establishing the required
keys. In this scenario, the PS facilitates WPR discovery. However, the node can use several
PS for a single connection, increasing his privacy.
Service generated routes are implicit routes that can be used as a mean of increasing
user privacy, without requiring the user to actively partake in the process. This comes as
additional privacy provided by the PS, without involving the user. This is only possible due
to the characteristics of the proposed cryptographic solution presented in Sec. 5.3.1.1. Given
that hints are defined on a hop by hop basis, at any point the WPR or PC can extend the
existing route by pushing forward its hint, and generating a new hint towards the WPR that
will be receiving the original hint. This process is deemed subpathing. It should be noted
that, because the original sender is not aware about added WPRs, it will not share a key
with them and will not be part of the CID layered encryption. To solve this issue, the WPR
in the extended subpath must not attempt to decrypt the CID and only forward it.
5.3.3 Routing Impact Evaluation
To understand and discuss the benefits of the Waypoint Routing, we must evaluate its per-
formance. We provide a two-fold analysis based on overhead and on path optimality, which
determines how “close” the privacy aware routes are to the optimal ones obtained with cur-
rent routing mechanisms. We later show how this proves to be one of the WP Routing main
advantages.
5.3.3.1 Performance
To assess the overhead, we perform an analytical evaluation of the control overhead in data
packets, and a ratio of encrypted bytes over transmitted information, allowing a better under-
standing of the privacy costs. Assuming a packet with the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU)
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size of 1500 bytes, we calculate the percentage of control overhead. In our scheme, a packet
is composed by the IPv6 header, 40 bytes long, and two IPv6 options, of 24 bytes each: a
modified routing header to include the hint, and a destination option to include the Circuit
Identifier (conveyed in the reserved space). This represents a 48 byte increase on maximum
size data packets, which is a 3.2% percent overhead increase. In other solutions this overhead
is larger: TOR uses a 500 byte fixed cell size for data, which is then appended with headers,
compounding a 960 byte overhead (not factoring in IPv4/IPv6 headers). This represents
65, 8% overhead increase. As far as encryption is concerned, the proposed solution mandates
that the two hints are encrypted at every point. This requires 32 bytes at most, while other
solutions require much more. As an example, TOR encrypts/decrypt the 500 byte cell at
every hop (not counting management data structures).
5.3.3.2 Path Optimality
We propose a path optimality measure, which is the difference in path cost between the
optimal route defined by the routing mechanisms (e.g RIP, OSPF, BGP), and the “privacy-
aware” route. The objective is to provide a broad idea of how privacy impacts the route,
and then to draw conclusions on the overhead imposed on the users to achieve privacy. We
compare, in a simulated environment, three different approaches against the optimal route:
1) an edge Path, which is a random route using the networks edges (end-to-end routes, as
they exist in the current TOR deployment); 2) a core path, using random routes based on
the network core (to support privacy in the network); 3) and the composed path, which is a
simple route selection mechanism that uses network knowledge to build privacy-aware routes
minimizing path cost, resulting in less overhead.
Figure 5.12: Simulation Scenarios for path optimality considerations.
In the simulation, we consider the network to be a square node matrix, shown in Fig. 5.12,
where edges (dashed) represent endpoints and the inner matrix nodes represent routers, with
fixed coordinates. We define the path cost as the cartesian distance, calculated hop-by-hop.
In a three-node route, the path cost would be the sum of the cartesian distances between
each of the three nodes. The optimal path cost is the cartesian distance between source and
destination, a simplification of the shortest path. The edge path uses random edge-nodes to
act as WPRs (only dashed nodes in Fig. 5.12, whereas the core path resorts to random core
nodes (inner matrix nodes). The composed path, in the simulation, uses a divide and conquer
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strategy: it selects a mix of nodes in the source’s quadrant, a center node, and nodes in the
destination’s quadrant, forming a composed route. Every result presented is the average of
104 executions in a custom simulation environment.
Fig. 5.13b presents the findings concerning path cost, with a 3 hop route and varying
network size. This shows that the core path presents an overhead decrease of 28.4% on
average, when compared to the edge path. Even more, the composed path reduces the average
overhead by 69.6% when compared to the edge path approach, and 57% when compared to
the core path. The composed path approach is the closest to the optimal path, with roughly
double the path cost.
We apply the same scenario on a fixed network size of 104 (100x100 matrix) nodes and
varying route size, as shown in Fig. 5.13a. This graph shows the same type of gains: the
core path strategy decreases overhead in more than 27.4%, while the composed path brings
the overhead down by more than 63%, when compared to the edge path.
With a generalized performance increase, the exciting conclusion is that using the network
core (e.g. both core path and composed path approaches) can lead to a significant performance
boost and overhead reduction, which in turn can result in better adoption.
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Figure 5.13: Impact on abstract path cost.
5.3.3.3 Building deployable solutions
In the previous sections we presented the Waypoint routing concepts and architecture to
define a new routing infrastructure that enables privacy support, along with an evaluation of
the proposed solutions. Derived from Chaum Mix concepts, our proposal resembles other mix
network approaches such as TOR, by anonymity standards. However, by preventing packets
from reaching the network edges (end-hosts), we provide a more effective privacy solution
that is not exposed to the perils of malicious exit nodes or traffic inspection [131]. Instead,
we rely on the PS, which is designed to secure user data. This brings the network operator
back into the privacy game, enabling it as a privacy provider, capable of delivering optimized
traffic and privacy data paths stemming from his deep knowledge of the network. This not
only provides better performance, but removes the peers from providing security. While in
theory anonymity provides a better solution, in practice malicious exit nodes can subvert the
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system, whereas here the exit nodes (and all peers in the path) are trusted. Thus, the user is
trading part of his anonymity towards the different privacy services for trusted privacy. This
also proves to be an advantage over peer-to-peer systems like Tarzan [51], because here the
WPR entities can be certified and trusted, whereas in systems like Tarzan, and even TOR,
attackers can try to operate nodes to gain knowledge about the ongoing communication, and
even inspect traffic as the last hop.
Beyond the privacy gains, the other key advantage is performance. When compared to
approaches that favor user involvement, the evaluation showed that just by moving from the
edges to network routers can yield a 30% overhead decrease. And when applying a simple
strategy of quadrant allocation, the overhead can be reduced by as much as 70%. This
evaluation showed that the approach has a significant relative advantage by allowing WPR
selection, further highlighting the benefits of converting privacy into a service, provided either
by the network operator or by a VASP, which only benefits from network knowledge and smart
route construction. Also, by diversifying WPR and PS, user privacy can increase due to the
added confusion.
When compared to TOR, layered encryption in WPR is restricted to the global hint,
while hop hints use normal encryption. This shows that the encryption in our scheme is only
a small fraction of what is required in TOR, which encrypts the entire cell. Also, by working
with IP-level mechanisms, as opposed to TOR that works on the transport layer, using only
IPv6 headers results in massive overhead reduction, from the estimated 65% of TOR to an
acceptable 3%. We conclude that the proposal incurs in a privacy overhead penalty, but with
significantly better results than other proposals due to the low amount of extra information
required.
One of the most fundamental differences is that TOR does not make assumptions on how
the Onion Routers are selected, whereas WP Routing makes strong assumptions on the archi-
tecture definition, to keep traffic out of the network’s rims, and to maintain communication
on an optimal and secure level (avoiding traffic from being routed by endpoints). If we ap-
proximate TOR to the random model analyzed in Sec. 5.3.3, and Waypoint Routing to the
other analyzed variants, core path and composed path, we can see that a core-oriented scheme
can boost the performance of the overall privacy scheme, greatly reducing the performance
impacts on expected delay, in some cases as much as 70%.
It is possible to summarize the proposed solution as source based routing mechanism for
IPv6 using encrypted addresses within extension headers, concealing unique addresses and
location through the use of Waypoint Routers. Beyond the end-user benefits, and due to its
lightweight properties, the framework fosters privacy as a value added service. This promotes
using the network infrastructure as the driver for privacy, getting the network operator off
the sidelines in the process and leading to considerable privacy and performance gains.
The proposed Waypoint Routing mechanism allows scalable performance by bringing pri-
vacy mechanisms into the network layer. In doing so, we allow the construction of “privacy-
aware” routes, based on waypoints. WPR uses less encryption, creating less overhead, and
routes closer to the optimal network mechanisms. Even though the simulations use simple
routing scenarios (starting with an iterated triangle inequality), they already indicate that
transferring privacy towards the inner network nodes, along with smart route selection, can
lead to a smaller privacy performance impact.
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5.3.4 Waypoint Vertical Integration
The Waypoint Routing solution solution addresses specific network layers threats. But the
dichotomy of vertical vs horizontal privacy approaches indicates that it is still necessary to
analyze the solution from a vertical perspective. This means that it is necessary to consider
the WP Routing implications in the PRIVED construction, and also in the integration with
the VID model and the complementary VNS pseudonymity solution.
From a PRIVED perspective, it is necessary to determine the impacts on the overall
privacy model. The first interesting concept is that we are breaking the uniqueness of IP
addresses, which carries both user identification and location. By removing identification,
and only providing location limited with the understandable hop, we solve two issues: i)
we provide less means, and one less global identifier on which to perform IS information
correlation; ii) we solve an orthogonal privacy solution that is created by the semantics of
the identifier, rather from an identification problem that directly relates to the IS in the
PRIVED model. In practice, this reduces the meaningful information that can be extracted
from a packet event, which now carries less obvious relationships between upper and lower
layer identifiers. This advantage also aids in preserving the different IS boundaries, where we
have one less threat pending on the correlation of multiple information sets.
Similarly to the proposed link layer solution, the Waypoint approach protects against
several threats on the specific network layer. But, it also assumes that there are certain
entities in the network that can be aware of the identification of the node. In the previous
solution this was the Access Point. In the Waypoint model it is the Privacy Controller, which
does not protect against the PS. Also, as the communication is intended for a peer, or service,
the waypoint solution does not protect the exchanged user information. The solution for this
problem, as for the link layer, must come from the VID/VNS combination to enhance user
privacy.
The VID framework should be used as a complement, from an information protection point
of view. The different virtual identities can help keep separate views of the user, which in turn
is supported by the Waypoint solution on the network layer, creating a symbiotic relationship.
This is further supported by the fact that, in combination with the VNS approach, it can
provide several tools to disguise the user, providing a layer of protection towards correlation
from the network operator, and in this case, from the privacy provider. By using several
network layer addresses, pseudonyms, the probabilities of having a correlation between already
used addresses, at the access network, at the PC, or even at a WPR, can decrease due to the
properties of the pseudonymity solution.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that a network cooperating entity is required.
As discussed, the PS shares many trust goals with the IdP, and an aggregation of both provides
an aligned view on privacy, as well as the bridge between horizontal and vertical solutions.
The main conclusion from the complementarity of both solutions is that the network
information can be used as contextual information to threaten user privacy, which is now
safer due to the proposed solution. The Waypoint solution assists these problems at the
network layer. However, it does not eliminate the need for vertical coordination, through
virtual identities and virtual network stacks. Privacy threats are still very relevant from a
vertical perspective, and even though we present solution to handle the layer below, there are
still layers above that can jeopardize privacy: the transport layer and, more importantly, the
application layer, as discussed in the next section.
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5.4 Transport and Application Layer Privacy
The previously discussed layers, link and network, required an explicit solution to cope with
privacy requirements stemming from the PRIVED approach. But, as we move up in the
network stack, we face more implicit solutions that must be properly analyzed.
The implicit properties result first, from the tight bounds between the network and trans-
port layers, and second, from the close relationships between the application layer and the
VID concepts supported by IdM.
In this section we provide an analysis of the complexities of the transport and application
layers, to align them not only in a horizontal perspective, but more importantly, with the
vertical privacy landscape defined so far.
From the transport perspective, it is worth discussing the tight coupling with the net-
work layer, and the consequences for privacy. On top of this, it is still important to further
extend the threats defined in Sec. 3.4.4, as well as the consequences of decoupling the dual
functionality of the role of locator and identifier, introduced by the IP address, that reaches
the transport layer.
The application layer presents challenges that are tightly related to the vertical solution.
As this layer deals with different protocols and services, it is hard to provide a single targeted
solution. To address this, we extend the idea of using IdM as an application layer solution,
closely related to the VID model. As such, we identify and select an IdM solution that
is capable of satisfying the VID approach, and can serve as the basis for the architectural
instantiation in the following chapters.
To achieve these goals, we first look at the transport layer, and then the application layer,
and analyze them considering the protocols employed and the relationships with the vertical
approaches, especially the VID concepts in the light of the PRIVED model.
5.4.1 Transport Layer
One of the most important features of the transport layer is that is shares identifiers with
the network layer. This creates a dependency relationship that has privacy implication. The
IP, which is used for the topological location in the network, serves to identify a host on the
transport layer. In fact, as previously discussed in Sec. 3.4.4, the transport layer becomes
a network address (IP) associated with a well know port, to identify to which application
should the packets be delivered. This is the dual meaning that forces a tight relationship
between network and transport, that must be further analyzed.
The ports used on the transport layer also raise privacy concerns, in the measure that they
identify an application. Even though is is only a tacit definition, an agreement supported by
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), it provides a relationship between port
and application that in most cases allows the quick fingerprinting of the traffic type, and of
the user’s desired action. But this is only a tacit definition. In fact, several firewalls work by
filtering out well known ports.
Despite this usage, it would be possible, from a privacy perspective, to decouple port
numbering from the actual application selection. As an example, it is possible to run an HTTP
server on port 8000, a port which is not usually associated with HTTP access. However, this
requires that clients know beforehand to which port to connect, implying a discovery process.
This discovery process would require a shift in how we use network ports, towards a semantic
discovery of applications. In this case a node would first discover the “HTTP application”, in
146
order to learn the correct port to connect. This would break the privacy concerns of ports.
The feasibility of this approach is already supported by the fact that several applications
only use this well-known port as a starting mechanism. Once the connection is accepted,
the communication is switched to other ports, negotiated upon connection, e.g. FTP in
passive (PASV) mode. With a proper discovery protocol, it would be trivial to adapt services
towards this paradigm. Furthermore, an advantage of such an approach would be that, with
the availability of a discovery process for port numbers, we are not limited to port numbers,
and can use any identifier (which could comply with the VNS approach, of using pseudonyms
on the port level, to differentiate the connections without compromising the IS).
But as discussed, this is not a limitation of the way the transport layer is built, but rather
a usage problem, on how we associate well known port number to specific application. As
such, we focus on the duality presented by the reuse of the network identifier, in this case
the IP address. We explore two different situations that concern the reuse of the identifier
from the network layer, and when there is a solution that enables decoupling between the two
layers, introducing a new namespace of addressing.
5.4.1.1 Network Layer Dependencies
The most common situation for the transport layer relies on reusing the network identifiers -
the IP address. As discussed, this standard use of the network stack results in a dependency
that also defines the privacy properties at the transport layer. In fact, the overlapping role
between locator and identifier, and its reuse leads to the same location and identification
problems tackled in Sec. 5.3, for the network layer.
But this tight coupling allows a simple conclusion: in the presence of a solution for the
network problems, the transport layer issues are matched by the network properties. This
creates the implicit solution that guides our discussion.
From the PRIVED model perspective, if the correlation is always true, then the privacy
problems are not exacerbated as long as there is a solution that addresses the network layer
issues. This means that there is no extra information aggregated into the IS, besides a port
number, that further compromises the IS. Since port numbers are the same for all hosts,
extracting further information from this event observation is only interesting from a data
mining perspective, as it requires deducing knowledge not only from the observed identifier
but also about the meaning of the action. While this sort of analysis is possible, it is out
of the scope of our proposed solutions, since it requires probabilist and semantic inference of
knowledge.
5.4.1.2 Locator and Identifier Decoupling
A different approach is to consider that the network and transport identifiers can be separated.
This can happen in certain circumstances, involving a locator-identifier split. As already
presented, this can be the case when using mobility solutions such as MIPv6 or HIP. In the
first case, a new addressing layer based on IP addresses (Home addresses) is used as transport
identifiers. In the latter case, hashes of public keys (Host Identity Tag) serve the purpose of
transport identifier.
These are just examples that allow separating the network from the transport layers. This
decoupling can become a two-wedge sword, as on one hand it can create the opportunity to
truly solve the network problem as a pure locator solution, but on the other hand it requires
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that we solve the transport layer identifier privacy issues. Assuming that there is a solution
which splits identifiers and locators, a new opportunity is created within the addressing
structures that requires an alignment with the VID and pseudonymity solution.
When properly separated, the transport layer identifiers assume a pure identification role
which, in most cases (e.g. HIP and MIPv6), introduces a globally unique identifier. This
was discussed as part of the mobility pseudonyms in the VNS approach, in Sec. 4.5.3.4.
From this section we can extract the generic solution for a split solution, that relies on using
pseudonyms, guided by the VID model, which should then be coupled with both the upper
(application) and lower layer identifiers. From the PRIVED perspective, this is similar to
the previously presented solutions, since it requires pseudonyms to break the correlation
mechanisms introduced at the transport layer.
5.4.1.3 Vertical interactions of Transport identifiers
From a vertical privacy perspective, regardless of the two discussed scenarios, coupled or
decoupled layer, there is still the need for a vertical solution. In the first case, where both
layers are tightly coupled, this coordination is assured by the network layer solution. In a
possible instantiation scenario, this would be entirely assured by Waypoint Routing.
If a layer decoupling is in effect, like the one proposed in the next chapter instantiating
mobility and privacy solutions (Sec. 6.5), solving the network layer becomes simpler, but there
is a need to address the transport layer independently. The mechanisms to achieve this would
require to properly align the transport addressing solution with the pseudonymity approach
from the VID model, in order to respect the PRIVED correlation properties.
Regardless of the situation, this layer still transports the application layer information. As
the other vertical dependencies, solving the transport layer does not entirely solve correlation
through upper layer identifiers, nor does it handle the information exchanges with peers or
services. Again the solution is two-fold: first, it is necessary to address the application layer
identification problems, and second, these solutions must be properly scoped within the VID
approach to enable a vertical privacy interaction.
5.4.2 Application Layer
As argued for the vertical approach in Chap. 4, the privacy solution for the application
layer lies with Identity Management. How to introduce IdM as a privacy solution has been
preliminary discussed in Sec. 2.4. The IdM paradigm brings the notion of user or digital
identities. We have relied in this construction to build the vertical VID solution, as well
as the support for network pseudonyms. Therefore, it makes sense that this is the approach
followed at the application layer, thus reusing the solutions provided by IdM. However, despite
relying on IdM for several aspects, most of the application layer specific solutions have been
assumed throughout the Thesis. It is only natural that we align the application layer solutions
to fit the key concepts that we have been exploring up to now, namely pseudonymity.
While the focus of this Thesis does not particularly fall within the application layer, the
impacts and threats present on this layer must be understood, so that we can rely IdM
technologies and an architectural corner stone for the VID model, especially as we seek to
instantiate the IdM functionality, rather than stay at a purely conceptual level. In fact, this
is what we perceive to be privacy at the application layer, making it important to explore.
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Many technologies that could drive our IdM privacy aware interaction exist at the applica-
tion layer. We have explored several solutions [122, 70, 116, 20, 109] in Sec. 2.4. However, out
of the range of the cited approaches, we must select the one which best fits our proposed con-
cepts and requirements. As outlined in other sections, the most important factor that drives
the proposed vertical solutions is the pseudonymity support, which is the main privacy re-
quirement for the application layer. Pseudonymity assures, according to the PRIVED model,
that information is not correlated between different providers through unique identifiers. But,
at this point we are not concerned with the vertical implications of this statement, but rather
with the horizontal support at the application layer, enabling us to explore different solutions.
At the application layer, we are mostly concerned with service interaction and the support
of multiple pseudonyms (ideally per SP). In fact, we can generalize this requirement to a claim
concerning all interactions: the application layer solution must enable the use of generalized
pseudonyms towards service interactions. With this main goal, we take SAML 2.0 [20] as the
primary application layer technique towards privacy preservation, and generalize it, so that
its benefits can be extended onto other IdM and privacy solutions, opening the possibilities
on the application layer. It is worth noting that the overview presented here is entirely biased
towards the network point of view. The objective is not to discuss the information exchange,
but rather the information leading up to it, involving the network.
5.4.2.1 The SAML Use Case
Over different iterations SAML became synonymous for a set of protocols, which together
define the core SAML 2.0 specification [20]. These include protocols to handle Assertions,
Authentication, Artifact and Name resolution and mapping, as well as Single Logout (Single
Sign-On is implicit, given that it is one of the most basic requirements). The two most
important features provided by SAML are the already discussed, and important, SSO and
Federation mechanisms, which make it useful to support interoperability among different
providers. Beyond the User entity, the SAML architecture mandates the Identity Provider
(IdP) and the Service Provider (SP). The proposed naming also includes SAML Authorities
or Asserting Parties as alias for the IdP, and Relying Parties as alias for the SP.
One of the fundamental aspects about SAML is that it provides pseudonyms, which are
“opaque pseudo-random identifier with no discernible correspondence with meaningful iden-
tifiers”, citing the SAML specification. By employing these pseudonyms, SAML promotes
privacy by preventing any type of collusion or linkage by multiple providers or eavesdroppers
on the network, that would be possible through global identifiers (Sec. 3.4). The key aspect
is that SAML uses these identifiers when establishing a relationship between the IdP and
the SP. Therefore, every bond between SP/IdP uses a new, uncorrelatable pseudonym, thus
safeguarding user privacy. And because this is managed through the IdP, the user is not bur-
dened with identifier management. Beyond privacy protection, SAML also provides identifier
protection as defined in Sec. 3.5, through encryption of the different exchanges which contain
attributes, identifiers or assertions, thus ensuring confidentiality. Also, SAML complements
this with SSL/TLS tunnels, providing the sought after identifier protection. Another key as-
pect that emerges from SAML is the use of profiles: SAML provides a generic framework that
is instantiated as required by specifying different profiles (e.g. Web access). This is generic
enough to cover most use cases provided by any other mechanisms, at the cost of simplicity.
This aspect makes it more flexible other web based solutions, like OpenID.
Beyond these network oriented mechanisms, SAML includes strong privacy features which
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allow providers to exchange privacy policies and settings. This type of privacy is what we
refer to as the contextual opportunities, because it deals with the contents of the exchanged
information. SAML enables the definition of access and exchange policies that limit the
nature, type and form of the exchanged information. This is a powerful mechanism, that
even though escapes the objectives of our work, provides an important privacy feature which
is currently under research.
The most relevant part of promoting a SAML approach, from our point of view, is that,
when properly aligned with the network layer, SAML can provide application layer support
for most of the privacy principles proposed by PRIVED. It is pseudonym oriented approach,
enables the information reduction principle even at the information exchange level, and pro-
vides great tools for vertical control aspects. This makes SAML a powerful composition of
feature rolled into a single protocol. But, strictly speaking at the application layer, the base-
line lies in the fact that SAML provides the required pseudonym granularity to interact with
different services, providing a very adequate privacy solution in light of PRIVED. It would
even be possible, with a collaborating IdP, to support anonymity in the interaction with
services.
5.4.2.2 IdM Support on the Application Layer
After the observation of the SAML use case, we can extract several concepts that must
be supported at the application layer. These can be used, first to rule out the remaining
solutions as privacy drivers for our proposals, and second to enhance those same application
protocols with the missing features. A generic IdM solution would have to provide, beyond
the fundamental IdM issues, a strong component for pseudonym generation and management.
This includes identifier management for the user, and controlled interactions with SPs. It
is in these two aspects that most solutions do not provide any guidance or support. We
extract from SAML the necessity of establishing non-traceable pseudonyms that should not be
subjected to linkage or correlation to other identifiers. This is fundamental, in order to support
the information reduction argued within PRIVED, as well as to prevent the correlation of
different IS. The second aspect that is worth mentioning is the granularity at which IdM
solutions must generate pseudonyms. In line with the PRIVED concepts, SAML provides
a unique pseudonym between SP/IdP. This a very good approach, and IdM solutions that
are privacy focused must provide such granularity, so that it is possible to avoid any type of
privacy threats. Furthermore, it should be even possible to generate more than one SP/IdP
pseudonym per user, according to the needs of the user. Only in this flexible environment
can we guarantee that the information sets are not compromised. This is also vital for any
vertical integration with solutions such as VNS.
However, currently only a few IdM solutions feature such approaches. This is particular
visible in web environments, where solutions are mostly aimed at SSO, and data management
i.e. to simplify the user’s life, which is a valid argument in itself, but does not yield the most
adequate privacy environment to support cross-layer network privacy.
5.4.2.3 Vertical Integration of IdM
There is still one topic that escapes the horizontal approach. We have argued in Chap. 4 that
we turn to the IdM layer for control, both for identity information management, and also
for cross-layer pseudonym management. But so far, there has been no indication on how to
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actually achieve this using a specific IdM technology. While we propose such a solution in the
next chapter, it is important to establish two basic requirements that are entirely imposed on
the application layer protocol: i) there must be a strong relationship between the IdM layer
and the remaining identifier and protocols in the network stack; ii) there must be a strong
relationship towards the user.
The first requirement establishes the need for control mechanisms regarding the vertical
approach. If the IdM solution simply aims at SSO and nothing else, it misses the objective
of providing a vertical layer that enables several of the benefits discussed so far. And this is
directly tied to the user relationship that is granted by the IdM solution. Solutions like SAML
promote the usage of policies and strong access control to limit access to user information,
and to promote different privacy mechanisms. This must be a part of the solution, which will
enable not only vertical policies, but also pseudonym related policies.
But, the cross layer integration requires that we explore a vertical model for privacy
management, which influences how we treat the IdM solution: using an IdM solution as
an application layer protocol requires that all communications are established through lower
layer protocols. However, establishing lower layer protocol connection requires that we have
already instantiated a VID onto the network, which causes an inter-dependency between layers
and identity selection. This problem cannot be solved horizontally at the application layer,
requiring once again a vertical solution, explained in the next chapter, where we integrate
SAML with VNS.
5.5 Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter we set out to perform individual enhancements to each layer.
The reasoning behind this course of action was clear: having proposed a vertical solution, the
need to tackle individual threats at each layer becomes more pressing, so that they do not
compromise the overall privacy approach. The motivation behind this approach led to seeking
out individual threats on different layers, and to the analysis of which protocol mechanisms
lead to privacy loss. When contrasting the work highlighted in Sec. 2.5, which dealt with
the network aware privacy aspects presented in the related work, the focus was evident on
both the link and network layers. On the link layer, the major threats deal with protecting
the network access, from identification and tracking. On the network layer, the main focus is
about protecting user identification as well as location.
However, these are the overall threats. We started to dig deeper on the link layer, and
as we analyzed the privacy threats, we discovered that each individual protocol can yield a
large amount of information, if not properly handled. We explored 802.11 to demonstrate
our work on the link layer, thus providing an in-depth analysis of what can be extracted
just by protocol observation. This work resulted in a clear definition of all the information
that can be seen on the network, and that can threaten user privacy. After carrying out this
analysis we can only conclude that to take privacy seriously, this should be performed for
every protocol that is the target of privacy threats, and that can identify the user.
Then we proposed a novel solution that involves the secure transport of link layer packets
through a novel encryption scheme. In our proposal we identify the communication channel
between two peers by the employed key, rather than by any end-point identifiers (such as
MAC addresses). This proved to be a very effective scheme given that only the channel
key holders are capable of looking at the contents of the stream, thus releasing no private
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information. But, this required a few changes on the link layer protocol operations, and so we
were faced with the necessity of evaluating the feasibility and performance of the proposed
solution. This was done through simulations, considering several aspects. The bottom line
is that, using the proposed scheme effectively provides link layer privacy, but carries a small
penalty that can be minimized with the right tools and proper implementation. This led us
to believe that our solution, not only meets the proposed privacy requirements, but succeeds
in not compromising the vertical aspects discussed in Chap. 4.
Afterwards, we naturally shifted the focus towards the network layer, to deal with identi-
fication and location issues. We found that the best way to provide privacy relies on voiding
the IP addresses of topological meaning, or at least, restricting that meaning to a very narrow
location range. With this in mind, we turned to anonymity based solutions to find the answer
to location and identification problems. However, current anonymity schemes provide signif-
icant penalties for adoption, relying on network edges and users for routing, and providing
large performance overhead. With this in mind, we proposed a lightweight routing mechanism
that can be described as a source based routing mechanism for IPv6 using encrypted addresses
within extension headers, concealing unique addresses and location through the use of Way-
point Routers. The result was in fact a lightweight routing mechanism that only encrypts
extension headers, pushing the packet along the route by using routing Hints. This enables
the paradigm shift that we deem important: by creating lightweight schemes, we can push
privacy into the network core, and network operators, thus increasing the adoption of privacy
technologies and reducing the costs of privacy as a whole. This opened towards positioning
the network provider (where the operator is a primary candidate) as a privacy provider, using
its network knowledge to aid in route selection and privacy provision, resulting in much bet-
ter and efficient routes. To provide accurate values for this, we proposed a simple evaluation
mechanism based on path optimality, that tries to compare different routing solutions to an
optimal route, thus estimating the impact on network routing schemes, caused by different
privacy solutions. The results were indeed encouraging, resulting in performance gains over
existing solutions that indulge our best expectations. The conclusion was that, not only it is
worth considering the proposed scheme, but that the path optimality measurement scheme
can provide interesting metrics for privacy comparison.
Lastly, we performed a two-step analysis of the transport and application layer. On the
transport layer, we uncovered the identifier dependency between network and transport layer,
along with the threats introduced by transport mechanisms (ports), as wells as those that can
result from an identifier decoupling. The conclusion that the transport layer can be indistin-
guishable, from a privacy perspective, from the network layer due to overlapping identifiers,
allowed us to step into the application layer, simply to understand the assumptions and fea-
tures required to support the outlined privacy mechanisms. In the light of pseudonymity, we
found that among the analyzed protocols, SAML provides the best match for any applica-
tion layer solution. However, we established some generic concepts that guide the selection,
adoption and even modification of application layer mechanisms: i) the application layer IdM
protocol must be strongly pseudonym oriented, establishing non traceable pseudonyms that
bare no resemblance to any global identifiers the user might have, thus undermining any
possible correlation; ii) the IdM solution must support a granularity, that at best, supports
creating per SP pseudonyms, thus generating no basis for collusion on the SP side, as well
as for eavesdroppers on the application layer. We also found that both these requirements
are well established within SAML, and that it is reasonable to look once more at the vertical
aspects of integrating a SAML based on a joint VID and VNS approach, thus tackling the
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remaining network integration issues.
These issues stem from identity selection and network utilization problems that must be
met with a vertical (architectural) approach. These concepts are considered in the next chap-
ter, showing how different architectures can abide by these principles as we build architectural
instantiations of these paradigms.
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Chapter 6
Architectural Instantiations
Once we accept our limits, we go beyond them.
Albert Einstein
From the previous chapters, identity emerged as a path towards increasing privacy to the
end-user. As a privacy tool, identity simplifies information control, while simultaneously al-
lowing the development of user-centric privacy solutions. This is visible in both the horizontal
and vertical approaches presented before, creating a trend that can be synthesized through
architectural privacy drivers.
In this chapter we present four architectural drivers that define conceptual abstractions for
network architecture design, resorting to the underlying principle of using identity as a privacy
enabler. For each of the proposed drivers, we introduce concrete instantiation examples that
can be seen as the results of the concepts explored so far.
As particular instantiation examples we first propose a solution that integrates a vertical
privacy layer using a specific IdM protocol. This is followed by a solution that decouples
control and execution in the network, allowing the use of identity as a privacy-aware con-
trol layer. We then explore a privacy architecture focused on operational aspects, supported
by an identity-enabled layer separation mechanism that can increase network privacy. Fi-
nally, we propose a privacy-oriented architecture that uses identity to simplify the cross-layer
identification and control through identity references, closely related to the VID and VNS
approaches.
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6.1 Introduction
The last two chapters explored the idea of a vertical dimension to privacy, complemented
by horizontal considerations where necessary. The vertical dimension deals with user-related
privacy concepts, relying on a cross-layer approach to support the necessary privacy require-
ments. This vertical function was designed using the concept of user identities, using IdM
as a realization of the proposed approach. The horizontal dimension targeted specific layer
and protocol threats, focusing on eliminating unwanted relationships and mechanisms that
compromise user privacy, on different network layers. These solutions usually required using
properties from the vertical considerations as means towards supporting end-user privacy.
In this context, identity appeared as a privacy tool that enabled controlling user-related in-
formation, aggregating it into well-defined sets, as well as defining a mechanism that supports
linking different protocols to the user identity (e.g. through pseudonyms). By acknowledg-
ing that identity can function as a privacy support technology, it is possible to combine the
concepts implicit in other chapters, into a specific set of privacy architectural drivers. These
drivers can become the principles that introduce the possibility of designing privacy-aware
network architectures.
In this chapter we propose to design privacy as an integral part of the network architecture,
supported through identity concepts. We first identify these concepts as the mentioned archi-
tectural drivers, and how they can be converted into concrete instantiations. These different
aspects are proposed in Sec. 6.2, where identity is used as the main support tool, resulting in
four different concepts that are instantiated into different privacy-aware architectures.
The first step consists in defining an architecture that instantiates identity as a vertical
privacy enabler. As presented in Sec. 6.3, this proposal integrates a VID/VNS combined
approach with specific application layer IdM technology, in our case, SAML 2.0 as indicated
by the previous chapter.
The second approach proposes a clear separation between the control and execution of
network related mechanisms. It builds on the concept of using identity as a privacy-aware
control layer, separating user-related information from the actual protocol execution mech-
anisms. This separation attempts to avoid the correlation of different events by isolating
the actions on the network, properly controlled by a privacy-enabled layer. In Sec. 6.4 this
concept is instantiated into a mobility related architecture that splits control and execution,
outsourcing control to the IdM layer and leaving the execution up to the different mobility
protocols. With the control formalized on a vertical layer, we explore the operational aspects
of different protocols, exploring the role assumed by identity in the context of mobility aspects
(a common concern in NGN).
Closely following the concept of separating control and execution, we also propose a sep-
aration between layers. By breaking the dependencies between layers, properly tied to user
information, and in this case, identity, it is possible to develop privacy-aware protocol instan-
tiations. Accordingly, identity can become an operational driver when properly tied to layer
separation mechanisms. This is presented as part of a locator-identifier split, in Sec. 6.5,
where we explore the role of identity as a privacy-aware mechanism that can be incorpo-
rated into different protocols, in this case the Host Identity Protocol. HIP is a protocol that
already presents identity-related concepts, along with the proposition of clearly separating
the network from the transport layer, a property that we use to the benefit of privacy-aware
mechanisms.
From a privacy perspective, based on the previous concepts, identity can be classified as a
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user-related control layer that can be present in different network protocols. Combining these
properties can lead to a simpler and more effective privacy control mechanism. To achieve
these goals, we provide a last architectural driver that defines identity as a privacy-aware
interaction driver in NGN. In practice, this means that to improve the privacy control and
center it on the user, we convert the current network stack (and protocols) into a user-centric
operation that is enriched by user information. By using mechanisms stemming from the
VID model, the VIDID, it is possible to endow the network with privacy-aware identifiers,
controlled through identity. The result of this application is an architecture that embeds
identity into existing protocols, as means of providing simpler control over important privacy-
related information. In our proposed approach, presented in Sec. 6.6, network protocols
become in some way related to the user identity, introducing a privacy control mechanism
over the interactions that occur on multiple protocols.
To better understand the different instantiations, it is important to concretely define and
summarize the four different architectural concepts that drive the different proposals. This
is presented in the following section.
6.2 Architectural Concepts
The solutions proposed in the previous chapters have underlying recurring principles. These
principles can be summarized as the concepts that drive architectural design, which we em-
phasize as architectural drivers. These approaches must be systematized, so that the resulting
concepts can be applied when proposing privacy-enabled architecture instantiations.
The identification and application of the conceptual drivers can be seen as an outcome of
the privacy proposals present in the previous chapters, which already indicated the possibility
of leveraging broader concepts towards new privacy-oriented architectures.
One of the important recurring concepts is using identity as a privacy tool. Because
identity simplifies the control of user-related information, it provides adequate tools upon
which to design privacy-aware systems that take into account user-related data. It can also
create a vertical space that can relate both network and user related identifiers.
As a cross-layer privacy tool, identity can cover several technologies, ranging from low level
authentication to application layer services, which makes it applicable to users, devices and
services. Accordingly, identity becomes more that just a hub for user information. Instead,
it becomes an important tool for intrinsic privacy support, from where we can draw several
privacy related architectural concepts.
Based on the cross-layer capabilities, it is possible to envision identity as a vector that
drives privacy design. This results in the first concept, which highlights identity as a vertical
privacy enabler. Identity can provide a privacy-oriented vertical layer, using the IdM protocol
to control pseudonyms on different layers. This requires an integration between the cross-layer
pseudonymity solutions and the IdM solution at the application layer, thus providing a vertical
architecture. It is important to notice that, while we sometimes purposely confuse identity
with IdM, it is not restricted to IdM. Identity can embody a design philosophy, whereas IdM
can be a core component (among others) used to instantiate the outlined philosophy.
The integration of the vertical privacy enabler concept opens the door to a new design
feature that outsources control decisions on the network to a privacy enabled layer. Aligned
with the previous concept, we can resort to the vertical identity layer as the control mechanism
for different network procedures, thus making them privacy aware. This is proposed through
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the second architectural driver, which favors identity as the main control mechanism within
the network, thus creating a privacy (aware) control layer. The reasoning behind this derives
from the fact that the identity layer is capable of handling user information, making it an
information cluster (relative to the user) in the network. By aggregating user information
and collecting network data, it can provide the conditions for strong decisions regarding any
protocol in the network. Furthermore, the decision capability is already partially reflected in
the IdM layer, since it comprises several policy management considerations. The practical
outcome is an architectural split that differentiates between control and execution, with the
control part relying on identity.
Separating different functional aspects requires a more tight control on the network in
order to maintain the consistency across different operations. While this is achieved through
identity for the control and execution, it can also be done for separating different layers in the
network stack. This introduces value not only for the control part, but also for the operational
aspects of the network, which can be related to a privacy-aware control structure. Following
this reasoning, we take advantage of identity to define a privacy-oriented layer separation that
breaks the inter-layer dependencies, and thus minimizes the correlation opportunities.
Using identity-related aspects in the operational part of the network results in the third
privacy driver that defines identity as privacy-enabling operational driver. The value of this
concept lies in the fact that, by separating different layers with user-centric references, it is
possible to include privacy considerations in the different network protocols.
One possible instantiation of this driver is using HIP, which already supports identity
concepts that enable easily switching network identifier (IP addresses), without compromising
ongoing connections, which are tied to the Host Identity (that can be linked to IdM).
Finally, we consider that identity can become the primary privacy-aware interaction driver
in NGN. This driver can be seen as traversal idea, present in the previous concepts. Its main
purpose is to promote identity-related information in every network interaction, by inserting
references in existing protocols. This enables a two-fold approach where, on one hand, every
network interaction transaction can be simplified by resorting to common and cross-layer
user information and, on the other hand, every transaction can be governed by privacy-aware
mechanisms. This also promotes the use of identity as an integral part of network stack
management, enriching several protocols and making them privacy aware by providing an
easy relationship to pseudonym based solutions.
Proposing several architectural privacy drivers means that all the current models for
network interactions can be redesigned to stand any of the proposed principles, which are
closely related to the user. We can summarize the different drivers as follows:
• Privacy through an identity vertical enabler (Sec. 6.3)
• Privacy through an identity control layer (Sec. 6.4)
• Privacy though identity as operational driver (Sec. 6.5)
• Privacy through identity driven interactions in NGN (Sec. 6.6)
Using these conceptual guidelines, it is possible to design different privacy-aware archi-
tectures promoting the identity aspects outlined above. The result is a set of proposed
architectures that show the advantages of the different drivers, instantiated onto network
paradigms.
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6.3 Cross Layer Privacy support For IdM
As part of an architectural effort to increase privacy through a vertical layer, it is necessary
to integrate pseudonyms as an extension of user identities. This concept is an underlying
approach of the VID framework, aligned with the virtual network stacks to provide pseudo-
nymity. Therefore, it must be instantiated through a concrete IdM proposal that integrates
with the network, leveraging the advantages that IdM provides, such as an authentication
and authorization framework aimed at retaining user privacy. This complements the use of a
privacy-oriented vertical solution to control pseudonyms on different layers.
Identity management systems focus on privacy aspects that deal with the interaction
between users and services. In this context we use a SAML [20] based IdM framework [76]
that employs pseudonyms between user and service provider (SP), providing privacy to the
user by avoiding correlation across different SPs. Through minimum disclosure policies and
technologies for user attributes, this approach protects every user interaction by hiding or
withholding sensitive information. In this section we present a SAML-based IdM solution
that supports the VID concept, designed to integrate with the VNS capabilities, especially
focusing on how to support the major IdM interactions. The main objective is to prevent IdM
related pseudonyms (SAML pseudonyms) from being linked through network stack identifiers.
Since the network vertical threats that relate to the PRIVED model fall in the category of
the vertical solution proposed earlier, addressed by the VNS approach, we focus on a solution
that handles the threats of correlating IdM pseudonyms through specific network interac-
tions: by inspecting network events, such as the initial contact towards a service provider or
selecting an identity to use on the network, it is possible to compromise IdM pseudonyms.
We take advantage of cross layer pseudonyms to mitigate the threats outlined in Sec. 6.3.2,
thus enabling a privacy solution in IdM scenarios that integrates with the proposed network
pseudonym solution. However, it is important to first characterize the IdM architecture,
which was also defined in the scope of the SWIFT [72] project.
6.3.1 Cross-layer IdM Architecture
The IdM architecture upon which we base our network pseudonymity integration support,
already attempts to cover a wide range of privacy issues by employing a cross layer identity
solution. With a SAML framework at its heart, it uses IdM concepts to tackle network
based interactions, well beyond SP interactions. We focus on the relevant aspects that can
be used to drive cross layer privacy, addressing issues that range from the network layer to
the application layer, providing an approach to ensure the user privacy. Some of the most
important features provided by the SAML framework are the pseudonyms established between
the SP and the user, shown as the End User1 (EU) in Fig. 6.1, which protects the user identity,
making the user anonymous at the SP. Single Sign-On also provides an important value for
the end user by enabling a more secure and controlled environment, entirely supported by
SAML , ensuring user authentication and identity control. Also important is the use of the
VID concepts, which means that the user only discloses the relevant parts of his identity,
appearing as different virtual identities exist, instead of a single user. This increases the
1The term End User stems from SAML naming, and commonly refers to the end user as a manifestation
of the user on a particular device. While we adopt this naming here for proper alignment with SAML, this
commonly refers to the user identity in our proposal, or simply the user, and we differentiate from the user
terminal when necessary.
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overall privacy of the user.
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Figure 6.1: A Cross Layer Identity Management Architecture.
The architecture extends the use of the SAML framework to the different layers of the
network. This means that the IdM framework is not limited to service interaction and estab-
lishes a consistent cross-layer approach for security and privacy. It is composed of five main
functional elements, as seen in Fig. 6.1.
The user plays a central role in the IdM architecture. As the owner of the identity
information, the EU selects appropriate policies and mechanisms that handle how information
is disclosed within the system. By using several identities, the EU is able to consume services
made available by an SP, which in this scope is anything that provides additional value to an
EU, including network services. The SP consumes EU’s identity information in the form of
Authentication Statements to ensure that the EU is really who he claims to be, and Attribute
Statements that ensure the EU meets all the necessary authorization requirements to consume
the services. The Authentication Provider (AuthNP) is the element responsible for the actual
EU authentication. It creates the necessary authentications statements that also act as SSO
Tokens, and are used by the EU in order to prove that he is the rightful owner of a given VID,
thus proving its authenticity to SP and network services. This description fits perfectly with
the envisioned features for the Identity Manager presented in the VID framework2 (Chap. 4).
The described processes occur through the IdAgg that acts as the coordinating element
of all the EU identity related information. In the VID context the IdAgg should be mapped
directly into the role of the IdBroker, proposed in the VID framework. In fact, the IdAgg is
should not be the information holder of user related information (e.g. attributes, credentials),
but instead should retrieve it from an AttP. In this case, each attribute should be consider
an Entity Profile Part, described in Sec. 4.3.1.2. Accordingly, the AttP corresponds to the
Entity Profile Part holder.
By interacting on the behalf of the user, using different pseudonyms for each peer entity
2Even though the functionality is similar, the naming is modified to be properly aligned with the SAML
2.0 specification, as well as the expected functions stemming from the cross-layer IdM framework proposed
within the SWIFT project. This provides a seamless integration and protocol re-use.
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within the framework, the Identity Aggregator (IdAgg) enhances EU privacy. One IdAgg
keeps track of the different AttP entities, responsible for storing user attributes, fetching
the necessary attributes needed by the EU to consume a service. The framework employs
a minimum disclosure policy when it comes to disclosing EU’s attributes to the SP. This
is particularly interesting in the light of the PRIVED model, where each Information Set
should be as small as possible (which can be achieve through minimal disclosure) to prevent
unwanted correlations between different sets.
The cross-layer IdM approach provides a user centric framework where the EU has control
over its identity. It protects the user information against unauthorized access and exercises
control on information access, by disclosing only what is absolutely necessary for the EU to
consume a service. It also uses pseudonyms in the communication channel between all the
entities, being the IdAgg the only element that can link different VIDs. However, the network
can jeopardize the aforementioned privacy efforts by presenting several threats as discussed
in the following sections. Also noteworthy is that part of the lure of IdM systems is the
creation of distributed policy environments [87], where policies play an important role in the
framework, for access control, information, context or networks, among other resources.
6.3.2 Linking SAML pseudonyms
As an IdM property, SAML supports the use of pseudonyms to ensure that a user can perform
multiple uncorrelated interactions with the same service provider. This follows the philos-
ophy of the PRIVED privacy model, as well as indicating that it can be aligned with the
pseudonymity approaches outlined in Chap. 4. While guaranteeing that correlation at the SP
is impossible using the mentioned pseudonyms alone, it also clearly states that “correlation
may be possible through non-SAML handles” [20]. Maintaining different pseudonyms for a
certain layer will not ensure privacy, if through vertical linkage we can create a relation-
ship between a lower layer identifier with a higher layer identifier, thus inferring that those
pseudonyms belong to the same user, as shown through the PRIVED model. In practice, a
user may present many SAML pseudonyms to the same SP, but if all interactions are made
using the same IP address the SP could infer that all actions were performed by the same
user, defeating the purpose of the pseudonyms. This issue does not stem from SAML, but
rather from the fact that SAML interactions are carried atop identifiers over which SAML
has no control, adhering to the vertical correlation properties in PRIVED,
The aforementioned correlation events highlighted in the PRIVED approach will always
occur in two situations on the SAML framework: upon the first authentication of the user
against the IdAgg, and when contacting an SP. This procedure maps well to an IdAgg-
initiated authentication scenario: when the EU is already authenticated with the IdAgg, and
wishes to access an SP, the EU asks the IdAgg to issue an Authentication Statement for the
SP. This Authentication Statement is now bound to a SAML pseudonym (created during the
initial enrollment/subscription) used by the SP to identify the EU. Assuming that the EU
has more than one subscription with the same SP it would be easy for the SP to, through
vertical linkage, infer that those pseudonyms belong to the same user. We consider the set
of identifying information that SAML accredits to one identity (one pseudonym) and expand
it to include the identifiers from the lower layers. With this expansion we can align the
pseudonymity features from SAML with equivalents in the network stack.
These interactions that can lead to a privacy breach, are directly related to identity selec-
tion (as discussed in Sec. 4.5.3.6). In SAML based interactions, the user chooses his identity,
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represented by the employed pseudonyms, when accessing a SP. Before the authentication
process occurs, SAML has no considerations regarding pseudonymity, considering that all
non-authenticated users are equal. However, the same is not true for network interactions:
when a terminal sends a message into the network, it is immediately disclosing identifiers and
therefore asserting an identity. For IdM it means that upon the moment a terminal starts
sending packets it selecting an identity, in the form of network identifiers (IP and MAC ad-
dresses). This implies that, prior to contacting a service, the user’s identity must already be
instantiated in terms of local identifiers (at the terminal). If not, when the EU contacts an SP,
it is already presenting a set of network identifiers without an associated SAML pseudonym.
After the initial SP contact, the SP will initiate an EU authentication to determine the user’s
identity (pseudonym). This is another important use-case defined as SP-initiated authentica-
tion [124]. From now on, any pseudonym that the EU presents to the SP can be correlated,
through network stack identifiers that the EU presented to the SP on its initial contact.
The contradiction between the typical SAML authentication and the exposed interaction
model dictates two main cases that must be handled: 1) the user has already chosen the
identity to be employed (and consequently all associated pseudonyms); 2) the user has con-
tacted a SP but has not yet selected an identity, and special considerations must be made to
circumvent this use-case.
6.3.3 Supporting Cross Layer Pseudonymity
Pseudonymity is a core SAML feature, and therefore a prime candidate to be integrated into
the cross-layer IdM framework by following the VNS approach. We re-use the concept of
virtual interfaces instantiated per identity, as presented initially in Sec. 4.5.3.1, creating a
set of network identifiers based on identity. As discussed, the IdM paradigm is important to
instantiate the control proposed by the VID model over the different VNSs, as emphasized
throughout in Chap. 4. The proposed control plane interacts with applications, providing
information for network stack management (Sec. 4.5.2). However, the challenge for the inte-
gration of VNS and SAML, is to determine when and how to apply a new VNS, either when
contacting the IdAgg or an SP.
6.3.3.1 Network Pseudonyms and the IdM Framework
To integrate network pseudonymity support in the SAML-based architecture, it is necessary
to generate different identifiers for each SP (or group of SPs). Managing the complexity of
using per-SP pseudonyms should be supported by IdM control layer, to enable the required
granularity for pseudonyms. In this context, it is also important to balance privacy and
performance, given that creating multiple network stacks can have an impact on the network
(Sec. 4.4): creating multiple pseudonyms will impact the access technology because the device
will now have to take care of multiple ongoing communications (e.g. multiple 802.11 [66]
associations). Addressing impacts derive from the fact that the user will employ a number
of identifiers proportional to the number of VIDs in use, reducing the address space available
in the network. Because of this, it is important save resources by re-using network stacks for
different operations, while still preserving the user privacy.
For most operations, such as contacting an SP, different SAML pseudonyms will be used,
assuming that the identity was already selected and properly authenticated, leaving us in
the IdAgg-initiated authentication scenario. The decision to generate or reuse a VNS should
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come from the IdM layer, which is aware of authentication, VID, pseudonym and SP. The
most straightforward strategy would be to instantiate a stack for each SAML pseudonym.
Alternatively, it is possible to instantiate one stack per VID [129] (Sec. 4.2).
Regardless of the adopted granularity, there is always information divulged at the appli-
cation layer (e.g. presenting the user’s real name at different SP links different pseudonyms),
a situation that is foreseen in the IdM application scenarios.. By reusing the same privacy
policies that guide this process, it is possible to select one VNS for different providers. Such
policies should be enforced by the IdM control layer, which handles the mapping between the
SAML identifiers and the network stack identifiers.
The IdAgg can be considered a special case, given its implicit trust properties on behalf
of the user. The initial authentication with the IdAgg requires a VID, along with a VNS,
and yielding an SSO Token [124] that may be used to contact several SPs. Subsequent VID
authentications at the same IdAgg can use the same VNS, given that the IdAgg is trusted
entity and is already capable of correlating different pseudonyms to the same VID, thus saving
resources that yield no privacy increase. This is a recurring trend throughout the proposed
solutions, where the network provider is required to be a trusted entity: the Identity Manager
in VID framework; the Access Point in the link layer privacy solution; and the Privacy Service
in the Waypoint Routing proposal. In all of these cases there is a common trusted entity that
is able to map the different identities or privacy features, something that must be included
in the architecture design.
Nevertheless, in this case, supplemental privacy countermeasures can be taken to protect
against eavesdroppers, such as a user creating a set of predetermined VNS instances, used
in a round robin fashion, defining a VNS pool for IdAgg authentication. While this has no
privacy effect towards the IdAgg, it can be sufficient to defeat eavesdroppers on the network,
while still saving a fair amount of resources.
6.3.3.2 Contacting the Service Provider
The proposed generic policies that cover creating or reusing a VNS to contact an SP assume
the user is authenticated and has already selected a VID, representing the IdAgg-initiated
authentication scenario. However, this only covers the case where the identity to use is already
clear. When the first contact is towards the SP, defining the SP-initiated scenario which is the
one first contacting the IdAgg, the risk of correlation increases, given that a network stack is
required to first contact the SP. Protecting the user in this scenario requires two approaches
to be considered: 1) use a new VNS for such events, preventing correlation but triggering a
performance bottleneck or 2) use a VNS pool dedicated to this case, from which a VNS is
selected on a round robin basis on each occurrence. As soon as the user selects his identity,
the appropriate VNS can be used instead.
The later approach needs to be carefully evaluated as there will be a chance of correlation,
even if small. The positive uptake is that this reduces the number of required stacks to main-
tain the unlinkability across different identities. By using a round robin approach, there will
be a large period of time until stack reuse occurs and linkage is possible. Nevertheless, since
this is policy driven, it can always state that a new VNS will be used in such cases, incurring
in the performance penalties as mentioned in Sec. 4.5.5, but safeguarding user privacy, espe-
cially if we considered this to be the non-standard case as opposed to first authenticating at
the IdAgg.
163
6.3.4 A SAML based Architecture
By itself, the VNS is only a tool that can prevent linking attacks on the network. The
strategies that allow control of the pseudonymity solution are just as important as the tool
itself. For user privacy protection, there must be a clear definition of how the VNS is used
by the IdM framework, and more importantly, we must define the entities that provide such
control and interaction, and the functions they must support. The goal of the privacy proposal
is to establish a relationship between SAML pseudonyms in the IdM layer, and corresponding
virtual network stacks. To do so, we connect the SAML operations that require network
resources to the creation or re-usage of a VNS. An example of this process can be a user
contacting an SP which will cause a VID to be chosen, consequently triggering instantiation
of SAML pseudonym. This pseudonym instantiation must be properly conveyed to the cross-
layer IdM framework, where a decision must be taken to either create a VNS or use an existing
VNS. Below we present the functional elements from which the architecture to support cross
layer privacy was built on, along with an example of how this solution maps into an IdM
practical use-case.
6.3.4.1 Functional elements
The functional elements that compose the privacy architecture are built around the princi-
ple that there must be a tight integration between the VNS solution and the IdM support
functions.
This integration is done through the SAML Core which intercepts SAML operations that
require network resources for the interaction between a user and a SP. Fig. 6.2 details the
cross layer privacy architecture composed by three main components:
SAML Core
Identity Management
VNS ManagerVID Manager
Physical Interface
VNS 2 VNS 3
VID A VID B
SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4
VNS 1
Figure 6.2: Cross layer pseudonym support architecture.
VID Manager (VID-M) The VID-M is the central element of this architecture and inter-
acts with all the other elements. It is the interface point between the IdM layer and the
VNS functionality and intercepts SAML pseudonym instantiations through the SAML
Core. If network resources are needed, the VID-M triggers the policy mechanisms that
will decide if, for a given pseudonym, it should use a new VNS or reuse an existing one.
VNS Manager (VNS-M) The VNS-M element is the primary point of interaction with the
network stack. It is responsible for the proper usage of the VNS. The VNS-M enables
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the creation of the necessary network pseudonyms along with the configuration of the
underlying network stack. It also provides the virtual interfaces for each VNS, which
simulates the existence of multiple devices in the user’s terminal.
SAML Core (SAML-C) The SAML-C element is responsible for bridging the SAML op-
erations performed on the IdM layer that involve to the creation or usage of VIDs,
pseudonyms or assertions, to the VID-M. The SAML-C also creates the link to any
identity management policies that can come from the IdM layer.
6.3.4.2 Functional Overview
Using the defined functional elements of the cross layer privacy architecture, we describe
how they interact to provide the desired functionality from a privacy perspective. This op-
erational overview describes using different VNS stacks in two scenarios that relate to user
authentication, either IdAgg-initiated or SP-initiated [124]. We only present the case of web
based services, thus assuming that the user already has a network connection but it is not
consuming a service. Whenever a user attempts to access a service, the SP will initiate an
authentication towards the IdAgg. The identity selection and the VNS interaction must be
considered before contacting the SP. This interaction should be policy controlled and can be
described in the following three step process:
1. When an EU requires access to a service, he must first select a VID to use, triggering
the creation of a VNS.
2. In the case that the EU needs simultaneous access to a different SP with the same VID,
it should use the IdAgg initiated authentication, given that he is already authenticated
and possesses a SSO Token. In this step, the EU has two different options: 1) use the
same VNS (one VNS per VID scenario), or 2) create a new VNS in order to prevent
correlation of the same VID with the two SPs (one VNS per SP scenario).
3. Finally, if the EU requires access to a new SP with a different VID, step 1 is repeated
and a new VNS is created.
The proposed three step process can be mapped to the interaction shown in Fig. 6.3, which
exemplifies the authentication and subsequent consumption of a service. In this interaction
the EU starts by selecting a VID, triggering the creation of a new VNS. Afterwards, the
EU performs a Service Access operation to consume the service provided by SP 1. While
consuming this service, the EU wishes to access SP 2. Due to the fact that he is already
authenticated with the IdAgg, only a new VNS is created and used alongside the already
existent SSO Token to obtain an Authentication Statement for SP 2. The end result is
the instantiation of two VNSs by the user, one per service, making it impossible to link the
SAML pseudonyms to the same EU terminal. This ensures user privacy even while consuming
services with different VIDs on a single terminal.
6.4 Identity Driven Mobility Architecture
Using identity can increase the privacy of a network architecture, by providing the glue
between application layer and the lower layers, providing a vertical approach to privacy. The
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Figure 6.3: Accessing multiple services using Single-Sign-On.
vertical privacy integration reinforced the use of identity as a privacy tool. As we further
outsource the control for privacy-aware mechanisms, we identify the feature of increasing
privacy by using a common control layer for all network and user related aspects. This role
can be assumed by the identity layer, becoming even more important as a privacy-providing
mechanism.
By focusing on the feature of using a common privacy-aware control layer, we highlight
the second architectural driver of outsourcing the control functions to identity, through a sep-
aration between control and execution. Here, we instantiate this design concept by separating
the decision and execution of mobility mechanisms in a user-centric scenario.
Mobility can benefit directly from identity related information, as it requires many user-
related inputs (e.g. user profile, preferred networks, experience preferences, etc.), either on
end-user devices or in the network, to perform adequate and informed handover decisions.
This relationship defines a context where it becomes interesting to explore the separation of
control and execution.
With identity at the decision helm, a separation between decision and enforcement can
lead to an environment that supports information demanding mechanisms, like mobility. The
common privacy denominator drops to identity, where most information is now directly or
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indirectly tied to the user identity, isolating IdM as an important tool for cross-layer privacy
support in the network, and consequently, for mechanisms that require both privacy user-
related information, like mobility. Having identity at the core of the mobility architecture
enables a user centric approach to information and policy distribution capabilities: the identity
framework naturally fits a control view of mobility, since it stores many user and network
related policies, along with attributes.
When considering mobility management, the natural bias is towards the operational as-
pects. Attention is usually devoted to classical mobility solutions, such as MIPv6 [77] and
derivate protocols [41, 135, 121], which have become the standard approach. These solutions
focus almost entirely on the operational aspects of device mobility, and can be considered a
tool that solves the data layer aspects of mobility. But they do not provide a strong frame-
work for handling the informational and control aspects of mobility. Similarly, other mobility
mechanisms, like SIP [125], used to implement terminal, service, session and even personal
mobility, mostly target operational aspects as well. These examples indicate that there is no
common approach that aggregates different mobility protocols, thus creating a gap on how to
integrate them together both in control and operational views. Consequently, such different
aspects, all operating on the network, have different control mechanisms and can unavoidably
lead to more identifier correlation opportunities, further increasing the network privacy issues.
On an opposite approach, as the handover and mobility mechanisms increase in complex-
ity, they have increasing information requirements, to enable more efficient technical solutions
for the mobility operational aspects. This leads to an ecosystem where protocols require more
information, but can simultaneously further jeopardize privacy. An example of such a proto-
col is IEEE 802.21 [68], which defines Media Independent Handover functions that enable a
low level information distribution mechanism to assist the mobility process. By using the Me-
dia Independent Information Service, it provides a network oriented approach for information
distribution, which enables mechanisms for information distribution for the handover process,
but fails at providing a cross layer mechanism given its narrow applicability. This is another
useful tool in mobility management, but not a vertical control layer. By manipulating 802.21
as a tool, the mobility extensions presented in [75] try to gather as much input as possible
both on the network and on the terminal, covering QoS and network related user preferences
to perform “smarter” mobility decisions. While interesting, and a step in the right direction,
this solution falls short of the cross layer approach that is required for the Future Internet.
Such solutions leverage the operational aspects of the different protocols, but do not make a
strong argument for a common and vertical mobility and informational management layer.
Most of the aforementioned protocols fail to acknowledge that the important aspect is not
moving devices, the strictly operational view, but instead it is the user needs, where privacy
plays a major role. In this context, mobility is just an action, like any other, that requires
a strong control layer, which does not focus on signal quality or similar metrics, but instead
enables a cross layer approach that empowers the user and preserves privacy.
6.4.1 Identity Centric Mobility Management
As part of the architectural drivers, identity provides several advantages to user and service
interaction. The concepts that stem from IdM framework, discussed in the previous section,
revolve around enhanced security and privacy as part of the core system value, introducing
a cross-layer architecture with a vertical notion of privacy, which goes beyond current IdM
systems. In the presented instantiation example (Sec. 6.3), this was achieved by integrating
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SAML, in a composed VID and VNS approach. Consequently, every network interaction
is made privacy-aware and influenced by identity information, a key concept of the VID
framework, where identities become the communication endpoints. In this ecosystem, the
IdM system gains a new dimension by defining itself as a core technology, making it a suitable
candidate for a stronger control layer.
When discussing IdM systems, it is worth nothing that we are considering the specific
subset of entities that provide the basic IdM functions: strong authentication and between
all the involved entities; secure attribute exchange and information storage; policy oriented
mechanisms as privacy and decision enablers for the aforementioned functions. These features
are present in the cross-layer IdM architecture presented in Sec. 6.3.1. In fact, we build
the presented mobility enhancements around the same architecture which was presented for
integration of IdM SAML pseudonyms and the VNS approach.
6.4.1.1 Identity Driven Mobility
Mobility is becoming less about maintaining sessions and more about enabling an improved
user experience. This user centric characteristic turns mobility into an identity driven process.
The paradigm is becoming about user centric information, and applying network functions
towards user needs, rather than centering the mechanisms on the network itself. As such, a
plethora of vectors contribute to the decision of where a terminal attaches and whether it is
necessary to change point-of-attachment. To accompany the shift, it becomes clear that the
mobility functions must be defined according to the notion of identity. It should be possible
to formulate identity dependent mobility decisions. We rely on a rich information set and
the application of mobility protocols as tools transformed into a cohesive architecture by the
vertical IdM layer that controls user privacy.
To provide a rich information environment we use the attribute server as storage for mobil-
ity and user related information, rather than creating protocol dependent entities that store
only a subset of information (e.g. Media Independent Information Service in 802.21 [68]).
The dynamic nature of the information that contributes to the handover and mobility deci-
sions implies the use of a dynamic structure (not the semi-static information types defined by
current protocols), that adapts to shifting information requirements, important for mobility
in the Future Internet. Also, the information can be shared across different protocols, rather
than a protocol-specific silo.
Focusing on specific tools, no single protocol has proven superior to others, especially
considering different layers. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the Future Internet will not
be made of a single protocol, but of many performing individual functions. This creates the
need for a coherent control layer that can naturally fall on the IdM plane. An advantage of
using IdM as a primary element in the mobility management architecture is that, beyond a
controlled authorization and access control, it defines a privacy-preserving environment, which
is particularly interesting when defining complex mobility scenarios that involve multiple
network providers with different identity-dependent attributes.
6.4.2 Splitting Mobility: Control and Action
We propose a definition of mobility as a two-step process, consisting first, on the decision,
and second, on the actual process of triggering and executing mobility. While the decision
process that will guide user or session movement is ultimately protocol independent, mobility
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management is clearly linked with the protocols used at different levels in the network.
The entire mobility decision process forms the control layer, while the process of triggering
mobility, i.e. determining the necessary actions and performing them, is the execution layer.
This leads to the separation shown in Fig. 6.4, where the mobility process is divided in two
different layers [123]: the Mobility Control Layer and the Mobility Execution Layer.
Control Layer
Execution Layer
Mobility
Management
Terminal
Terminal
Identity
Management
Figure 6.4: Control and Execution duality.
6.4.2.1 Mobility Control Layer
The first part of the proposed mobility management scheme is protocol independent, serving
a dual purpose: it acts as the information repository for storage; and as the decision plane,
based on cross-layer information focusing on mobility as a policy based mechanism. Acting
as the information repository, the control layer is concerned with both static and dynamic
information. Static information can be characterized as capabilities or features of user (e.g.
preferences), network (e.g. contracted bandwidth) and devices (e.g. display size). On the
other hand, dynamic information deals with the surrounding environment or conditions (e.g.
network load or user location), as well as with policies that define the guidelines over existing
capabilities and environment. Consequently, the identity control layer should act as the
information hub for all data relating to mobility protocols and decisions.
The information collected from both network and user should then be coalesced into a
control pattern that establishes what actions should be taken (policy trigger and driven). The
resulting actions, which get pushed onto the execution layer, enable the mobility processes
and are a direct consequence of the results of policy executions. In practice this process can
outlined by a “control decision” taken in the IdM component, which is then is translated
into an “action” of moving the session from one identity to another, therefore establishing a
barrier between the control functions and the action of moving the session between identities.
6.4.2.2 Mobility Execution Layer
The high level mobility process decisions are outsourced to identity-aware components, through
IdM, that are capable of outlining privacy-aware decisions, using user-centric information.
Once a decision is sent from the control layer, it will need to be converted to protocol actions.
Consistent with the two step process, the execution layer is able to determine what actually
needs to be done in results of a decision, and how to realize those actions. This is achieved
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by introducing two abstractions, that come together as shown in Fig. 6.5, which are protocol
independent adaptation layer, and a protocol dependent action enabler:
Generic Execution Layer (GEL) : The GEL provides high level abstractions that can be
used in mobility centric decisions, and breakdown generic identity driven decisions into
protocol and layer oriented decisions.
Protocol Executors : The executions take the parsed decisions conveyed by the GEL and
propagate them as protocol specific operations.
By taking advantage of semantics that generically describe the mobility process, the iden-
tity management components are able to apply policies and convey decisions to the mobility
management components. But, the semantic should not be focused on specific mobility ac-
tion that must be taken. Therefore, the GEL converts the abstract decisions into actions
that fit the granularity of the mobility protocols, by clearly identifying the available identi-
ties, sessions and devices. The conversion process should also be both privacy and identity
aware, in the sense that it is responsible for identifying the potential impacts and conflicts
on the different virtual network stacks that might be affected by the decision. Similarly, it is
also in a position to determine whether or not a specific mobility action can compromise the
correlation of different identifiers. The GEL is a particular example of how a privacy-aware
control layer can function both vertically, by integrating with the identity approach, as well
as providing a privacy-oriented course of action for the different protocols that are executed
on the same layer (horizontally).
Figure 6.5: Generic mobility and identity abstractions.
One of the important features of this approach is that it enables mobility to be expressed
independently of the protocol, as well as permitting a concurrent execution process on the
by the different protocol executors, by directly triggering the required protocol mechanisms.
From an abstract point of view, we must provide a common semantic approach to mobility,
enabling the dissemination decisions, understood at the GEL, that translate into particular
protocol actions.
6.4.3 Generic Mobility Architecture
Control and execution define the two concepts that can become the cornerstone of the pro-
posed identity driven mobility architecture. But to constitute a feasible approach, they must
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be translated into functionality supported by network entities that can be instantiated in the
IdM architecture. Moreover, these abstract roles will allow modeling the mobility process
encompassing multiple protocols and still remaining consistent through a common control.
To properly instantiate the generic entities, we assume that control is done through infor-
mation and decisions, while the execution process is the enforcement of the decisions origi-
nating in the control layer. The specified requirements can also be observed in generic access
control frameworks, from which we reuse the decision and enforcement concepts resulting in
the three entities described below:
Mobility Information Point The entity that stores information that is pertinent to the
mobility process. It stores domain related information depending on the level it operates.
These entities can be distributed across the network, targeting several IdM specific
functional boxes, as well as user devices, for user generated information. This can be
the attribute server, the identity aggregator or a new (distributed) component.
Mobility Decision Point This is the entity that gathers both the static and dynamic in-
formation, executing the decision process controlling mobility. This entity can be dis-
tributed over the network where mobility information has relevance. A few examples
are the access network, the local mobility domain, the global mobility domain, as well
as the device for user centric information and mobility events.
Mobility Enforcement Point The mobility enforcement point should interact with the
decision point, by sharing the abstract interface layer, so that it effectively bridges
the decision into protocol operation. This should be mostly network entities, protocol
specific, and the user devices, which will be part of the focus of the actual mobility
process.
This approach enables us to model the mobility process, while reusing the entities and
protocol which are already in place. Mobility is triggered by the Mobility Enforcement Point
(MEP) using the GEL to collect and transform network and user event into the correct
mobility semantics. A mobility decision request is then sent to Mobility Decision Point (MDP)
that decides if a mobility action should be performed, based on information collected from the
Mobility Information Point (MInP). If the result is to perform a mobility action, the inverse
flow occurs: the MDP conveys a decision to the MEP in generic mobility terms, which is then
properly translated by the GEL into semantics specific to the mobility protocols. When the
translated decision reaches the MEP,it executes the various required steps to carry out the
necessary changes in the network to complete the mobility task.
6.4.3.1 Identity Control Plane
Given the generic nature of the defined entities, they can be treated as roles assumed by al-
ready deployed entities. But, before instantiating these roles (which is done next in Sec. 6.4.4)
into concrete entities, either from VID model or from the SAML-based cross-layer framework,
it is necessary to further clarify the different required roles and purposes. Based on the two
critical roles (decision and enforcement), we divide the control plane into an information
management component and a policy execution component, assumed by each relevant entity
on the network. Most of the mobility decision process can be offloaded to network entities,
residing in the control plane with cross-layer information access. But, this is not the only
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location where mobility decisions occur: when the local network or visited domain also con-
trols the mobility within its networks, i.e. network based mobility management, they are also
mobility decision points. This process is based on network conditions, which will not directly
involve information related to the end-user. The result is that local mobility management
entities become specialized MDPs that focus on specific aspects of the network. Furthermore,
the terminal can also become an MDP, by apply user policies and inter-provider policies that
cannot be handled by a single network or identity provider. The mobility control plane then
results in set of decision and enforcement points scattered through different places: in the
IdM system, in the mobility system and on the terminal (which is a part of both). This is
exactly what is shown as in Fig. 6.6, where the defined elements interact through control
primitives.
It should be noted that policy evaluation can be a daunting task, taking much longer
than a few seconds. For particular cases, where movement decisions are time constrained,
there should be a fallback mechanism or deadline definition for distributed decisions or policy
executions (similar to real time operating systems) assuring a valid response in useful time.
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Figure 6.6: Control (left) and Execution (right) plane views.
6.4.3.2 Mobility Execution Plane
The execution plane involves different entities and implies the extended use of the GEL to
transform control plane decisions into concrete protocol operations at the MEP. Fig. 6.6
presents the mobility management backend and the terminal interacting through the defined
abstractions. There are enforcement points in all entities involved in the mobility process
(i.e. signaling and operations), that is the mobility management system in usage, and the
terminals on the user end. The GEL will then transform these commands into the appropriate
protocol executors that pass them to the involved terminals.
The protocol executors, closely coupled to the MEP, provide the actual modular view that
enables our proposed architecture to act as a control blanket over current and future mobility
solutions. Therefore, each protocol executor should correspond to a different technology
(e.g. MIPv6, HIP or SIP), with the benefits of reusing currently established protocols with
similar conditions and performance. In fact, performance issues become orthogonal to the
management system, given that the modular system cannot improve the performance of each
individual building block.
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6.4.4 Instantiation
The proposed architecture is capable of modeling several mobility scenarios, where different
entities can play important roles. For this specific instantiation, concrete decisions on the
mobility process must be made. Following the reasoning in Sec. 6.4.3, we assign the designated
roles to the different entities of the cross-layer IdM architecture presented in Sec. 6.3.1, using
the IdAgg, AuthNP and AttP, further clarifying the abstract definitions. As also mentioned
in Sec. 6.3.1, the IdAgg is similar to the IdBroker in the VID framework, whereas the AuthNP
maps to the IdManager, and finally the AttP, corresponds to the EPP holder. This mapping
creates a common alignment over the different provided solutions, starting from the VID
framework, and leading up to the different instantiations.
The central element in the scenario is the IdAgg, which acts as the MDP. It controls the
mobility process by resorting to user identity (e.g. for retrieving preferences and contracts
information), associated policies, and network status. This information is mostly retrieved
from the Attribute Server (AttS), which assumes the role of MInP. The policy engine, which
should be part of any IdM architecture, is divided between the MDP, which acts as the Policy
Decision Point, and the MEP, which acts as the Policy Enforcement Point, thus disseminating
and enforcing mobility related decisions and policies. For the mobility protocol, we propose
including PMIPv6 [41] as the primary mapping protocol due to its network based approach
for handling mobility, which allows outsourcing mobility decisions to the network. Therefore,
both PMIPv6 entities, the Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) and the Mobile Access Gateway
(MAG), compose a single protocol executor connected to the MEP.
Figure 6.7: Example architecture instantiation.
When mobility is triggered by PMIPv6, the LMA uses the GEL to convert the event
into the correct semantics and to request a mobility decision to the IdAgg (acting as MDP).
The IdAgg collects the necessary information (e.g. user attributes, network information or
policies) from the AttS (acting as MinP). If the result of the information decision is to perform
a mobility action, e.g. change point of attachment, provider, or session condition, then the
IdAgg will format the resulting decision and distribute the appropriate decisions to achieve
the desired state in the network, which will be processed at the MEP by the policy engine.
The resulting actions will be sent to the correct GEL, where they will be transformed from
the mobility semantic decision into the correct protocol action and towards the LMA/MAG.
This process summarizes the nature of the mobility process in the architecture.
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6.4.5 Evolving Identity Paradigms
From the presented architecture, the most fundamental achievement is that a clear separation
between control and execution seems feasible. This can become a tool for better privacy and
identity integration, as well as a door for further protocol optimizations that do not disrupt
current network functionality. With this separation it becomes possible to introduce privacy
as a design feature of different network architectures by using an identity-oriented control
layer.
One of the key benefits of this separation is the common mobility semantic across differ-
ent elements, taking full advantage of the strong policy oriented mechanisms used through
the network. And as such, policy based mechanisms can be made user or identity-centric,
moving control to a rich information layer. In fact, the movement primitives realized by the
execution layer are a consequence of distributed policy application that can follow a hierar-
chical policy evaluation approach, adding flexibility to mobility management. However, the
presented architecture should take into account the possible overhead of distributed functions
when considering mobility (time) requirements: even though individual protocol performance
should remain unchanged (because protocols are not modified), the overall performance also
depends on the different modules present on the execution layer.
Regardless of the potential benefits, the separation in the mobility framework shows that
there is margin for progression in the mobility aspects. Current semantics for mobility become
part of a new framework that can support existing communication paradigms, and simulta-
neously allow future iterations of new or existing protocols, given the modular approach.
The proposed separation introduces new networking paradigms, due to the fact that not
only can the user-privacy and information controls benefit from this approach, but also that
a common control layer (in this case identity-driven) can support cross layer (mobility) con-
cepts. It also indicates that, by addressing inter-dependencies between layers, as done here
for mobility purposes, a two-fold scenario appears: i) privacy can be independently improved
on each layer, trying to mitigate individual threats and perils; ii) replacements for recurring
concepts, such as current mobility schemes, can be used transparently due to the abstractions
put forth by separation layer and constructing of common paradigms.
6.5 Instantiating Privacy and Mobility through Identity
One of the proposed architectural drivers focused on achieving privacy through identity as an
operational driver. The value of such a proposition stemmed from the fact that using identity
as a privacy tool can be useful, not only on the more control related aspects of the network,
but also on the operational side of protocol instantiations. It is possible to explore an identity
approach that promotes a separation between functional layers, to promote a privacy-oriented
environment less prone to identifier correlation, where it is possible to defined new solutions
for privacy threats on the different network layers.
In this context, identity makes sense as a tool to achieve privacy, since it can provide a
separation between different layers, as well as a relationship towards the user, establishing the
opportunity to reuse the vertical privacy framework. An example that introduces a separation
between layers is the Host Identity Protocol (HIP). HIP introduces an explicit differentiation
between locator and identifier, by splitting the network and transport layer through the
introduction of a new namespace that assigns identities to hosts. The Host Identity (HI) is
the public part of an asymmetric key pair. The main idea behind HIP is to decouple the dual
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functionality provided by IP addresses, which results in seamless mobility support through
IP address renumbering supported by strong security features.
This is a direct application of identity as an operational procedure that can be explored
with a privacy intent. The identity metaphor serves to create a layer separation and a new end-
point for the network communication. The key concept to extract is that, when a separation
is created between layers, it is possible to reduce the correlation options, since it becomes pos-
sible to employ the proposed solutions, such as pseudonymity, to create a privacy-preserving
environment. From the PRIVED perspective, the upper layer identifiers, which are above the
separation layer, do not need to be bound to a single lower layer identifier. Consequently, it
is possible to create Information sets that are not correlatable through network identifiers,
since it is possible to use different ones for corresponding upper layer identifiers. In this
separation, identity becomes the tool that enables the paradigm to which the communication
becomes linked, making it possible to apply a VID approach supported through pseudonyms.
Furthermore, from this separation, it is possible to address individual network problems on
each layer, since they can be decoupled from other protocols.
In this section we use the split proposed by HIP, along with identity as the operational
driver, to introduce new ways to tackle mobility and privacy issues. First, we solve specific
network issues such as location tracking of users, by concealing the use of IP addresses. This
can be done by using the HIP identity mechanisms that stem from the locator/identifier split,
to outsource the locator to identifier conversion into the network, making sure that the user’s
location is never revealed within topological boundary. This provides location privacy to
end-nodes. Second, we use the identity properties of HIP to establish a relationship to the
IdM environment. This creates a scenario that can take advantage of Virtual Identities and
Virtual Network Stacks to provide a vertical privacy solution, with horizontal ramifications.
6.5.1 Revisiting Network Privacy Issues: the HIP use-case
As we have seen, there are two actions associated with the IP address: one is identifying the
node and the second is providing its topological location. If this functionality is divided in
two different roles, with a protocol like HIP, we can provide orthogonal solutions that can
be complemented to solve these threats without requiring complicated solutions. We define a
network framework that uses HIP as the base protocol and is able to conceal the IP addresses
of communicating HIP nodes. From a privacy perspective, we can take advantage of the
discussed separation to reduce the correlation potential of identifiers, but also, it is possible
to address specific location privacy at the network layer. Using an architectural approach
based on protected geographical areas (IP network domains), beyond which the locators have
no meaning, it is possible to design a mechanism that provides location privacy to end-users.
This is done by taking advantage of the locator/identifier separation provided by HIP, that
currently has few privacy considerations. Our proposal relies on an architectural solution for
location privacy without requiring modifications on the core network, while still supporting
mobility.
The current HIP architecture does not take into account location privacy issues, since it
requires a node to send its locator to every peer, similar to the Binding Update messages
exchanged in MIPv6 [77]. In fact, HIP ultimately suffers from the same location privacy
issues as MIPv6 described in [44, 60], discussed in Sec. 2.5, by exchanging locator parameters
in the HIP Base Exchange (BE), the initial handshake. This also occurs on mobility events,
where update messages with the locator parameter must be sent. HIP promotes an end-to-
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end paradigm, where both Initiator and Responder learn each other’s current IP address once
the BE is completed. But, in an architecture which supports location privacy, hosts should
never be able to map the identifier to the real locator of the node.
There have been previous proposals to introduce network elements that shield a HIP
node’s location [85]. We aim to extend this, and provide new functional units that enhance
the protocol operation and provide location privacy to the nodes in the network [100].
6.5.2 HIP Location Privacy Architecture
We can take the separation aspects of HIP to provide an environment that has a strong
relationship with identity (and the VID layer), but that also has an impact on network
related privacy. As suggested in [85], location privacy is provided by delegating the HIT to
IP resolution to a network entity called the Rendezvous Agent (RVA). Moving the resolution
upwards in the network topology, from the HIP Mobile Node (HMN) to the RVA has the
added benefit that locators do not need to be disclosed in the Access Network. The core
feature of our solution is the concept of RVA protected areas, which are access networks
where global locators are either concealed or not used at all. Instead, HITs or local addresses
are used to identify the traffic path. The RVA is also responsible for local mobility, i.e. under
its protected area. Rather than defining a specific transport layer for our approach, we define
a set of basic requirements which must be met for the protocol to function properly. The
only assumption made is that the core network is IP based. We do not specify any particular
technology under RVA protected areas. In fact, we consider possible instantiations based on
direct IPv6 address translations, tunnels or semantical adaptations (replacing IPv6 addresses
with HITs). In Sec. 6.5.3 an IPv6 based solution is described.
A simple example of the proposed topology is shown in Fig. 6.8, consisting of two RVA
protected areas connected to the Internet. An RVA protected area is composed by multiple
ARs which are directly connected to an RVA. There are no assumptions made about the
size and number of necessary RVA protected areas, although it is reasonable to think that
an RVA can cover a large number of access routers. A wider coverage area, geographical or
topological, limits the amount of location information revealed to an external eavesdropper.
The RVS and DNS servers are located in the core. The AR and the RVA are functional
entities, thus they can also be collocated in the same machine, but at the expense of some
limitation on location privacy.
Depending on the chosen solution for routing in the access networks, already existing HIP
elements may require modifications, since hosts and routers depend on the protocol used in
the access network. If some form of identity based routing is used, then the amount of infor-
mation to be kept at each node (e.g. AR keeps HIT based neighbor tables) is larger. If the
access network remains IPv6 based, then no modification is required other than enhancing
the neighbor advertisement protocol. Another element of the HIP architecture which requires
minor modifications is the RVS. The RVS should be capable of performing a double resolu-
tion: translating a received HIT of a host into the HIT of its designated RVA, and resolving
the corresponding RVA address. However, to understand the architecture we must further
understand the RVA, along with the extensions necessary to the BE performed between nodes.
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Figure 6.8: Basic architecture topology example
6.5.2.1 Rendezvous Agent
The RVA is an enhanced Rendezvous Server (RVS) which performs the IP-HIT or IP-IP
address translations. This functionality split provides location privacy to the HMNs behind
it. The mechanism consists of re-addressing packets flowing from and to the core network.
To forward packets to a host outside the RVA protected area, the RVA addresses a globally
routable IPv6 address previously assigned by another RVA to the destination host. When an
RVA receives packets from the outside network to a host belonging to its RVA protected area,
it readdresses them to HITs, or local addresses, and forwards the packet to the destination.
Note that the RVA is the entity which assigns globally routable IP addresses to the hosts
under it, and the only one capable of mapping HIT, or local address, to global addresses.
The RVA is capable of forwarding packets based on HITs through maintaining a mapping for
every HMN in the protected area to its point of attachment, which is the AR. The RVA is
responsible for handling mobility for the nodes in the protected area, raising the possibility
that the RVA might have to signal other RVAs or HIP nodes, on behalf of the HMNs, for
location updates.
6.5.2.2 Base Exchange Extensions
When an HMN first arrives to a protected area, it registers with the responsible RVA. The
HITrva is retrieved from the Advertisement messages sent by the AR. The registration takes
the shape of a BE with the RVA (Fig. 6.9) using registration extension [83]. Once this phase
is over, the RVA assigns a global IPv6 address (IPg) that is used for the registering node in
the core network. The IPg should be generated from a pool of addresses assigned to the RVA.
In case we are using identity based routing, during this phase the RVA learns the HIT-AR
mapping necessary for packet forwarding. Once the BE with the RVA described above is
completed, the HMN has to register with its RVS or update it. Afterwards, if registration at
the RVS is needed, a BE is performed, which informs the RVS of which RVA is being used,
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by the inclusion of the area RVA identifier in an RVA parameter in the I2 packet.
Figure 6.9: Base exchange with Rendezvous Agent
The HIP base exchange between an initiator and a responder remains mostly unchanged,
with minor differences at the network layer: because the BE packets now travel through each
node’s RVA, all the traffic is now proxied.
6.5.2.3 Mobility Support
In our architecture we can define two types of handover: Intra and Inter RVA. Both these
procedures are triggered by the advertisement system when a new access router or a new RVA
identifier is detected. Moving within a protected area constitutes an intra RVA handover, and
requires only updating the RVA binding. The handover is transparent to all communicating
peers. If the HIP node changes protected area, then an inter RVA handover occurs. In
this scenario the host has to register with the new RVA (performing a Base Exchange), and
updating its RVS entry with the new responsible identity. The new RVA should also inform
the old RVA of the handover, so that packets are forwarded correctly and the connection is
not severed. When the new RVA receives a forwarded packet from another RVA, it updates
the location to the forwarding RVA. Forwarded packets need to be differentiated from the
normal traffic, allowing a RVA to decide whether mobility updates are needed or not.
As stated before, our framework also requires RVA-to-RVA communication for location
updates. The RVA-to-RVA communication should be preceded by a HIP base exchange,
allowing secure communication and, more importantly, authentication. But depending on the
scenario, the trust relation between the RVAs may be different. For instance, in a network
operator scenario, all RVAs may be certified by a common Certification Authority, allowing
only trusted RVAs to signal each other. A more flexible solution resides on the HMN providing
a certificate to the RVA during the registration process, thus enabling them to prove to each
other that they are acting on behalf of the HMN.
6.5.3 Instantiation and Analysis
The framework definition, as described in [100, 102], does not make assumptions on packet
transport mechanisms within the RVA protected area, although IPv6 is assumed in the core
network. The most feasible approach is to also use IPv6 within the areas where locators have
meaning. These areas, named protected areas, define the geographical space beyond which lo-
cators are replaced with global identifiers, as discussed before, and also require topologically
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bound identifiers. This means that communication inside the protected area is done with
IPv6 addresses with a global format, but with local scope, translated by the RVA. The main
advantage of this solution is that it requires no changes to routing mechanisms within the
access network. With the IPv6 access network, the deployment of the RVA advertisement sys-
tem consists on enhancing the Router Advertisement [144] messages to carry HIP parameters
as options. Just like a HIP parameter, a neighbor discovery option has a type-length-value
format. The new HIP parameter (RVA INFO) is an option that advertises the HITrva, along
with the advertisement lifetime. Through the advertisement mechanism, the HMN can de-
tect different protected areas. Address configuration and mobility detection should be done
according to [144], with the extension of RVA detection by HITrva announcements. The
registration with the RVA is performed according to the previous section, followed by the
assignment of a global IPv6 address to the HMN. Later, the HMN registers the acquired
HITrva with the RVS, for correct I1 packet forwarding. When movement is detected, the
HMN updates the binding with the RVA, in case of intra RVA mobility, or registers with the
new RVA, in case of inter RVA mobility, updating the RVS afterwards.
6.5.3.1 Prototype Implementation
To validate our approach through practical testing, we implemented the global IPv6 assign-
ment and packet translation mechanisms, discussed above. Registration procedures are similar
to those performed when registering with the RVS, and therefore are of secondary importance
to a prototype. The implementation was developed under Linux, kernel 2.6.15, using as basis
the HIPL implementation provided by the InfraHIP project [48]. It consists of a manually
triggered registration process, with an IPv6 global address being assigned upon completion
for the registering local address. After this, the RVA performs the necessary translations.
The work is performed by a module which stores the registered addresses, under a hash table,
resorting to Linux IPTables for packet capture. In Fig. 6.10 we depict the scenario used for
the performance evaluation. This scenario consists of two access networks, both served by
the same RVA. This RVA is capable of handling multiple protected areas. After each node
registers, the RVA generates addresses from a pool of available prefixes. For simplicity, we
use only one prefix for both areas. The testing procedure is composed of two phases: first we
show the results of a base exchange between the two endpoints and the assigned addresses
in the several areas and nodes. We then perform measurements on the responsiveness of
the system, using Round Trip Time (RTT) values of ICMPv6 echo request and response
packets, and on how our protocol impacts the overall system performance, by measuring the
throughput of TCP when our scheme is in place. This prototype aims at showing the flow
of addresses through networks between communicating peers, and also how the translation
overhead impacts the implementation, allowing us to generalize to protocol operation delays.
6.5.3.2 Location Leakage Analysis
Since both endpoints are assigned and use global IPv6 addresses for communicating with
each other, they cannot determine the actual address, and consequently location, within the
RVA protected area. In Table 6.1 we represent the information gathered at each point in our
reference scenario. As an example, we can see that Node A is sending to the global address
of B, 2001::6ada:1e65:93f3:ff00, but is unaware of his local address, 3ffa::1, where the packets
actually get delivered.
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Figure 6.10: Implementation testing scenario.
Networks Node A Node B
Area 1 3ffe::1 2001::6ada:1e65:93f3:ff00
Core 2001::ded8:ce89:6390:eb00 2001::6ada:1e65:93f3:ff00
Area 2 2001::ded8:ce89:6390:eb00 3ffa::1
Table 6.1: Summary of the addresses observed on each network segment
Protecting the identity of the nodes is not the primary concerned of the proposed scheme,
which targets specific layered issues. An attacker can still identify the HMN and its peers, but
not their network topological position. To actually protect the user identity associated with
the HIP identity, increasing the privacy of the end user, requires establishing a relationship
towards the VID and VNS approaches, discussed in the following sections (Sec. 6.5.4).
The RVA is a point of information gathering for the network and, if compromised, reveal
the identity and location of registered nodes. Another mechanism that provides information
on the location of the node is hop count. Even if the node is behind an RVA, the hop
count, together with the topology of the underlying network, can reveal information on the
whereabouts of the node. One mechanism to thwart such attempts is to keep the hop count
value between the RVA and the node to 1. This can be achieved by tunneling.
6.5.3.3 Performance Evaluation
From the prototype we analyze two different performance metrics: the first is the RTT of
ICMPv6 Echo Request and Response packets, to evaluate the real impact of packet transla-
tion. In fact, we measure the implementation delay to infer the real protocol impact, although
aware that this is not an optimized implementation. We use the RTT to measure the delay
introduced by all the necessary translations. The other proposed measurement is the TCP
throughput that shows the impact on bandwidth caused by the translation delay. In both
cases, we compare the performance with RVA intervention to normal HIP operation.
Regarding the RTT, we perform 100 measurements, and present the averages for each
run in Fig. 6.11, matched against a plain HIP scenario, under the same conditions. As we
can see the RVA introduces a slight delay in packet delivery. Using our protocol, the average
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Figure 6.11: Round Trip Time (RTT) Impact
value for the RTT is of 1.130 ± 0.003ms, whereas, without RVA, it is of 1.067 ± 0.002ms.
However, the difference is sufficiently small that we can discard the impact on network traffic.
We measure the maximum available bandwidth for a TCP connection in two scenarios with
and without RVA processing. Each run consists of starting a TCP traffic generator for 30
seconds, and obtaining the bandwidth of that flow. The results of an average of 10 runs,
show that the total bandwidth used with normal HIP is of 6.43±0.03Mbit, and for HIP with
RVA translations is of 6.44± 0.07Mbit. The similarity in these values allow us to neglect the
impact on network throughput performance, meaning that the added delay has very little
impact on the TCP throughput.
6.5.4 Integrating HIP with IdM
At a first glance, user and host identities, each using distinct identifiers, are unrelated. But,
user and host identities cannot be considered independent as they can become part of the same
Information set. In fact, if a user is represented by a VID, then it is only natural that the host
identifier becomes part of a VNS associated with that VID, instantiated to consume a service.
This happens because the HI identifies the host, which belongs to the information virtualized
by the VNs approach. This indicates that an integrated view on identities across the user
and host level is required, promoting the vertical privacy integration, taking advantage of the
proposed privacy concepts that focus on identity as an operational tool.
Host identities are coupled to user identities, making the integration of both a necessity
achieved through an architecture that considers HIP as a network level protocol capable of
delivering mobility and multihoming heavily based on identity concepts. HIP and user IdM
are very different when considering the layer on which they operate, the identifiers employed
and the problems they solve. This creates several challenges, where an integrated solution can
leverage properties of the different solutions, tackling key issues such as security of IdM trans-
action through HIP, a distributed trust mechanism for HIP through IdM, and the integration
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of both technologies for enhanced user mobility and cross-layer Attribute Exchange. How-
ever, the integration of HIP and IdM requires addressing two problems: first, the integration
requires appropriate security mechanisms that allow establishing trust information, based on
the presented Host Identities and the IdM systems; second, it is necessary to integrate the
different structures and identifiers stemming from the HIP and IdM namespaces.
6.5.4.1 HIP IdM enabled Architecture
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Figure 6.12: Architecture and Interaction among Components
The proposed integration presents architectural challenges that must be addressed within
the architecture. The key operations that must be outlined fall under the category of Host
Identity Management, carried out by the IdP. Beyond this, the IdP must also provide attribute
retrieval mechanism using HIT, and verifying Host Identities, belonging to different hosts.
This makes the IdP the main entity that allows the interconnection of both host and user
identities. Fig. 6.12 illustrates the supported IdP services and interactions between users and
IdPs. The user IdM services, based on an extended SAML architecture, allow the integration
of the host identity namespace. The main user-centric IdM services are similar to those
highlighted in Sec. 6.3, covering authentication and attributes, which are described here in
terms of services. The Authentication Service (AS) provides user authentication by generating
a user-specific Authentication Token (AT) that can be used to consume other services i.e.
SSO. The Attribute Service (AttS) manages user and host related attributes, indexed by
either HI/HIT or user identifiers.
The most important part of Host Identity integration is a two part addition to the IdP, that
enables creating or assigning Host Identities. Additionally, it provides session management
to allow information retrieval about ongoing HIP sessions. The HIP subsystem at the IdP is
composed by the HI Manager (HIMgr), which provides the HI assignment (creation and host
assignment) and HI registration function (for self-assigned HI). The second part is the HIP
Session Manager (HSMgr), which keeps track of ongoing HIP sessions relating them to access
control.
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6.5.4.2 Host Identity Management
In the proposed architecture, the IdP is responsible for HI management, which refers to HI
generation at the IdP. Alternatively, this role can be replaced by user-generated HIs that are
later registered at the IdP. In both cases, the user first authenticates against the AS to obtain
an AT for further interaction with the HIP subsystem as illustrated in Fig. 6.13a. In case of
an existing HI, the authentication process can use HIP to increase the registration security
on top of a secure channel.
When the user requests an HI, the IdP assigns one based on the provisioning of the
obtained AT, which can be newly created or already existing, depending on the AT. The
creation process includes generating a public/private key pair, whereas the assignment is just
transmitting the keys towards the user. This transmission triggers the establishment of a
relationship between Host and User Identity by registering the HI and HIT as attributes at
the AttS. HI verification can be done through X.509 certificates created by the HIMgr, and
provided to the hosts. When the HI is assigned by the IdP, it can always assign the same
HI independent of the actually used device, creating a long term relationship between the HI
and the user identity. Moreover, the IdP has to store the private key and thus act as a key
escrow for HIP, in scenarios where this feature is required (e.g. lawful interception through a
trusted entity).
(a) Host Identity IdP Registration (b) Extended Base Exchange and attribute retrieval
Figure 6.13: Host Identity Management Process
When key escrowing at the IdP is not desired, the user can generate its own HI and register
the public part at the IdP, resulting in increased network privacy. The authenticated user
contacts the IdP, providing an HI to the HIMgr that properly calculates the HIT, registering
both at the AttS. This enables the mapping between identities, and provides the knowledge
for X.509 certificate generation.
The HI verification creates the new role of Public Key Infrastructure for the IdP, delegating
trust to the IdM plane. Whenever these verifications are needed, the certificates can be
verified by contacting IdP, either directly or through federation mechanisms. A host can
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provide its certificate to a peer during the base exchange, as explained in [113], which defines
a type-length-value field “CERT” for X.509 certificate transport [64]. The inclusion of an IdP
reference in the certificate also allows it to function as a pointer for lookup services, allowing
attribute retrieval. Based on this reference and on the received HI/HIT, it is possible to use
SAML for attribute retrieval, as exemplified in Fig. 6.13b.
This instantiation presents an approach of how to explore the horizontal privacy concepts.
Not only does it provide the mechanisms to increase localized privacy threats in the network
(e.g. location privacy) but, through the use of identity, it provides a seamless integration
with the VID model. In this particular case, the IdP is part of the IdM system. The IdP
is the aggregate set of the IdManager and the IdBroker, which in terms of the cross-layer
IdM architecture, it represents the IdAgg and the AuthNP. Therefore, there is a common
instantiation trend over the different proposed functions, as well as a clear space under which
to introduce user Virtual Identities, as well as the Virtual Network Stacks, supporting the
pseudonymity approach.
6.6 Intrinsic Privacy-aware Identification
One way of instantiating a privacy-aware network architecture is to create a close relationship
between the network and the user, which has been done so far by introducing identity as
a privacy control mechanism. Based on the previous instantiation examples, resorting to
identity as a path towards privacy also works on an individual layer approach.
By including identity information in the different network operations, it is possible to
create a privacy-aware environment, where the user identity, and consequently the VID layer,
becomes the driver for the different network interactions in NGN. This has been presented in
Sec. 6.2 as the final architectural driver.
To truly instantiate identity, as means to provide cross-layer privacy support, it requires
that the different interactions in the network become user-centric, resorting to the common
control layer. This requirement includes not only the protocols that explicitly convey an
identity concept, such as HIP (explored in the previous section), but also legacy protocols
working on the network today. This allows us not only to instantiate pseudonyms as part of
the VNS approach, but also to provide a close relationship to the vertical privacy control layer.
On one hand, this approach can simplify the use of cross-layer (user) information, resulting
in more available information for protocol usage and simultaneously providing simpler and
more effective control mechanisms for the information set or VID, enhancing the privacy
aspects. On the other hand, by relating (most of) the network operations to user identity, it
is possible to create a tighter privacy control on the information that is exchanged with every
transaction performed on the network. This approach reinforces the use of identity as a tool
for privacy-aware mechanisms at the various layers in the network stack.
To provide this relationship, it is necessary to include the different protocols in the net-
work, even if they did not previously have an identity connection. Even though the lower
network layers are important, they have been mostly neglected in terms of identity concepts
beyond using the vertical layer as a control source. User related information can be explored
by lower layers, not only for control purposes, but also for user relationship. It is possible
to devise a solution where identity information becomes easily accessible by all layers in the
OSI model, enhancing network protocols and providing better cross-layer integration, start-
ing with AAA mechanisms. This dependency illustrates identity as the interaction driver
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in NGN, where user information and identity information become fundamental aspects of
network operation, defining a paradigm that supports privacy-aware networks.
We propose to integrate privacy considerations in the different network protocols and
layers by creating an identification system that supports intrinsic identity references. This is
feasible through the VIDID structure, presented in Sec. 4.3.1, enabling identity information
to be referenced from any protocol when properly enhanced with resolution mechanisms,
promoting the use of identity in lower layers, such as transport and network. The protocol
operations that can benefit the most from this interconnection are those which require more
user related information to operate, like mobility protocols in NGN scenarios. Through an
identity-dependent design, a new privacy paradigm can be created by embedding identity
related identifiers into existing protocols. However, this integration can become complex
when handling a large array of protocols, of which several are at the core of 4G networks
and have been mostly indifferent to the privacy and identity aspects. NGN encompasses
services ranging from VoIP to IPTV, and span across many different access technologies, such
as WiFi, WiMax or even UMTS. Such scenarios are very volatile in terms of user mobility,
making session continuity an important issue, and increasingly require more user and network
information. These requirements include QoS and AAA information, which brings added
complexity to the environment that must be made identity aware.
As part of the analysis performed in Sec. 2.4.2 to determine the existence of identity related
concepts in the network, we concluded that protocols have used identity in different formats,
but none of the presented protocols can express a true relationship towards identity or cannot
easily integrate with legacy (identity unaware) protocols. A considerable improvement can be
made through the VID approach, along with VNS support, bringing the control of identity
information into the network. But even with the proposed solutions to support a different
namespace or identity integration mechanism, none is able to provide a unified namespace with
a cross-layer design centered on identity and supporting mobile environments. We propose an
identity relationship by adding an Identity Pointer3 to the generated pseudonyms, enabling
a strong connection between the VID solution and the different network protocols through
their identifiers. The proposed identifier needs to appear on different layers, enabling a
clean identity integration scheme, without requiring modifications to the entire network stack
and protocols. This will enable the support of a distributed database model, indexed by
common identifiers enabling a tighter and simpler privacy control on the different aspects
of the network, such as resource authorization, QoS information, as well as new mobility
paradigms.
The support for such identifiers requires an enhanced architecture, for both terminal and
the network, to support the identity approach: regardless the addresses used, the same iden-
tity material is always provided, greatly simplifying the network processes such as accounting,
authorization, QoS reservation. Moreover, using the same identifiers across different attach-
ment points provides a consistent mobility approach across the network, enabling a new
identity-dependent mobility paradigm.
3The ID-Pointer is a synonym for the VIDID proposed in the VID framework. In this section we pro-
pose using a more generic term, ID-Pointer, to enable a broader application scope that is not necessarily
constrained to the VID framework, but can work as a generic identification structure for any solution that
requires establishing a relationship to an Identity oriented namespace.
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6.6.1 Supporting Privacy through an Identity Oriented Architecture
Integrating identity in the different levels of the network requires a well defined architecture.
This introduces a necessity to rethink the current the terminal architecture, along with the
need for abstractions that transform NGN operations (e.g. mobility) into privacy-aware
paradigms controlled to the vertical layer resorting to user information.
The architecture upon which we propose these new abstractions is shown in Fig. 6.14,
and was first introduced in Sec. 1.2.1 where we have addressed typical 4G heterogeneous
network scenarios [1, 3, 4, 73]. Recovering this characterization is important because the ar-
chitecture summarizes several important features to the network mechanisms that we review,
especially considering controlled resources and authorization: Bandwidth Brokers control
network resources and their utilization; Authorization, Authentication, Accounting, Auditing
and Charging (A4C) servers take care of terminal authentication and authorization; and SIP
proxies handle SIP based applications, especially VoIP. Also, a service pool is available either
local, or remote e.g. Internet. In this 4G network representation we also include and Identity
Manager to allow for the support of identity based access to the services and mobility.
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Figure 6.14: Network Architecture Model.
The presented functional units have distinct planes of action that culminate in different
namespaces for each independent area. But most of them, including services and applications,
are to some extent user oriented, either for control, management or measurement. This means
that there is relevant user information, potentially containing private information, scattered
in the network. Through this property, it becomes obvious that the user must regain control
of the information that relates to him, and is crucial to retaining his privacy. This can
only be achieved by linking this information back to the user, through identity concepts,
and adequately handling it in a privacy-aware location, such as a vertical privacy layer that
adheres to the VID concepts and respects the PRIVED model.
The information distribution leads to different databases over multiple entities, with in-
formation pertaining to the user. This paradigm can create information conflicts, than only
increase when outlined in the context of mobile environments, such as in the targeted 4G sce-
narios, where terminal roams across multi-operator heterogeneous networks with controlled
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access and resources.
In this scenario, the user has several hurdles to overcome in cooperation with the network,
and the first is at the access point, where authentication is required at an A4C server, eventu-
ally provided by the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [74].
With the generated credentials, the A4C creates state at a MIPv6 HA, introducing a binding
between authentication material and address information. By now several namespaces and
identifiers are in play: link layer access between the user terminal and AP; the PANA protocol
between client, AP and A4C; Diameter (or similar) between the A4C and the HA, involving
Network Layer identifiers. Afterwards, the terminal will register its Network layer addresses
with the A4C and the HA, completing the interactions on this plane. But, there are still
the interactions with the Bandwidth Broker for QoS purposes. This is established by the
terminal, AP or Access Router with the Bandwidth Broker, coordinated with the network
entities, using MAC addresses, local IPv6 addresses, CoA or HoA.
Going into NGN environments that support multihoming and heterogeneity, the previous
mentioned bindings are multiplied by each active interface, yielding a multidimensional control
and data plane where several and different identifiers are used, further accentuated by the VNS
approach which creates virtual devices to support different network stacks. Using identity
as a driving concept can help to simplify the control required for each of these mappings,
that carries their own identifiers and protocols. Failing to provide a common control point,
e.g. VID, can lead to unnecessary and costly mappings, followed by unnecessary database
replication, where several entries exist across different planes that in fact deal with the same
entity. In fact, this is the reasoning behind the privacy-oriented vertical layer presented in
Chap. 4.
In this complex environment, we can rely on identity to provide proper namespace inte-
gration that creates a viable approach for user privacy: the namespace provides a rich set
of information that directly relates to the user, enabling abstractions that rely on the user-
centric paradigms instead of network devices and stack elements
6.6.1.1 Identity Referral
To instantiate the aforementioned views of identity onto the network, enabling the same
conceptual views to be used across administrative domains for user-centric functions (e.g.
QoS or A4C), requires two concepts: an IDManager and an ID-Pointer. The IDManager,
similar to that employed by the VID framework, stores identity information along with user
policies and provides a common view over user information to other network entities, such
as domain functions or service providers. It acts upon an identifier that refers to stored
identity information. The identifier, ID-Pointer, provides the integration between the Identity
Namespace, and consequently the IDManager that represents that namespace, and network
protocols. It is used as a handle, derived from identity information, and understandable at
the IDManager.
The ID-Pointer is nothing more than the realization of the VIDID (Sec. 4.3.1.3) from the
VID model, presented as the link towards identity, that can be included in legacy protocols.
The structure of the ID-Pointer is shown in Fig. 6.15. It is composed of 2 fields: identity
realm (16 bits long) capable of encoding 216 (65536) different identity realms (which can
be viewed as an administrative trust domain in Figure 1); and an Index of 48 bits capable
of indexing 248 (or 2.8 ∗ 1014) different identity registers. Further study should be devoted
towards achieving a better balance on field sizes.
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   Realm Index0 16 64Figure 6.15: Identity Pointer (ID-Pointer).
The proposed configuration for the ID-Pointer allows any entity on the network to quickly
locate the realm to which an identity belongs. Converting a Realm into an IDManager’s
address requires a resolution mechanism. While different identifier resolution strategies are
not a primary concern for the proposed solutions, the realm could be obtained through a
DNS-like mechanism using reverse lookups, or through Distributed Hash Table (DHT) mech-
anisms. Through the resolved realm an entity should obtain the necessary information to
access the correct IDManager and reach the desired identity information. The ID-Pointer is
only truly useful if integrated across the network stack. This requires an extension or change
on the current protocols and layers, either by using explicit negotiation or by modifying the
different layer identifiers to include the ID-Pointer. Besides an identity scheme, the cross-layer
integration of the ID-Pointer does not require major modifications to the entire network stack
and protocols, as described in the next section.
6.6.1.2 Identity Bindings
	  
Network Control Plane
Mobile
Node
Point of 
Access
Access
Router
Home 
Agent
SIP
Proxy
Service
802.21 MN_ID
Care-of Address
Home Address
ID-Pointer URL
Home Address/ID-Pointer URL
A4C Identity 
Manager
Bandwidth 
Broker
ID
-P
oi
nt
er
ID
-P
oi
nt
er
ID
-P
oi
nt
er
ID
-P
oi
nt
er
ID
-P
oi
nt
er
Figure 6.16: Identity integration at different layers.
Upon establishing methods to quickly and easily refer to identities, we need to provide
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the correct mappings and bindings to be used in a cross-layer design. Using implicit pointers
embedded in the protocol, network entities are able to retrieve the identity handle and resolve
it without any functional modification to each protocol. Alternatively, identifiers can be
exchanged out of band, e.g. using negotiation protocols, requiring network entities to exchange
this information deliberately. The solution depends on where and what level we are integrating
the ID-Pointer. We present a bottom up approach, covering from the link layer up to the
application layer, including mobility, for the integration of ID-Pointer structures, either in
negotiation phase or imbued in the native protocol identifiers. Fig. 6.16 presents an overview
of the ID-Pointer integration at different layers, for which we offer a layer by layer description:
Link Layer Since L2 addresses are 48 bit long, there is no space to convey the complete
identifier in the addressing structure itself. But, next generation heterogeneous scenarios
are using IEEE 802.21 [68] to provide link layer Independent Media Services. We can
include in the 802.21 negotiation procedures, the ID-Pointer as the Media Independent
Handover Identifier, or in a PANA [74] negotiation phase. Assuming that the reference
architecture is 802.21 capable, we replace the MN ID, which is a type-length-value field,
with the ID-Pointer: this enables the linkage between the MAC address and an MN ID,
therefore providing the reference to the ID Layer.
Network Layer At layer 3, the IPv6 address provides a proper space to include the ID-
Pointer, carried inside the actual locator. The last 64 bits are used to identify the
owner of the address, and could be replaced by the ID-Pointer. Fig. 6.17 shows the
IPv6 address configuration, built after stateless address auto-configuration, and provid-
ing the ID-Pointer to the AR. This generated address is in fact the MIPv6 CoA that
will be later registered with the HA. Through the ID-Pointer, the AR has sufficient
information to access the network control plane in order to retrieve the required mobile
node information, such as QoS, authorization and user preferences.
Transport The HoA also follows the same structure, enabling the HA to also have easy
access to the mobile node information. Since transport protocols will establish their
bindings using the HoA, which acts as the endpoint identifier, we are in fact integrating
the ID-Pointer in the transport layer, implicitly conveying identity information also to
the services (through HoA).
Application Layer The application layer has a rich variety of protocols, most of which are
URL based (Sec. 5.4). Some protocols that work at the application layer, e.g. SIP [125],
allow changing the communication endpoint while still maintaining ongoing sessions.
Using SIP as an example use-case for identity integration, it is possible to outline an
approach of how to integrate the identity based identifiers. Integrating identity into
SIP requires breaking the resolution of SIP identifiers into several stages. The terminal
registers its HoA with the SIP Proxy, which provides the ID-Pointer. Afterwards, to
communicate with a user, one must know the URL, in the form of johndoe@domain.tld.
The first step is to resolve the domain.tld to identify the IDManager, using a DNS
record similar to MX, as done for email. The username could then be resolved on the
IDManager, obtaining an ID-Pointer, for the target user. This allows redirecting the
initiator at the SIP level to the correct resource. This process implicitly links URLs and
identities, allowing the initiator to retrieve information from the destination, if allowed,
and providing a verifiable identity to the responder - the initiator’s ID-Pointer.
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Figure 6.17: IPv6 ID-Pointer.
As the descriptions for the different layers show, the ID-Pointer is a flexible structure that
can be adapted to different protocols. The adaptation only requires minor modifications to
fit most protocols, and provides an invaluable identity reference that can be used at any point
in the network.
6.6.1.3 Terminal and Network Support
To have a privacy oriented design supported through identity, both terminal and network
need to undergo modifications affecting the network control plane. The terminal requires a
control layer that instantiates identity functionality, interacting with applications in order to
provide inputs for network stack management. As seen in Fig. 6.18, applications might be
identity aware and provide specific inputs to the management plane, or legacy applications,
where the management decisions will be inferred by a legacy interface component, which is
in-line with the proposal made for VNS and for SAML IdM integration, discussed in the
previous section (Sec. 6.3).
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Mobility protocols should refrain providing triggers for mobility, but just reacting to con-
trol plane commands, following the identity oriented operations to maintain connectivity.
While the control plane has a direct path through the identity management layer, the data
plane is orthogonal. Considering that identity management is mainly a control plane task,
its repercussion on the data path is to keep each layer consistent with the current identity
and mobility policies. This dichotomy is further explored in Sec. 6.4, that targets specifically
the separation of control and action using identity driven protocols, to handle the increased
information hardships that result from heterogenous mobility management solutions in 4G
scenarios.
On the network side the modifications are more operational than functional. The normal
network operation is based on distributed information, which can be modeled as relational
databases. These databases are unrelated among them, since they use different identifiers for
each piece of information, relating to the same user. As shown in Fig. 6.19, we propose to
change the way these databases are organized, making them identity oriented, by using the
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Figure 6.19: Identity Oriented Network Database Model.
same indexing material, the ID-Pointer, across all the databases: the same ID-Pointer grants
access to the relevant database. As an example, using the ID-Pointer at the Home Agent
enables the requester to access the HoA and the set of CoAs for a particular database; using
it at the Bandwidth Broker grants access to a user’s profile.
6.6.2 Instantiation Example: Identity and Mobility Management
After introducing the architectural cornerstones to accommodate architecture with intrinsic
privacy support through identity mechanisms, we consider a mobility scenario as an instantia-
tion example, since it plays a major role in NGN networks. Even the proposed identity-centric
approaches could be mapped to a wide range of protocols, we selected a few use case proto-
cols to provide clear examples: PANA [74] for authentication, MIPv6 [77] for network layer
mobility and NSIS [52] for QoS. Using these specific protocols, we present generic procedures
for the handover phase, allowing a clear view of how identity leverages and simplifies protocol
mechanisms.
Optimizing user and flow distribution, that governs the mobility process, requires infor-
mation at several levels. Collecting information about an identity combines the layered view
over a user, which is indexed based on ID-Pointers. At the link layer, an 802.21 based frame-
work collects information, such as network availability and provider information, e.g. L2 QoS
capabilities. Higher layer information is also easy to retrieve: the ID-Pointer can be used to
access QoS information at the Bandwidth Broker, accounting and authorization information
at the A4C. User policies can also be involved in the decision process, stored at the IDMan-
ager, along with top-level user information. It becomes very easy for the network and user to
gather all the necessary information to start the mobility process, represented by an handover
event, and run algorithms that effectively distribute the load and optimize resources.
These processes can be exemplified by a seamless handover process, leveraged through
identity mechanisms, and therefore containing the much needed privacy considerations. In a
network handover the trigger to move an identity can have two origins: network or terminal
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initiated 4. Identity based mobility has advantages in both cases. When performing terminal
(represented by an identity in our case) initiated mobility, the terminal decides to seek out a
new point of attachment. In this case, the signaling load can be reduced: the network easily
collects the flow information about an identity, leaving up to the identity or device just the
need to signal that a particular identity will be relocated, followed by the actual movement.
In network initiated mobility, the network decides that a particular identity should change
the point of attachment. The benefit resides in the ease of information retrieval and signaling,
since two access routers can easily share information about an identity, by sharing ID-Pointers
and related flow information.
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Fig. 6.20 depicts the information flow process of a simplified network initiated handover,
but with 802.21 signaling suppressed for simplification purposes. A network control point,
possibly the Bandwidth Broker, decides to perform the handover of a flow and informs the
old and new access routers that the Identity identified by ID-Pointer will change its point
of attachment. This is performed by preparing the reservations on the new link, and by
the old access router transferring all context relative to ID-Pointer, to the new one. After
this process, the node moves and performs a PANA authentication once again (this process
could be optimized by pre-authentication schemes before handover). Then, both an address
configuration and mobility update are required. In the mobility process, no other elements
need to be informed, since the ID-Pointer is still valid and network elements are Identity
4Both types of mobility triggers, network and terminal initiated, along with strategies to support both, are
explained with further detail in [75]
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oriented.
6.6.3 Network Impacts
The discussed identity bindings provide an integrated view over the network and user envi-
ronments that takes into account privacy, while still retaining existing protocol properties and
assuring backward compatibility. Therefore, we reuse each protocol without modifications,
through the same identifiers across the network, in the form of the ID-Pointer. Accordingly,
it becomes important to discuss the benefits and costs of such approach and the effect of
supporting multiple identities.
This identity approach allows the support of a distributed database model, indexed at
each network element by the same identifier, providing the necessary cross-layer and cross-
protocol integration. This distributed meta-system is not bound by a particular protocol
identifier, as opposed to today’s systems, which require different identifiers at different network
points, increasing the problems of the scattered information model. Using these different
identifiers consistently is possible through the identity (VID), which assures an aggregation
point. As such, it becomes feasible to use different pseudonym identifiers on the different
layers, providing a VNS approach, without breaking existing protocols, and taking advantage
of all the privacy features proposed in Chap. 4.
Moreover, regardless the addresses used, the same identity material is provided, greatly
simplifying network processes such as accounting and authorization. Each layer contains in-
formation indexed by the same ID-Pointer on both remote and local entities. This means that
the index used at the Access Point is the same used at a Bandwidth Broker, and requests and
responses are performed based on the same identifier. In complex information environments,
this enables a uniform view over a user and its sessions, regardless of where they are occurring.
In a normal scenario a Bandwidth Broker that keeps track of L2 and L3 assignment would,
for the same user, require a list of the MAC addresses in use, a list of IPv6 addresses and their
respective Home Addresses; in a common index scenario, only one ID-Pointer would suffice,
along with the information necessary in both cases, eliminating several steps of mapping and
translation between identifiers, such as CoA and HoA.
Also, it provides an easier interaction with user profiles. In previous architectures, the user
profile is not necessarily the user’s identity, and in the same reasoning the users identity does
not contain network profile information, such as QoS in an Information Card [109]. With the
proposed scheme both can coexist on the identity layer, providing information such as resource
authorization and QoS information, which are important in a 4G scenario, coupled with the
user identity, enabling user-centric architectures. Each entity can retrieve this information
easily, whether working with Link Layer or Application Layer information, providing that
they have the necessary access credentials to the IDManager.
Current architectures can be complex systems, making them hard to improve since there
are many design constraints. But, pre-existing constraints, such as user centric multi-device
environments, must be respected. Complexity is therefore inherent. The proposed design can
make innovation simpler by reducing the system complexity. Simpler is better in the sense
that we can assume simple access to a large set of information, provided by an abstraction
layer, valid at each point of the network stack. Network architectures can evolve by turning
the focus to truly user-centric paradigms, taking advantage of the provided integration, which
fails in current systems. This also means that the abstraction layer can be summarized in
concise APIs, making it simpler to build on top of. Application developers can easily create
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user-centric software since the architecture itself provides the metaphors and handles required
by today’s business processes.
The cost of such an integrated view is mainly the resolution of the ID-Pointer at each
network element: it must be resolved into an IDManager, provided by the Realm. This can
be done through functions such as reverse DNS queries, or using more evolved mechanisms
such as Distributed Hash Tables to locate the correct IDManager. Nonetheless, the cost of
resolution can be minimized through caching processes, or optimized through information
deduction (e.g. if the A4C receives a pre-configured HoA, it can safely infer the Realm by
looking at the address).
The presented architecture requires a cross-layer introduction of identifiers as a major
privacy tool. While the benefits are several, legacy support of current protocols is a major
concern, especially if we consider that user (critical) information must be distributed across
such environments, endangering privacy. Taking this legacy requirement into account, we
presented integration means that take advantage of the existing identifier spaces in each
protocol, bringing to a minimum the impact on each protocol level. The implicit disclosure of
the identifiers enables a non-ID enabled node to communicate seamlessly with an ID enabled
node, at the cost of neglecting the Identity properties in the communication.
6.7 Conclusion
When analyzing the vertical and horizontal dimensions of privacy that originated from the
privacy model, we acknowledge the recurrence of different architectural aspects used to provide
privacy. Properly analyzing these concepts led us towards defining identity as a simplifying
tool towards user-centric privacy architectures.
In this chapter, we tried to synthesize the common aspects of the different proposed
approaches into architectural drivers that increase user privacy. The outcome of this process
resulted in four different aspects that take advantage of identity as a tool towards defining
an architectural support for privacy. Based on these four different aspects, we proposed an
architectural instantiation for each, that tried to highlight the important aspects of combining
the proposed architectural drivers. The different instantiations were aligned with the VID
approach, increasing the strength of each proposal towards a strong link to the vertical privacy
control layer, taking advantage of identity concepts through an IdM framework, as well as
network pseudonyms stemming from VNS.
The first of the discussed architectural drivers focused on providing privacy through a
strong identity control layer. Particularly, this dealt with re-using the VID framework from
Chap. 4, but with a clear focus on integrating an IdM solution into the vertical model, in
this case SAML. The advantage of this approach was showing that a concrete IdM solution
can provide an adequate instantiation for the VID concept, and in turn the different issues
concerning the network can be addressed. Particularly, we showed how a SAML based ap-
proach can help regulating the usage of different VNS’s. Furthermore, we showed how to
address specific instantiation problems, such as selecting and using different identities, using
a concrete example, resulting from the VID generic approach.
From an architectural perspective, this reinforced the notion that the privacy features of
using pseudonyms can be pragmatically integrated in the network, using an IdM solution as
the control layer, promoting a concrete instantiation to the VID paradigm. This completed
the different pieces of the vertical puzzle, and showed that, while not all IdM solutions can be
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directly mapped onto the VID/VNS solutions, relying on cross-layer pseudonyms and vertical
strategies preserves the user’s privacy under almost all conditions. We also observed that
SAML provides the sought after user-centricity on the application layer, and empowers all
network layers with policy-based negotiation mechanisms that can now operate cross-layer,
as discussed in Chap. 5.
Using the vertical layer for privacy management, it is possible to control the different
VNS instances on a device towards the network. However, the control aspects of the vertical
layer seemed to enable more features than simply managing the user’s pseudonyms. The con-
nection to IdM showed that it is possible to have a central layer, aware of user information
and therefore capable of maintaining privacy. Starting from this assumption, we explored the
privacy gains of using an identity control layer to guide different aspects of network opera-
tion, resulting in the architectural driver of privacy through an identity control layer. This
conclusion led to the instantiation of an architecture that attempts to clearly separate control
and execution, where one part is highly dependent on user-related information (control) and
the other is highly operational (execution). Pragmatically, we explored a use-case centered
around mobility management, where the control was outsourced towards the IdM plane, as a
vertical privacy-aware decision plane, while the execution is left to individual protocols. This
proposal indicated that the richness of user-centric information stemming from an identity
layer can positively impact the decisions taken over different network procedures, making
them privacy-aware and even distributed. It also showed that, from a purely operational
perspective, the treatment of mobility protocols as plug-ins can lead to a situation where it
is not necessary to adopt a one-size-fits-all protocol, but rather a customized selection that
adapts to the user’s needs.
While the previous instantiation concerned splitting decision and execution for the sake of
outsourcing control to identity mechanisms, it showed that it is also possible to address privacy
issues by focusing on identity as an operational driver in the network, our third discussed
architectural driver. By taking an already identity focused protocol, HIP, we instantiated
a network-oriented privacy solution, extracting direct benefit from the identity properties of
HIP that create a new namespace. Using the identity focused separation layer, we were able
to leverage HIP’s mobility mechanisms to the advantage of the user, using the separation to
address specific privacy issues, such as location privacy. This solution was also complemented
from a vertical perspective, establishing a relationship between HIP’s notion of identity and
IdM systems. This opened the door to a straightforward introduction of the combined VID
and VNS ecosystem into different network protocols, providing a secure and privacy-aware
coupling between technologies. Using protocols that already provide a notion of identity
simplifies the overall integration process, requiring only an alignment with the VID framework,
given that the overall approach is naturally aligned with the PRIVED model.
The previous proposals required explicit network modifications, as means to reach an
integration with the vertical control layer. However, to provide privacy, we required an
intrinsic solution that is able to establish an identity focus on the different interactions in
NGN. This represents the last architectural driver, that was instantiated by providing an
identification solution that inherits properties from the VID solution to provide a tight identity
relationship that can be used in all the different network protocols.
Using a relationship to the identity vertical layer can define a privacy baseline that can
be used in most network interactions. Accordingly, we introduced an architecture that used
carefully crafted identifiers, that fit into existing protocols, as means towards establishing
the required identity connection. This connection provided a two-fold advantage: first, it
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provided the mechanisms towards defining a more privacy-aware environment, since it is
possible to re-use the privacy tools coming from the identity solutions; second, it allowed
defining mechanisms to deal with the growing complexity of managing the different assortment
of protocols that needs to be contemplated in order to maintain privacy. As described by
the PRIVED model, if all the different protocols are not considered in a privacy solution,
it is possible for one (or several) to undermine the entire effort of the privacy proposals.
From this perspective, the VIDID integrated into the architectural instantiation created the
possibility of redesigning current protocols to enable a clear reference to identity and to user-
centric information. This not only supports but encourages pseudonyms that can integrate
with the different technologies, and it also enables an unparalleled view of the user across
different network components, which were previously disconnected from the information plane.
Through the use of implicit identity references, we enabled protocols to communicate using
the same “language” and dealing with the same “objects”, which results not only in a privacy
increase, but also on a complete user-centric paradigm for the network.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
If you do not change direction, you may end up
where you are heading.
Lao Tzu
With such a wide problem space and a comparable solution spectrum, it is important to
keep the proposed contributions in perspective, as well as understanding what can be done
as follow-up work on the different aspects of this Thesis. This final chapter presents the most
important conclusions on the explored privacy topics, while revisiting the initial hypothesis
under the light of the presented proposals. We present how the different aspects come together
to form a consistent view on privacy, and also how the Thesis results can be a starting point
for future and emerging networking paradigms.
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7.1 Results and Achievements
Throughout the different chapters we presented several complementary solutions that build
on each other to promote a more effective privacy environment for the network user. We
started by presenting a model that complies with the outlined privacy definitions, attempting
to shed some light on the complexities of network-related privacy aspects. This enabled a
vertical approach to privacy that tried to address the cross-layer problems caused mostly by
information correlation. The result focused on a privacy protecting model, leading to a vertical
architecture that places identity as a main tool for architecture design, specially centered on
user privacy. The properties of the vertical framework also highlighted several shortcomings
on the different layers, motivating the analysis of specific layer problems using the proposed
privacy model. This horizontal focus led to several presented solutions, covering the different
layers in the OSI stack, with particular attention on several network-based threats, which
were the primary concerns.
The combination of the different privacy aspects and proposals contributed to a paradigm
shift that relies on a vertical layer for information control and user-centric privacy manage-
ment. This role was assumed by identity, which became a tool towards providing privacy in
the network, and allowed the definition of several architectural drivers for designing privacy-
aware architectures. The identification of these architectural features transformed identity,
and Identity Management, into a privacy-driving feature in the network, rather than an ap-
plication layer-only Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET).
Going back to the initial objectives, it is important to understand that the different
contributions were only proposed as means of pursuing the privacy hypothesis presented in
Chap. 1. Therefore, in this chapter we analyze and discuss the hypothesis in the light of the
work described between chapters 3 through 6.
Nevertheless, a PhD thesis should offer more than a compiled package of results, aligned
with a proposed theory and hypothesis. It should contribute to future solutions by opening
different (research) paths, that others may follow. To comply with this vision, we present
several directions that complement the proposed work, along with insights stemming from
the different privacy aspects that can be taken into other domains. Therefore, as a concrete
result of the discussions presented throughout the different chapters, we promote an outlook
on privacy, along with a vision that focuses mostly on evolving network, architectures and
paradigms based on the Thesis’ results.
In the following sections, we first go through the different aspects that frame the hypothesis
and attempt to address it, using the conclusions to promote an outlook on privacy and a
possible evolution path for network paradigms.
7.1.1 Understanding Network Privacy
Concerning the network, usually confusing privacy concepts are made clearer through the
proposed definition and subsequent framing discussed in this Thesis (Sec. 3.2), which is an
important contribution that should be highlighted. This motivation led to the several contri-
butions that try to simplify network related privacy issues, through tangible and pragmatic
definitions. We started with a lexicon that frames our privacy discussion on the network,
trying to avoid, when possible, confusions with orthogonal or concurrent definitions. These
definitions also served as a starting point for a pragmatic model that attempted to handle
privacy from a network perspective, using three recurring concepts: Information Set, Event
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and Relationship. These concepts enabled the description of several network-based privacy
threats, addressing both basic and complex network interactions, through a pragmatic ap-
proach that can relate multiple network protocols through events and relationships. This
event-focused approach defines the user as the central object of the Information Set, mak-
ing it the single most important entity in the privacy equation. Also, the different model
components allow mixing simple network observation events with complex correlation events,
defined as relationships, that can only be made through extensive information collection and
pattern observation. These properties make the proposed model suitable for a diverse range
of use-cases and network conditions.
In order to prevent the model from becoming exceedingly conceptual and loosing its
potential impact, we presented a network instantiation, going through several layers and the
network stack model present in Chap. 3. The instantiation tries to build an effective bridge
between theory and practice, contributing to the clarification of network privacy concepts.
The conclusions, beyond the resulting models and threats, showed that there is a vertical
and horizontal dimension to privacy. In this context, vertical privacy deals with the traversal
aspects of privacy, and the cross layer threats that compromise security and privacy at different
layers. Conversely, the horizontal aspects focus on technology specific privacy aspects that
stem from particular network properties, especially identifiers and network mechanisms. In
our approaches we tackled both, showing how can their privacy issues could be addressed or
improved.
7.1.2 Vertical Dimension
An important conclusion of the privacy review done in Chap. 2, and consequent privacy model
presented in Sec. 3.3, was that network privacy is not limited to a single layer. In fact, a single
layer can compromise others, creating a clear dependency between the different layers in the
network stack. As a direct consequence, this understanding led to a vertical notion of privacy
that resulted in a cross-layer conceptual approach defining virtual personae, modeling how
the user interacts with the world, covered mostly in Chap. 4. The Virtual Identity is a digital
construction of the user that has repercussions on how the user is perceived and handled in
a digital environment. This concept enables a vertical approach that resembles how users
interact with the different services, outlining the tools which enable the construction of a
privacy framework. The VID framework presents a new way of dealing with users in network-
intensive environments, using IdM concepts to address network privacy concerns.
The VID model, presented in Sec. 4.2, was designed to have an impact on all the net-
work layers that required user interactions, creating several requirements to support multiple
identities belonging to the same user on a single terminal. Given that privacy is a cross-layer
issue, as concluded by analyzing the different correlation threats, it must be provided across
the different network layers. We turned to the idea of pseudonymity to address cross-layer
threats and to enable the coexistence of several VIDs for a single user. We discussed the
notion of pseudonymity in the network, all of its benefits and drawbacks, and how well it
matched against the proposed privacy model in terms of information set. Studying network
pseudonymity, as discussed in Sec. 4.4, as well its relationship to VID and Information Set,
provided enough insight to define an instantiation of cross-layer pseudonyms as Virtual Net-
work Stacks (Sec. 4.5). VNS uses a per-identity virtual device metaphor to support different
information sets that encompass the network stack. A prototype implementation was inte-
grated into working test-beds and demonstrators, showing the feasibility of the approach in
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different contexts.
This proved that there is the space and the means to build a vertical layer that retains
control capabilities over the network and that, with the proper semantics, can support the
VID concept with multiple pseudonyms on the network. This contributes to an improved
privacy environment, and allows us to focus on specialized network privacy issues that exist
on the different layers.
7.1.3 Horizontal Dimension
Given that several privacy problems stem from the lower layers in the network, we tried to
provide a system that deals with identifier related information, outlined by the PRIVED
model, and used in the VID approach. These tools can handle different threats, such as
identifier correlation and identification problems, resulting in user tracking, recognition or
location pinpointing (among other threats), which can result from different aspects of the lower
layers. In Chap. 5, we attempted to identify these threats on each layer, resulting in a multi-
layer study that addressed mostly link and network layer issues, with some considerations of
privacy aspects on the transport and application layers.
At the link layer, we proposed a solution that uses a novel transport mechanism to support
several privacy features, presented in Sec. 5.2. The goal of the solution is to make every packet
visible on the network indistinguishable, especially regarding information that can jeopardize
privacy. Therefore, it should not contain any noticeable information bits, except for the
intended destination. This was achieved with the concept of identifying the communication
channel by its encryption key, and not by explicit identifiers like sender and receiver. To test
the different system properties of the system, we implemented a simulation scenario (using NS-
2) around the proposed solution, evaluating its feasibility and potential performance impacts.
The result was a comprehensive study, yielding several interesting observations of the link
layer behavior, which met the original requirements.
We also addressed the network layer, where the most important issues revolved around
user identification and location information contained in unique identifiers. After a study
of network layer functions, we proposed a solution to handle the issues at the routing level,
entitled Waypoint Routing, described in Sec. 5.3. By inserting Waypoint Routers in the
communication path, which are routers that mask the sender (following the tradition of
MixNets), which perform hop-by-hop (between WPR) routing to protect user privacy. Due
to the changing addresses on the packet, it is virtually impossible for any single node along
the path to determine the original packet source. The novelty of the solution resided in
the proposed lightweight mechanisms that allow core routers to efficiently perform privacy-
providing mechanisms. Consequently, privacy can be provided as a value added service by
the operator, rather than a peer-to-peer end-user system. We presented this novel solution
along with a study on how inefficient privacy techniques can impact routing, crippling its
performance.
Exploring the remaining layers led to the conclusion that transport and application layer
also require privacy considerations, outlined in Sec. 5.4, even though different from the two
previous analyzed cases.
Focusing on the transport layer, we identified that it suffers from mostly the same issues
as the network layer, given their tight identifier reutilization (IP addresses). The direct result
is that, a solution that addresses the network layer aspects can directly benefit the transport
layer, as they both share identifiers. The only exception to this scenario is when locator-
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identifier split solutions are employed, which we address further in Sec. 6.5 as a result from
architectural privacy design in mobility protocols, and also application ports that do not pose
severe privacy threats, but can still be addressed in the scope of pseudonymity,
The application layer provides a very different model than the other layers, as it deals with
user information and attributes. In this scenario, where many different protocols deal directly
with user information and identification, it is necessary to consider a different approach. While
addressing all of the application layer mechanisms is mostly out of scope of the addressed
network interactions in this Thesis, the application layer can provide mechanisms for privacy
that we already used in the vertical layer. IdM solutions provide privacy aware application
protocols that enable the definition of user-centric privacy technologies. While these solutions
focus mostly on service interactions, they can address most specific privacy issues on the
application. We extend this by identifying the important technologies that accomplish these
features, and by defining cross-layer considerations, which is then carried over to Chap. 6, as
we instantiate a specific application layer solution, SAML, in a cross-layer privacy environment
provided by Virtual Identities and Virtual Network Stacks.
7.1.4 Architectural Drivers
For the most part, the proposed solutions incorporate privacy as a core architectural compo-
nent, often resorting to user-centric mechanisms. Considering privacy as an integral part of
the network, led to several architectural features that can be used to define new privacy-aware
network solutions. As presented in Chap. 6, these privacy features stem mostly from the ver-
tical control layer, which can consolidate privacy aspects in network related technologies and
mechanisms, resorting to identity concepts as the main tool to promote privacy-aware network
solutions.
These architectural feature were used as means to instantiate several architectures, most
of which rely on identity centric mechanisms, embodied by IdM-based solutions. By linking
privacy with identity we are providing more than simply security enhancements. More impor-
tantly, we are linking privacy with the concept of identity. This is beneficial because it relates
to social concepts of privacy, that always deal with the concept of “self”. In return, using
identity concepts in the network leads to a user-centric environment with scalable control
for user (private) information. Through these assumptions, we defined several architectural
drivers, that enable privacy as a core feature of most network interactions.
A proposed method to integrate privacy in the network was defined by using a vertical
enabler that can instantiate the VID layer. This control layer, which we define by using a
SAML-based solution in Sec. 6.3, promoted privacy by using identity as the vertical privacy
enabler. The IdM solution provided a VID framework realization, that focused on SAML
as the main protocol used for the vertical information coordination, including the user’s
pseudonyms (as VNS).
While we presented some strategies that enable the mapping of SAML identities and
pseudonyms to the network, the control features that are privacy-aware by definition can fur-
ther serve to control information flow on the network. Therefore, we not only used identity as
a driving technology for the vertical layer, but we also encouraged using the vertical layer for
further network control. This was realized by providing a simple architecture that separated
control from execution, as instantiated in Sec. 6.4), using mobility as an example technology.
This approach focuses on three aspects: i) consolidating all user-centric information on the
IdM infrastructure, ii) decoupling that information from mobility processes, and iii) express-
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ing mobility through common semantics that are capable of turning mobility protocols into
action only mechanisms. The real benefit of this proposal is that once mechanisms are truly
decoupled, control can be made user-centric in a privacy-aware context, as proposed by a
vertical layer. In fact, this separation is not necessarily just from a control/execution per-
spective. We also explored such a separation between layers, in our case, between the network
and transport layer, showing how simple identity concepts and information decoupling can
provide privacy oriented operation drivers on the network.
Finally, as a result of the requirements for integrating identity as a tool for network pri-
vacy, we proposed a solution capable of instantiating identity centric operations in several
different aspects of typical network operation. In Sec. 6.6, we used an ID-Pointer that mimics
the definition of the VIDID from the VID model, to provide an identity focus for the differ-
ent network protocols. This promoted a simpler control mechanism for the different privacy
features in the network, as well as means of simplifying the utilization of user-related infor-
mation in low level network operations. Not only does this simplify network privacy, but it
also provides more adequate handles for integrating cross-layer pseudonymity in the network.
The main result of the architectural privacy drivers can be highlighted as the different
architectures that provide clear instantiations of the different proposed concepts. The nature
of these concepts proved very important towards enabling privacy as a core network feature to
the use of a support technology, such as identity, that adequately deals with user information.
In most network level protocols, this user bias is not something that can be easily achieved
without the support of adequate identifiers (VIDIDs), as well as technologies capable of
controlling the user’s information set using identity concepts (VID), well integrated with
NGN networks.
7.1.5 Reviewing the Hypothesis
We started with a question revolving around the privacy threats that originate from the
different identifiers present in heterogeneous mobile networks, and potential consequences
towards the user. More importantly, we set out to discover if, when found, these threats can
be properly mitigated. As the scientific method dictates, we postulated an hypothesis stating
that network level threats can be caused by the identifiers present on different protocols and
layers, which present a unique way to undermine privacy, resulting in reproducible breaches.
The conclusion, six chapters later, is that the hypothesis was validated in the light of
the results, but with complicated ramifications demanding more than a binary response. The
discovered vertical and horizontal dimensions of privacy showed that on the network, identifier
relationships are corrosive to privacy and can provide consistent means to undermine it. The
vertical aspects create constant privacy threats, reaching several layers and compromising
isolated privacy efforts. Similarly, the horizontal aspects show that each layer poses unique
threats yielding private information, covering different aspects of user privacy. The validity of
the hypothesis started to become evident with the PRIVED model, and was corroborated by
the following solutions, both vertical and horizontal, which showed how containment spaces,
either separating vertical interactions using personae, or horizontal separations constraining
identifiers, prove to enhance privacy. Each solution reinforces one of these two aspects, and
shows that there can be recurring approaches towards privacy, which can be implemented in
future network solutions.
Concerning the more abstract theme of network privacy, we observed that the network
is not necessarily a privacy jeopardizing environment. In fact, there are even some scenarios
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where network technologies improve on our privacy, allowing anonymous interactions, where
the user can be protected by pseudonyms and alias identifiers. Unfortunately, this is not
the case with most of the analyzed network protocols, to which we must be alert, that can
compromise all privacy efforts. Currently, the best place to start compromising privacy, is
indeed in the network, where protocols make consistent use of identification paradigms to
carry out their objectives. In this context, identifiers as the way we use them, proved to be
particularly vulnerable to correlation and linking threats, defining an environment where a
single flaw can contribute to undermining user privacy. This shows that we must always look
at the network as a whole, considering a vertical paradigm, but always mindful that specific
layer identifier threats exist.
To support this broader vision on privacy, we acted on the proposed privacy models and
concepts, leading to several novel solutions presented through the Thesis, which we believe
contributed positively to the privacy landscape. By focusing on network privacy, the identified
threats and proposed solutions bring us to a final conclusion regarding the hypothesis: the
different articulations of privacy solutions, along with the model that relies on two distinct
axes, revealed the validity of the hypothesis by defining identifiers as a major threat in the
network, concerning their internal properties as well as the correlation mechanisms they
provide. These findings corroborate the initial postulated hypothesis that identifiers are
in fact a major threat on the network.
7.2 Future Outlook on Privacy
Throughout the presented work there was an effort to provide tools that enable us to increase
our understanding of privacy in the network. As a result, we tried to elaborate on a core
model that focuses on the most pressing network threats, using identifiers and identification,
but that still has room for improvement. There are several ways in which we can conceive a
roadmap that enables us to further pursue some of the privacy topics studied here. The most
immediate subjects relate to constructions of the privacy model and also orthogonal privacy
issues, as discussed below.
7.2.1 Measuring Privacy
While there is always great debate about user privacy, there is always a gap, which we
struggled with many times, dealing with how privacy can be perceived by users and services,
and even to some extent, measured. Because providing privacy can not be directly comparable
across different situations, several discussions can become superficial. Consequently, one of
the primary ways to improve the work presented here, and to improve the privacy field
in general, is to provide mechanisms that enable any type of privacy measurement. This
quantification is important to enable the user and providers to perceive privacy, both in terms
of effective protection, and of network related measures. It is always complex to debate privacy
vs performance trade-offs and gains, without a clear evaluation of the privacy gains/losses,
because there is no direct metric or comparison means.
There are some proposals on how to address this particular issue, using the concept of
entropy [132] from Shannon’s Information Theory, which is mostly applicable in anonymity
schemes [36]. While anonymity is not privacy, it can still be the foundation for many types
of information centric measurement mechanisms, that deal with randomized information (as
argued within the PRIVED model, where the uniqueness or not of identifiers can be a cause for
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discussion). Accordingly, a direct evolution of the proposed model is to enable an arithmetic
proposition for the quantification of privacy, which can be done using entropy as a starting
point.
7.2.2 Building on the Privacy Model
Beyond the conceptual parametrization of the model, which directly implies a quantification
system that enables measuring privacy, there is a need for experimental validation of the
privacy model. While we have done several validations on the efficiency of privacy protecting
mechanisms, there is a need for an experimental tool that directly maps the PRIVED model
as an attack tool, thus demonstrating the flexibility of the proposed approach. In practice,
what we are suggesting is a privacy scanner that builds on network events and creates an
information set handler that consumes network information. While this has been done in
several distinct tools that can be used for specific threats or layers, there is no single tool
that follows the complete PRIVED approach. The efforts for building such a tool are already
planed as a continuation of the work shown in this Thesis.
The implementation of a network scanner using the PRIVED methodology should result
in the consolidation of the conceptual model. The tool could be used to explore complex
relationships, especially the evidence collecting model and the relationship factor. This could
be considered as another potential branch of the proposed work, which would provide a
pragmatic approach towards determining the effectiveness of the model.
While some of the work that deals with complex correlation mechanisms has been pro-
posed as future work, there is still a need to verify the model in such conditions. In Chap. 3
we introduced several possible techniques to deal with complex correlations mechanisms, such
as using Bayesian inference for relationship establishment, which are still not explored in the
scope of the PRIVED model. From these, an attractive research direction is to consider
probable relationships, resulting from evidences correlated against each other to determined
information leaks, outlining potential privacy threats. This can become an important ap-
proach to privacy, when properly validated through real test-cases, and supported by our
practical approach to privacy in the network using the PRIVED model.
7.2.3 Improving Orthogonal Conditions
Most of the discussed improvements so far relate to the privacy model. However, the en-
visioned network environment stemming from the different explained proposals shows that,
once there is a more meaningful layered separation supported by privacy aware identifiers,
there can be a more meaningful exploration of layered privacy, and resolution mechanisms.
In fact, identifier issues, multiple identifiers and resolution has been one of the implicit tech-
nologies, for which we introduced some considerations, but that requires a Thesis on its own.
This is precisely how it is being pursued, within the scope of another PhD Thesis, as means
of using identifiers and resolution to power several of the privacy and identification related
technologies and proposals, and has already been the object of a MsC Thesis.
As we proposed in Chap. 5, there is now space for layered improvements, in order to
complete and complement the privacy mechanisms of the vertical approach. Taking this into
account, there is already ongoing work to improve our proposed link layer solution. Because
of the unique mechanisms of that particular proposal, there are no distinguishable packets
on the link. This would cause an attacker to turn to traffic patterns. The natural evolution
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is to provide traffic pattern concealment, as part of the overall strategy of hiding link layer
information, thus providing privacy to the user.
On the network layer, and due to the framing of the discussion around lightweight privacy
mechanism, a bigger discussion considering routing mechanisms can arise: how to relate
Waypoint Routing relationships with TOR; and to provide a distributed discovery mechanism
for WP routers and Privacy Services. We believe that it is possible to design a system
that suits both Waypoint Routing and TOR, which implies privacy metrics and discovery
systems for privacy providers, provided either by the network operator or by end-user, with
the discussed benefits and drawbacks. Another idea that is yet to be explored, is to study
Waypoint Routing mechanisms as control schemes in the network, creating a better privacy
environment that relies on key properties derived from the Waypoint mechanisms. This can
be done to enhance the privacy control layer, while using unobtrusive routing mechanisms,
thus protecting user privacy and establishing a better trade-off for privacy.
There are also some aspects of the proposed solutions that would benefit from implemen-
tation and real wold deployment, but that could require the work of another thesis, relating
it to privacy metric systems as mentioned above. This also serves as a general conclusion, be-
cause several solutions presented here require implementation and deployment for validation.
As they mature, these ideas are becoming ready to be incorporated into more widespread
contexts, and yield tangible privacy benefits.
7.3 Evolving Paradigms
Working on privacy implies an in-depth inspection of network mechanisms, focusing on several
operations and content. At this point, it is safe to assume that privacy is not simply about
network operational aspects, but also about what information is conveyed and how. This
implies dealing with the relationships between layers, and performance or security trade-offs,
specially concerning the user. These different vectors play important roles regarding with
privacy in the network. Therefore, exploring complex privacy issues can provide insight not
only on the current state of user privacy in the network, but also on fundamental operational
aspects of the network. There are lessons that can be extracted and applied generically to any
networked environment or solution. The gained knowledge can assist ongoing efforts towards
future solutions that try to rethink current networking paradigms, such as clean slate designs
and Future Internet approaches.
Applying the knowledge gained throughout the Thesis on the different network mecha-
nisms, identifiers and user-centric design, makes it easier to step out of our zone of comfort,
and equate solutions that not only consider privacy aspects, but allow an evolution into new
paradigms. In this section we explore how using privacy as a core future technology, especially
focusing on aspects that stem from the generalization of the proposed privacy solution, can
provide a path towards evolving network paradigms.
7.3.1 A step into future architecture
What we have witnessed in the evolution of Internet-based network paradigms, is that the
layered model has self-imposed limitations. Even though the initial concepts are still valid
(independent layers that build upon each other to provide aggregated value), in some cases the
design has become diluted through several compromises. There are clear limitations to this
model due to the fact that layers became very dependent on each other, specially considering
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identification aspects. This is emphasized in privacy discussions because information specific
to a single layer, in most cases, cannot be replaced, as it would impact adjacent layers. This
shows that while the network stack is very sound in theory, identifier and layer functionality
re-usage has lead to several potential violations of the layered model approach.
Another recurring idea that appears throughout the Thesis is that we turn to identity for
control. If we take a step back, we can see that this happens due to the lack of any other
layer or tool that provides control primitives over network and user information, which creates
a more effective privacy environment. A potential cause for this phenomena is the lack of
reusable control semantics. Reusable semantics enable the network to benefit from a common
control structure. This is what we attempted to introduce as we explored derivative of first, a
VID solution that creates a controllable network structure, and later, an IdM approach which
provides the control infrastructure.
One of the subtle changes that is implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) mentioned relies
on the fact that we shift the communication paradigm towards a model where the user in-
creasingly becomes the endpoint of the communication, rather than the device. While the
user identity has been substantial clarified, on the network side, it can still be complicated
to grasp a proper management structure for the network aspects. While our first attempt to
embed identity information into network protocols (Sec. 6.6.1) proved interesting, it can be
seen as a first step towards a new model.
Based on the identifier concepts (that provide relationships towards a control layer, e.g.
identity) and explicit layer separation, we can define a session-based approach towards net-
working. This approach is supported by the fact that most protocols and digital systems
already provide the notion of a session (even though sometimes in different formats). This is
highlighted in Fig. 7.1, which defines the connection between two endpoints. Further consider-
ations reveal that a session based approach to networking can in fact be a powerful abstraction
to drive network innovation, because it can be used from a pure vertical perspective, as an
aggregation of session (a recursive definition), and a horizontal session, the basic unit that
drives protocols.
Figure 7.1: Different session and corresponding identifiers on the network.
Our first work in this direction was “Mobility Aware Paths: The identity connection” [94],
were we proposed the idea of building identity controlled structures, named paths, that en-
able the conversion of identification solutions through resolution mechanisms, on different
layers. This reinforces the user as the communication endpoint, leading to the idea that com-
munication can become user-centric, and provide control semantics for the network. When
the identity moves from just an aid in the network to the end-point of the communication
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protocols, we are faced with a new communication paradigm.
By acknowledging the transformation of endpoints, we continue to extract common aspects
of the network communication, starting from the idea that the network operates based on
session semantics. This enables flexible communication, either through a path or a session,
allowing bigger steps towards future architectures. Using sessions as a base concept, or
better yet, as an evolution of paths which only deal with network connectivity, we have a
driver for horizontal and vertical relationships in the network. Furthermore, sessions can be
related to the user and, at the same time, to the simpler abstraction mechanisms, such as
network packets. What is intended with sessions is a concept that promotes both a horizontal
approach, using targeted layer sessions, and a vertical glue that aggregates the layered sessions
- a meta-session. The layered approach can be traced back to the original plan for the OSI
or TCP/IP models. The session concept can be reused in a system wide view of isolated
layers, which present individual sessions that are related in the scope of a higher level session,
defining a consistent abstraction model.
The main advantage of the presented model is that it enables a clear separation between
layers and protocols, making it possible to introduce a concise control layer. Following the
proposed ideas in this Thesis, this layer can revolve around identity, providing the missing
user-centric components for Future Internet architectures. The Future Internet aspects are
introduced because achieving the layer separation requires re-engineering existing paradigms,
which would lead to a new Internet design. But, because this approach draws on well-known
concepts, such as layer separation and isolation (something which was originally intended in
Internet’s layered design approach), it can present a smoother evolution path than a clean
slate design. Also, the user-centric control layer (which can be IdM or any evolution of this
user-centric paradigm) enables us to outline integration mechanisms similar to the concepts
proposed by HIP (Sec. 6.5.2 and Sec. 6.5.4). The basic methodology would be to provide
separation layers, with independent identifiers that relate to IdM, which already proved in-
teresting in the solutions discussed earlier. The paradigm shift implies refocusing the roles
of each layer, cutting any superfluous or redundant functions. Once that is completed, it
is possible to design abstraction mechanisms, like those proposed by the Generic Mobility
architecture (Sec. 6.4): the mobility abstraction layer provided means for clear control and
execution, while still reusing existing protocols and enabling the integration of new solutions.
This concept can be extended to the different network layers.
We try to introduce these ideas by relying on vertical information sets that use identity
and session and the driving concepts. By separating the different layers, it is possible to
rediscover the nature of the layered network model, with meaningful implications on concepts
like privacy and mobility, which suffer from the close layer relationships and dependencies.
However, this approach has a requirement that can be seen as a key element in future designs:
it needs a complex naming and addressing system that is agile enough to support a networking
paradigm built upon user and session references.
The outlined approach represents a model that requires the use of several shim layers on
the network stack, as show in Fig. 7.2. This is an evolution of concepts like HIP [113] and
LNA [11], but where the introduced identifiers are handled by the naming and resolution
layers, which should be coordinated by IdM systems with strong privacy requirements.
This provides an evolution path towards future networks, that still takes advantage of
today’s protocols. The main issue that needs to be considered is the definition of a model to
aggregate the proposed concepts and establish the required layer separation. Nevertheless,
the implicit conclusion of this discussion, which is an indirect conclusion from studying how
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Figure 7.2: Wedge layer design.
privacy on one layer can affect others, is that a Future Internet architecture can be built using
vertical and horizontal separation. While this may appear to be a daunting task, it does not
need to be done in a single step. By using a modular approach, it can become an evolving
effort, similar to what happened with the current Internet design.
7.3.2 A step into the real world
After several iterations with IdM technology and user-centric paradigms, we realized that
this is a digital concept that brings both security (specially privacy) and personalization. In
fact, several different systems can benefit from the identity information relationship, since it
allows customizable environments. The companion concepts are secure authentication and
authorization mechanisms, introduced by IdM, which are enhancements that can be integrated
into current systems. This would allow the creation of a reusable component that is usually
a complicated piece of software and architecture. Therefore, we can look at the IdM system
as an architectural component that can serve as a privacy-aware AAA platform, especially in
mobile environments where users become very agile and require further security and privacy
features.
Using our devices in real world transactions, either for purchase, discounts, or social inter-
actions, is an already established trend. While we turn to our devices for these transactions,
we are not taking full advantage of their capabilities. We are mostly using them as transport
mechanisms for authentication mechanisms, that can sometimes be easily forged and have
limited security. This is incoherent with increasing security and privacy requirements. But, if
we introduce an authentication and authorization component that has a user representation,
we can provide a platform that can enhance real world interactions using electronic devices.
This approach enables exploring IdM as the driving technology for security and privacy in
real world interactions, where the most interesting applications reside in different scenarios
like e-ticketing, domotics, or any type of device interactions, promoted by the user.
Identity Management
System
OpenIDCardspace
SAML SWIFT
Shibboleth
Bluetooth
NFC
Wifi
Access Control
System
Multipass
Figure 7.3: High level Multipass architecture using IdM for M2M a U2M interactions.
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These concepts were applied in a spinoff effort derived from the presented Thesis, the
Multipass project, which fosters the use of the IdM backend for a symbiotic user/device
relationship. It enables a scenario where physical Machine-to-Machine (M2M) and User-to-
Machine (U2M) interactions are more secure and privacy aware. The overall approach is
shown in Fig. 7.3, where we can see the IdM backend directly interacting with “real-world”
access control mechanisms, that are engaged with the user over wireless technologies. To
support this ecosystem, the project built a transaction oriented architecture that turns to
IdM for identity oriented control and validation of all transactions that happen between a
user (which is translated in his device) and a provider. This enables stepping out of the
normal applications of digital systems, venturing into a space that is in demand for security
and privacy features, such as true user authentication (rather than device) and support for
mutual authentication mechanisms, outlining a new evolution of digital interactions.
7.3.3 A step into the cloud
A technology that is quickly shaping into one of the most prominent computing trends is
Cloud computing, or simply Clouds. The new paradigm is built around services provided
to the end user, where even the network can be regarded as a service. Users create their
environments on cloud services, where they store their files and most important backups,
run publishing services (e.g. blogs or websites), and basically run every desired service.
Currently, most aspects of domestic (the average user) computing have a Cloud counterpart,
many running on an affordable (often free) offering model. While it requires little technology
knowledge from users, these new cloud services introduce unprecedented service conditions in
availability, cost, and (mobile distributed) access.
However, because users have to surrender control over their data to services, privacy is
something that is severely lacking in cloud computing. It is almost impossible to determine
where the data is, who accesses it, how safe it is, and how can it be deleted (if it actually
can be deleted). These features, which were taken for granted in our ordinary use of personal
computers, now elude us because there is no physical access to the servers running the Cloud,
which might not even be all on the same geographical location or country. As such, in
distributed systems that can serve millions of users, a single security breach can jeopardize
many users, rather than just a few when the same breach occurs on a home computer.
Consequently, the same principles that make Clouds attractive (make a service available to all
devices, anywhere in the world, for a massive number of users) also raise several new problems.
In fact, the business model is the first to undermine privacy, because free applications and
services can generate profit by selling private user information, even if anonymized.
The above mentioned issues are not new in the scope of this Thesis. Privacy through-
out the other network layers suffers from similar privacy problems, where once information
reaches the wire, it leaves the user’s grasp. A potential solution can be including Cloud tech-
nology as one of the layers discussed throughout previous chapters. Because IdM is already
becoming an increasing trend in the Cloud, through lightweight services that provide SSO,
like OpenID [122] based services as provided by Google, and now Twitter and Facebook us-
ing OAuth [116], we can still shape identity to be one of the primary privacy drivers. This
is possible through a paradigm shift to user-centric clouds, making the cloud also about the
user, and not only about the infrastructure and services. By leveraging Identity Management,
there is a path where the user takes the cloud concepts and turns them to his advantage. The
traditional separations on cloud services as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-
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Service (PaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) then can be structured according to slightly
different lines, as shown in Fig. 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Identity as Core component of Cloud technology.
A cloud system that uses user-centric technology can put the user back in the driver seat
of his data, providing the required data control, information security and privacy that must
come with all modern systems. This can be achieved by designing a distributed system that
explores the heterogeneous user-owned infrastructure, while providing privacy, security and
authentication. Such a system could provide Operating System like semantics to access all
the existing services and API’s, harmonizing application access. However, the current cloud
model does not consistently provide such features, and while they could be implemented
separately - enhancing current cloud technologies - they would not benefit from user-centric
characteristics beyond the fragmented model that exists today.
This presents identity as a kernel cloud technology in a distributed environment, where
linking activities to specific users is essential. In this scenario, informations become dis-
tributed, using an infrastructure with multiple ownerships. The result is a user-centric service
layer built around user data and resources, that is capable of managing a pool of distributed
resources (the cloud). Every service running in the cloud will have the notion of user, which
is in fact the currency (user information) for service access, through user-dependent creden-
tials. By aggregating this information on the IdM system, it is possible to have a broad view
over the Cloud resources available to each user, and to provide this view to self-organizing
software. From this point on, the IdM layer becomes a mechanism capable of aggregating
user resources, scattered through the cloud, in a coherent architecture. The omni-presence of
identity and user information justifies that IdM should be a kernel component of the cloud
ecosystem: it is the entity capable of making cloud services available to end users, controlling
the available information and preserving privacy while still creating a better user experience.
The proposed concept can be summarized as wrapping traditional Cloud organization
(SaaS/PaaS/IaaS) in modified logical layers. These should be managed by a top level control
layer, built with IdM technologies, and by a lower layer consisting of standardized interfaces
(which can be either achieved through a well-defined middleware). Each one of the blocks
proposed in Fig. 7.4 can be considered as a separate sub-system, and its implementation may
lead to user-centric clouds with different characteristics. The intended outcome of using IdM
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as the driving technology is giving users the control over services and cloud information. By
providing IdM as the glue layer between services and their interaction, we enable intrinsic
user-centric mechanisms, especially concerning authentication and access management, along
with privacy control of sensitive user information. We proposed this concept in [16], where
the user-centric mechanisms are provided by IdM, and the lower layer semantics are provided
through a distributed Operating System approach.
In this context, IdM allows the creation of long-lived trust relations between digital en-
tities, and the creation of a reputation system allowing for distinct access control service
provision taking in consideration provided resources and past behavior. We can describe the
IdM subsystem as a set of services, which must have well known interfaces, in order to be
reused throughout the entire architecture.
The key feature of this future vision is that, even in futuristic scenarios that involve
current and upcoming technologies, it is possible to use the concepts presented in this Thesis
to leverage metaphors and systems that provide added privacy, and integrate the new key
aspects into user-centric operations that value the primary subject of privacy - the user.
7.4 Final Thoughts
We have looked at different aspects of privacy, and how they can work in a networked en-
vironment. We considered this specially important as we continue to move our interactions
into the digital plane. But, privacy is and will continue to be a hard topic to tackle, given
the surrounding confusion, and even antagonism, towards the concepts at stake.
When discussing privacy, there is always a balance to be struck: either between privacy
and performance, privacy and usability, and as the social trends are now showing, between
privacy and full disclosure. Unfortunately, in these discussions, there are still those who
do not care about privacy. This can be a consequence of privacy suffering from a delayed
cause-effect, but also of an ever growing desire for public interaction. This can lead to the
discussion of whether privacy is really needed, especially in computer networks, which usually
require a performance or usability compromise. However, we believe that this argument is
moot because it does not exist unless the underlying architecture, framework or environment
actually provides privacy. Privacy must come first, and by design. It is only when we have
privacy-aware systems that we can decide whether or not to forfeit privacy, as a compromise for
improved network conditions. Regardless of the incentives, if there is no privacy protection
there is no privacy leverage, and the information is already jeopardized. For any of these
discussions to be meaningful, the information balance must tip towards the user, which should
have control over his information, rather than network entities and services (thus supporting
the mentioned concepts of asymmetric knowledge).
The balance surrounding privacy is especially important in technical terms, because in
order to provide privacy, we need privacy-aware networks and computing systems. To achieve
this goal we need a model, architectural drivers and targeted solutions that relate the concepts
of user and network privacy, all of which are conclusions supported by the work presented
throughout the Thesis.
It is important to understand that we can only discuss whether or not privacy fits all
situations and conditions, or when do we want or need to revoke it, if the user already enjoys
the bias of privacy. If the user was not already protected, it is not necessary to decide to
retain or revoke the privacy of past actions, since this was already imposed by the system.
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From a technical perspective, to enable a choice between both conditions, either preserving
or revoking privacy, requires technologies that support the concept of privacy. The direct
conclusion is that privacy-aware (network) systems are a precondition towards allowing us
the choice of upholding our Human Right for Privacy.
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